Internal threats to economic security include. Abstract - external and internal threats to the economic security of the country. Internal threats to Russia's national security

Internal threats to economic security Russian Federation at the moment, have a strong impact on the state of the economic system of our state. If we talk about internal threats, as a concept, then we can define internal threats to the economic security of the Russian state as factors that damage the country's economy, with the source of their formation within the state.

The main internal threats to Russia's economic security include:

1) Property stratification of the population;

2) Monetary policy pursued by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the economic block of the Government of the Russian Federation;

3) Recession real sector economics;

4) Offshore nature modern business in Russia;

5) Raw materials bias of the domestic economy.

I would like to start considering internal threats to economic security with such a threat as property stratification of the population. This threat is characterized by a significant difference in the standard of living and income of different segments of the population. Property stratification contributes to the growth of crime, due to the fact that a significant number of citizens living in the Russian Federation are losing income necessary to maintain a satisfactory standard of living. In addition to the growth in crime, citizens' dissatisfaction with the high degree of manifestation of social injustice is growing, which is expressed in different opportunities for the wealthy and the poor, for example, the lack of equal access to quality food, social services, etc.

The Romir Research Center found out that the citizens of the Russian Federation are forced to save on food, due to the fall in the real level of income. Figure 2 shows the results of surveys of residents of the country, which reflect the share of Russians who save on certain goods and services in March 2016, as well as the share of Russians who were going to save on certain goods and services a year earlier.

Figure 2. Survey of the research center "Romir" in March 2016

It is worth noting that a significant proportion of Russians have increased, who have to save on very important goods, for example, food products, which are necessary to meet human natural needs. This phenomenon creates a threat of physical harm to the health of the population of the country.

At the same time, there is a social stratification between the richest and the poorest people in Russia. Ella Pamfilova talks about this in detail in her report, which was prepared in 2016. Until March 25, 2016, Ella Aleksandrovna held the post of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation, and since March 28, 2016 she was appointed Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. This report describes an increase in the difference in the indicator of the ratio of average income between the 10% of the richest strata of the population and 10% of the poorest strata in 2015 by about 15 times. If the current conditions persist, by 2017 the income inequality between the richest and the poorest could grow up to 20 times. According to Ella Pamfilova, the prohibitive gap in incomes between the richest and the poorest (poor), which is observed in Russia at the present stage, is one of the most significant internal threats to the state.

The next threat considered in our work, we consider the monetary policy pursued by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the economic bloc of the Government of the Russian Federation. Since the imposition of sanctions by the leadership of Western countries, our economy began to experience a deficit in credit resources. After all, the meaning of sanctions, if we mean exactly economic sanctions, was in limiting the access of businesses in Russia to cheap Western credit resources. And in modern economy an important role is played by credit resources used as an advance for the development of production.

Due to the loss of access to foreign loans, a large role in providing the economy with financial resources is assigned to the Central Bank of Russia. Since enterprises do not have the opportunity to develop their production through Western loans, they have a need to replace the source of obtaining credit money... In this situation, this role could be quite successfully taken by the Bank of Russia, as the only legal emission center in the Russian Federation, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

But the Central Bank of the Russian Federation decided to be guided by the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund, which were indicated in the final statement following the visit of the IMF staff in September 2014. This document states that it makes sense for the Central Bank of the Russian Federation to continue the course of tightening monetary policy and raise interest rates in order to reduce inflation. This decision raises questions, since, for example, for the United States and the EU countries it was recommended not to raise the interest rate, as this could cause tightening financial conditions or loosening financial stability that will hinder the growth of the economy.

It should be understood that by raising the interest rate, the Bank of Russia complicates the work of domestic entrepreneurs, since the lending rate, which is set, exceeds the profitability of most enterprises. In December 2014, the interest rate was raised to 17 percent and until March 2015 did not fall below 15 percent. In 2016, it decreased from 12% to 11%. As of 01.04.2017, the refinancing rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation is 9.75%. After raising interest rates on loans to a level exceeding the profitability of the production sector, many enterprises were deprived of the opportunity to use bank loans to develop their activities.

The contraction of credit led to a decrease in enterprise investment and consumer demand, which ultimately led to an even greater decline in production. Since production facilities cannot use credit resources, enterprises, instead of using the devaluation of the ruble as an opportunity for import-substituting expansion of production, are forced to raise prices for their products and services, due to the fact that European competitors were deprived of access to the Russian market. ... Thus, there is an increase in inflation, an increase in production costs, which entails an increase in the number of problem loans and bankruptcy of enterprises.

Table 2 shows the profitability of goods, products and services sold in 2015, according to data Federal Service state statistics and the Institute of Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Table 2. - Profitability of goods, products and services sold

in 2015, according to Rosstat data

We see that fewer industries in our economy have a return on sales that exceeds the current level of interest rates. Accordingly, most enterprises are unable to use the loan, both for financing investments and for financing working capital. Domestic enterprises, not being able to attract loans to expand production, decided to raise prices, as conditions became looser as a result of the counter-sanctions of the Russian Federation against the European Union. In addition to being forced to base the price of credit in the price of the product, they also had to reduce the volume of goods produced. Thus, there was an increase in inflation

This threat leads to the following: offshorization of the domestic economy. "Offshorization" of our economy undermines the economic security of the state. It is generally accepted that the offshorization of the economy today is considered a global problem... But it should be borne in mind that the offshorization of the Russian economy differs significantly from this phenomenon only in developed countries. In developed countries, offshore companies appear, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to create subsidiaries of parent companies registered in Western countries. Subsidiaries offshore structures are created to accumulate profits. Western schemes are used to minimize taxes that are paid by the parent company to the budget system of the country of registration.

Russian schemes differ from Western ones. We are building the following scheme: a chain of offshore companies is created, at the upper end of which is the parent company - the ultimate beneficiary. And in the domestic jurisdiction there are daughters, granddaughters, great-granddaughters, etc., in the capital of which the parent is involved offshore companies.

On December 21, 2011, at the congress of the all-Russian public organization Delovaya Rossiya, who was then prime minister, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin said that the offshoring of Russian business deprives the state of the ability to manage the economy. For the first time at such a high level, it was announced that offshorization is a serious threat Russian economy and national sovereignty.

Not only medium and large private businesses are offshorized in our country. Offshores are also actively used by companies with state status - state corporations, joint stock companies with a predominant share of the state. On 12.12.2012, President Putin announced to the Federal Assembly that 90% of state-owned companies make transactions in foreign jurisdictions. For example, PJSC Gazprom, the controlling stake of which is owned by the state, conducts a significant part of its activities within the jurisdiction, with more favorable taxation than in the Russian Federation. At the end of 2014, it became known that Gazprom was among the corporations using preferential tax schemes in Luxembourg. It is also worth noting that the number of these companies included the largest commercial Bank country "Sberbank", a controlling stake in which belongs to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

Going offshore, companies pursue economic goals... For example, the possibility of lending on acceptable terms, as well as the possibility of tax evasion. But this can lead to political consequences, since

Offshorization of the Russian economy undermines the security of our state, since a situation arises in which the assets of our enterprises are taken offshore, which entails the loss of sovereignty not only in the economy, but also in the management of the state.

The threat of a raw materials bias flows smoothly from the monetary policy of our country and offshorization Russian companies... Our scientists, who are engaged in scientific research and the creation of new technologies, having no opportunity to develop their activities by attracting domestic investments, are forced to look for them in other countries. This leads to a "brain drain". Brain drain is a process of mass immigration of people with higher education, as well as specialists with high intellectual abilities. On June 17, 2016, during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets stated that Russia is unable to stop the "brain drain" process. In his message to the Federal Assembly on December 1, 2016, Vladimir Putin raised this problem and proposed measures to resolve this issue.

On the other hand, since our companies register their business in foreign countries in order to gain access to acceptable credit resources and avoid tax payments, they have to fulfill the conditions set by Western creditors. It is becoming clear that Western lenders will provide loans at acceptable rates only on those terms that will be beneficial to the Western side. Accordingly, the main field of activity for which the money was provided was the raw materials industry. The logic of the actions of foreign creditors, who do not need competitors in scientific and technological spheres of activity, is quite understandable.

It is worth mentioning separately such a threat to our economic security as corruption. For our country, this issue is painful, since the amount of bribes is too significant. The head of the department for interaction with the media of the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation A. Kurennoy, said that the damage from corruption crimes committed in 2015 amounted to more than 43 billion rubles. This amount accounts for 0.053% of Russia's total GDP in 2015. The most dangerous thing in this situation is that most of the stolen funds settle abroad, together with the criminals who stole them.

Thus, based on the above, we can understand that the main internal threats to the economic security of the Russian Federation are the property stratification of the population; money-credit policy held by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the economic block of the Government of the Russian Federation; recession in the real sector of the economy; the offshore nature of modern business in Russia; raw materials bias of the domestic economy and corruption.

Security is the state of protection of the vital interests of the individual, society and the state from internal and external threats. Vital interests are a set of needs, the satisfaction of which reliably ensures the existence and opportunities for the progressive development of the individual, society and the state. The main objects of security include: a person - his rights and freedoms; society - its material and spiritual values; the state - its constitutional order, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The economic security of a country is characterized by its ability to prevent threats (or counteract them) aimed at various sectors of the economy, while unwanted changes in the objects of threats act as possible or actual damage.

The main subject of security provision is the state, which carries out functions in this area through the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. The state, in accordance with the current legislation, ensures the safety of every citizen on the territory of the Russian Federation. Citizens of the Russian Federation outside its borders are guaranteed protection and patronage by the state.

Citizens, public and other organizations and associations are subjects of security, have the rights and obligations to participate in ensuring security in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, the legislation of the republics within the Russian Federation, regulations of state authorities and administrations of territories, regions, autonomous regions and autonomous districts adopted within their competence in this area. The state provides legal and social protection to citizens, public and other organizations and associations that provide assistance in ensuring security in accordance with the law.

Security threat- a set of conditions and factors that pose a threat to the vital interests of the individual, society and the state. The real and potential threat to security objects, emanating from internal and external sources of danger, determines the content of activities to ensure internal and external security.

Under threats it is customary to understand the potential or real-life impacts that lead to one or another moral or material damage

Threats of negative changes in the external political, economic or natural environment or negative changes in vital spheres within the country can be classified according to:

objects - a person, society, state;

directions - economic, social, political, informational, etc .;

the amount of damage - marginal, significant, insignificant;

probabilities of occurrence - highly probable, probable, unlikely;

reasons for the appearance - spontaneous, deliberate;

the hierarchical principle - interplanetary, global, regional, interstate, national, regional, intrastate, local, personal.

From the point of view of the most general classification of security threats, they can be divided into internal and external (Table 1).

General classification of threats to economic security

Safety is achieved by conducting a single public policy in the field of security, a system of measures of an economic, political, organizational and other nature, adequate to threats to the vital interests of the individual, society and the state. To create and maintain the required level of security of security facilities in the Russian Federation, a system of legal norms governing relations in the field of security is being developed, the main directions of activities of state authorities and administration in this area are determined, security bodies and a mechanism for monitoring and overseeing their activities are being formed or transformed. ...

For the direct fulfillment of functions to ensure the security of the individual, society and the state in the system of executive power, in accordance with the law, state security agencies are formed.

Safety principles

The main principles of security are:

legality;

maintaining a balance of vital interests of the individual, society and the state;

mutual responsibility of the individual, society and the state to ensure security;

integration with international security systems.

Legal framework for security

The legal framework for security is:

The Constitution of the RSFSR, this Law, laws and others regulations The Russian Federation, regulating relations in the field of security;

constitutions, laws, other normative acts of the republics within the Russian Federation and normative acts of state authorities and administrations of territories, regions, autonomous regions and autonomous districts adopted within their competence in this area;

international treaties and agreements concluded or recognized by the Russian Federation.

Comparison of internal and external threats shows that the number of internal threats prevails. Among internal threats, the most dangerous are trends in the social, scientific and technical spheres. The resource potential is in a better position: Russia inherited from the former USSR a powerful resource potential, which makes up 21% of the world's resource reserves. Its maintenance ensures the development of a whole complex of branches of material production, which are sufficiently stable and allow Russia to be considered a great power. At the same time, the collapse of the single economic space of the USSR, mistakes in economic policy have significantly reduced the resource potential of Russia. Production volumes decreased, geological exploration work fell sharply, which affected the decrease in the growth of resources.

The social sphere plays a key role in ensuring not only economic, but also national security. It is the real embodiment of the interests of the individual, society, family, as well as classes, social groups, and the state. The greatest threat to the country's existence and its security is posed by:

sharp differentiation of income and consumption of the population;

deterioration in the structure of nutrition due to a decrease in the average consumption of the most valuable types of food;

increasing poverty.

The property stratification of the population is typical for all countries. However, the degree of this stratification, the amplitude of fluctuations in the incomes of various groups of the population should not be excessive. In this respect, an abnormal situation has developed in Russia, when, in the presence of 3-5% of very rich people, a significant part of the population has incomes below the subsistence level. World experience has proven that if the income ratio of the 10% richest and 10% of the poorest groups is more than 1:10, then society enters a zone of social instability. In Russia, according to official statistics, this ratio is 1: 12-14, in some cities and regions it is even higher.

The main threats to economic security are such phenomena and processes that negatively affect the economic state of the country, limit the economic interests of the individual, society, state, and pose a threat to national values ​​and lifestyle.

In the most general form, economic threats are divided into external and internal.

Internal threats to economic security include the following:

the growing structural deformation of the country's economy;

decrease in investment and innovation activity;

destruction of the scientific and technical potential of the country;

the effect of a steady trend towards the transformation of the country into a fuel and raw material periphery of developed countries;

strengthening of the property stratification of society;

criminalization of the economy and society.

External threats to economic security include the following:

"Brain drain" abroad;

Capital flight abroad;

growth of public debt;

growing import dependence on food and consumer goods;

excessive openness of the economy;

loss of sales markets for military products;

buying up foreign capital enterprises in order to oust national products from both external and internal markets;

low level of development of transport infrastructure for export-import operations.

External threats affect the threat strength of some internal threats. External threats to economic security include:

economic;

social;

ecological;

information and other spheres of public life.

Of the above-mentioned internal threats to economic security, it is especially necessary to highlight the growth of structural deformation of the economy, because in order to ensure economic growth in the country, it is first of all necessary to carry out structural modifications in the economy, the essence of which is in accordance with the structure of production and the structure of demand. The main directions of economic restructuring are as follows:

recognition of the feasibility of maintaining functioning enterprises in the economy;

determination of enterprises working on a military order and not subject to conversion;

the use of foreign capital in those spheres and sectors of the economy that significantly affect structural changes;

determination by legislation of those spheres and sectors of the economy that contribute to the creation of an optimal structure of the national economy.

A serious threat to economic security is the decline in investment and innovation activity. It is known that economic growth cannot be ensured without significant investment in strategic spheres and sectors of the economy. Meanwhile, the economic policy of the last decade in our country not only did not create conditions for the investment process, but, on the contrary, did not contribute to the restoration of economic potential.

The destruction of scientific and technical potential is a serious threat to economic security. Ensuring economic security presupposes the accelerated development of science-intensive industries and industries (instrument making, electronic engineering, electrical industry), contributing to the strengthening of the material and technical base of scientific organizations, thereby creating the prerequisites for the development of natural science and technical knowledge.

One of the significant threats to economic security is the effect of a steady trend towards the transformation of the country into a fuel and raw material periphery. This threat can be removed through an economic restructuring strategy. Of course, we are not talking about a sharp reduction in the export of fuel and raw materials at the present time, because this will also sharply reduce the revenues to the state budget.

The most dangerous threat to economic and social security is the increasing property stratification of society, deep polarization of welfare and disintegration of society. In our country, annually, according to the tax department of Russia, the number of millionaires was estimated at hundreds of thousands. Along with this, about a third of the population has incomes below the subsistence level. The basis for the reproduction of the poor population is the low level of economic development. Therefore, in order to reduce the level of poverty, it is necessary to increase the rate of economic growth.

As evidenced by the data, the vast majority of the population of Russia is poor. A significant multimillion part of the population of Russia is, by world standards, beggars, and they are not only homeless people and beggars. Beggars can be called those families whose income does not reach 5500 rubles per person per month (theoretically, it is possible for a person to survive in the conditions of the Russian Federation for this amount). Accordingly, many pensioners, rural residents, provincial people, citizens working in low-paid jobs and having children or disabled family members, as well as students, can be classified as poor.

At present, the criminalization of the economy poses a major threat to economic security. Criminalization of the economy is a process of economic formation, in which criminal elements and forms of business play a significant role, mafia structures involved, for example, in drug trafficking, human trafficking, export of illegal substances abroad, underground mining and trade in precious metals and stones, carrying out fraud and speculation on stock exchanges, in banks, etc. Senchagov V.K., Economic security of Russia, Moscow, 2005, p. 243

The danger of the expansion of the criminal economy for society is that it significantly reduces the taxable base and the amount of taxes collected. An effective legislative framework is needed to combat the criminalization of the economy.

Let us single out some of the external threats to economic security.

Let's start with one of the important dangers - "brain drain" or "brain drain", the emigration of the population, as a rule, its intellectual potential, and, consequently, to curb economic growth. The main reasons for intellectual emigration are:

extremely low pay for scientific work in the country of origin;

very low level of scientific research equipment;

political instability in countries from which qualified personnel drop out.

In the process of the “brain drain”, damage is done to the Russian economy, which, having spent large sums of money on the training of its scientists and specialists, loses a significant number of them, thereby reducing the level of its economic and technological security. According to recent calculations by American sociologists, the cost of training one highly qualified specialist in scientific and technical profile costs about 800 thousand dollars. Taking into account the fact that the average annual rate of emigration of scientists from Russia to last years were estimated at 5-5.5 thousand people, it suffers damage annually at 4-4.5 billion dollars. If we add highly qualified engineering and technical specialists, representatives of medical professions, teachers and cultural figures to the category of scientists, then, according to some sources, the total annual damage to Russia from the "brain drain" reaches 50-60 billion dollars. http://www.eprussia.ru/epr/69/4675.htm - article from the newspaper "Energy and Industry of Russia",

An important factor negatively affecting economic security is the so-called “capital flight” abroad. This is one of the key threats to economic security. Which is understandable, because investments in the national economy contribute to the development of the national economy of a given country, its economic growth, and an increase in the level and quality of life of its population. That is, the exported capital "works" for the country to which it was imported.

The specificity of capital flight from Russia is as follows:

the radical nature of the accelerated transformation of the economic and political system;

low level of investor confidence in the national currency, which led to the "flight" from the ruble to the dollar;

high inflation in the country.

Table 1. Net capital flight from Russia in 2011 (billions of dollars)

According to the table, we can conclude that in 2011, the import of capital into Russia amounted to $ 86.5 billion, and the export amounted to -183.8 billion dollars. Subtracting the import of capital from the export of capital, we get a net capital flight of 97, $ 3 billion. Almost $ 100 billion. This is the result of Russia's participation in international investment cooperation last year.

External public debt is an important threat to economic security.

Public debt is the amount of accumulated debt of the state, formed as a result of credit financing of its budgetary expenditures. Economic security: Vechkanov G.S. Textbook for universities. - SPb .: Peter, 2007, p. 164 The public debt imposes an additional burden on the economy and increases as the economic situation deteriorates. However, its stabilizing role in stimulating economic growth is also singled out. At the same time, excessive external debt, which does not take into account the real possibility of servicing it, threatens the state with bankruptcy and the loss of state sovereignty. Table 2 shows the structure and size of the state external debt of the Russian Federation.

Table 2. The structure of the state external debt of the Russian Federation * as of November 1, 2012

In accordance with the structure of threat formation, all internal threats to the economic security of Russia and its regions are divided into four large blocks:

• 1) industrial and technological threats;
• 2) financial threats;
• 3) organizational and legal threats;
• 4) social and demographic threats.
• 1. Industrial and technological threats. The composition of the main threats of an industrial and technological nature and their qualitative characteristic in relation to modern Russian conditions are given in table. 2.1.

Table 2.1. The main threats to the economic security of Russia of an industrial and technological nature

Production decline- this threat was one of the most urgent in the 1990s, when the decline in production was widespread.

Thus, the drop in the volume of GDP production in 1998 (the year of the greatest recession in the Russian economy) in comparison with 1990 was slightly less than 50% (in other words, the Russian GDP for the period 1990-1998 decreased by almost 2 times).

The decline in industrial production, which is the basis of the real sector of the economy, proceeded at an even higher rate. For example, in a number of regions of Russia, the decline in industrial production in the period 1998-2000. in comparison with 1990 was more than 70%. In general, in Russia for the period 1990-1998. the decline in industrial production reached 55%.

After 1998-1999 in Russia as a whole and in most of its regions, economic growth began, which continued until mid-2008. However, in the second half of 2008, the threats associated with a decline in production in the Russian economy intensified again. The decline in industrial production in Russia in 2009 amounted to 10.8% (Table 2.2), and in some regions of Russia this figure exceeded 15-20%. As for the production of GDP, in 2009 there was a decline of 7.9%.

Table 2.2. Index of the physical volume of industrial production by federal districts in 2000-2009,% to the previous year

Sources ". Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators. 2009: Stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Socio-economic situation in Russia. January - December 2009 M .: Federal State Statistics Service, 2010.

First of all, this situation is due to the orientation of the Russian economy towards the production of a limited set of products (mainly mineral resources and products of metallurgical production) and the strong dependence of the economy on the world conjuncture of prices for these products. As a result, any crisis phenomena associated with a decrease in demand and prices for these products in the world cause extremely negative consequences for Russian manufacturers.

Despite the growth of industrial production in the period 1999-2008, in many territories, as well as in Russia as a whole, the volume of industrial production at the end of 2008 has not yet reached the level of 1990 (in Russia as a whole, this indicator at the end of 2008 . was about 80%, Table 2.3). Let us add that by the end of the first half of 2008, Russia had practically reached the growth limit within the framework of the raw material model of economic development, since by this period the production capacities in these sectors were fully loaded. Further growth prospects of the Russian economy can be realized mainly through the introduction of innovations and the development of innovative industries and industries.

Table 2.3. Calculated value index of the physical volume of industrial production in relation to 1990 (base period),%

Deformation of the structure of the Russian economy. The problems associated with the structural deformation of the Russian economy can be considered from several positions.

First, in the last decade, the Russian economy has been acquiring a pronounced focus on raw materials. In 2008, the share of industries related to the extraction and production of fuel and energy resources and metallurgical production, in the total volume of industrial production in Russia as a whole reached 57.1%, while the most high-tech industries aimed at the production of machine-building products accounted for only 13.9%. For comparison: in 1990, the share of “raw material” industries was 21.2%, and the share of mechanical engineering and metalworking was 28.8%.

Secondly, a significant skew in the structure of the Russian economy is its rather strong orientation towards commodity production to the detriment of the production of services, including those based on modern information technologies. In 2008, the share of industrial production, agriculture and construction, which form the basis of material production, in the structure of production of Russia's GDP slightly exceeded 40%. A similar indicator for developed countries (at the end of 2006) was: in Germany - 30.2%, Great Britain - 25.6, France - 23.1, Sweden - 28.8, USA - 24, Canada - 33, 1, Japan - 30.6%, i.e. in most cases, the value of the indicator fluctuated around 30%.

In part, this situation in Russia is a consequence of the economy of the USSR, focused on the hypertrophied development of the branches of the military-industrial and fuel and energy complex and heavy industry with a predominance of large enterprises. At the same time, industries and spheres of production that work directly for a person and satisfy his needs and requirements have practically not developed.

During the period of economic reform in Russia, the share of services production in the structure of GDP has been gradually increasing. In 1990, this figure was 32.6%, and by 2008 it had increased to 57.8%.

Third, there is a high level of concentration of production in key sectors of the economy, primarily in industry. This situation is largely a consequence of the economy of the USSR, which was dominated by the desire to save unit costs for output while enlarging production and capacity of individual units. Indeed, this effect is one of the main advantages of large enterprises ( organizational structures) compared to medium and small. However, such an organization of production is good for a stable economy with stable internal and external conditions, which was typical for the Soviet economy. In market conditions, as the world and domestic experience has shown, too high concentration of production has more disadvantages than advantages. This is mainly due to the following reasons:

• low adaptive ability of large enterprises to a dynamically changing external and internal environment, which is typical for market system management;
• the complexity of enterprise management, a high level of bureaucracy in the management system;
• the need for high capital investments in solving the problems of development and modernization of production, which, due to the rapid change in market conditions, cannot always pay off, and a number of other, less significant reasons.

Fourth, the deformation of the structure of the Russian economy is manifested in the high level of unevenness of social economic development certain regions of the Russian Federation, especially acute after the beginning of the reforms of the 1990s. In the process of reforming the economy and the system government controlled there was a problem of depressed regions, which included a significant part of the territories, the economy of which, before the start of the reforms, was normally developed and self-sufficient and which consistently transferred considerable income to the country's budget. The regions of Russia were divided into two unequal groups: 15-20 regions (constituent entities of the Federation) are donor regions, for the most part providing the socio-economic indicators of the country as a whole, and the overwhelming majority are subsidized and depressed regions.

A depressed region is, in the past, a relatively prosperous territory, as a rule, with a high industrial and production potential and a sufficiently developed infrastructure, including social. Such regions must be distinguished from other problem areas (new development, underdeveloped, border regions, zones of ecological disaster, etc.). In general, the crisis state of these regions is a manifestation of the structural crisis of the Russian economy, which caused an uneven decline in production by industry. Depressed regions are characterized not only by lagging behind in socio-economic development, but by the formation of a situation in them, which carries a danger for social and market relations of the state.

There are other factors and signs that indicate the imperfection of the structure and structural relationships in the Russian economy (price imbalances, imbalances in social indicators, irrational structure of employment, etc.). Many of them will be considered below when analyzing other threats to Russia's economic security.

Destruction of scientific and technical potential. Scientific and technical potential, as defined by V.I. Gromeko is a set of labor, technical, material, information resources and resources of organization and management that meet the requirements of each given stage of scientific and technological development and are intended to create new and improve the output, intensive development of production and ensure, on this basis, changes in the conditions and nature of labor, and an increase in the efficiency of social production. The main component of scientific and technical potential and scientific and technical development is the system of research and educational organizations, the introduction of innovations in production and the economy. Therefore, when analyzing the threat under consideration, we will focus on this component of the scientific and technical potential.

At the time of its collapse, the USSR was a technological leader in many areas of scientific and technological progress. First of all, these were technologies related to military production (Russia, along with the United States, dominated the world arms sales markets), aerospace technologies, certain technological areas and technologies. civil engineering, implemented, as a rule, at the enterprises of the military-industrial complex or related industries (these technologies included, among other things, microelectronics, which at that time was an advanced direction of scientific and technological progress). The structure of research and educational activities included three main links:

• 1) research organizations concentrated in the system of the Academy of Sciences. The main direction of their activity was fundamental research in promising areas of scientific and technological development, as well as applied research on the most pressing problems that do not have standard solutions. In addition, research organizations formulated proposals for the implementation of the conducted developments in production. At the beginning of economic reform (in 1992), there were 2,077 such organizations in Russia;
• 2) organizations engaged in the implementation and practical implementation of scientific and technological developments in production: design bureaus, design and design and survey organizations, sectoral research institutes (SRI), pilot plants and industrial enterprises engaged in scientific research activities... This is the most important link in scientific and technological development: it is through them that the connection between science and practice is carried out. In 1992 there were 1,729 of them;
• 3) higher educational institutions that train qualified specialists capable of solving the problems of scientific, technical and innovative development in accordance with modern world trends and research developments by analogy with research organizations, and in some cases, the introduction of innovative developments in production. In 1992, there were 446 universities in Russia.

Over the years of reforming the Russian economy, the positions of the 1st and 3rd links have been more or less preserved, and in some cases strengthened, at least quantitatively. By the beginning of 2008, there were 1926 scientific organizations and 1134 universities in the country. The number of university students for the period 1990-2008 increased almost 3 times (from 2824.5 to 7513.1 thousand people). At the same time, as shown by statistical reporting data, as well as numerous studies in this area, the qualifications of the human resources of scientific organizations and universities have significantly decreased, since in the course of reforming the country's economy, a significant part of qualified specialists moved from them to other, economically more profitable areas of activity. ... In most cases, these were young people and middle-aged people, which dealt a strong blow to the generational change process in such organizations.

As for the number of growth in university students, there are few reasons for optimism. First, many students began to enroll in educational institutions on a paid basis, practically bypassing competitive selection, which, in turn, led to a significant decrease in the quality of higher education: over the past 20 years, from the standpoint of one of the leading and progressive educational systems in the world, it moved to an average level that does not exceed the world average in any way.

Secondly, there was a change in the priorities in the choice of specialties among applicants. The most prestigious sciences, which the majority rushed to study, were the humanities and social sciences (economics, jurisprudence, psychology, etc.), in contrast to technical ones, although for scientific and technological development priority should be given to technical sciences with a reasonable combination with others.

Note that of all the considered links of research and educational activities, the most powerful negative impact in the course of reforming the Russian economy, the second link has undergone. Only in quantitative terms, the number of organizations involved in the implementation and practical implementation of scientific and technological developments in production, during this period decreased by more than 3 times (from 1729 to 518). As a result, the connection between science and production began to be lost, and the research link in the production cycle was gradually washed out. This, in turn, dealt a strong blow to the technical progress and innovative development of Russian enterprises.

To a large extent, this situation was due to the gradual orientation of the Russian economy towards a resource-based development path that does not require a large number of innovations; the actual refusal (for various reasons) from many areas of scientific and technological development; the low competitiveness of many domestic high-tech enterprises, still in most cases solving the problem of survival, not development; reorientation of many enterprises to imported equipment and technological cycles, which puts the country in direct dependence on external suppliers; weak government support research organizations throughout the entire period of reforming the Russian economy and a number of other reasons.

The main results of the reform of the Russian economy in the scientific and technical sphere are characterized by the following indicators:

• the number of research personnel decreased from 804 thousand. in 1992 to 375.8 thousand in 2008;
• spending on science and scientific services in relation to GDP in 1992-1999 were less than 1%, and after 2000 did not exceed 1.3% (2008 - 1.03%), although according to the experience of developed countries, for the normal development of the scientific and technical sphere and ensuring scientific and technological progress, the value of this indicator should be not less than 2%;
• the number of advanced manufacturing technologies created is staggering. For example, in 1997 996 such technologies were created, and in 2007 - 780; in 2008 - 854;
• the volume of innovative products in the total volume of industrial production in recent years does not exceed 5-5.5% (2008 - 5.1%).

Depreciation of fixed assets and high emergency hazard. For the period 1990-2008. due to underinvestment, the degree of depreciation of fixed assets in the Russian economy increased from 35.1% to 45.3%. At the same time, the rate of renewal of fixed assets (commissioning of fixed assets as a percentage of their availability at the end of the year) fell from 6.3% in 1990 to 4 in 2007 and 4.4% in 2007, and in 1990 -ies, its value was below 2%. For most types of economic activities related to the production of industrial products, the degree of depreciation of fixed assets exceeds 50% (at the beginning of 2009, it was in the extraction of minerals - 50.9%; processing industries - 45.6; production and distribution of electricity, gas and water - 51.2%). The situation with the wear and tear of machinery and equipment is even more acute; active part of fixed assets. In the country as a whole, the degree of depreciation of machinery and equipment at the beginning of 2009 was 50.6%, and for a number of types of economic activities and industries this indicator reached 60-70%.

As a consequence of this situation, industrial accidents are increasingly occurring at the country's industrial facilities, the largest not only nationally, but also globally. The biggest accident in recent years was the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, the consequences of which the country's economy will feel for many years to come.

In addition, there is a strong obsolescence of fixed assets. Many machines and equipment used today, technological cycles, etc. developed back in the days of the Soviet economy (1960-1980s), are hopelessly outdated and do not meet modern requirements for a number of parameters.

Low competitiveness of domestic products, especially in the manufacturing sector. The competitiveness of the country's economy is a complex parameter, its assessment should be complex, since it depends on many indicators and factors. At the same time, in a simplified form, the competitiveness of the economy can be defined as the position of products produced in the country, in the domestic and foreign markets, as well as the country's ability to produce one or another type of product. The higher the technological level of production and the more diverse (diversified) the range of types of products produced, the higher the competitiveness of the country's economy.

As the analysis of the Russian economy shows, today Russia has a strong position in the world commodity markets (mineral resources, rolled metal products, pipes, etc.) and in the markets of some types of other products. At the same time, the positions of high-tech products, which primarily include machinery, equipment and vehicles, are rather weak. High-tech products during their production go through the greatest number of redistributions (in comparison with other types of products) and, therefore, have the greatest added value.

As you can see from the table. 2.4, the share of high-tech products in Russian exports is low and at the end of 2008 amounted to only

4.9% (while in monetary terms, exports of machinery, equipment and vehicles amounted to 23,003 million dollars), and the share of exports of manufactured products (which includes metallurgical production) as a whole amounted to 27.4% (about 128,300 million dollars, in 2008). In terms of exports of manufacturing products, even in absolute terms, Russia is several times inferior to most developed countries (Table 2.5).

On the other hand, Russian imports of machinery, equipment and vehicles in 2008 reached 140,772 million dollars, and more than 6 times higher than exports. There is a tendency for the rapid growth of imports of this type of product. In the leading world countries, the situation is the opposite: the export of high-tech products there is several times higher than the import. Moreover, at present, Russia has a deficit in its trade balance not only in terms of the position of "machinery, equipment and vehicles", but also in the entire manufacturing industry as a whole (see Table 2.4).

Table 2.4. Commodity structure of exports and imports of the Russian Federation, USD billion

Sources of: Russian Statistical Yearbook. 2008. M .: Rosstat, 2008; Russia in numbers. 2009: Krat. stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Socio-economic situation in Russia. January - March 2009 M .: Federal State Statistics Service, 2009.

Table 2.5. The main indicators of the export structure of the leading countries of the world in 2007

A source

Raw material orientation of the economy. Despite all the efforts of the Russian government to develop high-tech sectors of the economy and innovative industries, every year the country's economy becomes increasingly dependent on raw materials, primarily the oil and gas sector. This situation, in turn, makes the entire economy of the country highly dependent on the world conjuncture of prices in the commodity markets, making it high-risk. This was confirmed by the global economic crisis in 2008, when a significant decline in prices in these markets for almost the entire range of resources led to the emergence and rapid growth of crisis phenomena in the Russian economy.

Among the reasons for the failures in the development of high-tech industries in Russia should be highlighted:

• a strong lag of most industries in most technological and technical and economic characteristics from foreign counterparts already at the beginning of the period of radical reform of the Russian economy, which did not allow modernization of production with minimal capital costs;
• the collapse of production ties of the Soviet economy, in which the production cycle for the production of many types of high-tech products united enterprises located in several republics of the Soviet Union;
• weak government support for manufacturing enterprises in the early years of the reform of the Russian economy;
• the practical absence or high cost of long-term investments in the economy, making it impossible for most enterprises to implement large long-term investment projects;
• acquisition of many enterprises by criminal structures as a result of privatization;
• the lack of experience of most enterprises in the conditions of high competition, which was practically absent in the Soviet economy.

Indicators characterizing the consequences of the threat under consideration were given earlier in the analysis of previous threats.

The lag in the growth of explored mineral reserves from the scale of their production. In the context of the predominance of the production of raw materials industries in the Russian economy, the task of renewing and developing the raw materials base becomes urgent. However, today the situation is such that most of the large oil and gas fields were explored and put into operation in the 1960s-1980s, and at present their reserves have already been largely depleted. Thus, the gas reserves of the basic developed fields in Western Siberia - the main gas producing region of the country (Medvezhye, Urengoisky, Yamburgskoye) - have been exhausted by 55-75% and have passed or will pass into the stage of declining production in the coming years. The structure of proven oil reserves also continues to deteriorate. At the same time, in the last 10-15 years, the development of new large production areas mineral resources was not, and the volume of increase in the explored reserves of oil and gas in these years was lower than the level of their annual production. Newly developed reserves, concentrated mainly in medium and small deposits, are largely hard-to-recover. In general, the volume of hard-to-recover reserves is more than half of the country's explored reserves. At the same time, the newly discovered reserves and deposits in terms of the cost of resource extraction, as a rule, exceed the existing ones by an order of magnitude.

Among other problems associated with the exploitation and renewal of the country's mineral resource base, the following should be highlighted:

• lack of a geological reserve in the development of new territories (Eastern Siberia and the Far East, Yamal, the continental shelf);
• low efficiency of exploitation of existing fields (the problem of the most complete and complex extraction of fuel and energy resources);
• insufficient introduction of new technologies for subsoil use;
• absence effective mechanism regulation of subsoil use from the exploration stage to full repayment deposit reserves;
• about 80% of oil reserves are located in remote and northern regions of the country, which greatly complicates production and increases the cost of transportation;
• more than a third of the proven oil reserves are located in difficult geological conditions or fall on high-sulfur, high-viscosity and heavy oil, which lowers the price of Russian oil on the world market.

The threat of an impending energy shortage. Over the past 15 years, there have been practically no commissioning of large power plants and generating capacities in the country. For the period 2001-2006. Russia increased generating capacity by only 7 million kW, while the Soviet Union introduced 9 million kW per year.

This situation was partly due to a significant decline in production in the Russian economy during the 1990s, with a corresponding drop in electricity demand. In addition, there were practically no investment funds for the construction of new and modernization of existing power plants (for example, in the second half of the 1990s, the investment component was removed from the tariffs for the products of electric power industry enterprises as one of the measures to curb prices for their products). At the same time, the electric power industry is an industry with rather long periods of construction cycles (8-10 years or more) and should be developed in advance. Therefore, for example, in order to ensure the commissioning of new generating capacities by 2010, their construction had to start in 2000. The current situation with an impending shortage of electric power in the country is clearly shown in Fig. 2.1.

Rice. 2.1.

• 1 - required power; 2 - operating power;
• 3 - power with expired service

In the coming years, an increase in the number of energy-deficient regions is expected. In the united energy systems (UES) of the Urals, Center, North-West and North Caucasus already in 2008-2010. a serious deficit may arise (Fig. 2.2), which will be difficult to cope with even by increasing supplies from other power systems, since the possibilities for flows between the UPS are very limited.

Rice. 2.2.

As a result, this threat may become one of the main obstacles to continued economic growth in Russia, especially in energy-intensive industries.

Threats of a production and technological nature, determining the state of the production sector in the economy, today in most cases have a high level of manifestation. This situation casts doubt on the prospects for further economic growth and the exit of the country's economy to the leading economies of the world. Many reasons for this will be discussed below, however, first of all, the problems in the development of the manufacturing sector are associated with the financial sector.

2. Financial threats. Financial threats characterize the state of the monetary system, which, in turn, is decisive for the successful functioning and development of other spheres of the state's life. The composition of the main financial threats to the economy of modern Russia is presented in table. 2.6.

Table 2.6. The main financial threats to Russia's economic security

Low level of investment in the Russian economy. In order to carry out the normal development of the state economy, it is necessary to maintain a certain level of investment and strengthen it, ensuring the renewal production assets and commissioning of new facilities and production. At the same time, investment processes (especially at large enterprises and industries) are long-term in nature and should be carried out in advance, 5-10 years before the commissioning of the facility and earlier. Any interruptions in investment in the economy at the present stage may have adverse consequences not only at the present time, but also in the near future.

In Russia, during the 1990s, most enterprises were solving the problem of survival, not development, as a result of which their investments were minimal. Moreover, one of the government measures to regulate prices for the products of natural monopolies in the mid-1990s was the exclusion of the investment component from tariffs for their products, which also did not contribute to the development of investment processes.

One of the main indicators characterizing the level of investment in the economy is the ratio of investment in fixed assets to GDP. As the experience of the USSR economy, as well as foreign experience, shows, the value of such an indicator should be at least 30-35%, and often (in the implementation of large projects for the development of new territories) and 40-50%. For example, in 1990 the level of investment in the economy of Russia (at that time the RSFSR) was 38.7%.

In Russia for the entire period 1992-2006. the value of the indicator under consideration was at the level of 15-17%, and only in 2007 it exceeded 20% for the first time (according to the results of 2008, the value of the indicator was estimated at 21%). Unfortunately, in recent years, there has not been a radical change in the trend of insufficient investment in the economy in Russia. In a number of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the value of this indicator fell below 10%. Let us add that the financial crisis observed today has once again disrupted the normal course of investment processes, and already now we can state that the level of investment in the Russian economy has begun to decline rapidly since the second half of 2008. At the end of 2009, the value of the indicator, according to preliminary estimates of Rosstat, amounted to 19.3%.

It should also be noted that the most significant part of investments is pegged to raw materials, i.e. mainly goes to the development and maintenance of production capacities associated with the extraction of minerals or their primary processing (Table 2.7). From the presented data it can be seen that the largest part investments go to the development of raw materials and low-tech sectors of the industrial complex (mining, metallurgical production and production of finished metal products, production and distribution of electricity, gas and water) - about 25% in 2008; into infrastructure facilities, primarily transport and communications (also about 25%), the non-production sector of the economy associated with operations with real estate, rent and provision of services - 17%.

Table 2.7. The structure of investments in fixed assets by type of economic activity,%

A source

On the other hand, the share of investments directed to the development of the high-tech sector is very low. For example, in 2008, investments in production related to the production of machine-building products amounted to less than 3% of the total volume of investments in fixed assets; investments in research and development - only 0.4%. This situation casts doubt on the success of the strategy for implementing an innovative model for the development of the Russian economy, rather, signaling the opposite. To reverse such a negative trend requires not only attracting investment in this sector from the state and from own funds enterprises, which, as a rule, is not enough, but also significant funds of private investors (first of all, long-term bank loans on favorable terms). At the same time, today the situation is such that credit conditions are clearly unacceptable for most enterprises: in many cases, effective interest rates on bank loans reach 25%, and in some cases exceed 30%. As a result, bank loans in the structure of investments in fixed assets occupy a little more than 10% (11.1% in 2008), almost 2 times less than budget funds.

In addition, the investment rate is low social sphere, which includes primarily education, as well as health care and the provision of social services. As shown in the table. 2.7, the share of investments in fixed assets spent on these areas of the country's life did not exceed 5% throughout the entire period of economic reform.

One of the main threats to the development of investment processes in Russia (and a decrease in its rating in terms of investment attractiveness) is a large-scale spread of the shadow economy with weak opposition to it from the state. In such conditions, on the one hand, the profit of enterprises and organizations, which serves as the main source of enterprises' own investment funds, is artificially underestimated. On the other hand, the spread of various shadow schemes almost painlessly allows you to transfer funds already invested in specific projects. investment funds into shadow circulation with their subsequent cashing out and turning them into personal income individuals involved in this process. A more detailed description of the threat associated with the spread of shadow economic activity will be discussed below.

The crisis of the monetary and financial-credit system. This threat was typical for the Russian economy of the 1990s - early 2000s, and also acquired particular relevance in connection with the global financial crisis of 2008 and was expressed in the following:

• 1) the crisis of non-payments; shortage of cash; huge mutual debts accumulated between enterprises; widespread delays in wages; the acquisition of certain features by the Russian economy subsistence farming... Overdue accounts payable of enterprises and organizations in many territories at the end of the 1990s - beginning of the 2000s often exceeded the volume of GRP by 2-3 times. At the same time, today the negative manifestation of the threat in question has faded into the background and is irrelevant;
• 2) the almost complete absence of long-term lending in the economy. In conditions of high inflation, issuing long-term loans is associated with a huge risk for banks, therefore, almost all Russian banks prefer short-term investments. Long-term loans are issued on extremely unfavorable terms for creditors. The characteristics of this manifestation of the threat were considered in sufficient detail in the analysis of the previous threat;
• 3) a high level of inflation, in the first years of the reform, turning into hyperinflation and making it impossible for medium and long-term planning of socio-economic development and ensuring such development. The problem associated with high inflation is also relevant in today's Russia;
• 4) a fall in the liquidity of the banking system, the crisis of the mortgage system and the consumer lending system, the insolvency of many domestic enterprises before creditors, etc., which has confirmed its development during the global economic crisis since the second half of 2008.

Today, the problem of the growth of overdue debts on the part of both legal entities and individuals is very urgent. According to many experts, this state of affairs may become one of the main reasons for the second wave of the economic crisis in Russia. Thus, the Ministry of Finance estimated the volume of non-repayment of loans to the banking system of Russia in mid-2009 at 10% of the total loan portfolio, which is significant.

Continuing high inflation rate. Inflation is the rise in prices for a product or service (group of goods and services) over a certain period of time. For development and economic growth in the economy, there must always be some kind of low level of inflation, since the rise in prices indicates the presence of demand for this type of product and stimulates producers to increase the volume of its production. However, starting from certain levels, inflation becomes an undesirable phenomenon that threatens the sustainability of the country's economic development. At the same time, the main indicator by which inflation in the country's economy is judged is the index consumer prices, representing the ratio of the price level in the consumer market for a fixed set of goods and services in the period under review to a similar indicator previous period(usually take the ratio of prices in December of the current year to December of the previous year).

In conditions high inflation the manufacturer always finds himself in unfavorable conditions (the funds received from the sale of his products will lag behind the rate of price growth, especially for industries with a long sales cycle); money loses its function, giving way to commodity exchange; programs for the long-term development of enterprises and the economy of the state and territories are being phased out; there is a decline in the standard of living of the population, since the growth of income never keeps pace with the rise in prices, etc.

As shown by the dynamics of the consumer price index (Table 2.8), at present in Russia there is an increased level of inflation. However, if we compare the data of recent years with the first half of the 1990s (especially 1992-1993, when there was hyperinflation), then we can talk about relatively low levels of inflation. At the same time, according to the majority of economists, the marginal normal inflation rate should not exceed 5-6% per year, therefore inflation of 11.7% (based on the results of 2008) requires a special policy to reduce it.

For comparison, consider the value of the consumer price index in the developed countries of the world community (Table 2.9). For 7 years (2000-2007), the consumer price index was: in Germany - 113% (i.e., during this period, the consumer price index averaged 101.9% per year, or an average annual inflation rate of 1.9%), Great Britain - 121 (103, or inflation 3); in France - FROM (101.9, or inflation 1.9); in Italy - 117 (102.4, or inflation 2.4); in the USA - 120 (102.9, or inflation 2.9); in Canada - 117 (102.4, or inflation 2.4); in Japan - 98% (that is, prices practically did not change, which can be considered as not the most favorable phenomenon). The data presented clearly demonstrate the gap between Russia and developed countries in the possibilities of regulating inflation.

Sources of: Russian Statistical Yearbook: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Goskomstat of Russia, 2000; Russian statistical yearbook. 2004: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2004; Russian statistical yearbook. 2008: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2008; Russia in numbers. 2009: Krat. stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Social

economic situation in Russia. January - December 2009: Stat. report Moscow: FSGS, 2010.

Table 2.9. Consumer price index in Russia and leading foreign countries in 2001-2007,% to 2000

A source: The G8 in numbers. 2009. Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2009.

From table. 2.8 also shows that the global economic crisis has exacerbated the problem, leading to an increase in inflation in Russia. At the end of 2007, inflation in the country was 11.9%, in 2008 - 13.3%, in 2009 - 11.7%, i.e. no significant decline in inflation has been observed. On the other hand, in many countries of the world, on the contrary, deflation (price decline) is currently observed, which is an indicator that the crisis phenomena in Russia have slightly different patterns of occurrence and consequences for the economy compared to most other developed countries.

High prevalence of the shadow economy. First of all, the shadow economy is associated with the deliberate activity of economic entities aimed at hiding funds from taxation with their subsequent cashing out and using them for personal purposes. In addition, the main shadow operations include conducting unregistered activities, not receiving cash, etc. The shadow economy inflicts a tangible blow on the budgets of all levels, which are missing a significant part of their income.

As a result, education, health care, social services, federal and regional programs are underfunded in the territories; in many respects, the necessary programs and activities are not being implemented due to the lack of budgetary funds. The concealment of profits by enterprises leads to a significant decrease in their investment resources.

In addition to the above, other negative consequences of the shadow economy should also be noted:

• the competitiveness of the legal economy decreases;
• the resource provision of corruption is increasing, which leads to an increase in its scale;
• large uncontrolled financial resources serve as a means of influencing government policy, the media and election campaigns at various levels;
• redistribution occurs national income in favor of the elite group, due to corruption and the control of criminal groups over the shadow economy. This leads to strong property stratification and increased confrontation in society;
• capital flight continues abroad;
• uncontrolled trade in low-quality, dangerous goods for the consumer is expanding;
• the difficulty of assessing the scale of the shadow economy leads to large errors in determining the most important economic and social indicators of the development of society. This makes it difficult to develop correct management decisions at various levels, etc.

Today, according to many experts, almost all Russian enterprises one way or another, they use shadow schemes with weak opposition from the state. According to some estimates, the volume of resources transferred to the shadow turnover is comparable to and even exceeds the volume of produced GDP. According to the same estimates, the volume of funds lost to the budgets of all levels due to shadow economic activity is comparable to their revenue parts.

We add that the large-scale spread of the shadow economy along with the flourishing of corruption (this threat will be discussed below) are the main internal threats to the economic development and economic security of Russia, building up the entire spectrum of other threats.

Low efficiency of enterprises and organizations. The key indicator of the efficiency of enterprises and organizations is the profitability of production (sale) of products, which characterizes the level of profitability of production. Moreover, the profitability of products is the main indicator of the investment attractiveness of an enterprise for potential investors, as well as the quotes of its shares on commodity exchanges. As the analysis of statistical reporting data shows, during the period of reforming the Russian economy, the indicator in question has fallen sharply. If in 1992 it was 29.3%, then by 2007-2008. its value dropped to 13-14%.

One of the main reasons for this state of affairs is the already mentioned large-scale spread of the shadow economy, artificial understatement of profits, concealment of its true size. In addition, the low profitability of Russian enterprises is explained by the following reasons:

• a high level of material and energy consumption of the products of most enterprises due to the use of outdated production cycles. At present, the energy intensity of the products of the Russian economy is 2-3 times higher than that of developed countries;
• overestimated number of personnel of large Russian enterprises, several times higher than the number of personnel of foreign enterprises of a similar profile and capacity. At the same time, often many large Russian enterprises and integrated structures deliberately go to the preservation of surplus personnel to the detriment of the interests of production. This is done primarily to preserve social stability in the territories, especially in those where the enterprise is a city-forming one;
• in many cases, the lack of incentives among middle and lower managers to reduce costs in the production cycle;
• low level of labor productivity, etc.
• 3. Organizational and legal threats. Such threats primarily characterize the situation associated with the organization of economic activity in the state, as well as the legal framework that creates the rules of the game for conducting this activity. The composition of the most significant organizational and legal threats to the economic security of Russia is presented in table. 2.10.

Table 2.10. Organizational and legal threats to Russia's economic security

High level of monopolization of the economy. The fact that the Russian economy is the heir to the USSR economy largely predetermined the starting conditions for the reform of the Russian economy, which began in the 1990s.

In the early years of the reform, due to disintegration effects - the collapse of many industrial complexes the Soviet economy - their control over the markets has noticeably decreased. This was accompanied by a decline in production and bankruptcy of many enterprises. In addition, the opening of the borders brought foreign manufacturers to the country, who quickly began to gain positions on the Russian market. At the same time, the country continued to persist natural monopolies(for example, RAO UES of Russia, OAO Gazprom, RAO Russian railways», Etc.), completely controlling the markets for the production and sale of key products.

The economic growth of the 2000s led to the formation of the largest integrated structures in the economy, which again began to seize markets, crowd out small and medium-sized producers, and hinder the development of small and medium-sized businesses. In addition, during this period, production in such a key production for Russia as oil production and refining is gradually being consolidated and monopolized. As a result, in the second half of the 2000s, the following situation developed in the main industries and in the main markets:

• natural monopolies in the electricity industry continued to persist (electricity transmission is a complete monopoly, low competition between individual electricity producers, especially in the context of an impending energy shortage), railway transport, which is the main type of freight transportation. Since the products of these industries are used in almost all spheres of life and production, the entire economy of the country falls under the dictates of these manufacturers;
• in the extraction of mineral resources (oil and gas), the level of monopolization is also high. Almost all production and distribution of gas (over 90%) is concentrated in the hands of OAO Gazprom, which, in fact, is the only producer in Russia. With regard to oil production and refining, several large companies are engaged in this - LUKoil, TNK, Gazpromneft, Rosneft, Surgutneftegaz, and their actions on the market are more reminiscent of a division of spheres of influence than a competition;
• in metallurgical production, which is also one of the economy-forming ones, the output of certain types of products, as a rule, is concentrated in two or three large integrated structures that control more than 90% of their production volumes. At the same time, independent producers are either gradually absorbed by these structures, or go bankrupt, unable to withstand competition;
• in other spheres of life and production, including the consumer market, the situation is approximately the same; two or three large structures are being created, which squeeze out from the market independent producers who cannot withstand price competition. After the seizure of the market, the diktat of large companies comes, which more often than usual significantly increase prices to the detriment of the interests of the economy and the population.

The non-market nature of the Russian economy is indirectly indicated by the fact that in the context of the economic crisis and the worldwide fall in prices for many types of products in Russia, "for unknown reasons" these prices are growing.

In conditions of high monopolization of the economy, large structures stifle small and medium-sized businesses, which are the main center of innovation activity in the economies of developed countries. In addition, large structures, due to their inertia, are not able to go at the forefront of scientific and technological progress. On the contrary, the high level of bureaucracy inherent in large companies is more likely to hinder the introduction of pioneering projects than to facilitate their implementation. It is not for nothing that most innovations at large enterprises are associated with proven and proven technologies, and not with pilot projects characterized by a high level of investment risks. This situation casts doubt on the innovative way of developing the Russian economy.

Widespread corruption. The negative consequences that the spread of corruption entails are in many ways similar to the consequences of the spread of the shadow economy.

The social essence of corruption (from the Latin corruptio - damage, depravity) is expressed in the degradation of the apparatus of public power. A corrupt apparatus is not suitable for performing the functions of the state and is useless for society.

The forms of corruption are infinitely varied: from primitive, in the form of receiving bribes for the commission of legal and illegal actions, including as a result of the intervention of corrupt officials in the competition in favor of bribe-givers, up to complex and veiled ones - the participation of officials, their relatives and friends, personally or through proxies in various fields of business, sale of positions and titles. Corruption of top-level officials involved in lawmaking is manifested in lobbying laws for remuneration, etc.

Today, the organization of the Russian state is such that officials and government officials of different levels can actively interfere in the activities of economic entities or business structures. Despite all the attempts of the President, the Government and the State Duma to limit such influence by adopting laws, regulations, orders, orders, etc., the level of such interference is growing.

Numerous sociological studies conducted in Russia and its regions indicate a high level of corruption prevalence. For example, one of the latest studies conducted by VTsIOM (All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion), the results of which were published in September 2008 (1600 people were interviewed in 140 settlements in 42 regions, territories and republics of Russia), shows the following:

• three quarters of the respondents (74%) note a high or very high degree of corruption in society (30% - very high, 44% - high). Only 19% of respondents considered it average, only 1% - low, and no one said that there is no corruption at all;
• The most corrupt spheres and institutions of society, according to the respondents, are the traffic police (33%), local authorities (28%) and the police (26%). The second "three" includes: the whole society as a whole (23%), the sphere of medicine (16%) and education (15%). The federal government and the judiciary also received 15% in the corruption rating, with big business slightly lagging behind - 13%. Then there are military registration and enlistment offices, show business, the army and the sphere of trade (8, 6, 5 and 4, respectively). In last place are the media, political parties and the Parliament of the Russian Federation (3% each);
• 43% of the respondents do not see any result in the fight against corruption over the past year. Every third respondent notes that there are results, but they are not too significant (32%), and in 10% of cases they tend to see more of a worsening of the situation and an increase in corruption. Only 7% of respondents see progress in combating this phenomenon;
• More than half of the respondents believe that material reward (including gifts) for the work that people of various professions (doctors, teachers, etc.) must do for free is just as dangerous a phenomenon as corruption in government bodies (53% ).

International studies of the prevalence of corruption in various states are also of interest. Such research is regularly conducted by the international organization Transparency International. According to the results of a study carried out in 2008 (in the course of the study, 180 countries of the world were compared), Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden are characterized by the highest estimates (the lowest level of corruption); the lowest score (most corrupt) is in Somalia. According to the results of this study, Russia took 147th place, sharing it with Syria, Bangladesh and Kenya. The extremely low rating of Russia is evidenced, for example, by the fact that it lost to such states as Honduras, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Uganda and many others, which are significantly inferior to Russia in terms of economic development.

It should also be noted that most of the former Soviet republics were ranked higher than Russia. Thus, Armenia and Moldova shared 109th place, Ukraine took 134th, Kazakhstan - 145th, and Estonia (27th) and Latvia (52nd) became the best.

Imperfection of mechanisms for the formation of economic policy. First of all, this threat is associated with the fact that many key decisions on managing the country's economy, due to the long preparation and involvement of many ministries and departments lobbying their interests, are made with a delay, which significantly reduces their relevance. In addition, the final edition of many regulatory documents after passing through various instances differs in many respects from the original, taking the text of the documents away from the most pressing and problematic issues.

Let us add that in the activities of the authorities, the adoption of "populist" decisions is often practiced to the detriment of the interests of the economy and the activities of economic entities.

Imperfection of the legal framework. Many laws and by-laws in force in today's Russia allow for ambiguous interpretation, which makes it possible to evade their full or partial implementation. In addition, many laws are clearly outdated, outdated and an obstacle to economic development. Finally, laws are changing rapidly and dynamically, which creates significant difficulties for economic entities that do not have time to track these changes.

On the other hand, in general legislative framework acting in the Russian Federation cannot be called bad or imperfect. Rather, it is about non-observance of laws by subjects of economic activity, which often violate the current legislation, without incurring fair punishment. The reasons for this state of affairs were analyzed in sufficient detail when considering the previous threats of this group.

Insufficient development of infrastructure facilities and services. Infrastructure primarily includes transport (communication routes and vehicles), utilities, communication facilities, organizations serving the corresponding facilities, etc. Today, the level of development of individual infrastructure facilities has clearly lagged behind the needs of business, in many respects holding back its development. Some segments of the service sector are underdeveloped, which is also a constraining factor for economic development.

As an example, we can consider the development of the transport network and modern communications in Russia and the developed countries of the world. Table 2.11 shows the main indicators for such a comparison, from which it can be seen that in most positions Russia is several times inferior to almost all developed countries.

Table 2.11. The main indicators of the development of the transport network and modern communications in Russia and the advanced countries of the world (2006)

A source: "Group of Eight" in numbers. 2009. Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2009.

Lack of incentive mechanisms for efficient production. In part, the characteristics of this threat were given above when analyzing the situation associated with the low efficiency of enterprises and organizations. This threat is expressed primarily in the weak interest of middle and lower managers, as well as individual performers in the growth of production efficiency indicators. The practice is often adopted when the main results of increasing production efficiency are distributed between top managers and owners (shareholders) of the enterprise, while managers and performers of lower levels are not even morally encouraged.

Moreover, in many organizations there is a situation of curbing the incomes of workers in the lower and middle ranks in order to reduce the cost of production. In companies operating in rapidly developing markets, this sometimes leads to the following effect: the company can only support developed markets, practically without increasing sales, although the conditions for this are favorable. In companies operating in stable markets that do not have a tendency to significant growth, such a policy very often leads to the loss of the gained positions, and in some cases - to bankruptcy.

4 . Social and demographic threats. The threats considered above mainly characterize the state of the industrial and financial sector of the Russian economy and the conditions for its functioning and development. Social and demographic threats, on the contrary, primarily characterize the conditions, quality of life of the population and the possibilities of its development and reproduction, which is one of the main conditions for sustainable socio-economic development both in the short term and in the long term. The most significant threats to the social and demographic spheres in relation to Russia are presented in Table. 2.12.

Table 2.12. Social and demographic threats to Russia's economic security

Low standard of living of the population. The reform of the Russian economy, in addition to the crisis in the production and financial spheres, led to a catastrophic collapse of the standard of living of the population, which in the first half of the 1990s occurred at a very high rate (practically over the first 2-3 years of reforms, the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the population of the state fell several times ).

When characterizing the threat, one can consider the situation in terms of two main indicators characterizing the standard of living of the population:

• the share of the population with incomes below the subsistence level in the total population;
• the ratio of the average per capita monetary income of the population to the subsistence level.

It should be noted that most of the indicators (including those listed) characterizing the standard of living of the population, the Federal State Statistics Service began to support only since 1992.Therefore, it is rather difficult to compare the current situation with the pre-reform period due to the lack of data prior to 1992.

The share of the population with incomes below the subsistence level in the total population in 2008 as a whole in Russia was 13.1%, which is a fairly high figure. At the same time, in a number of regions this figure exceeded 25%. At the end of 2008, they included the Republic of Ingushetia (27.8%), the Republic of Kalmykia (38.4), the Republic of Mari El (25.2), the Republic of Tyva (32.9), Kamchatka Territory (25.0%) ). Note that in the context of the economic downturn that has been observed in Russia since the second half of 2008, the value of the indicator under consideration began to grow again.

On the other hand, in 2000, the share of the population with incomes below the subsistence level on average in Russia was 29% of the living population; for the period 2000-2008 the value of the indicator has decreased by more than 2 times. Moreover, in 2000 in many regions the value of the indicator exceeded 40-50%. Consequently, there are significant positive changes in the situation over the past 7-8 years. At the same time, the value of this indicator is still characterized by a high level of manifestation of threats.

Let us add that the subsistence minimum, the size of which is set by the executive authorities, is greatly underestimated. For example, for the IV quarter of 2008, the average subsistence minimum in Russia as a whole was estimated at only 4693 rubles: food - 1943 rubles, non-food products - 756 rubles, services - 1675 rubles, expenses on mandatory payments and fees - 319 rub. The severity of the situation is confirmed by the fact that one of the priority directions of the development of Russia in the near and medium term has been declared to increase the living standards of the population and the fight against poverty.

The situation with the ratio of the average per capita monetary income of the population to the subsistence level developed approximately according to a similar scenario. At the end of 2008, it was on average in Russia estimated at 3.3, while in order to ensure high-quality living conditions and normal material security of the population, in our opinion, it should be 7-8. However, it should not be forgotten that in 2000 the value of the indicator was 2.09.

Strengthening property differentiation of the population. High property differentiation of the population (the gap in incomes and material wealth) can lead to social conflicts between the poor and the rich, which is often accompanied by open clashes. On the other hand, low differentiation of the population contributes to a decrease in motivation to work among the most progressive and active part of the population, which ultimately may become one of the main reasons for the cessation of economic development and the formation of stagnation. Therefore, in a state with a developed and normally operating economy, there is always a certain level of differentiation of the population's income. During the Soviet era, a low level of income differentiation of the population was one of the main threats to the normal development of the economy. On the contrary, with the beginning of the reform of the Russian economy, the differentiation of incomes of the population became high.

The differentiation of incomes of the population is primarily judged by the ratio of the incomes of 10% of the highest-income strata of the population to the income of 10% of the lowest-income strata (otherwise this indicator is called the coefficient of funds). As shows statistical reporting, in 2008 the considered indicator for Russia as a whole was 16.9, while the trend of its further growth is obvious (for example, in 2000 the indicator was 13.9). According to experts from countries with developed economies, the recommended maximum value of the fund ratio should be no more than 12-14 (depending on the specifics of different countries).

Another equally important aspect of the differentiation of incomes of the population is the gap in the level of wages between entire individual industries and industries, which does not stimulate the achievement of an optimal distribution structure. labor resources in economics. Table data. 2.13 (wages by main types of economic activity) indicate that the highest average monthly wage in 2008 was characteristic of financial activities (41,489 rubles), which is more than 2 times higher than the average for the economy. On the other hand, in the sphere of real production, the level of wages was much lower. For example, in agriculture it was 5 times lower (8,201 rubles), manufacturing - 2.5 times (15,879 rubles), construction - 2.3 times (18,314 rubles), transport and communications ( 20 669 rubles) - almost 2 times. This situation contributes to the flow of the most qualified and active personnel from the real sector of the economy to the sector that does not produce a real product, which undoubtedly should include financial activities.

The situation with wages in the social sphere is even more acute. For example, according to the results of 2008, the average monthly salary in education was only 11,303 rubles, in health care and the provision of social services - 12,982 rubles. In other words, in these types of economic activities, the level of wages was one of the lowest. At the same time, the level of responsibility that lies with these areas, from the standpoint of preserving the nation and ensuring sustainable development countries in the long term, requires highly qualified personnel with decent wages to work in these areas. Note that as long as the indicated imbalances exist, there can be no talk of any strategies for the country's long-term development with the preservation and strengthening of its positions in the world.

Table 2.13. Average monthly nominal accrued wages of employees of organizations in Russia by type of economic activity, rubles (1995 - thousand rubles)

A source: Russia in numbers. 2009: Krat. stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2009.

Growth in unemployment and decrease in labor motivation. Economic growth and the associated increase in production volumes at Russian enterprises have led to an increase in the demand for labor and largely had a beneficial effect on the situation on the labor market. In 2007, the level of general unemployment (defined as the ratio of the number of unemployed to the number of economically active population) was 6.1%, which can be considered a quite acceptable indicator. For comparison, in the most intense years from the point of view of employment, in the second half of the 1990s, the level of general unemployment exceeded 10%. For example, in 1998 it was 13.2%, and in 1999 - 13%. In addition, in the 1990s, there was “hidden unemployment”, when a significant part of workers (up to 20-30% of the employed in the economy) worked part-time or were on unpaid leave at the initiative of the administration.

At present, the economic crisis in Russia has again exacerbated the problem of unemployment. For example, according to the results of 2009, the level of general unemployment in the country is estimated at 8.2%, i.e. it grew by 2.1% compared to 2007. At the same time, further growth in unemployment is expected (10% or more by mid-2010).

The tension on the labor market is also evidenced by the growth in the number of registered unemployed (in state employment services). At the end of 2009, this indicator for Russia as a whole amounted to 2147.4 thousand people, while at the end of 2008 it was equal to 1521.8 thousand people, i.e. during 2009, the number of registered unemployed increased in Russia as a whole by more than 500 thousand people, which indicates economic instability.

It should also be noted that despite the low level of unemployment in Russia as a whole, in a number of regions the situation on the labor market continues to remain tense (the unemployment rate exceeds 15-20%). First of all, these regions include the republics of the Southern Federal District (the highest unemployment rate among all constituent entities of the Russian Federation was in the Republic of Ingushetia - 56.1% and the Chechen Republic - 32.6% according to preliminary results of 2009), as well as in some economically depressed subjects (for example, in the Republic of Tuva - 25.8%).

In addition to the growth of unemployment, one of the main problems of the last 15 years is low labor motivation, especially at the lowest levels of the production process (workers, lower-level managers, i.e. the most significant part of the production personnel), which is mainly expressed in low wages. The economic growth of recent years has not led to an adequate increase in the wages of this category of workers. On the contrary, in some cases there has even been a decline in the standard of living of workers and their families. As a result, many enterprises have problems securing the production cycle with a qualified workforce.

The crisis of the demographic sphere with the threat of a demographic catastrophe. The crisis in the social sphere, the fall in the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the population, the change in values ​​in Russian society, the virtual absence of real programs to support the institution of the family, and many other reasons have led to the emergence and growth of threats in the demographic sphere. In our opinion, the situation in the demographic sphere (first of all, the birth rate, mortality rate, population growth) is one of the fundamental indicators of the social well-being of the population and the main criterion for the sustainability of the development of the state (territory).

First of all, the crisis phenomena in the demographic sphere were expressed in negative trends in population growth, which were observed throughout the entire period of reforming the Russian economy and persist today. In fact, the population has been declining in Russia for more than 15 years (Table 2.14). At the end of 2008, the natural population growth (defined as the difference between the number of births and deaths per 1000 people) in Russia as a whole was 2.5 people. per 1000 people of the population (in absolute terms, this is 362 thousand people); at the end of 2009 - 1.8 people. per 1000 people of the population, or 249.4 thousand people. Of course, this is significantly lower than in the late 1990s - early 2000s, when the value of this indicator was 6.5 million people. per 1000 people of the population (in absolute terms, the population decline during that period was close to 1 million people, but the very fact of the negative value of this indicator and the persistence of negative trends for more than 15 years indicate a very deep crisis. Unlike most other threats, negative the consequences of the implementation of this threat will acquire the highest degree of manifestation not today, but in 10-15 years and in subsequent years. negative consequences their implementation. For the demographic sphere, there will be no such effects, and negative consequences will still appear.

One of the main problems in the demographic sphere is a significant decline in the birth rate during the perestroika years. In 2009, the birth rate of the population was 12.4 people / SOO people. population (or 1764.2 thousand people), and there is a tendency to its gradual growth. For example, in the second half of the 1990s, the birth rate of the population was below 9 people / SOO people. population, in 1999 (the year with the lowest birth rate) it was generally 8.3 people / 1000 people. population.

At the same time, as can be seen from the presented indicators, there was no turning point in the trend of changing population reproduction in the direction of its qualitative improvement. The growth in the birth rate of the population in recent years (2007-2009) is largely due to the positive demographic wave of the 1970-1980s, which, in turn, led to a fairly high current population aged 18-35, i.e. the most productive part. In addition, despite the increase in the birth rate in 2007-2009, it still continues to remain at a fairly low level, yielding to the 1990 indicator (13.4 people / SOO people), not to mention the 1970-1980 indicators. biennium (when the birth rates of the population ranged from 14.5 to 17.5 people / 1000 people, i.e., on average, they were 1.5 times higher). Therefore, the future prospects for the reproduction of the Russian population are not obvious.

Table 2.14. The main indicators of the population and its reproduction over the years of economic reform

Sources: Russian statistical yearbook. 2009: Stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators. 2008: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2008; Russia in numbers. 2009: Krat. stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Socio-economic situation in Russia. January 2010: Stat. report Moscow: FSGS, 2010.

With the constant population decline observed over the past 15 years, one of the possible adaptation mechanisms that can be used to counter the negative consequences of population decline is the migration mechanism. Migration can be either permanent (moving to a permanent place of residence) or temporary (mainly labor migration, for the duration of a certain job). However, accepting a large number of migrants is far from a painless process, and in the current economic situation and social climate in Russia, it is even more painful. This is confirmed by the experience of a number of foreign states, for example France or the states of the former Yugoslavia. The expansion of the influx of migrants will inevitably run into opposition from a significant part of society and political forces. But at the same time, one cannot fail to see the positive consequences of labor migration for Russia, especially for the performance of low-skilled and low-paid work, for which the indigenous Russian citizens are reluctant.

In addition to low level the birth rate of the population The situation in the demographic sphere of Russia is characterized by a high mortality rate, significantly exceeding this indicator of leading foreign countries. In 2009, the mortality rate of the population in Russia was 14.2 people / 1000 people (in recent years this indicator has been gradually decreasing, for example, in 2005 this indicator was 16.1 people / 1000 people). In a number of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, at the end of 2009, this indicator exceeded 18-20 people / 1000 people. population, i.e. it can be said that the national project and various programs in the health sector being implemented today have not yet yielded tangible effects.

The fact that the mortality rate in Russia is high is evidenced by the results of a comparison of Russian indicators and the leading countries of the world (Table 2.15). The data in the table confirm that the mortality rate of the Russian population is 1.5-2 times higher than in the G7 countries. On the other hand, these same data indicate that, despite the high standard of living and material well-being of the citizens of these states, they, like the Russian Federation, experience problems associated with the low birth rate of the population.

Deteriorating health of the population. Low funding for health care, the gradual abandonment of free and affordable medicine, a significant increase in the prices of medicines combined with a decline in the standard of living of a significant part of the population, future uncertainty and the absence of real prospects for improving the quality of life, deterioration of sanitary and hygienic living conditions and many other factors determined on the one hand, an increase in the incidence of the population, including deadly diseases, on the other hand, led to a significant decrease in the quality of health care population. As a result, over the years of reforming the Russian economy, health indicators have fallen sharply.

Table 2.15. Population reproduction rates in Russia and the leading countries of the world people / 1000 people. population

Sources of: "Group of Eight" in numbers. 2009. Stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Russia and the countries - members of the European Union. 2007. Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2007; Russian statistical yearbook. 2008: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2008.

First of all, it is necessary to highlight the increase in morbidity for the main types of socially significant diseases - diseases of the circulatory system, malignant neoplasms, alcoholism, drug addiction and substance abuse, HIV infection and a number of other diseases. For example, for the period 2000-2008. the number of registered patients diagnosed with HIV infection in Russia increased from 78.6 to 301.3 thousand people; the number of newly registered patients with diseases characterized by high blood pressure annually - from 434.8 to 979 thousand people. (it should be noted that diseases of the circulatory system are the main cause of mortality in the population, they account for more than 50% of deaths); patients with diabetes mellitus - from 162 to 301.6 thousand people; the prevalence of drug addiction and alcoholism among the population is very high. In part, the increase in the prevalence of certain diseases is associated with an improvement in their detectability, associated with the development of diagnostic tools. However, to a greater extent, such an increase is due to a decrease in the level and quality of life of the majority of the population, less availability and deterioration of medical services, poor control of the health of the population and the epidemiological situation by the state and a number of other reasons. It was the deterioration of the population's health and the decline in the quality of medical care that became the main reason for the growth in mortality during the years of perestroika, when premature mortality increased significantly, i.e. mortality of the young population and people of working age (Table 2.16).

Table 2.16. Mortality rate of the working-age population and life expectancy at birth in the Russian Federation in 1990-2008

Sources of: Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2008: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat. 2008; Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators. 2008: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2008; Materials of the official website of the Federal Statistics Service.

As a result of such processes, according to the results of 2008, the average life expectancy of the population in Russia is only 67.9 years (for men - 61.8, for women - 74.2), noticeably inferior to the indicator of developed countries of the world community, where its value is approaching , and somewhere 80 years passed.

High crime rate. During the period of economic reform in the country, the level of crime has significantly increased, which is usually estimated by the indicator of the number of registered crimes per 100 thousand people of the population. In 1990, this indicator for Russia as a whole was 1243 cases (Table 2.17); by the end of 2009, its value increased to 2110 cases, i.e. almost 2 times, and in the period 2002-2006. basically, there was a tendency towards an increase in crime. In a number of subjects, the crime rate exceeded 3500 and even 4000 cases / 100 thousand people. population. The most disadvantaged regions according to the results

2008 was the Perm and Khabarovsk Territories, where the crime rate was respectively 3599 and 3940 cases.

In recent years, there has also been a tendency for an increase in criminality against the person. For the period 1990-2009. the number of such crimes has more than doubled (Table 2.17), in some periods of the reform of the Russian economy, going over 500,000. This situation speaks primarily of the low quality of life of the population and the high risk for individual citizens to become a victim of a crime.

Table 2.17. Main indicators characterizing the crime rate in the Russian Federation (1990-2009)

Sources of: Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators. 2008: Stat. Sat. Moscow: Rosstat, 2008; Russia in numbers. 2009: Krat. stat. Sat. M .: Rosstat, 2009; Socio-economic situation in Russia. January - December 2009: Stat. report Moscow: FSGS, 2010; Materials of the official website of the Federal Statistics Service.

Summing up the analysis of internal threats to the economic security of Russia, we note that most of them have a high level of manifestation at the present stage in all sections. socio-economic development of the country: both in the manufacturing and financial sector, and in the social sphere. This situation indicates a violation of the stability of the socio-economic development of Russia and the need for a significant correction of the current economic model. The main directions of such a correction can be distinguished:

• the accelerated development of high-tech industries and the construction of an innovative sector of the domestic economy, which, in terms of its performance indicators, would be comparable to the raw materials industries and low-tech industries;
• introduction of real mechanisms for the growth of production efficiency and the development of entrepreneurial activity;
• adoption and implementation of standards in the social sphere at a level comparable to the leading countries of the world;
• implementation of a long-term policy in the demographic sphere aimed at increasing the birth rate and ensuring a positive balance of population growth, etc.

• This category of crimes should primarily include murder and attempted murder; deliberate infliction of grievous bodily harm; rape and attempted rape; banditry; kidnapping; robbery; robbery.

The main sources of external threats lie in the foreign economic sphere, and often the state cannot influence them. Therefore, one of the main directions of countering external threats is to build a strong national economy, practically invulnerable (or weakly vulnerable) to the action of unfavorable external factors.

In contrast to internal threats to Russia's economic security, external threats are significantly less, so there is no need to separate them in several directions. The list of the main external threats to the economic security of Russia is given in Table. 2.18.

Table 2.18. External threats to Russia's economic security

High level of external debt. External debt is inherent in the economies of all developed countries and includes two main elements:

• state, i.e. borrowing by the state against its guarantees;
• corporate (private) - debts of private banks, enterprises, etc. mainly the business sector of the national economy. In this part of the external debt, the state is not a guarantor or is on a very limited scale.

For state regulation the economy, the state external debt is of paramount importance, since the state bears obligations on it and spends budget funds on its servicing (closing the principal amount of the debt and paying interest, and sometimes penalties for late payments). Starting from certain values ​​of the public external debt, its servicing becomes difficult, and in some cases (with an unfavorable situation in the economy and a high value of external debt) it becomes impossible in full volume of the undertaken obligations. Therefore, the basis of the state policy in the field of external borrowing is the prevention of such levels of external debt, at which unfavorable situations begin to develop.

As for private external debt, it would seem that it does not pose any problems for the state, but is a problem of purely private non-state companies. However, in reality this is not the case. As a rule, most of the private external debt lies with the largest domestic banks and enterprises, which are economically important. The state of the country's economy and social sphere depends on the success of these structures, therefore, if they have problems associated with a high level of external debt, the entire economic system of the country will suffer. As a result, in critical situations the state can become hostage to the large external debt of private companies and is often forced to intervene, assuming part of the debt service obligations or acting as a guarantor to creditors.

Thus, a high level of both state and corporate external debt poses a threat to the state economy. Therefore, it is advisable to analyze the threat under consideration on the basis of the total volume of external debt, which includes both components. The dynamics of changes in the country's external debt over the period of reforming the Russian economy is presented in Table. 2.19.

Table 2.19. External debt of the Russian Federation in 1995-2009 (at the end of the period), USD billion

A source: Official site data The Central Bank Russia.

This threat was of high urgency in the late 1990s - early 2000s and since 2008. The reasons for this situation and the structure of external debt in the periods under consideration are very different. In the late 1990s - early 2000s, the problem of high public external debt, which was predominant in the structure of the external debt of the state (for example, at the end of 1999 its share was 83.6%; in 2000 - 80 ,4%). Moreover, in some years it was comparable to the Russian GDP, which is considered a very high level.

Favorable external conditions (first of all, the conjuncture of prices on world commodity markets), observed after 2002, allowed the Russian economy to strengthen significantly and significantly reduce the burden of public external debt, bringing it to acceptable levels. For example, at the end of 2008, the debt amounted to $ 32.8 billion (for comparison, at the end of 1998, the state external debt of the Russian Federation was equal to $ 158.4 billion, i.e., it was almost 5 times higher than the 2008 level. .). Comparison of this indicator with Russia's GDP, produced in 2008 and equal to 41,668 billion rubles, shows less than 3% (the calculation was carried out at the rate of 30 rubles / dollar), which is negligible.

On the other hand, during the same period, the external debt of Russian companies increased significantly. In 2000, the corporate external debt was only $ 31.4 billion, which practically did not threaten the country's economy. By the end of 2008, the debt increased to $ 447.7 billion, i.e. almost 15 times! This growth was primarily due to more favorable conditions lending to companies by foreign banks in comparison with Russian banks in the context of the strengthening of the ruble in relation to the leading foreign currencies... However, the outbreak of the financial crisis led to a significant deterioration in financial condition Russian companies, which caused difficulties in servicing both external and internal debts, posing a real threat of bankruptcy to some of them. In addition, the appreciable weakening of the ruble against the leading world currencies in the second half of 2008 - early 2009 further exacerbated the already difficult situation for a number of Russian enterprises related to servicing external debt. As a result, many Russian enterprises in such conditions today solve the problems of survival, practically not engaged in modernization and development (in many cases, existing projects are frozen, on the implementation of which significant amounts of capital investments have already been spent).

The total volume of the external debt of the Russian Federation at the end of 2008 amounted to 480.5 billion dollars, (about 35% of the volume of Russian GDP), having reached a fairly high level. Add to this a significant decrease in Russia's international reserves, which are a kind of guarantor in the regulation of both state and (to a certain extent) corporate external debt. At the end of the third quarter of 2009, the size of Russia's international reserves was estimated at $ 413.4 billion. Compared to the beginning of August 2008 (the maximum value of the indicator was $ 596.6 billion), they decreased by more than $ 180 billion.

The predominance of raw materials in Russian exports. The characteristics of this threat were examined in detail when analyzing internal industrial and technological threats. We will only add that for an export-oriented economy, and the Russian economy should also be referred to it, the predominance of raw materials in exports is a serious problem in the face of unfavorable price conditions on world raw materials markets. This problem, in turn, entails many intra-economic problems (the difficulty of filling the revenue side of the budget, a drop in the performance of enterprises in the raw materials and low-tech sectors, etc.).

Russia's dependence on imports of many essential products, including food. An analysis of the situation reflecting Russia's high dependence on imports of high-tech products was given when characterizing internal threats (in the group of production and technological threats). We add that today there are no serious prerequisites for reducing this dependence. On the contrary, in all likelihood, in the coming years, its growth will continue (here we mean dependence not only on finished products, but also for the components that go to its creation at Russian enterprises).

An equally important threat is Russia's high dependence on food imports. Based on the results of 2006-2008 The share of imports of food products (taking into account the import of raw materials for their production within Russia) in their consumption in Russia as a whole, according to various sources, was estimated at 30-70% (from our point of view, this figure is 40-50%). In addition, food imports to Russia are significantly higher than their exports. For example, in 2008, imports of food products and agricultural raw materials to Russia amounted to $ 35.2 billion, while exports were estimated at $ 9.4 billion.

Capital outflow abroad. Capital outflow in most cases is negative and signals a crisis in the economy and its low investment attractiveness. From the standpoint of economic development, capital outflow is characterized as the withdrawal of funds from the national economy to the detriment of its growth. As domestic and foreign experience shows, the greatest capital outflow is recorded in the most unfavorable situations in the economy, which aggravates the already difficult situation.

According to the official data of the Central Bank of Russia (Table 2.20), there was a net capital outflow in Russia throughout almost the entire period of reform. Only in 2006-2007. there was a definite inflow. However, the global economic crisis has again undermined confidence in the Russian economy, triggering a sharp outflow of capital. In 2008 alone (mainly in the second half of 2008), the net capital outflow from Russia amounted to

132.8 billion dollars (despite the fact that in 2007 there was a significant net inflow - 82.4 billion dollars). In 2009, this process continued.

Table 2.20. Net capital inflows / outflows by the private sector of the Russian Federation in 1995-2009 (according to balance of payments data), USD bln

A source-. Data of the official website of the Central Bank of Russia.

Discriminatory measures of foreign states in foreign economic relations with Russia. Such measures, as a rule, are introduced by individual foreign states while protecting their producers from imports of products, including Russian ones. In most cases, these measures consist in raising customs barriers to the import of certain types of products. Much less often, these measures may take the form of a state policy against the goods of a state (for example, Russia) in the domestic market. In exceptional cases, discriminatory measures take the form of an economic blockade.