Document No. 7.8 Excerpt from the response of the Institute military history National People's Army of the GDR on the appeal of the Scientific Research Historical Group of the Main Staff of the USSR Navy ... The study ... did not confirm that Hitler allegedly announced the commander of the Soviet

The main features of the German war economy In contrast to the wars of past eras, in which success depended on the commanding skill, strategy, courage, organization and dedication of soldiers, - the First and Second World Wars were mainly wars of factories and factories.

No. 7 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB of the USSR In the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the NKO of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR dated March 6, 1941 Message from Berlin According to information received from an official of the Committee on the four-year plan, several members of the committee received an urgent task to draw up calculations of raw materials and

№ 9 NOTE OF THE NARKOMA OF STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR V.N. MERKULOV to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), SNK and NKVD of the USSR WITH THE TEXT OF THE TELEGRAM OF THE ENGLISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS A. IDEN TO THE AMBASSADOR OF ENGLAND IN THE USSR S. KRIPSU ABOUT GERMAN'S INTENTIONS ATTACKING THE USSR No. 1312 / MISSING ON APRIL 26, 1941 Perfectly

2.2. Deoffshorization of the economy, patriotisation of the elite Ownership of the bulk of the largest private Russian enterprises is taken offshore, and their real owners, in a number of cases, are also citizens of foreign states. Considering the scale

The program for mobilizing the country's forces to fight the aggressor, formulated in the directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of June 29

1941 and in the speech of the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. V. Stalin on July 3, she determined the direction, nature and scale of practical measures to create a well-coordinated military economy in a short time.

In developing its economic policy for the period of the war, the Communist Party proceeded from the Leninist proposition that the restructuring of the economy on a war footing is all-encompassing, that the entire national economy should be placed at the service of the front and the interests of organizing a durable rear. A powerful industrial base, created in the pre-war years, ensured a successful solution to this problem.

Rebuilding the country's economy, the party directed all its forces and means to achieve a sharp increase in the level of military production through the maximum and purposeful use of the military-economic potential of the socialist state, to achieve a decisive material and technical superiority of the Soviet Armed Forces over the troops of Nazi Germany and thereby ensure the achievement complete victory over the enemy.

The most important military-economic measures were the mobilization and redistribution of material, financial and labor resources to meet the needs of the front, the switch of civilian industries to the production of military products; the evacuation of the main productive forces from the threatened areas, the fastest deployment and their introduction into the number of those operating in the east of the country; maintaining the level of agricultural production in the amount necessary to supply the front and rear with food and raw materials; restructuring the work of transport in a military manner; redistribution of foreign trade turnover; reorganization of economic management.

In the difficult process of restructuring the national economy on a war footing Special attention paid to the defense industry. First of all, the front was to receive military equipment, weapons, ammunition, and equipment from it. Moreover, the new nature of the work of defense enterprises consisted not in changing the range of products, but mainly in the transition to mass production of the most advanced types of weapons and military equipment.

The restructuring of the military and civilian industry was a single, interconnected process. It demanded an increase in the production of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical products, raw materials and electricity. The restructuring entailed a change in technology and production technology, required further intensification and technical improvement of production processes. At the same time, it was necessary to ensure a regime of the strictest economy in all sectors of the national economy, in the expenditure of the most important materials, in order to create additional opportunities for increasing the output of military products. All this was carried out under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee. The main branches of the war economy were in charge of members and candidate members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. So, in the jurisdiction of N.A. Voznesensky, in addition to the State Planning Committee of the USSR, was the production of weapons and ammunition, V.M. Molotov - tanks, G.M. Malenkov - aircraft and aircraft engines, A.I. Mikoyan - food, fuel and clothing, A. A. Andreeva and L. M. Kaganovich - railroad transportation. Experienced party and economic workers headed the main industrial people's commissariats: A. I. Shakhurin - the aviation industry, V. A. Malyshev - medium machine building, and then the tank industry, D. F. Ustinov - weapons, P. I. Parshin - the mortar industry, B. L. Vannikov - ammunition, I. F. Tevosyan - ferrous metallurgy, A. I. Efremov - machine-tool industry, V. V. Vakhrushev - coal. Almost three-quarters of all members of the Central Committee and half of the candidates for members of the Central Committee took a direct part in organizing the war economy ( History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, vol. 5, book. 1, p. 276.). The efforts of workers at all levels of the party apparatus were directed towards solving military-economic problems.

The well-thought-out placement of the leading party cadres ensured the necessary unity of the political, economic and military leadership of the country. Lenin's provision on the strictest centralization "at the disposal of all the forces and resources of the socialist republics" ( V. I. Lenin. Full collection cit., vol. 38, p. 400.) was rigorously implemented. The Communist Party and the Soviet government carried out a number of organizational and economic measures, which began with a revision of economic plans. Following the introduction of the mobilization plan for the production of ammunition and the national economic plan for the third quarter of 1941, it was deemed expedient to have a general military-economic plan for a longer period.

On July 4, the State Defense Committee instructed a specially created commission headed by N.A. exported to the indicated areas in the order of evacuation "( Party and government decisions on economic issues. Collection of documents for 50 years. T. 3, 1941-1952 M., 1968, p. 42.).

On August 16, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ( Party and government decisions on economic issues. Collection of documents for 50 years. T. 3, 1941-1952 M., 1968, pp. 44-48.). In essence, the plan defined the basic principles of the accelerated development of the Soviet military economy and the tasks of deploying the military-industrial base of the Soviet Union in the eastern regions of the country, where it was planned to establish mass production of aircraft engines, aircraft, tanks, tank armor, small arms, all types of artillery pieces, mortars. and ammunition. A program was developed to increase the production of electricity, aviation gasoline, cast iron, steel, rolled products, aluminum, copper, ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, coal and oil mining in the eastern regions. In general terms capital construction the proportion of defense commissariats increased. The number of construction projects for industrial enterprises launched during the third five-year plan was reduced from 5700 to 614. Only construction continued, which could have been completed within a year. The plan for the fourth quarter provided funding for the restoration of 825 evacuated enterprises, primarily of defense significance.

In the field of agriculture, it was envisaged to increase the sown area for grain and industrial crops in the eastern regions of the RSFSR, in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Almost all large agricultural engineering plants were transferred to the jurisdiction of the military industry people's commissariats.

The role of the Ural-Siberian railways... The military-economic plan provided for the reconstruction and expansion of railway junctions and stations, the construction of second tracks on the lines connecting Siberia with the Urals and the Urals with the Volga region.

The creation of a powerful military-industrial base in the east, begun on the eve of the war, continued at an increasing pace. All the metal, materials and equipment obtained according to the accumulation plans for the previous quarters of 1941 were redistributed to the enterprises of the central and eastern regions, the state reserves of fuel, metal, food and industrial goods were increased.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the State Defense Committee paid special attention to the development of the metallurgical industry. A significant addition to the plan was the decision on the further deployment in the east in the shortest possible time of a powerful metallurgical base capable of fully satisfying the growing needs of military production, especially in high-quality metal and rolled metal. In the Urals and Western Siberia, within a year and a half, it was planned to build and put into operation 15 blast furnaces, 41 open-hearth furnaces, 8 Bessemer converters, 13 electric furnaces, 14 rolling and 3 pipe-rolling mills, 10 coke oven batteries. For the fastest commissioning of new capacities, the production bases of the Magnitogorsk, Novo-Tagil, Kuznetsk, Zlatoust metallurgical, Pervouralsk and Sinarsky pipe plants were used, as well as technological and power equipment transferred from metallurgical enterprises in the south and center ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6312, ll. 1-5.).

Significant changes were made to the state budget. Military appropriations in the second half of 1941 increased by 20.6 billion rubles in comparison with the first half of the year.

The restructuring of the national economy and the creation of a well-coordinated military economy capable of providing the front with the necessary material and technical means largely depended on the level of party leadership in all spheres of the country's economic life.

The Communist Party raised and put into action all the forces of the country in the interests of successfully fulfilling the military-economic plan adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Already the first weeks of the war convincingly showed that the party, its governing bodies, the party apparatus, with the experience accumulated in the course of socialist construction, were successfully solving complex military-economic problems. However, this did not exclude the need to change some of the usual forms and methods of the party's organizational and political work in relation to the management of economic life under war conditions. The changes were in the direction of strengthening organizational centralism in the system of party leadership, increasing the personal responsibility of party leaders for the state of the economy, and the formation, if necessary, of emergency party bodies.

The sectoral industrial departments created even before the war (at the end of 1939) in the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, in regional committees, regional committees and in many city committees and regional committees of large industrial centers were closely connected with enterprises, knew their production capabilities, needs, and the degree of readiness. to fulfill military orders. As new branches of production expanded, corresponding departments headed by secretaries were created in party bodies. This made it possible to promptly and directly take part in the implementation of plans approved by the State Defense Committee, to achieve a quick establishment of the production of military products, inter-sectoral production cooperation. Knowledge of local economic conditions made it possible for party bodies, in cases where the operational ties of the people's commissariats with enterprises in their industries were disrupted, to take responsibility for solving not only general economic issues, but also special ones - of a production and technical nature. This was also facilitated by the fact that the first secretaries of regional and regional party committees, as a rule, were authorized by GKOs at the local level.

Party organizations, with their intense activity, ensured the implementation of the directives and instructions of the State Defense Committee on the issues of economic construction.

The increased role of the party leadership in the national economy did not diminish the responsibility of the state bodies for managing the country's economic life. In its daily activities to deploy the military economy, the State Defense Committee relied on the apparatus of the Council of People's Commissars and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the Union-Republican People's Commissariats and others. government agencies... The role of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR as a body of state management of the economy in wartime not only did not weaken, but also intensified.

One of the important acts of the Soviet government, which to a certain extent gave direction to changes in the state apparatus, was the decree of July 1, 1941 "On the expansion of the rights of People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime." Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Soviet Army and the main directorates for supplying the branches of the national economy with coal, oil, and timber were formed. In the process of reorganization of the state apparatus, there was a sharp reduction in the staff of the people's commissariats, institutions and management levels. Specialists from institutions were sent to factories and factories, to production.

The work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the system of planning and supplying the economy were reorganized. Departments of weapons, ammunition, shipbuilding, aircraft building and tank building were created in the State Planning Committee. Based on the assignments of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee, they developed plans for the release of military equipment, weapons, ammunition by enterprises, regardless of their departmental subordination, and monitored the state of material and technical support of military production. The State Planning Committee received daily reports on the fulfillment of the tasks of the State Defense Committee. He had representatives in 25 economic regions of the country for operational communication with production.

The special conditions for the development of the Soviet military economy gave rise to operational forms of economic planning, including short-term production schedules (from one to three months), task plans for all branches of the defense industry and transport.

On the basis of the directives of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the State Defense Committee, the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, territorial and regional committees and bodies of Soviet power developed plans for the restructuring of industry and agriculture in their economic regions.

The military-economic measures of the Communist Party for the restructuring of the national economy organically included the task of providing it with cadres, since the front immediately diverted significant human resources from work at enterprises. For the correct and planned distribution and redistribution of labor resources, on June 30, 1941, the party and government established a Committee on the Distribution of Labor Power under the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR ( Later - the Committee for Accounting and Distribution of Labor.) under the chairmanship of P. G. Mo-skatov, who headed the Main Directorate of Labor Reserves.

Relying on objective economic laws and using the advantages of the Soviet social and state system, the Communist Party set in motion all the forces of the country to organize a rebuff to the enemy.

Displacement of the productive forces of the USSR to the east. The relocation of the main productive forces from the threatened regions of the country to the east was a forced measure caused by the extremely unfavorable situation at the front. At the same time, it became the most important link in the economic policy of the Communist Party, aimed at deploying the main military-industrial base of the country deep in the rear.

The Nazis hoped to repeat their "European experience", to seize the enormous industrial potential, material and human resources of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet people had to take effective and urgent measures to thwart the enemy's plans. From the rate of population displacement and production resources from west to east, the deployment of production of military equipment, the provision of quantitative and qualitative superiority over the Nazi invaders in all types of weapons largely depended.

The Central Committee of the Party, the State Defense Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR launched a tremendous amount of work to relocate the country's productive forces. It was led by the Evacuation Council, of which N.M.Shvernik was appointed its chairman, and A.N. Kosygin and M.G. Pervukhin were appointed as his deputies. The Council also included A.I. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov and others ( On September 26, 1941, by a special decree, the State Defense Committee organized the Department for the Evacuation of the Population under the Council for Evacuation. The department was headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR KD Pamfilov, who at the same time was introduced to the Evacuation Council as one of the deputy chairmen.). Control over the movement of enterprises from July 11 was carried out by a special group of inspectors, headed by A. N. Kosygin, created by the decision of the State Defense Committee under the Council for Evacuation.

The Council determined the order, timing, sequence and final points of evacuation of people and material values... Its decisions, approved by the government, were binding on all party, Soviet and economic bodies.

A harmonious operational system of evacuation bodies has developed in the center and in the localities. Under all Union People's Commissariats authorized by the Council ( By the end of 1941, the staff of authorized personnel for the evacuation of the population numbered about 3 thousand people (Echelons go to the east. From the history of the relocation of the productive forces of the USSR in 1941 - 1942. M., 1966, pp. 10, 18).) became deputy people's commissars, and commissions were created from experienced, qualified employees of the apparatus, which developed specific proposals and plans for relocation in various sectors of the economy and individual large enterprises. In addition, the people's commissariats sent their representatives to the evacuated factories and factories and to the points of their new deployment.

In the republics and regions that were under the threat of enemy occupation, evacuation commissions were formed, and evacuation points were formed at many railway junctions, stations and wharves.

The export of industrial equipment and other material values ​​to the eastern regions of the country has become the most important task not only for local party and Soviet organizations, but also for the rear services of fronts and armies.

From the very beginning of the evacuation, a huge responsibility fell on the shoulders of transport workers, especially railway workers. On the instructions of the Party Central Committee, the State Defense Committee and the USSR Council of People's Commissars, the transport commissariats urgently developed specific plans and measures to ensure the unhindered movement of goods exported to the east.

To provide practical assistance to the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS), authorized by the Council for Evacuation ( Central archive of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (hereinafter - CA AUCCTU), f. 1, d. 39, l. 45.). Later, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) gave instructions to send the Deputy People's Commissars of the Navy and responsible workers of the political administration of the People's Commissariat for Morphology to all sea basins ( Echelons go east, page 155.).

The transfer of enterprises of defense importance to the rear from the western regions of the country began from the first days of the war. Already on June 29, 1941, a decree was adopted to export 11 aircraft factories to the east from the threatened zone. Two days later, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ( Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (hereinafter referred to as II of the USSR). Documents and materials, inv. No. 91, ll. 83-83a.). Soon, the State Defense Committee recognized it necessary to transfer 26 factories of the People's Commissariat of Armaments from the central regions and Leningrad to the cities of the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia and Central Asia. On the basis of these enterprises in new places, it was planned to expand the production of weapons, cartridges and various devices for weapons ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 5418, fol. one.).

On July 20, the State Defense Committee ordered the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry A. I. Shakhurin to establish the sequence of redeployment of factories so that the evacuation would be carried out without violating the production plan.

The difficult situation on the fronts of the Patriotic War made it necessary to carry out a mass evacuation almost simultaneously from Ukraine, from Belarus, the Baltic states, Moldova, Crimea, the North-West, and later the Central industrial regions. The evacuation from the western border regions was especially intense. It took enormous efforts of local party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol and military bodies, population, workers of enterprises and transport to ensure the rescue from the enemy of millions of people, the most important industrial equipment and other material and cultural values.

A significant burden of this most complicated matter fell on the shoulders of young people. At the enterprises of the frontline zone, more than 32 thousand industrial youth groups, brigades and detachments ( Central archive of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth Union (hereinafter - "CA Komsomol), f. 1, on. 1, d. 255, l. 67.). They dismantled, loaded and dispatched equipment around the clock.

Echelons with cargo and people in a continuous flow moved to the east, and primarily to the regions of the Middle and Southern Urals, to the Volga region, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. In just three months, more than 1,360 large, mainly military, enterprises were relocated ( N. Voznesensky. The military economy of the USSR during the Patriotic War. M., 1948, p. 41.).

With incredible difficulties, under continuous enemy bombing and shelling, the enterprises and population of the Ukrainian SSR were evacuated. On July 4, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR sent a special directive to all party and Soviet organizations of the republic, in which the urgent task was put forward to accelerate the "shipment of valuables, equipment of enterprises and foodstuffs" ( AI of the USSR. Documents and materials, inv. No. 91, ll. 56-58.).

Party organs have made tremendous efforts to ensure the clarity and coherence of the redeployment. Recalling the evacuation of large factories, the former secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional party committee KS Grusheva writes: “We had a few days to carry out a complete dismantling of these factories, to load machine tools and various equipment into trains. After that the workers of the regional committee went there themselves. The engine plant - Leonid Brezhnev, the machine-building plant - the head of the regional committee department NL Telenchak and I. with the plan and procedure for the evacuation of equipment and personnel. The evacuation was carried out in an orderly manner, without nervousness and haste. The equipment, literally to the last screw and nut, was installed and laid on the platforms provided in time. Engineering and technical personnel, workers and employees were provided with food, money .. By mid-July, the last one, as we called it "special", was sent echelon "( K. Grusheva. Then, in 41st ... M., 1972, p. 38.).

At the beginning of August 1941, due to the threat of German troops going to the Dnieper, evacuation industrial facilities The Dnieper region and the Crimea has reached its maximum tension. Only through the Kiev junction, 450 echelons were sent to the east, which removed the equipment of 197 large enterprises of the Ukrainian capital and over 350 thousand Kievites ( Hero whale. Kiev, 1961, pp. 191-194; History of Kiev. T.P. Kiiv, 1960, p. 487.),

In mid-August, a mass evacuation of enterprises and residents of the Zaporozhye and eastern regions of the Dnipropetrovsk regions began, primarily the units of the Dnieper hydroelectric station, large plants, factories and power plants.

In an extremely difficult situation, many enterprises in Zaporozhye were evacuated under enemy fire. By the end of August, about 5,500 workers were employed in dismantling and shipping equipment of large Zaporozhye metallurgical facilities.

The scale of the evacuation of enterprises and the population can be judged at least by the fact that for the export of Zaporizhstal alone it took about 8 thousand cars ( Zaporizhzhya region during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945). Collection of documents. Zaporizhzhia, 1959, p. 56.). All in all, from the Zaporozhye group of factories, about 320 thousand tons of machine tools, structures, metal and other cargo were dismantled and transferred to the rear. By the beginning of October, the removal of the main equipment of the Zaporozhye and Dnepropetrovsk factories was completed. In total, from Ukraine during June - December it was removed to the rear (taking into account construction organizations republics, factories and factories of the Crimea) about 550 large industrial enterprises.

In extremely difficult conditions, the evacuation of the population and the relocation of productive forces from the territory of the Byelorussian SSR took place. On June 23, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus made a decision on the immediate evacuation of children and material values ​​from cities that were subjected to shelling and bombing. However, the rapid advance of the fascist troops did not allow the evacuation from the Brest, Bialystok, Baranovichi and Pinsk regions, which were occupied just a few days after the start of the war. The evacuation from the eastern part of the republic took place in a more organized manner. So, the operational headquarters of the Gomel regional committee of the CP (b) B organized the export of 38 enterprises of union-republican significance. Within three days, the largest plant in Belarus, Gomselmash, was dismantled. More than 1000 wagons with people, valuable equipment and materials ( P. Lipilo. CPB - organizer and leader of the partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. Minsk, 1959, p. 21.).

In total, 109 large and medium-sized industrial enterprises (39 of the Union and 70 of the republican significance) were relocated from the territory of Belarus to the eastern regions of the country.

The evacuation from the Baltic states took place in an equally tense atmosphere. Despite the continuous raids of enemy aircraft and the actions of saboteurs, railway workers and workers of enterprises in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia loaded 4-5 times more wagons than usual. Transport ships located in the ports of the Baltic coast were also used. But due to lack of time, it was not possible to take out a significant part of material values ​​from the Baltic republics.

Evacuation traffic from Leningrad and the region, mainly by rail, began even before the emergence of an immediate enemy threat to the city on the Neva. The entire organization of this work was under the control of A.N. Kosygin, who was sent to the city as an authorized GKO. First of all, the equipment of those defense enterprises that could not manufacture products under the created conditions was exported. The decision of the State Defense Committee to move to the rear of the Kirov and Izhora factories was made on August 26, 1941, but two days later their export was temporarily stopped ( The evacuation of the factories resumed on October 4, 1941.).

On August 29, 1941, the enemy cut the last railway line. By this time, 773,590 people, including refugees from the Baltic States and the Karelo-Finnish USSR ( Central archive of the USSR Ministry of Railways (hereinafter referred to as the CA of the Ministry of Railways), f. 33a, he. 49, d. 1241, l. 80.), as well as dozens of large enterprises.

Later, in winter, people and equipment were removed from Leningrad by air and across Lake Ladoga along the Road of Life. Only from January 22 to April 15, 1942 from Leningrad on the ice of Lake Ladoga 554 186 people ( 900 heroic days. Collection of documents and materials about the heroic struggle of the workers of Leningrad in 1941-1944. M. - L., 1966, p. 106.).

The evacuation of the population, enterprises and institutions of the central regions of the RSFSR, Moscow and the Moscow region continued for several months. It took on a particularly large scale in the fall due to the threat looming over the capital, and continued until December 1941. By the end of November, most of the equipment of 498 of the most important enterprises was removed from Moscow and the Moscow Region to the rear areas. By this time, the total number of evacuated Muscovites reached 2 million people ( History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941 -1945, v. 2, pp. 148, 258.).

Despite the enormous difficulties, the transfer of productive forces to the rear areas of the country went smoothly on the whole and in accordance with the target dates. In the second half of 1941, 1523 industrial enterprises, including 1360 large plants and factories, were removed from the front-line zone in the second half of 1941 to the east. Of these, 226 are located in the Volga region, 667 in the Urals, 244 in Western Siberia, 78 in Eastern Siberia, 308 in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Along with the relocated enterprises, up to 30-40 percent of workers, engineers and technicians arrived. Thanks to the initiative of the party, Soviet, trade union, Komsomol, military and economic bodies of the eastern regions of the country, the entire working-age population was immediately actively involved in work at these enterprises.

At the same time, grain and food supplies, tens of thousands of tractors and agricultural machines were evacuated to the rear. Collective and state farms in the eastern regions of the country in the second half of 1941 took in 2,393.3 thousand head of cattle displaced from the front-line ( Yuri Harutyunyan. Soviet peasantry during the Great Patriotic War. M., 1970, p. 52.).

Hundreds of scientific institutes, laboratories, schools, libraries, as well as unique works of art from museums in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other cities were taken out into the interior of the country.

The evacuation transport in 1941 required about 1.5 million railroad cars.

From July until the end of navigation, the river fleet managed to transport more than 870 thousand tons of cargo to the rear.

The most important condition for the successful movement of productive forces from west to east was the selfless labor of the collectives of the evacuated enterprises and institutions. Workers, office workers, collective farmers, all working people in those difficult days displayed exceptional restraint, courage, and selfless loyalty to the cause of the Party and the socialist Motherland.

In the process of evacuation, the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance of the Soviet republics manifested themselves with renewed vigor. The relocation of industrial enterprises became the business of not only the workers of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic republics, Moldavia, the western regions of the RSFSR, but also the workers of all rear regions.

The deployment of evacuated enterprises in the eastern regions was largely possible because during the pre-war five-year plans a large-scale industry, a fuel and energy base were created here, mineral deposits were explored, and new transport routes were laid.

The relocation of productive forces to the east is one of the brightest pages in the history of the Great Patriotic War. “One cannot but admire the feat of Soviet workers, engineers, production commanders, railway workers, who ensured the evacuation of many hundreds of large enterprises and more than 10 million people to the east,” noted Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. the country was displaced thousands of kilometers. There, in uninhabited places, often under the open sky, machines and machine tools literally from railway platforms were put into business "( L. Brezhnev. Lenin's course. Speeches and articles. T. I. M., 1970, p. 133.).

By their heroic efforts, the Soviet people thwarted the Nazis' calculations to disorganize the Soviet war economy.

Industrial restructuring. The interests of the all-round development of military production required the expansion of the country's raw materials and fuel and energy base, and above all in the eastern regions, where the main arsenal of the Soviet Union was being created at an accelerated pace.

In this regard, the most difficult tasks faced the metallurgists of the east. They were supposed to not only significantly increase the production of metal, but also significantly change the technology of its production, in the shortest possible time to master the production of new grades of cast iron, steel, armored products.

Before the war, the proportion of high-quality steels in the metallurgy of the eastern regions was small. At the Magnitogorsk Combine, for example, it was no more than 8.2 percent.

Since June 22, the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee took control of the work of the plant to fulfill military orders, and especially to produce high-quality steel grades. A committee of scientists created at the city committee took an active part in organizing the production of such steel. As a result, already during the second half of 1941, the steel-makers of Magnitka were able to master the production of over 30 new grades of steel and to arrange its special rolling. Due to the lack of the necessary rolling mills in the Urals, for the first time in the history of world and domestic metallurgy, blooming was adapted for this purpose.

On July 23, the plant's blooming shop produced the first armor plate. In October 1941, residents of Magnitogorsk increased its output in comparison with August 3 times, in December - already 7 times. The metallurgists of the Urals provided high-quality armor for the tanks a month and a half ahead of the government's deadline. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government appreciated labor feat Magnitogorsk metallurgists, equal in value to winning a major battle. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and the director of the plant G. I. Nosov and deputy chief mechanic N. A. Ryzhenko were awarded the State Prize.

In a short time, the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant was transferred to the production of high-quality steel and rolled products. In the second half of 1941, the Zlatoust plant mastered the smelting of 78 new brands of metal.

Soviet scientists, in collaboration with engineers, technicians and workers, in an unprecedentedly short time managed to solve an extremely important task: to master the smelting of high-grade steel in ordinary open-hearth furnaces.

Previously, the metallurgy of the Urals and Western Siberia received manganese from the Ukraine and Transcaucasia for the production of high-quality metal. In 1940, the share of the eastern regions in the extraction of manganese ore did not exceed 8.4 percent. Therefore, the organization of forced extraction of manganese has become of paramount importance. The miners of Nikopol, who arrived in the Northern Urals, began to carry out this important military-economic task. And already at the end of 1941 the first Ural manganese went to the ferrous metallurgy factories of the eastern regions. The Urals and Eastern Siberia began to produce 13.7 percent of the manganese mined in the country ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 32, fol. 143.). The Ural, and then Kazakhstani manganese ore made it possible to start the production of blast furnace ferromanganese at the metallurgical enterprises of the Urals and Siberia. This was a major victory for miners and metallurgists, which allowed a sharp increase in the production of high-quality rolled products. Its share rose from 23 percent in the first half of 1941 to 49 percent in the second, and in the eastern metallurgical plants - from 36.9 percent in July to 70.8 percent in October.

In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the mining of tungsten ore, vanadium, molybdenum and other rare metals necessary for the production of alloy steels was developed at an accelerated pace.

The military industry absorbed a huge amount of non-ferrous metals. Therefore, the Soviet government in the second half of 1941 increased investment in the development of nonferrous metallurgy by 25 percent compared to the second half of 1940. construction battalions.

At the same time, aluminum plants were built in the Sverdlovsk region and Kuzbass.

Five plants for the processing and rolling of non-ferrous metals were built at a rapid pace. The production capacity of the country's largest Balkhash copper-smelting plant in Kazakhstan was increased.

In connection with the temporary loss of Donbass and the heavy damage inflicted by the Nazis on the Moscow region coal basin, the fuel problem in the country has sharply aggravated. At the same time, the restructuring of the metallurgical industry and the expansion of military production in the eastern regions required a significant increase in the production of coal, primarily coking coal. The Kuznetsk Basin, which before the war gave about 14 percent of its all-Union production, soon became, along with the Karaganda Basin, the main supplier of coking coal and chemical products.

To increase the production of coal, it was necessary to improve the utilization of the existing mines, to establish the excavation of additional workings, to lengthen the face lines and equip them with mechanisms. A group of economic, engineering and technical workers, experienced Donbass specialists, who at the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942 came to the Kuzbass and the Karaganda basin, rendered great help to the miners of the east. She was followed by miners, echelons with equipment and various units. The Parkhomenko Coal Engineering Plant was relocated from Voroshilovgrad to Karaganda, and from Moscow - the Mining Institute with faculty and students.

The supply of Kuznetsk and Karaganda coal to metallurgical plants, especially to the Urals, was extremely difficult due to the extreme congestion of the railways. Therefore, the construction of new mines and open-pit mines in the eastern regions was of great importance for increasing coal production.

The oil industry found itself in more favorable conditions compared to other sectors. All refineries were quickly switched over to the production of aviation gasoline (primarily high-octane), fuel and lubricants for tanks and ships.

During June - October 1941, the level of oil production was higher than in the same months of the previous year ( ). However, by the end of the year, due to the lack of pipes, as well as due to transportation difficulties, the total oil production was reduced and amounted in December to only 65.8 percent of the June 1941 level ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 32, fol. 172.).

Considering the huge demand for oil products, the party and the government, in accordance with the military-economic plan for the 4th quarter of 1941 and for 1942, outlined a large capital construction in the regions of Second Baku, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Along with this, the task was set to speed up the construction of new and the expansion of a number of operating oil refineries and plants in Ufa, Saratov, Syzran, Orsk, Ishimbay and other places.

From the very first months of the war, measures were taken to further develop the country's electric power industry. The capacity in the east was insufficient to meet the needs of the growing military industry. The redistribution of electricity resources was carried out: first of all, the military, metallurgical and coal industries were supplied with it; electricity consumption was significantly limited by a number of other industries and the population. On July 10, the Soviet government adopted a decision "On speeding up the construction of power plants in the Urals." At an accelerated pace, work was carried out to add to the number of operating power plants in Western Siberia.

To speed up the start-up of new power plants, the volume of construction and installation work was reduced, thermal and electrical circuits, structures of buildings and structures were simplified.

Mechanical engineering and metal products enterprises played an extremely important role in military production. A number of the largest machine-building plants were transferred to the defense commissariats. Heavy engineering was almost entirely switched to the production of tanks, guns, mortars, and ammunition.

To organize a well-coordinated military economy, it was necessary, along with the restructuring of the work of existing enterprises, to launch new capital construction.

The organization changed dramatically construction works, terms and norms of design, construction methods. The list of shock construction projects included military enterprises, power plants, enterprises of the metallurgical, fuel and chemical industries, and railways.

By the decision of the State Defense Committee of July 8, 1941, in the system of the People's Commissariat for Construction, on the basis of the existing construction and assembly trusts, special construction and assembly units (OSMCH) were created, which were, to a certain extent, paramilitary organizations. They secured permanent engineering and technical personnel and skilled workers.

On September 11, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, in order to speed up the commissioning of industrial enterprises with the cost of a minimum amount of materials, adopted a decision "On the construction of industrial enterprises in wartime" ( Party and government decisions on economic issues, vol. 3, p. 49.), which provided for the use of wood and other materials in construction and the limitation of the use of metal and reinforced concrete for this purpose.

The front of construction work has moved to the east. The main construction projects were concentrated in the Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia, where, along with the construction of new power plants, mines, factories, evacuated enterprises were being restored.

Great work on relocating enterprises and deploying shock construction in the east of the country was carried out by such major organizers of industrial and construction business as N.A. Dygai, V.E.Dymshits, L, B. Safrazyan, K.M.Sokolov, P.A. Yudin and others.

Blast furnaces at the Magnitogorsk and Chusovsky plants, the Chebarkulsky high-quality steel plant, the automobile plants in Ulyanovsk and Miass, the Altai tractor plant in Rubtsovsk and Sibtyazhmash in Krasnoyarsk, a number of aircraft and tank plants, ammunition factories and other defense enterprises values.

The rapid concentration of forces and resources in decisive areas made it possible to build defense facilities of paramount importance in the shortest possible time.

The deployment of military production was accompanied by the mobilization and redistribution of not only material, but also labor resources. The problem of cadres during the war has become especially acute. The conscription into the army, the exclusion from the sphere of production of the population who ended up in the occupied territory, led to a reduction in the number of workers and employees from 31.5 million by the beginning of 1941 to 18.5 million by the end of the year.

The labor shortage in the leading industries was partially compensated for by other sectors of the national economy, the introduction of compulsory overtime work, and the abolition of regular and additional vacations. This made it possible to increase the equipment load by about a third ( History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, vol. 5, book. 1, p. 286.).

Hundreds of thousands of Soviet patriots, primarily women and youth, voluntarily came to industry, construction and transport. In the second half of 1941 alone, 500 thousand housewives and 360 thousand students in grades 8-10 were involved in production. The system of state labor reserves remained a significant source of replenishment of the ranks of qualified personnel.

Thanks to the help and assistance of party, trade union and Komsomol organizations, the Committee for the Registration and Distribution of Labor from July 1941 to January 1942 was able to transfer to the defense industry from local industry enterprises, from the service sector, industrial cooperation, communal services and to mobilize from among the unemployed urban and rural population 120 850 people. In addition, construction battalions and work columns of 608.5 thousand people were sent to coal mines, oil fields, power plants, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, construction and railway transport.

All these extraordinary measures largely determined the favorable prospects for the development of military production.

Agricultural restructuring. Agriculture occupied one of the most important places in the mobilization of the country's economic resources. He was faced with the task of providing the front and the population in the rear with food, and industry with raw materials, and create state food reserves.

At the same time, it was necessary to harvest crops in a timely manner and evacuate agricultural machinery and livestock from the threatened areas.

The restructuring of agriculture proceeded in extremely difficult and difficult conditions. The most able-bodied and qualified part of the male population of the village went to the front. Hundreds of thousands of kolkhoz and kolkhoz women, workers of state farms were mobilized to work in industry, in logging, and in the front-line areas - for the construction of defensive structures. The entire able-bodied rural population, from adolescents to old people, entered the fields of the country. Women on the collective and state farms have always been a great force, but now all the worries are almost entirely on their shoulders. Hundreds of thousands of women have mastered tractors and combines. During the first one and a half to two months of the war, the machine and tractor stations (MTS) trained 198 thousand tractor drivers and 48 thousand combine operators. Almost 175 thousand of them were women ( "Peasant", 1941, No. 13-14, p. 7.).

Due to the lack of people in the countryside, the harvest in 1941 was delayed. The working people of the country's cities came to the aid of the collective and state farms. Millions of townspeople, including schoolchildren and students, took part in the field work. In July - August 1941 in the fields of the country, after accelerated training, 25 155 tractor drivers and 16 thousand students worked as combine operators ( Yuri Harutyunyan. Agricultural machine operators. M., 1960, p. 80.).

However, the progress of agricultural work was negatively affected by a lack of technology. There were not enough spare parts. Almost the entire fleet of powerful diesel tractors, most of the vehicles and a significant number of horses were sent to the active army. The total number of tractors in agriculture in terms of 15-horsepower decreased by the end of 1941 to 441.8 thousand against 683.8 thousand in 1940. The number of trucks decreased from 228.2 thousand in 1940. up to 66 thousand in 1941. Therefore, during the harvest of the first war year, along with the use of technology, manual labor was used. On the collective farms in the rear regions of the country, 67 percent of the ear crops were harvested by horse-drawn vehicles and by hand, on the state farms - 13 percent ( History of the USSR from ancient times to the present day. T. X. M., 1973, p. 81.).

The labor heroism of collective farmers and state farm workers matched the heroism of the soldiers at the front. On the collective and state farm fields there was a real battle for grain, for victory. In the front-line areas, every day lost for harvesting threatened to lose the entire harvest. Pravda wrote in those days: “Grown by laboring hands, a rich harvest is earning ... Thieving, envious fascist eyes will burrow on him. Hitler ... robbed the countries of Western Europe. And now, sowing death, ruin, poverty, hunger on his way, he is getting close to the bread of the Soviet peasant. This will not happen "( Pravda, July 28, 1941).

In the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldavia, in the Leningrad, Smolensk, Kalinin and other regions of the RSFSR, which became the arena of battles, collective farmers, workers of state farms and MTS often harvested bread under enemy fire. In order to preserve the harvest, to preserve herds and public buildings, the rural population in these areas proactively organized fire protection and air defense. Thus, millions of poods of grain and other agricultural products were saved. The collective farms of the eastern regions of Ukraine fulfilled the plan for harvesting grain in 1941 by 93.8 percent. Over 2.3 million tons of grain were procured in the republic.

Taking measures to maintain grain production at the required level in subsequent years, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 6347, fol. one.). It was also considered expedient to expand the sowing of grain crops in the cotton-growing regions of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.

The unfavorable development of events at the front had a heavy impact on agriculture. The number of collective farms decreased from 236.9 thousand in 1940 to 149.7 thousand by the end of 1941, state farms - from 4159 to 2691, MTS - from 7069 to 4898. Gross grain harvest decreased from 95.6 million tons in 1940 to 55.9 million tons in 1941. The country received less than thousands of tons of sugar beets, sunflowers and potatoes.

The number of livestock has sharply decreased. As of January 1, 1942, in comparison with the same month of the previous year, it decreased: cattle - from 54.8 million; heads to 31.4 million, pigs - from 27.6 million to 8.2 million, sheep and goats - from 91.7 million to 70.6 million, horses - from 21 million to 10 million. ( IVI. Documents and materials, inv. No. 32, fol. 325.). Accordingly, government purchases of agricultural products also decreased.

Under these conditions, the role of the eastern regions of the country increased significantly, where already in the fall of 1941 the total area of ​​winter crops in comparison with 1940 had significantly increased. The 1942 plan provided for a further increase in sown areas for grain, industrial, vegetable and melon crops and potatoes by more than 4 million hectares ( History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945, vol. 2, pp. 167-168.).

Preparing for the spring of 1942, the collective and state farms felt even more acutely the lack of people and draft power. Party organizations took measures to involve the entire population capable of work in collective and state farm production.

The problem of labor resources was not limited only to a shortage of workers. Large-scale agricultural production needed experienced managers, qualified specialists, and machine operators. Most of these cadres were men before the war. The party recommended that local bodies be more bold in nominating leading collective farmers, mostly women, to the leadership positions - to the posts of chairmen and brigadiers.

The problem of restoring technology has become acute. Worn-out cars needed repair, spare parts were required, and their production was reduced. At the beginning of 1942, on the initiative of the Komsomol members of the Ilovlinskaya MTS of the Stalingrad Region, a movement for the collection and restoration of parts for agricultural machines began throughout the country.

The city provided constant assistance to the village in the repair of equipment. Industrial enterprises, together with work teams, sent machine tools, metal and tools to the workshops of the MTS and state farms.

As a result, by the spring sowing campaign of 1942, the plan renovation works was almost completely completed, the main part of the tractor fleet was in working order.

Livestock breeding experienced great difficulties: there was not enough feed, the construction of farms was stopped, and animal health services worsened.

In Kazakhstan, in particular, the land authorities were staffed with livestock technicians and veterinarians only by half. The use of cows in the field reduced milk yield. Mortality and slaughter of livestock increased.

On March 11, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) made a decision on measures to preserve young animals and increase the number of livestock. The party and the government demanded to achieve complete retention of young animals on collective farms, state farms, private farms of collective farmers, workers and employees. The state encouraged collective farms that raised young animals in every possible way, provided them with loans, tax incentives, and allocated additional land for use for hayfields and grazing.

Despite the reduction in agricultural production, the Soviet peasantry did everything not to remain in debt to the front. Thanks to socialist production relations, the country's agriculture was able to become a solid support for the front. Having mobilized all human and material resources, it was able to fully use its material and technical base, maintain the required level of production of basic products and, at the cost of the strenuous, selfless efforts of the village workers, provide the army and the population with food.

Rebuilding of transport. The transfer of the economy to the rails of war was closely connected with transport, especially with the railroad. His important role during the war was primarily in the fact that he ensured uninterrupted delivery to the front of a huge number of troops, military equipment, weapons, ammunition, food and equipment, as well as massive national economic transportation. Lenin pointed out the special place of railway transport in modern military conflicts, calling it "the most important material factor of war, which is of paramount importance not only for carrying out military operations, but also for supplying the Red Army with combat and clothing equipment and food" ( V.I. Lenin, Poly. collection cit., vol. 38, p. 400.).

It was possible to successfully solve the entire complex of the most complex problems facing the transport only by quickly reorganizing its work in a military manner. The beginning of this big deal was the transfer of train traffic from June 24 to a special military schedule - the letter "A", which was introduced by order of the People's Commissariat of Railways on June 23, 1941 instead of the military schedule of 1938 ( CA MPS, f. 43, op. 49, d. 1421, l. 2; d. 1443, l. 2.). The new schedule provided for the priority advancement of military echelons and especially mobilization cargo. It was designed for the maximum capacity of the road sections.

In transport, a special system for regulating cargo flows began to be applied, taking into account the increased amount of cargo planned in a centralized manner. A significant part of the rolling stock was converted to transport military units, military equipment, ammunition, and the wounded. In the fronts, the posts of NKPS commissioners were established, endowed with great rights. Measures were taken to increase the capacity of the most important nodes in the eastern regions. In the deep rear, the construction of new railways and highways began.

The relocation of industry to the east and the new location of military enterprises required organizing the work of transport, taking into account changes in the economic structure of the eastern regions. Before the war, the network of the Ural-Siberian roads was underdeveloped and worked with great stress. The relocation of a large industrial base here further increased the disproportion between the level of industrial development and the state of transport.

Insufficient capacity of the country's eastern railways, which was especially felt with the onset of winter, hampered economic transportation, and a number of large enterprises did not receive the required amount of raw materials and fuel. In early February, the coal reserves at the Magnitogorsk Combine remained for 5-6 days. Due to a lack of ore, the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant was under threat of stopping work.

Finished products were not exported from the enterprises. In January 1942, the average daily loading on railway transport was more than two times lower than the pre-war indicators ( G. Kumanev. Soviet railway workers during the Great Patriotic War (1941 - 1945). M., 1963, p. 99.).

The railroads lacked steam locomotives and fuel. At the beginning of the year, up to 3 thousand trains stood without steam locomotives. Two thirds of them were carrying evacuated equipment ( "Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1961, No. 6, p. 80.).

Urgent measures were needed to correct the situation. On January 24, 1942, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree on accelerating the rate of loading and moving trains with coal along the roads of the Urals and Siberia. For the eastern highways, specific tasks were set to implement this government decision.

On February 14, 1942, a Transport Committee was created under the State Defense Committee, which included I.V. Stalin (chairman), A.A. Andreev (deputy), A.I. Mikoyan, I.V. Kovalev, A.V. Khrulev, G. V. Kovalev, 3. A. Shashkov, P. P. Shirshov, A. G. Karponosov and others. His task was to plan and coordinate transportation on the main modes of transport, develop effective measures to improve the material and technical base of the entire transport system.

Due to the acute shortage of coal, by the decision of the State Defense Committee, the locomotive fleet of a number of roads was switched to wood fuel and a fuel mixture.

At the same time, the State Defense Committee changed the structure of railways management and strengthened the leadership of the NKPS. Instead of L.M. Kaganovich, who, as noted in the GKO decree of March 25, 1942, could not cope with the work in a military situation, was put at the head of the People's Commissariat of Railways, General A. V. Khrulev.

In March and April 1942, the party and government adopted a series of new measures to improve the work of transport. The salaries of railway workers of train and shunting brigades were increased. Excess rolling stock from the western front-line roads moved to the east.

Thanks to these measures and the selfless labor of railway workers, transportation for the army and the national economy increased. By the beginning of May 1942, on only 10 central highways, the volume of loading and unloading had increased by 50 percent, and the idle time of wagons had noticeably decreased.

Other types of transport were also rebuilt. As a result, the level of its cargo turnover gradually increased, which can be seen from Table 3.

Soviet transport workers took a worthy place in the selfless struggle of home front workers for the creation of a well-coordinated military economy capable of ensuring victory over the enemy.

The national economy of the USSR for 70 years

Anniversary statistical yearbook

ECONOMY OF THE USSR IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

« The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War fully revealed the advantages of socialism, its enormous economic, socio-political and spiritual potential. It was the Victory of the Soviet state created by the great Lenin, the most advanced social system, the socialist economic system."(Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU" On the 40th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 ").

The victory in the Great Patriotic War was a vivid confirmation of the correctness of the party's policy, which in the pre-war years steadily pursued a course towards a significant increase in the country's economic and defense potential. The plans of all pre-war five-year plans were aimed at solving this problem.

Using all the resources, industry and other industries continuously expanded the production of products for the needs of the army.

Basic indicators economic development USSR during the war years

The war dramatically changed the tasks facing the Soviet economy. Of particular importance in the first months of the war was the massive redeployment from the front and front-line areas of a huge amount of valuables, equipment and millions of people for thousands of kilometers to the eastern regions of the country, providing in the shortest possible time at a new place of production, urgently needed by the front. A total of 2,593 enterprises were evacuated from July to December 1941 from the threatened areas. Among them there were 1523 large enterprises, of which 1360 enterprises, mainly military ones, were evacuated in the first three months of the war.

Of the total number of large enterprises evacuated, 226 were sent to the Volga region, 667 to the Urals, 244 to Western Siberia, 78 to Eastern Siberia, 308 to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. More than 10 million people were transported to the rear areas by rail, more than 2 million people were transported by water.

During the war, about 1.5 million wagons, or 30 thousand trains with evacuated goods, traveled by rail from areas threatened by seizure by the enemy.

2.4 million heads of cattle, 5.1 million heads of sheep and goats, 0.2 million pigs, 0.8 million horses, a lot of agricultural machinery, grain and other foodstuffs were moved from the western regions.

The temporary loss of economically very important regions and industrial centers in the first months of the war had a heavy impact on the work of all sectors of the national economy. Late 1941-early 1942 was the most difficult and critical period for the Soviet economy. The national economy experienced an acute shortage of labor, fuel, electricity, raw materials, and various materials. The volume of gross industrial output from June to December 1941 decreased 1.9 times. But already in December 1941, the decline in industrial production was stopped.

By the middle of 1942, the lost capacity of the military industry was not only restored, but also surpassed. The Soviet Union has created a well-coordinated war economy capable of ensuring the production of war products on an increasing scale.

The radical change in the work of industry, which began in the second half of 1942, was consolidated in 1943; in comparison with 1940, the output of the defense industries has more than doubled.

The USSR surpassed Nazi Germany as a whole in 1942 in the production of tanks and self-propelled guns by 3.9 times, combat aircraft by 1.9, guns of all types and calibers by 3.1, rifles and carbines by 3 times. More ammunition was fired.

The climax of the growth of the war economy of the USSR was 1944. In 1944, the USSR produced more than in 1942, tanks and self-propelled guns by one-fifth, and combat aircraft by 1.5 times.

The creation of a solid base of military-industrial production in the East of the country was of decisive importance for the well-coordinated work of all parts of the economy.

In 1942, 20 new electric furnaces and 9 rolling mills began to produce metal in the eastern regions. The total capacity of the turbines put into operation in 1942 in these regions amounted to 672 thousand kW. The Chelyabinsk CHPP, Karagandinskaya TPP, Kirovo-Chepetskaya CHPP were put into operation.

In total, during the war years, production in the Urals increased 3.6 times, in Siberia - 2.8 times, in the Volga region - 2.4 times.

The output of military products increased at a particularly high rate in the eastern regions of the country. So, in 1942, compared with 1940, in the Urals, it increased more than 5 times, in the Volga region - 9 times, in the regions of Western Siberia - 27 times.

During the war years, the high efficiency of the military economy was ensured, and, first of all, of the defense industries. For three years, from May 1942 to May 1945, labor productivity in industry increased by 43%, and in the defense industries by 2.2 times.

Along with an increase in labor productivity, the costs of producing the most important types of weapons have been significantly reduced. In 1944, the cost of all types of military products, compared with 1940, decreased on average by 2 times. Generally economic effect from reducing the cost of military products for 1941-1944. amounted to an amount equal to almost half of all expenses State budget USSR for military needs in 1942

Soviet. the state, relying on its own resources, solved the most difficult problem of rearmament and material support of the multimillion army. Lend-lease deliveries to the USSR accounted for about 4% of industrial production in our country.

The war test showed that it was the advantages of the socialist economy that made it possible to withstand and win in the most difficult conditions.

Smelting about 3 times less steel and producing almost 5 times less coal than Nazi Germany (taking into account the import from the occupied countries, annexed territories and imports), “During the war, the Soviet Union created almost 2 times more weapons and military equipment.

This article examines some of the economic aspects of the development of the domestic military-industrial complex during the Soviet period in the history of the XX century. In our work, we rely to a large extent on archived data.

During the Civil War and "War Communism", in conditions of international isolation, all weapons were to be produced domestically, relying on domestic resources. Since 1919, enterprises that served the artillery, navy, aviation, engineer troops and commissary were removed from the jurisdiction of various departments and transferred to the authority of the Council of War Industry of the All-Russian Council of National Economy (VSNKh).

With the transition to a new economic policy, the reorganization of the management of the national economy began. In the state industry, including the military, group associations began to be created - trusts, which were supposed to work on the principles of cost accounting. In accordance with the decree on trusts of April 10, 1923, the Main Directorate of the USSR Military Industry was created as part of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, to which arms, cartridge, gun, gunpowder, aviation and other military-profile factories were subordinate; Aviatrest existed independently. In 1925, the military industry came under the jurisdiction of the Military-Industrial Directorate of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, consisting of 4 trusts - arms-arsenal, cartridge-tube, military-chemical and rifle-machine-gun.

In general, the military industry has been in operation since the mid-1920s. began to be transferred to the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies of the state, self-supporting principles in this area turned out to be unviable. With the beginning of forced industrialization, there was a transition to a more rigid system of state planning and industrial management, first through the system of sectoral central administrations, and then sectoral ministries 1.
Bystrova Irina Vladimirovna - Doctor of Historical Sciences (Institute of Russian History, RAS).

The starting point for a new round of militarization and the creation of a military industry can be considered the so-called period of the "war threat" of 1926-1927. and the subsequent rejection of NEP - the "great turning point" of 1929. By the decision of the Administrative meeting of the Labor and Defense Council (RZ STO) of June 25, 1927, the Mobilization Planning Directorate of the Supreme Council of National Economy was created, which was to lead the preparation of industry for war. The main "working apparatuses" of the RZ STO in preparation for war were the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, which was responsible for training the army, and the State Planning Committee of the USSR, which was in charge of developing the control figures of the national economy "in case of war." The People's Commissariat of Finance, in turn, was supposed to consider "estimates of extraordinary expenses for the first month of the war" 2.

In specially developed resolutions of the State Planning Commission and the RZ STO on the control figures of the 1927/28 financial year, this time period was considered as "a conditional period when the main processes of transition to working conditions during the war (mobilization) are taking place in the national economy", and the whole next year - as the period when "the main transition processes have already been completed." In an atmosphere of "military threat", most of these plans were of a paper-declarative nature. Military spending has not yet grown significantly: the main funds were spent on preparing the "industrial leap", and the defense industry has not yet emerged organizationally.

The emergence of classified, numbered factories dates back to this period. At the end of the 20s. "Personnel" military factories began to be assigned numbers behind which the former names were hidden. In 1927, there were 56 such factories, and by April 1934, 68 enterprises were included in the list of "personnel" military factories approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of July 13, 1934 established a special regime and benefits for enterprises of defense significance - the so-called special-regime factories.

The main task of the secrecy regime was "to ensure the maximum safety of factories of defense significance, to create strong guarantees against the penetration of hostile, counter-revolutionary and hostile elements into them, as well as to prevent their actions aimed at disrupting or weakening the production activities of factories" 3. This system was significantly strengthened and expanded in the post-war, "nuclear" era of the development of the defense industry.

To finance the so-called special works of a narrowly defensive nature at civilian industry enterprises, special loans were allocated from the budget, which had the purpose of ensuring the independence of defense work from the general financial condition enterprises 4. The figures of the actual military expenditures of the state were allocated in the budget on a separate line and were classified.

The emergence of specific defense industries became possible only on the basis of accelerated industrialization, the creation of heavy industry. After the liquidation of the Supreme Council of the National Economy in 1932, the defense industry was transferred to the system of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. Since the mid-30s. the process of organizational separation of the defense industry from the basic branches of heavy industry began. In 1936, military production was allocated to the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry (NKOP). This was the stage of "quantitative accumulation". The growth rates of the military industry, according to official data, noticeably outstripped the development of industry as a whole. So, if the total volume of industrial production in the second five-year period increased by 120%, then defense - by 286%. During the three pre-war years, this lead was already triple 5.

1939-1941 (before the start of the war) represented a special period when the foundations of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex (MIC) were fixed. The restructuring of the national economy had a pronounced militaristic character. During these years, a system of governing bodies for the defense industry was formed. The general management of the development of mobilization planning in 1938-1941, as well as supervision over the activities of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, was carried out by the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, whose chairman was J.V. Stalin. The Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars monitored the activities of the defense industry. During the war years, all functions of managing the defense industry were transferred to the State Defense Committee (GKO).

In 1939, the NKOP split into specialized defense people's commissariats: weapons, ammunition, aviation, shipbuilding industries. To coordinate the mobilization plan of industry in 1938, an interdepartmental Military-Industrial Commission was created. The military departments - the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy, as well as the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) were the main customers and consumers of military products. A characteristic feature of the period of the first five-year plans was the significant role of the military in the formation of the defense industry, which increased even more in the pre-war years. So, from 1938 to 1940. the contingent of military representatives of NGOs at the enterprises of the defense industry increased by one and a half times and amounted to 20,281 people. 6

For our study, this period is especially important as an experience of the functioning of the military mobilization model of the Soviet economy, the essential features of which manifested themselves at subsequent stages in the history of the USSR and became the foundation of the Soviet military-industrial complex. These features included the subordination of the interests of the civilian consumer to the solution of military tasks. One of the main tasks of the third five-year plan, the government considered strengthening the defense capability of the USSR "on such a scale that would provide a decisive advantage for the USSR in any coalition of attacking capitalist countries." In this regard, according to the plan of the third five-year plan, compared with 1937, expenditures on the national economy as a whole increased by 34.1%, on social and cultural events - by 72.1%, and on defense - by 321.1%. ... Military expenditures were supposed to amount to 252 billion rubles, or 30.2% of all state budget expenditures 7.

A characteristic feature of the Soviet mobilization model was the attraction of funds from the population through the so-called state loans (many of which the state did not intend to return). In 1937, a special loan for strengthening the defense of the USSR was issued for 4 billion rubles, however, according to the People's Commissariat of Finance (NKF), the subscription to this loan turned out to be even higher - 4,916 million rubles. (most of it fell on the urban population). As stated in the circular of the NKF of April 9, 1938, in accordance with the "large growth in the current year of the fund for wages and incomes of the collective farm village", it became possible "this year to significantly exceed the loan amount" 8. This practice became an integral part of the Soviet economic system.

Even sharper shifts towards militarization were outlined in the so-called IV special quarter of 1939, when a mobilization plan - MP-1 - for arming the army was put into effect, requiring the restructuring of the entire industry. It provided for the establishment of a list of construction projects, for the development of which funds were allocated in excess of the established limits, and also the military departments received priority over civilian consumers. From total amount capital investments for construction in 5.46 billion rubles. investments in defense construction projects and enterprises amounted to 3.2 billion rubles, i.e. more than half of 9.

Emergency mobilization plans were also adopted in 1940-1941. In connection with the introduction of mobilization plans, military orders were placed at enterprises of all industries, up to factories for the production of children's toys and musical instruments. Oftentimes, the implementation of these plans required a complete change of their production profile from civilian to military. At the same time, the process of transferring enterprises from civilian departments to military ones, which then took on a massive character during the war, began. In 1940, more than 40 enterprises were transferred to the defense departments 10.

The actual average annual growth rate of defense production in the first two years of the pre-war five-year plan was 143.1%, over three years - 141%, against 127.3% of the average annual rate established by the third five-year plan. The volume of production of the gross output of the people's commissariats of the defense industry has increased 2.8 times over three years 11. An even more intense program was planned for 1941. The industrial authorities were obliged to ensure that all consumers prioritize the fulfillment of military orders for aviation, weapons, ammunition, military shipbuilding and tanks.

In the pre-war years, a new military-industrial base began to be created in the east of the country. The idea of ​​developing the eastern regions from the very beginning of its inception was strategically linked to the growth of the country's military potential and the solution of defense tasks. Even before the war, the Urals became a new center of military production, and the development of the Far East from this point of view began. However, a decisive shift in this regard occurred during the war years, which was primarily associated with the occupation or the threat of the enemy seizing most of the European territory of the USSR.

During the war period, there was a massive movement of industry to the eastern regions: in total, more than 1,300 enterprises were evacuated and restored in the east, most of which were under the jurisdiction of the defense commissariats. At 4/5 they produced military products.

The structure of industrial production, which must be transferred to the satisfaction of military needs, has also radically changed. According to rough estimates, items of military consumption accounted for about 65-68% of all industrial products produced in the USSR during the war years 12. Its main producers were the people's commissariats of the military industry: aviation, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons, shipbuilding and tank industries. At the same time, other basic branches of heavy industry were also involved in securing military orders: metallurgy, fuel and energy, as well as the People's Commissars of the light and food industries. Thus, the development of the economic structure of the military-industrial complex in the war years was in the nature of total militarization.

During the Great Patriotic War, the country lost three quarters of its national wealth. Industry was badly destroyed in the territories that were under the occupation, and in the rest it was almost completely transferred to the production of military products. The total population of the USSR decreased from 196 million people. in 1941 to 170 million in 1946, i.e. by 26 million people thirteen

One of the main tasks in the first post-war years for the USSR was the restoration and further buildup military-economic base of the country. To solve it in the conditions of economic devastation, it was necessary first of all to find new sources of restoration and development of priority sectors of the national economy. According to official Soviet propaganda, this process should have been designed for "internal resources", for ridding the country of economic dependence from a hostile capitalist encirclement.

Meanwhile, this dependence by the end of the war remained very significant. The analysis of the ratio of imports of the most important types of equipment and materials and their domestic production, carried out by Soviet economists in 1944, showed that, for example, imports of metal-cutting machines accounted for 58%, universal machines - up to 80%, crawler cranes (their domestic industry did not manufacture) - 287%. The situation with non-ferrous metals was similar: lead - 146%, tin - 170%. Particular difficulties arose with the need to develop domestic production of goods that were supplied during the war years under Lend-Lease (for many types of raw materials, materials and food, the proportion of these supplies ranged from 30 to 80%) 14.

In the first post-war years, one of the most important sources of resources was the export of materials and equipment for the so-called special supplies - trophy, as well as for reparations and agreements from Germany, Japan, Korea, Romania, Finland, Hungary. The Commission for the Compensation of Damage Caused by the Hitlerite invaders, created in early 1945, made a general assessment of the human and material losses of the USSR during the war years, developed a plan for the military and economic disarmament of Germany, and discussed the problem of reparations on an international scale.

Practical activities for the removal of equipment were carried out by the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, as well as special commissions from representatives of economic departments. They compiled lists of enterprises and equipment, laboratories and research institutes that were subject to "confiscation" and shipment to the USSR as reparations. By the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars "On the dismantling and export to the Soviet Union of equipment from Japanese power plants, industrial enterprises and railways located on the territory of Manchuria", the management of this work was entrusted to the authorized Special Committee under the SNK MZ Saburov. By December 1, 1946, 305 thousand tons of equipment had arrived in the USSR from Manchuria with a total value of 116.3 million US dollars. In total, over the two years of the Special Committee's work in the USSR, about 1 million wagons of various equipment were exported from 4,786 German and Japanese enterprises, including 655 military enterprises 15. At the same time, the greatest interest from the Soviet side was caused by German developments in the field the latest species weapons of mass destruction.

By the summer of 1946, there were about two million prisoners of war in the USSR - a huge reserve of labor. The labor of prisoners of war was widely used in the Soviet national economy (especially in construction) during the first post-war five-year plan. German technical groundwork and the work of specialists were actively used at the initial stages of domestic rocketry, atomic projects, and in military shipbuilding.

Eastern European countries also played the role of suppliers of strategic raw materials at the early stage of the creation of the nuclear industry in the USSR, especially in 1944-1946. As uranium deposits were explored in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, the Soviet authorities followed the path of creating joint stock companies for their development under the guise of mining companies. To develop the Bukovskoye field in Bulgaria, at the beginning of 1945, the Soviet-Bulgarian Mining Society was created under the auspices of the NKVD of the USSR 16. The field became the main source of raw materials for the first Soviet reactor.

The countries of the eastern block continued to be the most important source of uranium until the early 1950s. As N. A. Bulganin emphasized in his speech at the "anti-Beria" Plenum of the Central Committee of July 3, 1953, the state was "well supplied with uranium raw materials," and a lot of uranium was mined in the GDR - "maybe not less than the Americans are at their disposal ”17.

The most important resource of the post-war restoration and building up of the economic and defense power of the USSR was the mobilization potential of the centralized planned economy to concentrate forces and resources on the most priority directions from the point of view of the country's leadership. One of the traditional levers of compulsory mobilization was the financial and tax policy of the state. At the end of the war, in the IV quarter of 1945, the state, it would seem, gave relief to the population, reducing the war tax by 180 million rubles, but at the same time a war loan was organized (by subscription of the peasants) for 400 million rubles. 18 Food prices were increased in September 1946 by 2-2.5 times. In 1948 the size of the agricultural tax increased in comparison with 1947 by 30%, and in 1950 - 2.5 times 19.

In general, the course taken by the leadership of the USSR for military and economic competition with the West, and above all with the much more developed economically and technologically the United States, was carried out at the cost of considerable hardships for the majority of the country's population. At the same time, it should be noted that the implementation of the Soviet atomic and other programs for the creation of the latest weapons in general responded in the post-war years to the mass sentiments of the Soviet people, who were willing to endure difficulties and hardships in order to prevent a new war.

One of the resources for economic mobilization was massive forced labor. The system of the NKVD camps became the basis for the creation of the atomic and other branches of the military industry. In addition to the labor of prisoners compatriots, at the end of the 40s. the labor of prisoners of war was widely used and a system of organized recruitment of labor from various strata of the population was applied. A peculiar semi-compulsory form was the work of military builders and specialists, the importance of which especially increased after the abolition of the system of mass camps in the mid-1950s.

In the first post-war years, it was impossible to maintain the size of the armed forces and the size of defense production on a wartime scale, and therefore a number of measures were taken to reduce the military potential. In this regard, two stages are outwardly distinguished in the military-economic policy of the Stalinist leadership: 1945-1948. and late 40s - early 50s. The first was characterized by tendencies towards demilitarization of the Soviet economy, reduction of armed forces and military spending. Real indicator These tendencies were the demobilization of the army, carried out in several stages from June 1945 to early 1949. In general, by the end of 1948 - early 1949, the Soviet Army was generally reduced from more than 11 million people. up to 2.8 million people twenty

In the first post-war years, the country's leadership also proclaimed a course for the restructuring of industry for civilian production. After the reorganization of the management system in May 1945, the number of defense people's commissariats decreased, and military production was concentrated in the People's Commissars of arms, aviation, shipbuilding, agricultural and transport engineering (in March 1946 they were renamed ministries).

The implementation of the policy of reducing military production and increasing the output of civilian products began already at the end of 1945 and was under the personal control of the Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee (after the war - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) L.P. Beria, who concentrated control in his hands over heavy industry. However, his instructions to carry out the "conversion" of enterprises to civilian production were rather contradictory. On the one hand, he spurred on the directors of enterprises in every possible way, who were accustomed to working in extreme military conditions, to drive defense products and experienced great difficulties in the transition to civilian production. On the other hand, Beria gave orders to maintain and increase the production of a wide range of military products - gunpowder, explosives, chemical ammunition, etc. 21

In 1946-1947. the production of a number of types of conventional weapons - tanks and aircraft - was significantly reduced. The leaders of the defense industry departments actively resisted the policy of "conversion": the ministers D.F. Ustinov, M.V. Khrunichev, M.G. Pervukhin and others attacked higher authorities, right up to Stalin himself, with requests to preserve "unique" military production and on increasing the production of new types of defense products. Attempts to demilitarize industry led to a deterioration in the state of the industrial sector of the economy, which had already been destroyed by the war. Within 6-9 months from the beginning of industrial restructuring, the output of civilian products only to a small extent compensated for the decline in military production. This led to a decrease in the total volume of production, a deterioration in quality indicators, and a reduction in the number of workers. Only in the second quarter of 1946 did the volume of military output stabilize, civil output increased, and a gradual increase in production began.
According to official sources, the post-war industrial restructuring was completed already in 1947, as evidenced by the following 22 figures:

According to official data, military production in 1940 amounted to 24 billion rubles, in 1944 - 74 billion, in 1945 - 50.5 billion, in 1946 - 14.5 billion, in 1947 the level of 1946 However, these figures must be treated with a certain degree of conventionality: they rather show the general dynamics than are reliable in absolute terms, since the prices for military products have decreased several times since 1941 23

The dynamics of military spending of the state budget looked as follows: in 1940 - 56.7 billion rubles, in 1944 - 137.7 billion, in 1945 - 128.7 billion, in 1946 - 73.7 billion, in 1947, the level of 1946 remained. Thus, even according to official statistics, state expenditures on military needs by the end of the "conversion" period exceeded the pre-war indicators of 1940.

In general, the process of reducing military production mainly affected the rapidly obsolete weapons of the last war, which were not required in the previous quantities. In 1946-1947. the proportion of civilian and military products has stabilized.

However, already in 1947, plans for the production of civilian products began to decline in a number of defense ministries (shipbuilding, aviation), and since 1949 there has been a sharp increase in military orders. During the first post-war five-year plan, the nomenclature of "special items" was almost completely renewed, i.e. military products, which paved the way for what began in the 50s. rearmament of the army and navy.

In the late 40s. a long-term plan for the production of armored vehicles was developed until 1970. After the failure of the program for the production of tanks in 1946-1947, a sharp drop in their production in 1948, starting in 1949, a constant and steady increase in the production of this industry was outlined. In connection with the war in Korea, since 1950, the production of aviation equipment has increased sharply 24.

On the whole, behind the external "demilitarization" was a new round of the arms race. Already in 1946, the Council of Ministers adopted a number of decisions on the development of the latest weapons, decisions on developments in the field of jet and radar technology. The construction of warships, suspended during the war, resumed: a ten-year program of military shipbuilding was adopted, the construction of 40 naval bases is planned. Extraordinary measures were taken to speed up the creation of the Soviet atomic bomb.

Along with the traditional defense ministries, to manage the new programs, emergency bodies were created under the Council of People's Commissars (since March 1946 - the Council of Ministers of the USSR): the Special Committee and the First Main Directorate (on the atomic problem), Committee No. 2 (on jet technology), the Committee No. 3 (by radar). The extraordinary, mobilization and experimental nature of these programs necessitated the concentration of resources of various departments in special supraministerial governing bodies.

On the whole, "demilitarization" was rather a side line of the post-war industrial restructuring, the main strategic direction of which was the assimilation and build-up of the latest types of weapons. The plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR for 1951-1955. in the military and special industries provided for a significant, year after year increasing volume of supplies of all types of military equipment, with special attention paid to the preparation of capacities for the production of new types of military equipment and strategic raw materials, the replenishment of special production capacities switched after the end of the war to other sectors of the national farms.

For six defense-industrial ministries (aircraft industry, weapons, agricultural engineering, transport engineering, communications industry, automotive industry), on average, the output of military products over the five-year period was supposed to increase 2.5 times. However, for some types of military equipment, a significantly greater growth was planned: for radar and armored vehicles - by 4.5 times. On a more significant scale, the production of atomic "products" increased, which was planned separately even from all other types of military products. To eliminate bottlenecks and imbalances in the national economy and to create new industries for the production of weapons - jet technology and radar equipment - the plan outlined the volume of capital investments in the main branches of the defense industry in the amount of 27,892 million rubles.

Moreover, in the early 1950s. this plan has been repeatedly revised upward. In March 1952, the size of capital investments in the military and defense-industrial departments was noticeably increased. The arbitrary adjustment of plans was generally a characteristic feature of the Soviet planning system. Another long-term trend, with the exception of certain periods, was the predominant growth in investments in the defense sector compared to other sectors. During the period under review, a kind of military-industrial revolution began in the country, accompanied by a sharp increase in military spending, an expansion of defense programs and a simultaneous increase in the influence of the professional military elite on the decision-making process on defense issues. Since the early 1950s. increased production plans different types conventional weapons of modernized models - tanks, self-propelled guns, aircraft; the forced rearmament of the army began.

According to official figures, the strength of the USSR Armed Forces increased in the early 1950s. almost up to 6 million people According to recently declassified information from the archives, the quantitative composition of the central apparatus of the War Ministry on September 1, 1952 increased in comparison with the pre-war indicator - on January 1, 1941 - by 242%: 23,075 people. against 9525 25. The unfolding of a new spiral of the arms race and confrontation was partly due to the aggravation of the international situation in the late 1940s and early 1950s. (The Berlin crisis, the creation of NATO, the war in Korea, etc.), partly with the strengthening of the role of the military machine in the life of Soviet society and the state.

Despite the new growth of the USSR's military programs in the early 1950s, by this time the military-industrial complex had not yet gained the political weight that would have allowed it to decisively influence the policy of the Soviet leadership. In 1953-1954. the stable course towards the deployment of military confrontation with the West was replaced by a contradictory period in economic and military policy. 1954-1958 became a rare period for Soviet history, a period of declining military spending and an increase in the share of the consumption sector in the gross national product.

In contrast to the growth of military programs in the preceding 1950-1952 years, the second half of 1953 and 1954 were already marked by some shift towards civilian production and the consumer. For example, a survey and design work according to the War Ministry in 1953 it was initially 43,225 million rubles, and then was reduced to 40,049 million, i.e. more than 3 million rubles. The plan for the military and special industries for 1954 was also adjusted downward: the growth of production in 1954 compared with 1953 instead of 107% according to the plan and 108.8% at the request of the Ministry of War was reduced to 106.9 %.

When assessing the dynamics of the gross national product, one should take into account a 5% decrease in wholesale prices for military products since January 1, 1953, as well as an increase in the output of civilian products. The decrease in the volume of gross output of a number of ministries in 1953 and according to the draft plan for 1954 was also explained by a decrease in the output of defense products and an increase in the output of consumer goods, which had lower wholesale prices. In general, the production of consumer goods in 1953 and 1954. significantly exceeded the volume of production envisaged for these years according to the five-year plan of 1951 - 1955. 26

The tendency to reduce military spending continued in subsequent years, when the influence of NS Khrushchev in the top leadership increased, right up to the establishment of his autocracy in the summer of 1957. military expenditures of the USSR were reduced by a total of one billion rubles. By the middle of 1957, the size of the army and navy decreased by 1.2 million people. - up to about 3 million people. - due to the program announced by Khrushchev to reduce the traditional branches of the Armed Forces (in particular, this concerned Stalin's plans to deploy conventional naval forces and weapons) and a shift in priorities towards missiles, electronics and nuclear weapons.

According to some Western estimates, during the first three years of Khrushchev's rule, the share of military spending in the country's gross national product (GNP) decreased from 12% to 9%, while the share of the consumption sector increased from 60% to 62%. In 1959, the growth in spending on the production of advanced weapons reversed this trend, and the USSR's military spending rose again to the 1955 level, although due to the rapid growth of the gross national product during this period, the percentage of military spending in GNP remained the same. After 1959, their share in GNP began to increase slowly but steadily. Military spending again took a priority place in the economic policy of the Soviet leadership. According to Western estimates, in the time interval from 1952 to 1970. the period of the highest growth rates of military spending in the USSR was 1961-1965, when the average growth rate reached 7.6% 28.

At the same time, the lion's share of military expenditures was precisely the expenditures on the production and operation of the latest weapons and their systems, and not on the maintenance of the troops. This trend of a predominant growth in expenditures on military equipment developed more and more noticeably in the context of the scientific and technological revolution.

The period of the late 1950s - early 1960s. characterized by the search for new principles of organizing the management of the national economy of the USSR, including the defense industry. By the time of the reorganization of the management of the national economy undertaken by N.S. Khrushchev in 1957-1958. The main weapons production programs were concentrated in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (nuclear program), the Ministry of Defense Industry (renamed from the Ministry of Armaments in 1953), the Ministry of the Radio Engineering Industry (created in 1954), as well as the Ministries of the Aviation and Shipbuilding Industry. As you know, in the late 1950s, the system of line ministries was abolished, enterprises of the defense industry, like other sectors of the economy, were transferred to the jurisdiction of local councils of the national economy. To organize research and development work on the creation of weapons, State Committees for aviation technology, defense technology, shipbuilding and radio electronics, and the use of atomic energy were created.

In general, Khrushchev's reform led to a certain decentralization and the establishment of links between defense and civilian enterprises, the expansion of the geographical and social framework of the Soviet military-industrial complex. According to N.S. Simonov, enterprises for the serial production of defense products were included in the system of regional economic ties, got out of the state of production and technological isolation. Local economic authorities were able to place orders on them that met local needs. Enterprises of the military-industrial complex (MIC) even began to show a tendency towards economic independence, which was manifested in the establishment of real contractual relations with the customer - the Ministry of Defense - in terms of pricing 29.

At the same time, in the context of decentralized management of the defense industry, the coordinating role of the most important state body at the supra-ministerial level, which was recreated in the late 1950s, has increased. Military-Industrial Commission under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers. It was headed in turn by the largest leaders of the Soviet military-industrial complex D.F. Ustinov, V.M. Ryabikov, L.N.Smirnov. The Commission became the main governing body of the defense industry during the 1960s and 1980s.

The return to the ministerial system after the displacement of NS Khrushchev at the end of 1964 contributed to the strengthening of the centralized planning principle in the management of the defense industry. The next "gathering" of military-profile enterprises into centralized sectoral ministries began. In particular, in 1965, the Ministry of General Machine Building was created, in which work on rocket and space technology was concentrated (earlier, these developments were scattered across the enterprises of a number of ministries). As a result of the 1965 reform, the so-called "nine" of defense-industrial ministries was finally formed, in which military production was mainly concentrated (the Ministries of the Aviation Industry, Defense Industry, General Engineering, Radio Industry, Medium Engineering, Shipbuilding Industry, Chemical Industry, Electronic Industry, electrical industry). They were joined by 10 allied ministries, also engaged in the production of military and civilian products.

The economic structure of the military-industrial complex was actually the supporting structure of the entire socio-economic system of the USSR. As of the end of the 1980s, defense industry enterprises produced 20-25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), absorbing the lion's share of the country's resources. The best scientific and technical developments and personnel were concentrated in the "defense industry": up to 3/4 of all scientific research and development works (R&D) were carried out in the defense industry. The enterprises of the defense complex produced most of the electrical civilian products: 90% of televisions, refrigerators, radios, 50% of vacuum cleaners, motorcycles, electric stoves. About Uz, the population of the country lived in the zone where the defense industry enterprises were located 30. All this at the same time led to an excessive inflation of the zone of "unproductive" expenditures for the production of weapons to the detriment of the sphere of consumption.
The Soviet military-industrial complex became the most important supplier of weapons for the countries of the "third world" and the "socialist camp". In the early 1980s. 25% of weapons and military equipment produced in the USSR were exported abroad. The size of military supplies for many years was considered highly classified information, which was partially revealed to the Russian public only in the early 1990s. During the post-war period, the USSR took part in armed conflicts and wars in more than 15 countries (by sending military specialists and contingents, as well as supplying weapons and military equipment in order to provide "international assistance"), including 31:

In general, by the beginning of the 1980s. The USSR became the world's first arms supplier (in terms of supply), ahead of even the United States in this respect. The Soviet military-industrial complex has gone beyond the framework of one state, becoming a major force in the world economy and international relations. At the same time, it became an increasingly heavy burden on the country's economy and an obstacle to improving the living standards of the Soviet people.

1 For more details see: N.S. Simonov. The military-industrial complex of the USSR in the 1920s-1950s: the rate of economic growth, structure, organization of production and management. M., 1996. Ch. 2; Mukhin M.Yu. The evolution of the management system of the Soviet defense industry in 1921-1941 and the change in the priorities of the "defense industry" // Otechestvennaya istoriya. 2000. No. 3. S. 3-15. On the structure of the defense industry in the late 20s - early 30s. see also: Russian State Archives of Economics (hereinafter - RGAE). F. 3429. Op. sixteen.
2 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 164.
3 See: ibid. D. 186.L. 107.
4 Ibid. F. 3429. Op. 16.D. 179.L. 238.
5 See: A. Lagovsky. Economy and military power of the state // Krasnaya Zvezda. 1969.25 October.
6 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. P. 132.
7 RGAE. F. 4372. Op. 92.D. 173.L. 115.
8 Ibid. F. 7733. Op. 36.D. 67.L. 45.
9 See: ibid. D. 158.L. 29-34.
10 Ibid. D. 310.L. 37.
11 Ibid. F. 4372. Op. 92.D. 265.Sheet 4.
12 Simonov N.S. Decree. op. P. 152.
13 See: USSR and the Cold War / Ed. V.S. Lelchuk, E.I. Pivovara. M "1995. S. 146.
14 According to documents from the RGAE funds.
15 For more details see: State Archives of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as the State Archives of the Russian Federation). F. 5446. Op. 52.D. 2.L. 45-116.
16 See: GA RF. F. 9401. On. 1.D. 92.L. 166-174.
17 See: The Beria case // Izv. Central Committee of the CPSU. 1991. No. 2. S. 169-170.
18 See: RGAE. F. 1562. Op. 329. D. 2261. L. 21-22.
19 USSR and the Cold War. P. 156.
20 See: M. Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised // Soviet Military Policy Since World War II / Ed. By W.T. Lee, KF.Staar. Stanford, 1986. P. 281-311.
21 For more details see: Post-war conversion: Towards a history of the Cold War / Otv. ed. V.SLelchuk. M., 1998.
22 See: GA RF. F. 5446. Op. 5.D. 2162.L. 176.
23 See: RGAE. F. 7733. Op. 36. D. 687.
24 For more details see: I.V. Bystrova. The development of the military-industrial complex // USSR and the Cold War. S. 176-179.
25 RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 164.D. 710.L. 31.
26 According to RGAE documents.
27 See: Soviet Military Policy ... P. 21-22.
28 See: A.B. Bezborodov. Power and the military-industrial complex in the USSR in the mid-40s - mid-70s // Soviet society: everyday life of the cold war. M .; Arzamas, 2000.S. 108.
29 See: N.S. Simonov. Decree. op. S. 288-291.
30 See: B. Zaleshchansky. Restructuring of military-industrial complex enterprises: from conservatism to adequacy // Man and Labor. 1998. No. 2. S. 80-83.
31 Red star. 1991.21 May.

The Patriotic War was a special period in the development of the national economy of the USSR, a difficult test of the strength of the socialist economy. This period was one of the most difficult and difficult in the history of our Motherland.

The military economy of the USSR went through two distinct stages in its development.

The first stage lasted from June 1941 to mid-1942 and is characterized by the fact that during this period the national economy was reorganized on a war footing, the available material and technical resources accumulated before the war were mobilized and their redistribution in favor of the military industry and other industries. serving military production and the needs of the army, by reducing the production of civilian products. The sources of these resources were the reduction of the non-production sphere (in favor of the production sphere) and the sphere of civil consumption, as well as additional loading of equipment, an increase in the fund of working time, etc. Labor productivity in this period increased mainly due to the growth of the fund of working time; the number of workers in the war industry increased due to its decrease in other sectors of the national economy; investments in the military industry increased due to a reduction in investments in other sectors and the conservation of a number of construction projects. These sources were temporary and relatively limited, so their use could not be sustained.

From the middle of 1942, these sources could no longer provide a significant increase in war production, and in order to achieve further growth in war and the rise of heavy industry, it was necessary to find additional internal resources for accumulation. From that time on, the second stage of development of the USSR's military economy began, which is characterized by the fact that military expenditures on an ever-increasing scale began to be covered by the military economy, which was developing on its own basis, i.e. entered into force and became leading in the development of the economy normal economic sources, under which the basis for the increase in the production of military products was the growth of raw materials and energy resources. At the second stage, the main source of costs was expanded reproduction, the absolute growth of the social product and national income... This was a regularity of the war economy of the USSR.

During the second period, along with military equipment, the share of heavy industry production began to increase in the social product, the normal circulation of social reproduction resumed and began to expand, and the national income began to be directed on an ever greater scale not only to ensure military expenditures, but also to increase accumulation in the national economy. farm. The redistribution of resources in favor of war production ceased to play the role of the main source of military expenditures, which were now provided by the created well-coordinated and rapidly growing war economy, which was a prerequisite for the rise of the country's economic forces in the final period of the war.

Although in the summer of 1942 the country was forced to carry out a second evacuation of the productive forces and suffered heavy losses on this, by this time conditions had already been created for the successful solution of the problem of expanded reproduction through the massive commissioning of evacuated equipment and large-scale capital construction in the eastern regions. By the end of 1942, it was possible to materially provide a turning point in the course of the war, which was finally determined in 1943. This year was marked by the largest victories of the Red Army and became a turning point for the military economy of the USSR.

Relying on a well-coordinated and rapidly growing military economy, created by the beginning of 1943, the Soviet state achieved major successes in increasing the production of military products and expanding the combat reserves of the Soviet Armed Forces. Beginning in 1943, the military economy of the USSR, in terms of its scale, technical level and structure, more and more fully satisfied the requirements of the war and reliably ensured the successful solution of the strategic, tactical and operational tasks of the Red Army.

Before the Great Patriotic War, history did not know a state that, in the course of the war, could so decisively reverse the balance of forces and military-economic potentials, which was so unfavorable for itself at first, as the USSR achieved. The achievement of a general economic and military superiority of the USSR over Nazi Germany was prepared by the heroic Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party. Already in the winter of 1942/43, during the Battle of Stalingrad, the superiority of the Nazi troops in the amount of military equipment was eliminated.

Both in peacetime and in wartime, the economy of the USSR developed on the basis of the knowledge and purposeful use of the economic laws of socialism by the Communist Party. And although the whole life of the Soviet state was rebuilt on a war footing, and 57-58% of the national income, 65-68% of industrial and about 25% of agricultural products were directed to meet military needs, the economic development of the country, like the entire Soviet society, continued. This was evidenced by the growth of basic production assets, large-scale capital construction, an increase in national income, and the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government for the material and cultural conditions of the working people.

In the conditions of war, the role of the subjective factor in the formation and development of the military economy, the interconnection of production and superstructure phenomena, and the conscious activity of people increased significantly. The objective nature of the operation of the most important economic laws of socialism during the war period remained immutable. The Communist Party did not discover new and did not abolish the existing economic laws of socialism, but learned the peculiarities of their manifestation during the war period and, on this basis, developed its economic policy, determined the tasks, methods and techniques for creating and developing a war economy.

The achievement of a military, political and economic victory over Nazi Germany depended to a large extent on the depth of reflection of the objective conditions in the policy of the Communist Party, in the system of state administration and in all the conscious activities of the Soviet people. The Communist Party, proceeding from the requirements of the economic laws of socialism, developed the forms and methods of organizing and managing the war economy, influenced by its policy the consciousness of Soviet people, and directed their efforts to create a powerful and well-coordinated war economy. The economic laws of socialism were thus appropriately reflected in the measures carried out by the party to improve management and planning and in the daily activities of the Soviet people.

During the war, the manifestation of the economic laws of socialism had significant features due to the specifics of the military situation. The war economy as a whole, its demands were not a "green street" for the operation of the economic laws of socialism. The most important feature of the use of the economic laws of socialism in the formation and development of the military economy was the narrowing of their sphere of action in comparison with the period of peaceful construction. This was primarily manifested in a significant change in the pre-war economic proportions: between production and consumption, I and II divisions, accumulation and consumption, industry and agriculture, production and transport, means of production and labor resources.

So, if in 1944 all industrial production of the USSR amounted to 104% of the pre-war level, then the production of means of production increased by 36% in comparison with 1940, and the production of consumer goods fell to 54% of the 1940 level. heavy industry was facilitated by the fact that during the war years the main funds, material and labor resources were sent here.

In contrast to the peace period, when normal value relations were ensured between the I and II subdivisions of socialist production, during the war period the correspondence between production and consumption was out of necessity violated, since heavy industry was forced to sharply reduce production and supply of means of production for sectors of the national economy. producing consumer goods.

While the distinguishing feature of the economy of the USSR during the peaceful years was the proportional development of all sectors of the national economy at the outstripping rates of development of heavy industry, during the war years there was an accelerated development of the military industry and related industries, mainly the metallurgical and fuel industries, mechanical engineering and energy, with low rates of reproduction of the branches of the II division, non-industrial branches of material production, including agriculture, and the limitation of the development of the non-production sphere, which introduced changes in the proportions of social reproduction.

For example, during the war years there was a certain disproportion between the growth of industry and the development of agriculture. The level of development of agriculture was lower than the level of development of industry. In agriculture, up to 1944, there was a process of reduction in production, while in industry this process stopped already in 1942, and in 1943 industrial production began to grow.

At the same time, the law of preferential treatment continued to operate in the military economy of the USSR, i.e. outstripping, growth of production of means of production. True, the limits of its action were also narrowed, because society used it in one direction - with the aim of ensuring the correct proportions in the sphere of the war economy through the forced admission of certain disproportions in the entire national economy and temporary infringement of the needs of the population. If in 1945 the industrial output of the group "A" exceeded the level of 1940 by 12%, then the industrial output of the group "B" was only 59% of the pre-war level. However, at the final stage of the war, the party and the government began to intensively switch part of the production capacity of the military industry to the production of both equipment for the industry of group "B" and its products itself in order to increase the level of supply of the population.

Both in peacetime and during the war years, the main source of the national income of the USSR was industry, but its share in the national income changed and increased, amounting to 56.4% in 1943 and 51.2% in 1944 against 50.6 % in 1940, which was due to the growth in the share of mechanical engineering and metalworking in the industry itself. In 1945, the share of industry in the national income of the USSR temporarily decreased due to the fact that the need for military products began to decrease, and the release of more labor-intensive civilian products could not compensate for the reduction in military production for one (second) half year.

The share of agriculture in the national income of the USSR, which amounted to 27.3% in 1942, decreased in 1943 to 24.6%, and in 1944 and 1945 it dropped to 24.6%. exceeded the pre-war level.

During the war years, the share of capital construction in the national income of the USSR increased from 5.5% in 1940 and 5% in 1942 to 6.8% in 1945, which led to the accumulation of fixed assets.

During the war years, despite the enormous material damage caused to the national economy by the Nazi invasion, our country strengthened and developed its productive forces. The socialist state turned out to be strong enough to allocate significant funds in the difficult conditions of war to carry out huge capital work in the leading sectors of the national economy. Meanwhile, in most of the capitalist countries that participated in the Second World War, including Nazi Germany, the volume of capital construction decreased.

Capital investments in the national economy of the USSR increased from 18.6 billion rubles. in 1942 to 27.4 billion rubles. in 1944 and 36.3 billion rubles. in 1945. In total, during the war years, capital investments amounted to 94.6 billion rubles. The most important feature of the economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War was the deployment of the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the Nazis as the Soviet territory was liberated from the enemy. Thanks to the enormous efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, industry and agriculture were rapidly reviving. In this regard, in 1944 the total volume of capital investments in the national economy of the USSR increased by 1.4 times as compared with 1943. In the country as a whole, in just three years (1942-1944), new and restored production capacities with a total cost of 77 billion rubles were put into operation.

The most important factor in the growth of the national income of the USSR was the systematic growth in the number of workers employed in the sphere of material production. The decisive factor in the growth of national income was the rise in labor productivity. During the war years, labor productivity increased 1.5 times, and in the military industry - even more.

The growth of labor productivity was mainly achieved without large capital investments through the implementation of such effective measures as improving the organization of labor; assignment of the main qualified personnel of workers and specialists to the most important sectors of the national economy; improvement of production technology; equipping equipment with high-performance tools and fixtures; mechanization of labor; introduction of production lines and a conveyor system of production in assembly, machining and procurement shops; preferential material and technical supply of the most important branches of the national economy; creation of normal reserves in military production; equipping military factories with new types of high-performance machine tools; modernization of a piece of equipment; ensuring the preferential supply of the best production workers; the development of a system of material and moral encouragement of production initiative and labor upsurge of the working people.

An important source of growth in labor productivity was the increase in the level of labor qualifications. During the war period, new cadres of workers received the necessary vocational training and gained production experience.

But the main factor in the growth of labor productivity was the labor upsurge of Soviet workers. The working class, the collective farm peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia worked with inspiration and selflessness. The source of their great labor feat was patriotism, high ideological conviction, conscientiousness, the nationwide desire to make their own contribution and bring the victory over fascism closer. At factories, collective farm fields, construction sites, transport - everywhere pre-war production quotas were exceeded many times over. All-Union socialist competition for the fastest and highest-quality fulfillment of the tasks of the front was unfolded throughout the country on an unprecedented scale. It appeared important factor mass development of initiative in solving production issues, identifying production reserves, increasing output, increasing labor productivity.

During the war period, the socialist principle of distribution according to work was consolidated and continued to develop. In industry, construction and transport, this was facilitated by the development of premium forms of wages and the introduction of moderately progressive norms, in agriculture - by improving the system of payment for workdays, taking into account the quality of work, increasing the yield of fields and the productivity of animal husbandry.

A significant source of growth in national income was the savings in material costs. As a result of measures taken by the party and the government to reduce production costs during the war period, prices for military equipment were reduced by more than 50 billion rubles. During the war years, a strict regime of economy of material and financial resources... In industry, measures were widely taken to introduce new technology and modernize old ones, specialize and cooperate in production, and use substitutes for scarce raw materials.

During the war period, the patterns inherent in the reproduction of the country's national income in years of peace were preserved and manifested. Due to the growth of national income and the use of accumulated reserves, the solution of the problems of consumption, accumulation and reimbursement of military expenditures was ensured. The national income of the USSR, which declined during the first period of the war, increased continuously during the subsequent war years. If in 1942 the national income of the country fell to 66% of the pre-war level, then in 1944 it increased to 88% of the 1940 level.This growth was the result of expanded reproduction and was not associated with the liberation of areas temporarily occupied by the enemy, because the products in 1944 the industry of the liberated regions accounted for only 18% of the volume of 1940, and in the rear regions the gross industrial output increased 2.3 times against 1940.

During the war years, the process of an increase in the share of accumulation in the national income took place, although in comparison with the pre-war period in 1943 it was 7% and in 1944 - 15% of the total national income against 19% in 1940.

During the war, a significant part of the increase in accumulation was destroyed without a trace (military equipment) and, consequently, did not return to the national economic turnover, which limited the material and technical basis of the reproduction of civilian products. Of course, these factors could not have taken place during the period of peaceful construction.

During the period of the war economy, the circulation of the social product changed significantly, since the predominant part of the social product went to meet the needs of the front. Thus, heavy industry supplied the means of production mainly to the defense industry and related industries, and to industries producing consumer goods, much less than in the pre-war years. In this regard, the rate of reproduction of fixed assets in many civilian sectors has dropped sharply.

A convincing proof that during the war years the development of the economy was carried out on the basis of the conscious use of the economic laws of socialism by Soviet society was the process of expanded socialist reproduction in a comparable territory. The war imposed on the Soviet Union could not be fought only at the expense of previously created state reserves and required expanded reproduction. The presence of expanded reproduction in the USSR during the war was evidenced by the provision of the needs of the front, which throughout the war grew from quarter to quarter, and the needs of the front were satisfied almost entirely at the expense of its own resources, since the supplies of the Western allies under Lend-Lease amounted to only 9,800 million . dollars and were important for the elimination of certain "bottlenecks".

During the war period, expanded socialist reproduction was a unity of planned expanded reproduction of such productive forces and production relations that contributed to the rapid growth of the war economy as a whole. The expanded reproduction of socialist production relations was based, as in years of peace, on the basis of the development of socialist property, the strengthening and development of socialist principles of organizing production and distribution. For expanded reproduction, the social product and the national income of the USSR were used in a planned and expedient manner.

Socialist reproduction was carried out on the basis of the use of the basic economic law of socialism within the framework of new production relations caused by economic conditions wartime, In the course of socialist extended reproduction, the reproduction of the social product, labor resources, the development of new production relations was achieved.

The process of expanded reproduction under war conditions had specific features and qualitative features that significantly distinguished it from the process of expanded reproduction in peacetime. Along with a radical change in the conditions for the reproduction of the social product and its material structure in comparison with peacetime, expressed in the switching of production capacities and the use of a huge mass of material and labor resources for the production of military products, a distinctive feature of reproduction during wartime was also the special nature of the redistribution of the social product. and national income - increased concentration of resources in "narrow", but the most important sectors of the economy.

During the war, the process of expanded reproduction of fixed assets did not begin immediately. The first year and a half of the war had an extremely unfavorable effect on the state of fixed assets, since they were destroyed in the temporarily occupied Soviet territory.

Since the second period of the war, there has been a significant increase in fixed assets in the country, which was the result of an increase in capital investments in the national economy. Investment in industry has exceeded the depreciation of fixed assets by several times. The volume of capital work in 1944 was 1.5 times more than in 1943. Thanks to this, the fixed assets of the industry were significantly updated, its technical re-equipment took place on the basis of modernization of equipment, the introduction of numerous improvements, new devices and tools.

Despite the enormous difficulties associated with the war, the production assets of the national economy increased significantly. In 1943, the main production assets (excluding livestock) increased in comparison with 1942 by 20%, in 1944 - by 24, in 1945 - by 29%. The volume of fixed assets has noticeably approached the pre-war level. If in 1942 the cost of fixed assets fell to 68% of the 1940 level, then in 1943 it increased to 76%, in 1944 - to 84, in 1945 - to 88%. This increase testified to the fact that during the war years in the national economy accumulations were obtained, some of which were used to increase fixed assets in amounts that covered their disposal.

Along with this, during the war years, there was a progressive change in the structure of fixed assets: the share of fixed assets in industry increased sharply, and among its branches the share of fixed assets in heavy industry increased more rapidly. In general, the sectoral structure of production assets provided the necessary proportions in the sphere of material production.

The main production assets also grew in agriculture. True, in 1942 the fixed assets of agriculture fell to 55% of the pre-war level, but in 1945 they rose to 74%, although their growth rates were lower than the growth rates of industrial assets. In the context of the diversion of millions of workers to the front, the mechanization of agriculture and the industrial structure of its basic production assets made it possible to maintain agriculture at the lowest possible and necessary level in wartime. In the structure of fixed assets of agriculture in the USSR, even during the war, equipment, machines and other means of mechanization occupied more than 50%.

During the war, transport funds also grew, which ensured the normal circulation of the entire commodity part of the public product. In 1945, the main production assets of transport and communications amounted to 87% of the 1940 level against 67%, in 1942.

During the war period, non-productive fixed assets increased. Although they are not means of labor, their role in the economy is great, therefore the proportions between production and non-production assets are important for productivity growth. social labor, for the optimal combination of accumulation and consumption.

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, the restoration and use of depreciation charges for capital repairs of fixed assets. Additional appropriations were allocated from the USSR State Budget for capital repairs and replenishment of repair work on production fixed assets that were not completed during the war years.

Expanded reproduction included the restoration process. Although at the beginning of the war it was restrained by the pace of economic development, as the wartime difficulties were overcome, the restored enterprises themselves became an additional factor in accelerating the pace of economic development.

The high rates of expanded socialist reproduction during the war is a clear manifestation of the advantages of the socialist social system, convincing evidence of its enormous potential.

In the war economy, other economic laws of socialism were in effect, although not in full force. For example, the law of the fullest satisfaction of the needs of the people, which expresses the goal of socialist reproduction, operated within a limited framework, since under conditions of war the state did not have sufficient funds to realize this goal. The scope of this law was narrowed by the emerging objective social need for maximum satisfaction of the needs of the front. And yet this economic law did not lose its force, since the conditions that gave rise to it were in effect: public ownership of the means of production and socialist production relations.

The Soviet state, proceeding from the conditions of social production, invariably took into account the economic law of the fullest satisfaction of the needs of the people. During the war, its effect was manifested, first, in maintaining the state retail prices for consumer goods at the same level in both state and cooperative trade throughout the war; secondly, in the continuation, albeit of a limited amount, of financing the social and cultural services for the Soviet people. In the USSR, there was no freezing or lowering of wages in the sphere of material production. It was thanks to the conscious use of this law and the planning of the economy that the Soviet state managed to organize an organized supply of the population without resorting to balancing the budget at the expense of the working people, as is the case under similar circumstances in capitalist countries.

During the war years, the ratio of the need for an increase in the social product, aggravated by the needs of the war, and the balance of labor resources, limited in wartime, should have caused an intensification of the use of the law of saving social labor, but this did not happen.

Here it is necessary to distinguish between the economy of living labor and the economy of all social labor. If the productivity of living labor increased during the war years, then the operation of the law of economy of all social labor was narrowed by an insufficient increase in the equipment of labor and a decrease in the average level of labor qualifications due to the involvement of unskilled workers in production. The limited effect of this law was also manifested in an increase in output per worker due to an increase not only in labor productivity due to the improvement of technology and production technology and other similar factors, but also in hours worked by lengthening the working day and introducing overtime work. Of course, the productivity of social labor as a whole has increased primarily due to the heroic work of the Soviet people.

Thus, the law of economy of social labor and time continued to operate, but with some deviations. The peculiarities of the manifestation of this law during the war affected the operation of the law of value. The characteristic deviations in the operation of the law of value were caused and explained by changes that occurred in the operation of other economic laws with which it is associated.

During the war, the law of value, as an expression of the objective needs of economic management, was perceived by Soviet society as particularly relevant for the management of social production. But the war limited the possibilities of using this law, since, firstly, the role of money, through which the law of value operates, decreased, and, secondly, the action of natural forces increased in the unorganized market due to a decrease in commodity resources in the hands of the state and a plurality of prices. The operation of the law of value is evidenced by both centralized measures to save material, labor and financial costs, and the mass initiative of the working people for the rational use and conservation of resources. But the operation of this law underwent significant deviations, because during the war, to a certain extent, the basis of the law of value - the production of a product at socially necessary costs - was violated.

During the war period, the operation of the law of distribution according to work weakened. The highest wages were associated not with the highest qualifications of workers, but with the importance of the industry in which they were employed for defense. Since the majority of workers were concentrated in the defense-related industries, a significant part of the wage funds, and, consequently, of the purchasing funds, was concentrated here. For the same reasons (concentration of human and material resources in the defense industries), the production of the industry of group "B" has absolutely decreased, as a result of which there was an unrealized demand for consumer goods. All this has led to an imbalance between supply and demand - one of the sides of the law of value.

Thus, the reduced supply of goods by the state increased the demand for them on the collective farm market, where prices rose. As a result, the purchasing power ruble. In some sectors, the growth of wages was not compensated by the growth of labor productivity, which led to an increase in the cost of production. In agriculture, due to a decrease in the means of mechanization, the cost of production increased and through the operation of the law of value exerted its influence on the ratio of price and value: prices were detached from value. For this reason, the inequality of exchange between industry and agriculture increased. In the city, the rationing system led to some leveling in real wages. All this undermined the operation of the law of value.

In the process of the formation and development of the military economy, the Soviet state took into account the economic law of the rational distribution of productive forces, the scientific principles of which were formulated by V.I.Lenin. Although the operation of the law of rational distribution of productive forces was violated to a certain extent due to the need to send evacuated and new equipment to points where there were free production areas for this, in general, the placement of evacuated production facilities was not carried out spontaneously, not by gravity, but in an organized manner, with taking into account the proximity to sources of raw materials, energy resources, the availability of a transport network, etc.

The deployment of evacuated productive forces, as well as the construction of new industrial enterprises in the eastern regions, were of decisive importance for the development of the war economy, had a positive effect on the rational use of the country's various natural resources, accelerated the process of expanded reproduction and the growth of labor productivity.

An important means of organizing the war economy of the USSR and achieving economic victory over Nazi Germany was the strengthening of organizational centralism in public administration and planning of the national economy.

The struggle of the Soviet people against the treacherously attacking enemy was led by the Communist Party, its Central Committee, the Soviet government and the State Defense Committee. The organizing and guiding role of the Communist Party was clearly manifested in the unity of the political, economic and military leadership of the country and the Armed Forces. All the fullness of state power was concentrated in one body - the State Defense Committee, all of whose activities took place in close contact with the Headquarters of the Soviet Supreme Command. This made it possible to provide a comprehensive and prompt solution to the issues of armed struggle and the work of the Soviet rear. Issues of major military-political importance were considered at joint meetings of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, GKO and Headquarters.

GKO commissioners were appointed to the field to manage the military economy, coordinate the activities of party, Soviet and economic bodies to mobilize all the country's resources. In areas located in the immediate vicinity of the front, city defense committees were formed.

The creation of the State Defense Committee, the institution of GKO commissioners and local defense committees ensured increased centralization in the management of the military economy, made it possible to quickly and concretely implement the party's policy, to carry out the most complete mobilization and use of the state's material and human resources to defeat the enemy.

By the decision of the State Defense Committee, people's commissariats of the tank industry, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons were created, under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for the Registration and Distribution of Labor, the Council for Evacuation, and the Soviet Information Bureau were formed. I. V. Stalin, A. A. Andreev, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanov, M. I. Kalinin, A. P. Kosygin, A. I. Mikoyan, V. M Molotov, N. M. Shvernik. The leaders of the main branches of the military economy of the USSR were M.G. Pervukhin, B.L. Vannikov, V.A.Malyshev, D.F. Ustinov, I.F. Tevosyan, A.I. Shakhurin, P.I. K. Baibakov, V. V. Vakhrushev, A. I. Efremov, P. F. Lomako and others.

With regard to wartime conditions, the work of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, the regional and regional party committees, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the Union and autonomous republics, regional executive committees, regional executive committees, local party and Soviet bodies were reorganized. In the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union republics, regional and regional committees, new branch departments for the defense industry and transport were formed. The composition of the party organizers of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Komsomol members of the Central Committee of the Komsomol in factories and plants increased. For prompt execution of decisions higher authorities the rights of the Council of People's Commissars of the union and autonomous republics, as well as local government bodies, were expanded.

The Great Patriotic War subjected the Party and Soviet governing bodies and their organizational and business skills to a severe test. They passed this test with honor.

In wartime, strict planning and production discipline was strictly observed, and the personal responsibility of leading personnel increased.

During the war years, increased centralization in planning the national economy, due to the needs of wartime. The redistribution of the resources of the national economy, primarily in favor of war production, as well as the limitation of the production of a number of important goods caused by the war, required a centralized distribution in a planned manner of a much larger quantity of products than in peacetime. During the war, the number of products distributed from a single center according to the state plan more than doubled.

National economic planning was carried out on a scientific methodological basis. Among the most important scientific principles of planning, the principle of the leading link and the closely related principle of the greatest economic efficiency... The military-economic plans included such a use of the potential of the socialist economy, which made it possible to surpass Hitler's Germany in the production of military equipment, despite the fact that it used the economic and labor resources of almost all of the Europe it occupied. The plans took into account the main, decisive sectors of the military economy and concentrated on them a maximum of material, monetary and labor resources. In planning, the balance method was widely used, economic calculations the most efficient use of production facilities, labor resources, raw materials, materials, etc.

The planned nature of the Soviet economy, due to the domination of socialist ownership of the means of production, made it possible to establish proportions between industries and enterprises on the basis of the state plan and made it possible to radically change the proportions of the peace period in a short time in the interests of victory over the enemy. In the distribution of labor and material assets, the predominant share was occupied by military production and the branches of the military economy cooperating with it.

The change in the proportions in the national economy, aimed at the fastest development of the war economy and meeting the needs of the front, was reflected in the balance of the national economy. It included a scientific analysis of the main proportions and interrelationships between industries for the previous planning period and scientifically based calculations for critical indicators production and use of the social product and national income for the planning period. The balance of the national economy was based on the use of the economic laws of socialist reproduction, made it possible to rationally distribute production, material, financial, and labor resources and to determine the optimal tasks for the development of the war economy in the interests of defeating the enemy.

During the war years, in planning, when developing plans, agreeing and coordinating all parties and branches of reproduction in order to ensure the fastest creation of a well-coordinated war economy, the law of planned, proportional development of the national economy was used, but with some restrictions. This was manifested in the fact that the unified national economic plan was balanced on a unilateral basis of the maximum possible satisfaction of the needs of the front while limiting and limiting the remaining needs of society and therefore could not provide that optimal combination of consumption and accumulation inherent in socialism, as well as the I and II divisions of social production, which provided in peacetime. The effect of this law was reflected in the fact that the production capacities of industries related to the military industry were fully used. Economically, this meant that the law of planned, proportional development acted in conditions of a somewhat limited manifestation of the basic and other economic laws of socialism, and therefore the scope of its action also had some limitations.

During the war, the principle of democratic centralism also did not receive the necessary scope in planning, since it was in planning that centralization especially intensified.

From the first days of the war, all the work on restructuring the economy on a war footing, the deployment of the military industry and other defense industries went strictly according to plan. The military-economic plans drawn up by the USSR State Planning Committee and approved by the USSR Council of People's Commissars and the State Defense Committee had the force of law, contained an extensive program of military production, and provided a clear perspective for the development of the military economy. They played a great mobilizing and organizing role. Along with the main task - the maximum development of the military industry, the plans also provided for an appropriate level of development of metallurgy, fuel industry, energy, mechanical engineering, transport, agriculture, i.e. those industries, without the development of which there could not be a lasting rise in the military economy.

During the war years, systematic strict control over the fulfillment of planned targets was carried out, "bottlenecks" and imbalances in the development of the military economy were promptly identified and decisive measures were taken to urgently eliminate them.

State planning, being the most important instrument of centralized distribution and redistribution of material, labor and financial resources, ensured the rapid mobilization of the country's production potential to defeat the enemy.

The decisive factors that ensured the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany were: the leadership and military-organizational activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, unparalleled in scale and complexity, during the war years; the strength and might of the Soviet socialist state — a state of a new type; the valor and courage of those who emerged from the depths of the Soviet people and are closely connected with them by the unity of goals and interests of the Soviet Armed Forces, who have honorably fulfilled their patriotic and international duty; labor feat of workers of the Soviet rear.

The Communist Party - the guiding and inspiring force of Soviet society - from the first days of the war mobilized the masses for the sacred struggle against the German fascist invaders and for the defense of the gains of socialism. During the Patriotic War, the Communist Party was a worthy organizer and inspirer of the fighting Soviet people. Guided in all its activities by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, the party developed a scientifically grounded program for the defeat of the German fascist invaders, rallied all the peoples of the USSR around itself, united the efforts of the front and rear, soldiers and workers, led the nationwide struggle against fascism and brought it to a victorious end. ...

The wise leadership of the Communist Party clearly demonstrated the skillful use of all the objective possibilities inherent in the socialist system to create a solid military organization of the entire Soviet society. Through the efforts of the party and the government, the Soviet rear has turned into a single military camp, feeding the front with human reserves, weapons, ammunition, food, and maintaining the morale of the fighting soldiers.

The Communist Party launched colossal activities to organize a nationwide struggle in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR. In the rear of the enemy, underground party organizations were created, and a massive partisan movement developed. More than a million Soviet people were active in the ranks of partisan detachments, formations and underground organizations.

In the initial, especially difficult period of the war, when the Soviet people had to experience both setbacks and the bitterness of defeat, the party did not conceal the full severity of the trials that befell our country. The directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of June 29, 1941 said: "... in the war imposed on us with Nazi Germany, the question of the life and death of the Soviet state is being decided, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement." The party and the government demanded "to put an end to complacency and carelessness and to mobilize all our organizations and all the forces of the people to defeat the enemy, to mercilessly destroy the hordes of the attacker. German fascism» .

The Party, using the advantages of the socialist mode of production and planned management of the economy, in an extremely short period of time transferred all branches of the Soviet economy to a war footing: industry, transport, agriculture. In the course of the creation and development of the war economy, the party warned against the danger of overestimating its own forces, pointed out the inadmissibility of being content with the successes achieved, revealed shortcomings in the work of the war economy and called for the concentration of all forces on meeting the needs of the front in order to ensure the fastest defeat of Nazi Germany.

On the basis of a deep analysis of the basic laws that objectively determine the course and outcome of the entire war, the party showed the main factors as a result of which the Nazi troops achieved success in the first period of the war: a surprise attack on the USSR, the economic and military superiority of the aggressor, and convincingly proved that that they were of a temporary, transient nature, for the Soviet state, by virtue of the advantages of the socialist economic system, fully possessed the military-economic capabilities to decisively change the balance of armed forces and foreign policy conditions in its favor.

“The war has shown,” says the History of the Second World War, “that the outcome of an armed struggle is not determined by a simple ratio of material and human resources of the parties. The outcome of a long struggle is decided by a combination of political, economic, social and moral factors, the skillful and purposeful use of all available and potential forces, the achievement of superiority at decisive stages and in the most important areas. "

The party skillfully and decisively put into action all the forces and means of the Soviet state for the all-round development and strengthening of the country's economic and military potential, determined the political and strategic goals of the war, and exercised leadership in all spheres of social and state life of the USSR. Under her leadership, the most important operations of the Great Patriotic War were prepared and carried out, topical issues of the development of the Armed Forces, the organization of Soviet troops, their technical equipment and combat use were resolved. She supervised the distribution of labor, material, technical and financial resources of the Soviet state, organized in the shortest possible time a well-coordinated military economy.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a truly fighting party. The communists were the first to go to the front. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) made a redistribution of party forces in favor of the organizations of the Red Army and the Navy. In just four years of war, 1,640 thousand communists were mobilized into the Armed Forces, which was equal to half of the entire party membership by the summer of 1941. By the spring of 1945, every fourth Soviet soldier was a communist, while at the beginning of the war - every ninth. Party members have always been at the forefront of the fighting troops.

In the Soviet rear, the party had a close-knit militant party organism, numbering almost 2 million communists who selflessly fought on the labor front.

The Communist Party turned the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, firmly established during the years of peaceful construction, into a powerful source of victory over Nazi Germany, rallying even more closely into a single multi-million army of fighters for the victory over fascism all the nations and nationalities of the country.

The Communist Party found slogans accessible and understandable to the broad masses, calling them to fight the Nazi invaders, to win victory. The Soviet people, responding to the Party's calls, displayed high political consciousness and devotion to the Party's cause.

During the war years, Soviet people vividly demonstrated the greatest courage, resilience, high patriotism and internationalism, selfless labor, creative and political activity.

Thanks to the solid unity of the political, state and military leadership, army and people, front and rear, the Soviet Union turned into a huge military camp, engulfed in a single impulse - to defeat the enemy, expel him from Soviet soil, and destroy fascism.

Local party bodies carried out a great deal of work on the development of the war economy. During the period of military restructuring of the national economy, they often assumed the functions of direct economic leadership.

Local party organizations mobilized and directed the efforts of the workers of the Soviet home front to quickly meet the urgent needs of the front, improve the work of industry, agriculture and transport, make the most efficient use of materials and equipment, increase labor productivity, and supervise the activities of scientific institutions and public organizations.

The party attached great importance to the revitalization and enhancement of the role of local bodies of Soviet power and public organizations in the creation and development of the military economy. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) determined the content and methods of work of state and public organizations. Local Soviets of Working People's Deputies carried out military mobilizations in the rear, were engaged in general military training, the everyday life of the evacuated population, provided assistance to the families of military personnel, ensured sanitary and epidemic security, led the centralized supply of the population, etc. They were loyal and reliable assistants to the party.

The most important area in the activity of local party and Soviet bodies was work on the development of agriculture. To strengthen party leadership in agriculture under war conditions, the system of political departments of the MTS and state farms was re-created. Together with local party and Soviet bodies, they strengthened the influence of the party on the development of agriculture, helped collective and state farms fulfill their duty to meet the needs of the front and the population in food and industry in raw materials.

Local party and Soviet organizations widely attracted the urban population and collectives of industrial enterprises to help agricultural workers. In the order of patronage over collective farms, machine and tractor stations and state farms, workers of factories and plants repaired tractors and other agricultural equipment, took part in construction and restoration work.

The trade unions and the Komsomol did a lot of work to mobilize forces, develop the military economy, and provide the front with everything necessary for a successful armed struggle against the Nazi invaders. The trade unions widely and widely developed socialist competition, actively participated in the conduct of universal education, in the mass training and retraining of workers, in organizing the treatment of the wounded and assistance to the families of servicemen. In the harsh years of the war, as in peacetime, the Leninist Komsomol was the party's combat assistant. From the first days of the war, under the leadership of the party, he rebuilt and subordinated all his work of mobilizing young people to resolutely rebuff the enemy, to defend the Motherland and selfless labor in the rear.

During the war years, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the alliance of the working class and the peasantry - the unshakable class basis of the socialist system, its military organization, became the most important source of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

In its organizational activities, the Communist Party relied on strong ties with the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia. Friendly cooperation, mutual assistance, patriotism, loyalty to the socialist system, high labor and political activity of the working class, peasantry, and also the intelligentsia were the foundation on which the party in an extremely short time mobilized the available human, material, production, and monetary resources in the country and used them with such high efficiency, which is impossible in a capitalist society, torn apart by class contradictions.

Thanks to this, the Soviet Union had the strongest rear. During the war, the workers of the Soviet home front created a powerful military economy and won an economic victory over Nazi Germany. This fully revealed the superiority of the Soviet experience in running and managing the national economy and the possibilities of the socialist mode of production.

The victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War showed the whole world what a colossal, inexhaustible might the country of socialism and its people have, who stood up breast under the leadership of the Communist Party to defend their revolutionary gains, freedom and independence.

The victory of the Soviet people and the crushing defeat of the forces of fascism and militarism are a historically conditioned, natural phenomenon. The Great Patriotic War convincingly showed that there are no forces in the world capable of crushing socialism, bringing to their knees a people loyal to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, loyal to the socialist Motherland, rallied around the Leninist party. The invincibility of socialism is the main lesson of the war and a formidable warning to the imperialist aggressors.