National Economy of the USSR for 70 years

Anniversary statistical yearbook

Economy of the USSR During the years of the Great

« The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War, with all the full, revealed the benefits of socialism, his huge economic, socio-political and spiritual possibilities. It was the victory of the Soviet state created by the Grand Lenin, the most advanced social system, socialist economic System "(Decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU" On the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 ").

The victory in the Great Patriotic War was a vivid confirmation of the correctness of the party's policies, which in the pre-war years has steadily carried out a course of a significant increase in the country's economic and defense potential. Plans for all pre-war five years have been aimed at solving this task.

Using all resources, industry and other industries continuously deployed production products for the needs of the army.

Main indicators of the economic development of the USSR in the war years

	1940=100					1942=100
Produced National Income
Production main funds of all sectors of the national economy (without livestock)
Products industry
Mechanical engineering products
Gross Products agriculture
Capital investments
Cargo turnover of all types of transport
The average annual number of workers and employees
Retail trade turnover of state and cooperative trade

The war sharply changed the tasks that stood before the Soviet economy. Of particular importance in the first months of the war, mass relocating from front and front-line areas of a huge number of values, equipment and millions of people are thousands of kilometers to the eastern regions of the country, providing in the shortest possible time in the new place of production, the sharply necessary front. In total, it was evacuated from July to December 1941 from the threatened areas of 2593 enterprises. Among them were 1523 major enterprises, of which 1360 enterprises, mainly military, were evacuated in the first three months of war.

Of the total number of evacuated large enterprises, 226 was sent to the Volga region, 667-to the Urals, 244-in Western Siberia, 78-to Eastern Siberia, 308-to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. More than 10 million people were taken to the rear districts, water-more than 2 million people.

During the war from the areas who threatened the capture of the opponent, about 1.5 million cars proceeded on the railways, or 30 thousand trains with evacuated cargo.

From the Western districts, 2.4 million cattle heads were moved, 5.1 million sheep heads and goats, 0.2 million pigs, 0.8 million horses, many agricultural equipment, grains and other foods.

The temporary loss of very much economically regions and industrial centers in the first months of war was hardly reflected in the work of all sectors of the national economy. End of 1941 beginning 1942 It was the most difficult and critical period for the Soviet economy. The national economy has experienced an acute shortage of labor, fuel, electricity, raw materials, various materials. The volume of gross production industry since June but December 1941 decreased by 1.9 times. But in December 1941 decline industrial production It was suspended.

By the mid-1942, the lost power of the military industry was managed not only to restore, but also surpass. The Soviet Union created the coordinated military householdcapable of providing in increasing sizes by the production of military products.

The indigenous fracture in the work of the industry, which began in the second half of 1942, was fixed in 1943; Compared to 1940, the products of defense industries increased more than 2 times.

The USSR surpassed fascist Germany as a whole in 1942 for the production of tanks and SAU 3.9 times, combat aircraft-in 1.9, guns of all kinds and calibers-in 3.1, rifles and carbines-3 times. More was released and ammunition.

The cultification period of the growth of the USSR military economy was 1944. In 1944, the USSR was produced more than in 1942, tanks and sau on one fifth, combat aircraft-1.5 times.

The creation of a solid base of military-industrial production in the east of the country had crucial for the coordinated work of all units of the economy.

In 1942, metal 20 new electric furnaces began to give metal in the eastern regions, 9 rolling mills. The total capacity of turbines enacted in 1942 in these areas was 672 thousand kW. Chelyabinsk CHP, Karaganda GRES, Kirovo-Chepetsk CHPP were commissioned.

In total, during the war years, the release of products in the Urals increased 3.6 times, in Siberia-2.8 times, in the Volga region-2.4 times.

Especially high rates in the eastern regions of the country increased the release of military products. So, in 1942 compared with 1940 in the Urals, he increased more than 5 times, in the Volga region, 9 times, in the areas of Western Siberia, 27 times.

During the war years, high efficiency of the military economy was ensured, and in the first place of defense industries. For three years, from May 1942 to May 1945, labor productivity in the industry increased by 43%, and in defense industries, 2.2 times.

Along with the growth of labor productivity, the costs of producing the most important types of weapons are significantly reduced, in 1944 the cost of all types of military products compared with 1940 g decreased by an average of 2 times. In general, the economic effect of reducing the cost of military products for 1941-1944. Amounted to an amount equal to almost half of all expenses of the USSR state budget for military needs in 1942

Soviet. The state, relying on its own resources, has solved the difficult problem of re-equipment and material support of the multi-millionth army. Supplies to Land Lases in the USSR made up about 4% of the production of industrial products of our country.

Test war showed that it is the advantages socialist economy Allowed to survive and defeat in the most difficult conditions.

By paying approximately 3 times smaller than steel and producing almost 5 times less coal than fascist Germany (including importation from the occupied countries, accepted territories and imports), "The Soviet Union during the war years created almost 2 times more weapons and military equipment.

Major problems of the military restructuring of the socialist economy
The Soviet Union assumed the main blow to the entire military power of fascist Germany and its allies. By the time the treacherous attack on the USSR, Hitlerovskaya Germany had a fully unmobilized army, a militarized economy and extensive experience in conducting modern war.
The purpose of the attacks of Hitler's Germany to the USSR was the destruction of the first socialist state, the seizure and robbery of Soviet lands, the national enslavement of the peoples of the USSR and their extermination. On May 22, 1941, Hitler said that Russia would be quickly destroyed and that the bombardment of American cities in the eastern United States ^ 1 ^ should begin in 1941.
The Soviet Union had to rebuild the national economy on a military paw during the protection period of the country from fascist aggression. The Communist Party and the Soviet government had to solve an unprecedented task in history - in the most difficult conditions of the war in the shortest possible time to transfer the national economy for military rails, organize a coherent military economy, to turn into real economic and military power, the potential opportunities created in the USSR over the years of peaceful construction and Create a military economy, which is superior to the economy of fascist Germany with all its additional resources obtained from the occupied and dependent countries of Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Union could count mostly only on its own resources, for the allies reluctantly went to the provision of military-economic assistance to the Soviet state.
All the severity of ensuring military needs lay on the shoulders of the Soviet rear. Weapons, ammunition, military engineering property necessary for the Red Army, were produced during the war years in domestic industrial enterprises and from Soviet materials. 1941-1945 were a special period in the development of the socialist economy of a peace-loving Soviet state. In the creation of the Soviet military economy, only its inherent specific features and patterns were manifested.
From the first days of the war, the Communist Party has developed a scientifically based program of the nationwide struggle against the German-fascist invaders and the economic security of the defeat of the enemy. At that difficult hour, when the enemy invaded the limits of the USSR, the Communist Party and the Soviet government had to solve many important problems related to the organization of energies and with the transition of a peaceful socialist economy on the rails of the military socialist economy, to evacuate the rear from the threatened areas of enterprises, material and artistic values, the population and organize a massive output for the front and the national economy in a new place.
On June 30, 1941, with the aim of centralizing the leadership by the mobilization of all the country's forces to respond to the enemy to the joint decision of the Central Committee of the CCP (b), the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR and SCA of the USSR was formed by the State Defense Committee (GKO) at the head of I. V. Stalin. A number of members and candidates for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPP (b) entered the GKO. The prototype of this emergency senior state was the Council of Working and Peasant Defense, established during the Civil War for the Protection of the Young Soviet Republic from the onslaught of White Guards and the Interventory and with honor, who had fulfilled the duties assigned to him. The main directions of the work of these emergency supreme authorities were similar, but the GCO functions were more extensive.
The State Defense Committee, as an Extraordinary Body, focused in his hands all the completeness of power in the country. Under the leadership of GKOs, GKOs worked for GRAN USSR, addicts and departments, all economic organization organizations. GKo united into one entire efforts of the front and rear to ensure the vital activity of the state and defeat the enemy.
The State Committee of Defense carried out direct management of the production of the most important means of weapons for the Red Army: tanks, airplanes, ammunition, equipment, as well as railway transport. The main drug industry addicts were headed by members and candidates for the members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). At the disposal of the state defense committee there was a special institution of authorized GKO. In these positions, the secretaries of the largest party committees of industrial edges, regions and centers of the country were approved. The duties of the Commissioner GKOs primarily included the operational resolution of issues related to the organization and development of the production of military products.
Along with this during the war in more than 60 cities of the front-line band, such as Leningrad, Sevastopol, Tula, Rostov, Stalingrad, Kursk, the city committees of defense were created, which carried out the leadership of military economies, coordinated the activities of party, Soviet and economic bodies for Mobilization of resources.
In order to increase the efficiency in the work of the rear bodies, ensuring the necessary centralization of the planning and the organization of the rear of the Armed Forces of the USSR on July 28, 1941, the GCO's decision was created by the Main Directorate of the Red Army and the Real Management of the Tar in fronts and armies, and the post of the chief of the Red Army rear was established. and bosses of the rear of fronts and armies.
Under the Bureau of the Soviet University of the USSR, a special committee on the distribution of labor was created. Later, it was assigned to her accounting. Then the Committee for Food and Broadcast Supplies was formed, the main departments for the supply of sectors of the national economy of coal, oil, forest.
The restructuring of the State Department of Management was accompanied by a sharp reduction in the state of drug addicts, various institutions and the entire managerial apparatus. Many specialists from institutions were sent to factories and factories.
During the war, at its vast work on the creation and development of the military economy, GKO relied on the management bodies, adapted in the conditions of war to maintain the needs of the front; on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union republics, the versions and the committee; On the created city committees of defense in front-line cities, as well as to the Evacuation Council, the Committee on the Unloading of Transit Cargo, the Committee on Evacuation of Food Research, Textile Equipment, Manufactory, Raw Materials and other widespread goods and transport committee under GKO, coordinating all types of transport .
GCO prompt bureaus provided great help. Through this body, GKO carried out operational control over the fulfillment of military orders. The structure and composition of the operational bureau have undergone changes depending on the economic tasks that were solved on one or another stage of war. For rapid consideration and solution of supply issues, as well as to verify the need for food and industrial goods and identify additional commodity resources, a commission was created with the GKO operational bureau.
The central leadership of the restructuring of the national economy and the development of the military economy was carried out by the State Defense Committee. In the field of view, GKO was the work of all sectors of the national economy, and especially industry, as the main, leading branch of the military economy, which ensured the needs of the front and rear. In GKO and its bodies with the participation of the USSR and the corresponding drug addicts, the results of the work were regularly considered, the next tasks of the military economy were discussed and deciding. Active participation in this work was accepted by Gamin USSR, which became the economic headquarters of the Soviet Military Economy.
On July 19, 1941, the USSR Council was adopted on July 1, 1941, the decision "On expanding the rights of the USSR commissars in military time" was adopted. Commissar and addicts were provided to independently solve issues of distribution and redistribution of material and financial resources necessary to fulfill production and construction plans. The role of party bodies has significantly increased in the ground. Their efforts were aimed at exercising an early restructuring of the national economy, to fully satisfy the needs of the front.
The translation of the state and party apparatus for military time regime, strengthening the system of centralized management of the national economy provided the highest mobility and maneuverability of the military socialist economy.
The Communist Party sent the efforts of Soviet people to turn the country in the shortest possible time in a single military camp, as V. I. Lenin taught. A huge role in mobilizing all the forces of the Soviet people to fight the German-fascist invaders played the Directive of the SCS of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) dated June 29, 1941. It was detailed by political, ideological, economic and actual military events of the party and government, in the complex Providing successful struggle with fascist Germany.
Performing this directive, party, Soviet and business organizations launched a huge organizational and military-mobilization work among the population. It provided a number of major military-mobilization activities, and in particular the introduction of compulsory military training and universal mandatory preparation of the population to anti-heart defense.
Even before the war, when the threat of a military attack of Hitler Germany to the Soviet Union became a real danger, the Soviet government adopted a mobilization plan for the ammunition on the second half of 1941 and in 1942. In this regard, the activities for the restructuring of the work of industry, and especially engineering enterprises were envisaged in conditions wartime. The plan contains specific tasks to enterprises - for the release of ammunition; to develop the technology of their production (based on the equipment wevected); for the manufacture of devices, technological equipment and tools for the release of ammunition; To create mobilization stocks of materials and semi-finished products necessary to provide a given ammunition production program.
A week after the beginning of the war, the GCO approved the first plan of wartime - a mobilization national plan for the third quarter of 1941, which replaced the plan for the development of the national economy for this period. The plan was tasked to increase the production of military equipment by 26% against the pre-war plan for this period. In area capital construction financial, logistical and labor resources Concentrated on the most important defense facilities, mainly in the areas of the Volga region, the Urals and Siberia. Partial or complete preservation of secondary buildings envisaged. The approved list of impact buildings included military enterprises, power plants, enterprises of the metallurgical, chemical and fuel industry, construction of railways. The main resources were redistributed in favor of the military industry and co-parameted with her industries. However, in general, the volume of work on capital construction decreased compared with the pre-war period due to the fact that part of material resources, mainly metal, was aimed at meeting the needs of military production. The pre-war level of rail transport persisted only on the transport of coal, petroleum products, metal and grain. In order to save commodities, the retail turnover plan was reduced by 12%.
On August 16, 1941, a military-economic plan was adopted for the fourth quarter of 1941 and 1942, which covered the economy of the Volga region, Urals, Western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia. He gave the clear perspective of the development of a coherent military economy capable of providing material and technical advantage of the Soviet Union over fascist Germany.
The plan was set in a short time to create a large base of military-industrial production in the eastern regions of the USSR, which would not only compensate for temporarily lost capacity, but also to significantly increase the military-industrial potential of the country. The plan included specific tasks for accelerated development in these areas of military-industrial production, according to a sharp expansion of the fuel, energy and metallurgical base, as well as on other industries, agriculture and transport. The plan has determined the expansion of 6 million hectares of sowing areas in the collective farms of the Urals, Siberia, Southeast, Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as well as the redistribution of logistical, financial and labor resources in favor of military production and the creation of an economic base in the country's rear. It envisaged evacuation to the east of enterprises from the front-line strip, huge industrial construction, a significant expansion of the production of weapons, ammunition, food and a broad supply of the Red Army.
The translation of the USSR economy for military rails turned out to be a very complex process that demanded large difficulties. The restructuring of the economy on the Military Power took place in the conditions of hostilities, when the enemy quickly moved through the territory of the USSR. Urgent relocation industrial enterprises From the threatened areas led to a temporary cessation of the work of these enterprises and a violation of the prevailing territorial and industrial ties in the industry.
In the first period of war, the Soviet Union temporarily lost a number of vital densely populated household regions with a powerful industry and highly productive agriculture. About 90 million rubles lived in the territory of these regions of the world's most economically economically, and gross products were produced by 46 billion rubles. (in the old scale price), which was 33% of the entire gross production of the country.
Especially high was the proportion of temporarily occupied areas in the production of heavy industry products. They gave 71% of the world-union smelting of the cast iron to the war, 58% of steel smelting and 57% of rolled ferrous metals. Here, a quality metal required for the military industry was performed. In the first year of war, 61 domain and 225 Martenovsky stoves, 174 rolling mills, 131 coke battery stopped work. In total, the lost power of the metallurgical industry before the war was given by about half of the production of ferrous metals.
The enemy occupied the Donetsk coal pool - the main fuel base of the USSR. In 1940, 60% of the coal mined in the USSR was obtained in the Donbass. In the depths of the territory subjected to occupation, there were huge stocks of the most valuable for the national economy of raw materials. Thus, the geological reserves of coal in the Donbass were over 70 billion tons. Before the war, Donbass coal received 60% of all metallurgical enterprises, 70% of enterprises of major chemistry, 60% of railway transport, almost half of the country's power plants. Donbass mines were equipped with high-performance equipment. On the eve of the war they had 2600 heavy cutting machines, about 23 thousand pneumatic jackhaft and drilling hammers, 6,500 conveyors and conveyors, 1,500 electric locomotives.
At the temporary occupied enemy of the territory was Krivoy Rog - the main iron ore base of southern metallurgy. The deposits of this area were kept over 1.5 billion tons of iron ore with iron content of 46-65% and almost inexhaustible quartzite reserves with an iron content of 35-40%. In Ukraine, there were still a number of deposits. The most significant of them was the operated Kerch iron ore area with ore reserves of about 7 billion tons with an iron content of 20-42%, silica 11-30%, phosphorus - 0.4-1.2%. According to the size of the reserves and the quality of the iron ore of the South deposit, one of the first places in the world.
The enemy captured such an essential area of \u200b\u200bmining of strategic raw materials, as a Nikopol Marganese deposit, which on the eve of the war gave 35% of all the extraction of manganese ore in the USSR.
Chernihovshchina, Belarus, Western regions of Orlovsk, Kursk and other areas have large reserves of peat and large forest arrays.
Many rivers in the occupied territory carried large reserves of potential energy. On the Dnieper, in the years of the first five-year plan, one of the powerful hydroelectric power plants in the world was built - DniproNes.
The depths of Ukraine kept the significant reserves of stone salt, focused in the area of \u200b\u200bArtemovsk. Rich mercury reserves were kept in the Nikitovskoye deposit in the Gorlovka area. Near Novorossiysk had one of the largest raw materials for the cement industry. At its base, there were large plants that gave cement to build the most important engineering structures.
In the hands of the enemy were areas where there were such powerful enterprises of ferrous metallurgy, such as metallurgical plants in Donetsk, Makeyevka, Ordzhonikidze, Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk, Voroshilovsk, Sergo, Dnepropetrovsk, Dneprodzerzhinsk, Zaporizhia. Metallurgy South gave before the war is the main part of the metal produced in the country. For example, in 1940, the ferrous metallurgy of Ukraine mined 19 million tons of iron ore, paid 9 million tons of cast iron and 8.6 million tons of steel. Konstantinovka, Zaporizhia and Nikitovka were centers for the production of aluminum and zinc.
In the south of the country, a powerful multi-sectoral machine-building industry was created during the years of the pre-war five-year plan. In many cities of Ukraine, large enterprises of the machine-tool industry increased, for the production of equipment for heavy and mining, agricultural and transport engineering, shipbuilding.
At the temporary occupied enemy of the territory there were numerous enterprises of various industries of chemical, woodworking, timber, light and food industries, which occupied a large proportion in the public-union production of products. Thus, the enterprises of the food industry of the temporary occupied regions were given in 1940. 87% of the total sugar production in the country.
In temporarily captured by the enemy, a large number of powerful power plants united by Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk energy systems were concentrated. The power of these power plants was about 43% of the power of all power plants of the USSR ^ 2 ^.
As the front approached the bombing of the plants, so the valuable equipment was exported from the front-line zone and the threatened areas into the depths of the country, to the east, and upon arrival at the destination, it was restored to issue the desired product front. Enterprises remaining in the front-line strip continued to work hard, providing front needs. The industry of the Central District (Moscow, Tula and other centers) played a particularly large role.
However, the temporary loss of the most important economic regions caused a huge damage to the economy of the USSR, especially industry, as the large production capacity of many important industries dropped out for a long time. By November 1941, the loss of production capacity as a result of the temporal occupation of the part of the territory of the USSR was as follows ^ 3 ^:

+===================================
| Stone coal, thousand t | 240 772 | 151 570 |
+===================================
| Primary oil treatment, thousand t | 32 845 | 9 372 |
+===================================
| Electricity (on the drug addict), thousand kW | 6 398 | 3 718 |
+===================================
| Cast iron, thousand t | 18 200 | 12 825 |
+===================================
| Steel »» | 22 600 | 13 472 |
+===================================
| Electric furnaces, thousand t | 211 | 76 |
+===================================
| Rental, thousand t | 16 800 | 9 289 |
+===================================
| Coke »» | 24,000 | 16,000 |
+===================================
| Iron ore, thousand t | 34,000 | 22 000 |
+===================================
| Manganese ore »» | 3 100 | 1 800 |
+===================================
| Iron Pipes »» | 1 100 | 810 |
+===================================
| Synthetic rubber, thousand t | 127 | 90 |
+===================================
| Machine tools Metal cutting (on the addict of machine-tooling), pcs. | 32 328 | 19 822 |
+===================================
| Cars, thousand pieces. | 145 | 61 |
+===================================
| Spinning spindle (drug addil), thousand pcs. | 8 126 | 4 512 |
+===================================
| Leather shoes, mln. Couples | 165 | 116 |
+===================================
| Sugar, thousand C Becks per day | 1 814 | 1 679 |
+===================================
| Vegetable oil, thousand t seeds per day | 13 | 6 |
+===================================
| Canned dairy, thousand cans in shift | 127 | 67 |
+===================================
| Pasta, T per day | 1 408 | 914 |
+===================================
| Soap, t per day | 2 651 | 1 706 |
+===================================
| Cement, thousand t | 8 400 | 4 357 |
+===================================
| Cellulose, thousand t | 823 | 399 |
+===================================
| Paper, thousand t | 860 | 468 |
+===================================
| Cardboard »» | 83 | 56 | As you can see, the country suffered significant material losses.
Especially they were great in coal, oil, cast iron, steel, rolled, coke, iron ore, manganese, aluminum, metal cutting machines, ball bearings, i.e. According to the main types of products necessary for the production of military equipment. The situation was even more complicated by the fact that the majority of enterprises relocated to the depths of the country have not yet given the products, since or were on the way, or were mounted in new rear districts.
Significant damage caused the German fascist occupation of the military industry. From August to November 1941, as a result of occupation and evacuation, 303 enterprises manufactured by ammunition were disposed. The monthly release of retired enterprises amounted to 8.4 million corpses of shells, 2.7 million mines of mines, 2 million corps of airbabes, 7.9 million fuses, 5.4 million tools of ignition, 5.1 million shelling sleeves, 2.5 million hand held grenades and 16.1 thousand tons of ammonium nitrate.
In the war zone, such large industrial areas, like Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, who presented the main engineering centers of the country were in the zone of hostilities.
In 1941, due to the losses incurred, the main production funds as a whole were reduced by 28% compared with the presenter level.
Huge damage was caused by agriculture. If industrial enterprises in one degree or another could be maintained by evacuation and then establish production again in the rear districts, it is impossible to relocate the land and the lost volume of agricultural products immediately has nothing to compensate.
In the hands of the enemy turned out to be the fertile lands of Ukraine, Crimea, Don, Kuban, the North Caucasus. Fascist vandals robbed and ruined collective farms and state farms.
At the captured by the enemy territory, 47% of all sowing areas of the country were produced, 50% of the union grain, 86% of all products of sugar beet and 71% of sunflower was concentrated to 50% of the total livestock ^ 4-5 ^.
In Ukraine, in the Crimea, in the North Caucasus, in the Volgograd, Voronezh, Kursk, Smolensk, Leningrad, Moscow regions were many highly developed and productive grain, milk-meat, sheep-water, pig-breeding, beetroot, fruit and berry and other state farms, as well as Conezavodov . For example, in Smolensk and Leningrad regions, a large number of tribal, elite state farms of cattle were located, in the Moscow region - tribal pig-breeding state farms. Big glory used the conezavoda of the North Caucasus, Ukraine, the Voronezh region. They played a significant role in improving horse breeding and actively participated in the formation of cavalry compounds.
Before the war, the state farms temporarily occupied by the enemy of the districts played an important role in the economy of agriculture of the USSR. As a rule, these were advanced, cost-effective enterprises, which led the farm at a high technical level, was widely used by agrotechnik, high yields were obtained. These high-quality farms gave the country a large amount of food and industrial raw materials (bread, meat, sugar beets, fine wool, etc.).
Agriculture of the south and the center gave the country about 65% of winter wheat, up to 50% of corn and 40% buckwheat, a large amount of sugar beet, hemp, flax, sunflower, moleclavin, mustard and other technical and oilseeds. At the temporary occupied enemy of the territory there were up to 20% of the horse's livestock, about 17% of cattle livestock, approximately 25% of the pigstock of pigs.
Before the war in agriculture, the Ukrainian SSR had 85.7 thousand conventional 15-strong tractors, and in collective farms - 36.1 thousand cars, 1,769.5 thousand workers' horses, 542.2 thousand workers. The presence of a large number of agricultural equipment provided a high level of mechanization of major agricultural works: soil processing, crops, crop care, harvesting. In Ukraine, a large harvest was gathered before the war, which was put forward to the republic for a prominent place in the country on the gross collection of grain, sugar beet and other agricultural products, sales of agriculture and the number of products surrendered by the state.
Temporarily occupied by German-fascist invaders areas had a rich railway network. Here before the war is 1 thousand square meters. KM accounted for 39 km of the railway track, i.e. Almost as much as in the USA, where 1 thousand square meters. km at the time accounted for 40 km of the railway track.
In the conditions of temporary loss, the Soviet Union of the most important economic districts and large production facilities increased even more than the superiority of fascist Germany in the forces and the funds with which it had, treacherously starting the war against the USSR. As is known, at the time of attacking the USSR, the armed forces of Hitler Germany at the equipment of the tanks exceeded the Soviet Armed Forces more than 2 times, by the combat aircraft of new types - in 3.2, instruments and mortars - 1.4 times. In addition, the fascist invaders have a significantly large number of vehicles.
In the first months of war, Soviet troops lost a lot of weapons. In addition, military units had mostly old, not sustainable material part. Most tanks were old designs, and the new T-34 tanks arrived at first in small quantities. All combat operations were carried out with the help of light tanks, but they carried a big damage from all types of artillery enemy fire and even from large-caliber machine guns. The front demanded the replenishment of military equipment, the lack of which could not immediately fill the industry, seriously affected by the Hitler's occupation and bombardments of enemy aviation.
Unprecedented in history of the scale of the war, its technical and economic appearance - "War of Motors" - required a high technical level of production, a huge amount of high-quality raw materials and materials, energy resources, chemical and other products. For example, there are several dozen tons of metal on the production of only one heavy tank, and to produce an aircraft, it is necessary to have not only cast iron, steel, but also aluminum, magnesium, zinc, molybdenum, tungsten. The production of lungs and non-ferrous metals is associated with consumption of a significant amount of electricity. The production of ammunition required the appropriate scales of the manufacture of explosives. The arms of the army by airplanes, tanks, vehicles significantly increased the need for liquid fuel and lubricants.
The front presented huge requirements for all types of weapons and equipment. Satisfying them could have a powerful military industry, based on the developed modern industry: metallurgy, machine-tooling, fuel and chemical industry, energy.
These are the hardest days in the history of the Soviet state, when a mortal danger was hung over the country, the USSR was granted to himself: the Western allies did not provide him with real help. Under these conditions, it was necessary to carry out gigantic work on the expansion and creation of its own military-industrial base for the technical equipment and weapons of the Red Army and the Navy.
None of the past wars the country's economy did not play such an important role in ensuring victory over the enemy, as in the war of 1939-1945. No matter how large stocks of weapons and strategic raw materials created in peacetime, for successful conducting such a long, exhausting and severe war, which was the Second World War, it was necessary that during the war the production of military equipment and necessary for its production of industrial products Not only did not decrease, but more and more increased by mobilizing internal capabilities, all reserves and capacity building.
The restructuring of the national economy of the USSR on a military manager proceeded from the task of maximal development of military production so that in thousands of all-expressive sizes to increase the production of weapons and military equipment in the shortest possible time to achieve decisive superiority over the enemy in the amount and quality of military equipment and thereby create a solid economic framework for victory Over fascist Germany and its allies. The program of military restructuring of the economy of the Soviet Union envisaged a whole range of activities, the most important of which were:
a fundamental change in the structure of material production, distribution of the social product and national income;
switching to the needs of the war of a significant part of the resources sent during the years of peaceful construction to satisfy consumption and accumulation;
all-term development and durable military production increase by using a large part of the civil manufacturing office, the intensification of production processes at the current enterprises of the military industry and the establishment of new capacity industry in this industry while reaching an appropriate level of development of metallurgy, fuel industry, energy, mechanical engineering, railway transport, rural farms;
mobilization of all material, food, labor and financial resources in the country, strict centralization in their distribution and normalization, the redistribution of cash in favor of military economy when limiting the satisfaction of civil needs;
rebupping enterprises from threatened areas and front-line strip into the eastern regions of the country, their starts in the shortest possible time;
giant capital construction in all decisive industries in order to create new production facilities for producing the necessary front and country of industrial products.
As part of the rapid change in the entire sectoral structure of the national economy within the industry, the restructuring included the following activities:
maximum increase in the production of military products, taking into account the indigenous, high-quality shifts in its range and nomenclature at the existing enterprises of the military industry by identifying and using all reserves;
the reconstruction of existing enterprises and the construction of new enterprises of the military industry, mainly in the east of the country, as well as the translation into the military industry a number of enterprises engaged in the issuance of civilian products in order to expand the existing production capacity of the military industry;
attraction to the release of military products of enterprises continuing to produce civil products by reducing the plan for the production of goods for the population;
translation of enterprises serving the military industry to issue a new range and nomenclature in accordance with the needs of the military industry and the Red Army.
Military economy began to develop in extremely difficult summer conditions and autumn 1941. These were the most critical months for the country's economy: as a result of huge territorial and material losses, there was a reduction in production. The restructuring of the economy for military units demanded that the Soviet people voltage of all forces, unparalleled efforts and heroism. The Communist Party sent the efforts of all party, Soviet and business organizations to solve the most important military economic task - in the shortest possible time to fully master new production facilities, to achieve a fundamental improvement in the work of civil enterprises translated to ensure the needs of the front.
Civilian industrial enterprises could not always independently cope with the production of complex, multi-modeling modern weapons. Specialization and cooperation came to the aid. Based on the presence of metalworking equipment and the qualified composition of workers, such enterprises were instructed by the production of individual nodes or parts of a tank or aircraft, a rifle or projectile. This made it possible to quickly and effectively translate them to the release of military products. Soon, the majority of the factories that in peacetime civil products began to work for the front. They were engaged in stamping of ignition devices, garnet, casting min, pomegranate, bombs, mechanical processing of shell enclosures, etc.
In conditions, when part of the country's territory was occupied by the enemy and covered by military actions, traditional economic relations were disturbed. A particularly strong negative impact on the industry was provided by partial or complete violation of links between enterprises for the production of such cooperative products, like casting, forgings, electrical equipment and electrical appliances. Therefore, in the first months of the war, the State Committee of the State Commissioner carried out a number of urgent measures to establish industry and inter-district economic relations, to change the structure of individual industries and the range of products.
At that time, the addicts and enterprises were forced to make the creation of utility production. Thus, engineering enterprises created their own foundry base (steel, colored, cast iron casting), organized the production of hardware products, electrodes, various semi-finished products and parts, which before the war they received from the side, in cooperation. Raw materials produced separate nodes, machine parts and even simple units and equipment for their own equipment. Many enterprises have created their own energy base, using mainly wood fuel, harvested in nearby forests.
With all his small economic efficiency Such events then had a certain expediency, as they guaranteed the production from accidents and interruptions in the supply of fuel, electricity, components and semi-finished products, which was inevitable in severe military time conditions.
At the same time, in accordance with the military situation was created new system Production relationships with the enhancement of cooperation in the framework of the economic region, the region and then one city. The war stimulated the process of comprehensive development of economic districts on the eve of the war.
In an exclusively unfavorable setting of the first months of war, the workers of the Soviet rear and their leading power - the working class under the leadership of the party carried out the restructuring of the industry on a military man. In the relocation of the productive forces from the threatened areas to the east of the country, a huge organizational power of the party, the great dedication and labor heroism of the Soviet people appeared brightly. This unparalleled mass relocation and repair industry can be equated to the largest military operations of the Great Patriotic War.
The most difficult for the national economy of the USSR was the autumn period of 1941, when the Great Battle was walking near Moscow. Soviet country was in a difficult position at that time. The release of military products in October and November was the lowest. It caused emergency difficulties in ensuring existing fronts and new weapons, military equipment, ammunition, outfit, equipment. The security of the Soviet troops to the beginning of the defensive period of the battle near Moscow was extremely insufficient. For example, on the front and army warehouses of the Western Front there was only 0.2-0.3 ammunition of the main types of ammunition.
The fall in industrial production has reached its climax in November 1941, when the level of average monthly production was the lowest over all years of war and amounted to only 51.7% of the total production in November 1940 in December 1941. Compared to June, the smelting of cast iron decreased More than 4 times, steel production - in 2.8, rolled ferrous metals - in 3, ball bearings - 21 times. Fully stopped the production of individual types of engineering products. All mines stopped not only Donetsk, but also the Moscow region of the basin ^ 6 ^.
In this difficult for the Soviet state, the Western Allies period in every way tightened the fulfillment of military equipment in the USSR. In total, by the end of 1941, England and the United States sent 750 aircraft in the USSR and 501 tank instead of the promised 1,200 aircraft and 1,500 tanks ^ 7 ^.
The defense of Moscow every day became more stubborn. While the enemy rushed by all forces to Moscow, the supply of parts of the army by ammunition, equipment, means of transport and communications, food, broad and other property was associated with great difficulties. Everything that the front demanded, it was necessary to transport from the central warehouses to the front-line areas, and the railway transport due to the big overload did not always cope with military transportation. Many divisions experienced a big draw in weapons, ammunition and ordinary means of movement: cars, motorcycles, as well as human reserves. Often lacked fuel, warm outfit, food, forage.
In the most difficult period of the battle near Moscow, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on October 31, 1941 published calls for the Soviet people and the Armed Forces of the USSR in connection with the XXIV anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The party called on the personnel of the army and the fleet to stand to death, mercilessly struggling against the fascist invaders, and Soviet people - mobilize all the forces to help the front.
Soviet people unanimously responded to party calls. Soviet warriors fought heroically. At all fronts, they showed wonders of courage, fearlessness, self-sacrifice, although the enemy was more quantitatively and better armed. Anyone who did not fought at the front with the enemy, but worked in the rear, sought to contribute to the common cause of the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Motherland, to adequately note the XXIV anniversary of the Great October production success, give the front more ammunition, weapons.
The workers of the Soviet rear, working at the limit of human capabilities, not believing over time, courageously performed their duty to the fatherland. On his own initiative, thousands of teams were made by heroic efforts to speed up the fulfillment of military orders, to finish the installation of equipment transferred to new places of enterprises and establish armament production.
The Central Committee and MK WFP (b) took all the necessary measures to change the established serious position near Moscow and to force the translation of Moscow for military rails. The efforts of the city party organization and workers of Moscow were aimed at finding equipment to restore the production of military products.
Muscovites have established workshops in empty after evacuation of equipment: weapons, military equipment, ammunition. For example, at the factory. Sergo Ordzhonikidze remains only 150 workers, 10 people engineering and technical staff and 40 machines. But, despite this, a narrow production base, the plant has established the production of shuttles to the PSPATINU (PPS) gun. The CIS automotive plant in cooperation with the 1st GPZ, which began to supply the shutters, mastered the production of PPS. The second hour of the plant began producing fuses to mines, the trolleybus park of the Leningrad region - grenades. The red proletarian plant organized the production of hiking kitchens, ammunition and repair of tanks, the plant "Sickle and hammer" - repair of heavy KB tanks, the plant. Vladimir Ilyich - the release of fragantic fugasic shells. In factory workshops, planes, guns, tanks were repaired.
Railway workers in a free from the main work, the time was overtime, they installed old tank towers on platforms, turning them into peculiar dots on wheels. In November Days from Moscow went to the front of the armored train "death of fascism", "Moskvich" and others.
Even such purely peaceful enterprises, as confectionery factories and dairy plants, were rebuilt into a military paw and produced the desired front products. Thus, the confectionery factory "Rot-Front" instead of chocolate, candies and biscuits began to produce shells and repair anti-aircraft guns. Handicraft workshops, who in peaceful years, stamped spoons, buttons, teapots, brooks, turned into suppliers of hand and anti-tank grenades or parts to them.
The Moscow industry worked with great tension, smoothly supplied with arms and ammunition combat operations on the defense of the capital. At that time, about 2 thousand industrial enterprises were produced in Moscow, weapons and military equipment.
In December 1941, due to the increased military equipment, the tasks of the Moscow industry for the production of basic types of weapons and the supply of ammunition were increased compared with November several times, for example, the production of 50 and 82 mm caliber mortars - more than 4 times, PPS - 35 times. In addition, the party put the task to organize the mass production of anti-tank guns (PTR).
Many enterprises worked in the suburbs for the front. The plants of Mytishchi, Noginsk, Kolomna, Yegoryevsk, Orekhovo-Zueva, who mastered the production of such important types of military equipment, such as artillery implements, mortars, shells, machine guns, was played.
Workers' capitals and the metropolitan area with great enthusiasm and perseverance fought for the implementation of the manufacturing program. Not at night, the work of the Factories and Plants of Moscow and Moscow region did not cease. Workers and engineering workers workers worked clearly, nicely, in force 12-18 hours a day. Everyone considered himself mobilized to work for the front. The teams of enterprises constantly had difficulty. There was not enough or simply no equipment for the fulfillment of military orders, did not give materials, fuel, but managers of enterprises and workers showed a lot of skills, ingenuity, initiatives and found a way out. Shells, mines, machine guns, rifles, machine guns, tanks, guns, mortars, planes right from the factories and factories went to the front.
The industry of Moscow and the Moscow region became a large help of the military industry in the supply of the front of the ammunition and many types of weapons.
In the oldest conditions of the blockade, without the help from the outside, while maintaining the cold and courage, the Leningradians defended their city, selflessly protected: one - with weapons in their hands, others - at the machine in the workshops, where the ammunition was made, the tanks, cannons were repaired. Often, the technique, just enrolling from the front, immediately repaired, recovered and again went to the front.
Leningraders supplied their front with 76-mm cannons, mortars, anti-tank guns. Tsehi, who produced military equipment, worked around the clock. Often, workers did not come out of the workshops for several days, they also fed and slept. Many workers, and most of them were women and adolescents, exceeded the norms by 200-300%. Often the electricity supply was stopped, so small block stations were installed on the factories, for which steam and gas generator engines, diesel engines, car motors, steam boilers, and even rollers, which are rolled down roads. If there was no fuel and for such engines, the machines were driven by manually.
In the conditions of a besieged city, the problem of ensuring the production of military products with components, tools, raw materials, and the like was especially acute. It was solved by mobilizing all resources in the city, introducing substitutes, saving scarce materials, the development of new production technology. Leningrad plants themselves made the necessary equipment, devices and even equipment for the production of military products, quickly mastered new products and systematically increased the rate of production. In 1942, there were more than 50 different types of weapons and ammunition in the nomenclature of combat products produced by the Leningrad Industry.
Engineers and workers of Leningrad enterprises showed samples of technical creativity aimed at increasing the volume of issue and improving the quality of military products. In the Kirov plant, the production of KB tank production was changed, which made it possible to significantly increase their release. Opportunities for saving scarce materials were sought. For example, in the steel production, the rate of consumption of high-quality cast iron and ferroalloys in individual steel graam decreased by 10-20% and significantly increased the proportion of scrap metal. The smelting of some grades of doped steels began to produce not in acidic, but in major furnaces, as a result, the cast iron flow dropped from 44 to 35%. New technological processes were widely introduced, in particular the method of combined work of presses and molotov, which made it possible to significantly increase the release of artillery forgings in cash.
Throughout the country, the party conducted in the extremely complex military situation the titanic work on restructuring of the national economy on a military manner. In the most difficult conditions of the war, the relocation of enormous productive forces was completed, all cash resources were mobilized, all the possibilities for the organization in the eastern regions of the country's mass production of military equipment and all necessary for the conduct of victorious war were used. Members of the GCO, other responsible party leaders and government took the most energetic measures to give the Red Army the necessary military equipment.
Despite the enormous difficulties, the party and the government firmly kept in their hands the leading threads of the military management. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the GKO and SNK of the USSR were constantly kept in the field of view of the enterprise, producing military equipment, helped them in providing scarce raw materials, equipment. Partnerships of the Central Committee of the CPP (b) were sent to help the management of large defense plants - experienced party workers, prominent professionals.
With great tension, the addicts, the party and the government apparatus in Kuibyshev worked. At the Deputy Chairman of the USSR of the USSR N. A. Voznesensky, commoded in Kuibyshev, GKO laid personal responsibility for the accelerated development of the production of weapons and ammunition. Member of the Politburo Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) A. A. Andreev headed the part of the office of the party of the Commissariat of the Central Committee of the Party. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) provided him with the right to give on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party on the Organization of Industry in connection with the evacuation of enterprises, as well as on agricultural workpieces. The main task of the party and government apparatus in Kuibyshev was to relocate both military and civil industry to the eastern regions of the USSR, in the rapid restoration and providing the normal operation of evacuated enterprises in new places.
Party, Soviet and economic shots, created and educated by the Communist Party in the period of peaceful construction, showing high discipline, organization and patriotism, vigorously carried out full and comprehensive restructuring of the national economy on a military way, which covered industry, transport, agriculture and all economic management bodies .
However, at that difficult period of war, when Hitler's Hallehes were on the approaches to Moscow, failed to suspend the fall in industrial production. The loss of the most important economic areas in the West caused a number of disproportions in the economy: insufficient production of rolled black and non-ferrous metals for military and machine-building industries, coking coals, aviation and automotive gasoline, electricity deficit in the Urals, lack of component equipment and spare parts for boilers, foundry and blacksmith -Pressing equipment, "bottlenecks" on transport, etc.
In some industries, and in particular, in the rubber-oil, by the beginning of 1942, enterprises almost did not act, since their equipment was in the way or on conservation in Leningrad. Products of the rubber oil industry decreased to 4.4% of the pre-war level. The production of synthetic rubber decreased by more than 4 times, automotive tires - In 2, rubber shoes - 100 times.
Poorly coped with transportation railway transport. The average daily loading of railways fell to ^ 1 ^ / ^ 3 ^ pre-war level. Despite the measures taken to provide additional assistance, transportation difficulties were extremely slow.
The production and military industry decreased. For example, due to the relocation of the aviation industry, the aircraft were 3.6 times less, in November 1941 than in September. Forced relocation of enterprises of the military industry slowed down the pace of deployment of combat production. In the second half of 1941, the production plan of tanks was carried out by 61.7%. The production of T-34 tanks was especially noticeably reduced: if in the third quarter of 1941 they were produced 1121, then in the fourth - only 765. This provision was also developed in the aviation industry: if 6,600 aircraft were released in the third quarter, then in the fourth - only 3177 ^ 8-9 ^. The aviation industry could not fill the losses that Soviet aviation in combat operations. For the implementation of offensive operations in the winter of 1941/42, it was required to mobilize the entire main aircraft fleet of the country and transfer it to Moscow.
Electricity generation, metal production, fuel production significantly lagged on the growing needs of the military economy. The lack of metal, caused by the unsatisfactory course of work on the increasing production capacity of ferrous metallurgy, was acute. The resulting disproportion between the size of the metal production and the need for a military economy required the implementation of urgent measures to eliminate it. It was necessary to quickly eliminate and sharply negative impact on the work of the industry non-fulfillment of planned tasks on total mining Coal and coal coal, as well as a decrease in oil production in the main oil area - Baku and achieve growth in oil production in new oil areas.
Although the Central Committee of the USSR Central Committee and SCC took the necessary measures to improve the work of the industry and a sharp increase in the production of military equipment at the enterprises of the country, the Soviet Armed Forces continued to experience a large drawback in tanks, aircraft, guns, automatic weapons, ammunition, due to Than to equip newly formed divisions, it was necessary to allocate very limited resources.
The difficult situation was evolving with the need for the front of the ammunition. In this industry, there was also a massive evacuation of enterprises: from August to November 1941, 303 ammunition enterprises dropped out. In addition, the production of ammunition was hampered due to an acute lack of ferroalloys, nickel and non-ferrous metals. The need for copper, tin and aluminum compared to pre-war times increased several times, and their production was significantly lower than the day before the war. The production of non-ferrous metals, which has decreased in 430 times, was particularly sharply abruptly. Essentially it was almost not produced. Not enough chemicals. The production of chemicals has sharply decreased due to the loss of Donbass with its developed chemical industry and a sharp reduction in the production of chemicals in Moscow and Leningrad enterprises. 26 enterprises and workshops of the chemical industry were evacuated to the east, only 8 factories arrived at the place of November 1941, and less than half were commissioned.
All this has adversely affected the production of powder and explosives needed for ammunition equipment. Meanwhile, the need for them has grown rapidly. In the first period of the war, the mains of ammunition created in peacetime were consumed mainly, but they quickly decreased. Soon such a period was occurring when the needs of the front in ammunition were supposed to be provided at the expense of the current production of ammunition plants, and in recent months 1941 performed a plan by only 50-60% ^ 10 ^.
From the second half of November 1941, the military industry began to raise the production volume. By this time, the fall ceased and the process of increasing the volume of coal production, cast iron and steel smelting, production of rolled steel. The increase in the production of military products was achieved by increasing the technical and economic indicators of industry, improving the organization of production, the introduction of daily schedules for the production of products and the implementation of other events.
The Nazi leadership extended that the industry of the Soviet Union, undermined by the loss of essential raw materials and industrial areas, the evacuation of a large number of enterprises and mass departments to the front of the main qualified personnel, will not be able to fill losses and will not provide the front with the edge of the necessary weapons and food.
Thanks to the adopted Communist Party and the Soviet Government, the December offensive of the Soviet Armed Forces near Moscow, which provided for the implementation of colossal on the scope and determination of military-strategic operations, was somewhat better provided with aircraft, tanks, self-propelled artillery installations, artillery guns, mortars and ammunition. However, despite the significant strengthening of the fronts of the Moscow direction by reserves, superiority in the forces and funds was still on the opponent's side: in people and tanks - 1.5 times, in artillery - 1.8 times. Only on airplanes, the advantage was 1.6 times in favor of the Soviet troops. By the beginning of December 1941, the Center for German-Fascist Army "Center", together with the Air Force, had more than 1,700 thousand people, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1170 tanks and 615 aircraft. Soviet troops participating in the counterattack came out 1,100 thousand people, had 7,650 guns and mortars, 770 tanks and 1 thousand aircraft in service. These data refute the fabrication of bourgeois falsifiers on the alleged 20-fold superiority of the Soviet troops in the forces and means during counter-offering near Moscow.
The troops of the Red Army, breaking the fierce resistance of the enemy, victoriously completed the battle near Moscow. The workers of the Soviet rear contributed to this. By the end of 1941, all the tank and significant number of aviation plants ^ 11 ^ began to issue the combat technology.
However, as a result of huge losses incurred by the Soviet economy, there was a further change in the ratio of the levels of heavy industry production of the USSR and Hitler's Germany in favor of the latter. But the heroic efforts of the party, the government and the entire Soviet people, the fall in industrial production was discontinued, and from March 1942 it quickly went up. The increase in the production of industrial products was greatly influenced by the fact that before the war industry of the USSR had mainly almost new equipment established during the pre-war five years. Therefore, during the war, it coped with large loads and almost did not stop for overhaul.
Already by the spring of 1942, the majority of products relocated to the East established a mass production of products for the front, and in March, the Eastern Military Industrial Base produced so many military products as the entire industry was produced before the war. By the summer, there were 1,200 large evacuated enterprises in the east of the country, 850 new plants, mines, power plants, domain and Marten furnaces, rolling mills and other important objects were commissioned.
At the end of 1942, the USSR industry gave the front over? all military equipment, weapons and ammunition. Since March 1942, it is steadily, from month to month the total volume of industrial production increased. In the second half of 1942, the production of the most important types of industrial products began: cast iron, steel, rolled ferrous metals, coal, oil, etc. Due to the selfless work of the collective farmers and workers of state farms in 1941, the state prepared more than 1 billion grain pounds ^ 12 ^ .
The Soviet Union, overcoming enormous difficulties, entered into a period of rapid growth of all sectors of the national economy, and in particular military industry. The heroic efforts of the party, government and the Soviet people were crowned with success. It was possible to rebuild the industry as soon as possible, evacuate the population and material values \u200b\u200bfrom Western to the eastern regions of the country, deploy a powerful military industry in the rear and organize a massive release of modern military equipment. Such a quick and comprehensive mobilization of the national economy for the needs of the war did not know the story.
In fascist Germany, the translation of the national economy for military rails, made long before the beginning of World War I, took about seven years, and in the United States and England it was actually four to five years. Thanks to the advantages of the socialist building, the Soviet Union, even in the conditions of the fierce occurrence of a strong enemy, was able to restructure the entire farm for military units for one year - by mid-1942, and the translation of the USSR industry on military production - Mostly for three to four months. Only one fact is a vivid evidence of the indisputable superiority of the socialist economy of the economy over the capitalist.
The military restructuring of the USSR economy conducted as soon as possible demonstrated not only the huge opportunities laid down in the socialist production method, but also the superiority of the Soviet experience and leadership of the national economy of the country; Creative and organizational abilities of party, trade union, Komsomol, economic, administrative, scientific personnel, educated by the Communist Party; Labor feat and the moral and political unity of the workers of the city and the village.
Thus, it was successfully and in the shortest possible time tasks set by the Central Committee of the WCP (b), GKO and the USSR SNK in front of the workers of the Soviet rear, by:
mobilization of production facilities, workers and engineering and technical personnel of the socialist industry to ensure the needs of the Patriotic War;
rebupping industry and personnel from threatened areas to the East;
mobilization of material resources of agriculture, the labor of the collective farm peasantry and employees of state farms to ensure the needs of the army and the population in food and industry in agricultural raw materials;
restructuring of transport that provided the priority and speedy promotion of military routes and nationality goods of defense significance;
mobilization of construction personnel and mechanisms for the construction of military factories and co-parameted with them;
mobilization of labor resources, retraining of industrial workers and the preparation of new frames instead of designed to the Red Army;
attracting the non-working population to enterprises, construction, transport and agriculture.
During these activities, they were not only restored, but also significantly exceeded the lost power of the military industry, which ensured the opportunity to continuously increase the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces and move to the re-equipment of the Soviet troops, equip them with new, more perfect types of military equipment and weapons.
Perestroika radically changed the structure of the material production, distribution of the social product and national income of the USSR. For the needs of the front, a significant part of the resources and the production apparatus was switched. As a result of the restructuring, new major power in the military industry were created; The necessary level of development of metallurgy, fuel industry, energy, engineering, railway transport, agriculture has been reached; The Soviet rear was even more strengthened.
Perestroika touched on all sectors of the national economy. In the course of its implementation, whole drug addicts were translated into the release of military products. Enterprises that produced peaceful products before the war, mastered the production of the most diverse military equipment. Thus, the mortars began to produce the enterprises of the People's Commissariat of General Engineering, which before the war produced food, textile, chemical, printing and other types of equipment. A large number of enterprises were brought to the production of ammunition. It was the most massive type of military products.
Heads and employees of the drug addicts, director of enterprises engaged in the release of military products, party, trade union, Komsomol organizations and production teams gave all his way to an increase in the production of military products. In June 1942, the products of the Military Industry and Mechanical Engineering and Mechanical Engineering Products were 113% of the products issued by these drug addicts in June 1941 throughout the country.
The Hitler Military Command sought to disrupt the activities of the USSR industry, to reduce its supplies to the front. For him, the implementation of this task was not less than the achievement of decisive military-strategic success at the Theater of Military Action. Preparing a new offensive in the summer of 194. 2, Hitler in the Directive dated April 5, 1942 so determined the main task of the German-fascist armed forces: "... to finally destroy the remaining strengths of strength and deprive them, to the extent possible, the most important military Economic centers. "
According to Paulus's testimony, the strategic goal of the summer operation of 1942 was the seizure of the regions of the Northern Caucasus rich in oil ^ 13 ^.
This plan of the Hitler's military command predetermined the deployment in 1942 only heavy battles, the outcome of which depended primarily from the uninterrupted and steadily increasing supply of the front by military equipment, weapons and ammunition. The party put in front of the country's industry new task - In a short time, it is to achieve such a level of industrial production to exceed Hitler Germany in both the quantity and the quality of the produced military products. Already then the USSR industry overtook the industry of fascist Germany in such important parameters as the proportion of the production of military products per unit of most important types of strategic raw materials. Thus, Hitler Germany per million tons made aircraft 4.4 times and tanks 6.8 times less than the USSR; For 1 billion kWh-h produced energy - aircraft 4.3 times and tanks 6.6 times less than the USSR ^ 14 ^. This testified to the high concentration of military industry, more advanced technology and the organization of production in the USSR compared to fascist Germany.
However, due to the promotion of Hitler's troops in the spring and summer of 1942, the military economy of the USSR has undergone new difficulties in the departure of the Soviet territory. At the end of the summer, the fascist troops seized the Stalingradsky district - one of the largest industrial bases of the country, took the area of \u200b\u200bMaikop and approached Grozny. The enemy interrupted the most important river artery of the country - the Volga, which occurred the supply of the army and the rear of Baku oil. The seizure of such important industrial and industrial areas such as Donbass, the North Caucasus and Kuban, reaching it on railway and water communications, connecting the central and southern regions of the country, significantly complicated the work of the industry and the supply of the Red Army.
In the busy summer period of 1942, the Central Committee of the Party mobilized additional material resources to help the front. As a result of the measures taken from the second half of 1942, despite the second wave of the industry's evacuation in the summer and in the fall of 1942, the workers of the Soviet rear were able to ensure the increase in the production of the most important types of industrial products: cast iron, steel, rolled ferrous metals, iron ore, coal, oil, oil , caustic soda, sulfuric acid, automotive tires, metal-cutting machines, cement, etc. This allowed the rapid pace to increase the production of military equipment. If enterprises of armament, tank industry, aviation industry, ammunition in 1941 increased production by 40% against the previous year, then in 1942 - already at 186%. In December 1942, the volumes of gross production of military industries and mechanical engineering exceeded more than twice the figures of 1941 and one and a half times the level of 1940 ^ 15 ^ The proportion of military products in the total gross production industry increased from 26% in 1940 to 68% in 1942
Continuously built the rate of production of weapons and ammunition in the east of the country. Thus, in the Urals, the production of military products in 1942 increased compared to 1940. More than 5 times, in Western Siberia - in 27, in the Volga region - at 9 times. In the districts of the Urals and the Volga region, powerful enterprises of mass production of T-34 and square tanks were created on the basis of high -ractor plants. Here, as well as in Siberia, serial production of fighters and attack aircraft, guns of division, regimental and anti-tank artillery was established. By the end of 1942, thousands of enterprises translated into the production of military products were successfully worked in the USSR. If in 1941, 15,735 aircraft were produced, 6590 tanks, 38,371 guns (76 mm caliber and larger - without tank) and mortar (caliber 82-120 mm), then in 1942 - 25,436 aircraft, 24446 tanks, 158 681 The tool and mortars of the specified types ^ 16 ^. Already in December 1942 compared with December 1941, aircraft production increased more than 3 times, tanks - almost 2, machine guns - in 1.9, artillery shells - almost 2 times.
Military industry in the most difficult conditions of war at the same time as an increase in the production of military products persistently mastered the production of new, more modern species Weapons. New weapons and military equipment were received in the current Red Army, which allowed to provide a steady increase in the level of technical equipment of the Red Army. Since 1942, the creation of tank and mechanized corps, tank and air armies, artillery divisions, aviation buildings, which significantly increased the possibilities of the Red Army to solve strategic tasks.
By the end of 1942, in the Soviet Union, it was produced more than in fascist Germany, the most important types of military equipment and weapons.
After the unconditional surrender of fascist Germany, the former chief of the headquarters of the Hitler's Supreme Commander General Field Marshal V. Keitel was admitted that he and Hitler were deeply mistaken in assessing the military-economic opportunities of the Soviet Union. Head of the Military Economic Department of the Supreme Commander of the Hitler's Hitler Troops General Thomas January 21, 1942 wrote that for him there were a surprise "stunning achievements of the Russian military industry" ^ 17 ^. The head of the General Staff of the Land Forces Galder, the head of the headquarters of the Supreme Command, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander, Head of the Operational Guidelines of the Supreme Commander.
It should be noted that in 1942, despite significant temporary losses at the beginning of the war, the Soviet Military household on its scale, the technical level and structure reliably ensured the successful decision of the strategic, tactical and operational tasks of the Red Army.
Military plants and related enterprises have clearly supplied the front with weapons and equipment.
The collective farms and state farms reliably supplied the Red Army and the population of food, and the industry - raw materials.
Railway transport has noticeably strengthened the transport links of the Eastern regions and the center, and the transfer of railway transport to the hard schedule allowed better to provide the priority and speedy promotion of military routes.
Since 1942, in the process of the development of the military economy, a new stage was increasingly identified, which was characterized by the fact that the costs were satisfied at the expense of the military economy developed on their own basis; The normal economic sources of economic development of the economy became involved in the leading economic sources of the economy, in which the basis of the increase in the production of military products was the growth of raw materials and energy resources. From this stage, the main source of costs was expanded reproduction, the absolute growth of social product and national income. It was the pattern of development of the USSR military economy.
However, in 1942, the national economy was as a whole at such a level, when the ratio of the USSR military-industrial potentials and fascist Germany was not yet in favor of the Soviet Union. If by the time of attacking the USSR, the German military-industrial base exceeded Soviet quantitative indicators of approximately 1.5-2 times, then in 1942 - about 3-4 times. It was explained by the fact that 1942 was extremely difficult for the Soviet economy. Although the creation of a coherent military economy was forced everything, all cash material and technical resources accumulated before the war were mobilized, and their redistribution in favor of the military industry and other industries serving this industry, due to the reduction in civil consumption, to achieve significant granting production in heavy military conditions failed. In 1942, the volume of the production of the main types of heavy industry products was still significantly lagging behind the level of their production in 1940, which is seen from the following data ^ 18 ^:
+===================================
+===================================
| Electricity, billion kWh | 48.3 | 29.1 |
+===================================
| Coal, mln. T | 165.9 | 75.5 |
+===================================
| Oil »» | 31.1 | 22.0 |
+===================================
| Cast iron »» | | 14.9 | 4.8 |
+===================================
| Steel »» | 18.3 | 8.1 |
+===================================
| Rental »» | | 13.1 | 5.4 | During this period, a number of enterprises worked nertramically, with the overall implementation of the Plan on the shaft, did not cope with the implementation of planned assignments for the production of military equipment. The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and GKO demanded that the economic leaders of the Bolshevik overcome the difficulties, find and use the available reserves, increase the demands for each employee and make the fulfillment of such a plan that requires the situation.
In 1942, the consolidation and development of the country's military economy was intense. Investments in the military industry increased by reducing investments in other industries and conservation of a number of buildings. The number of workers in the military industry increased by reducing it in other sectors of the national economy. Large measures were carried out on the further development of the raw materials and fuel and energy bases of military production - industries of black and non-ferrous metallurgy, the production of electricity and coal production, production of chemical, forest products, mechanical engineering, as well as the light and food industry, ensuring the needs of the army and the population.
As a result of the measures taken by the decline in the production of the most important types of industrial products, which took place in the initial period of the war, stopped in February 1942. In the second half of 1942, a noticeable increase in the production of products was achieved compared to the first half of 1942, which is seen from the following Data ^ 19 ^:
+===================================
+===================================
| Cast iron, mln. T | 2.3 | 2.5 |
+===================================
| Steel »» | 3.9 | 4,2 |
+===================================
| Rental »» | | 2.6 | 2.8 |
+===================================
| Coal »» | 35.6 | 39.9 |
+===================================
| Metal cutting machines, thousand pcs. | 8.0 | 14.9 |
+===================================
| Electricity, billion kWh | 14.0 | 15.0 | Although oil production fell from 11.7 million tons in the first half of 1942 to 10.3 million tons in the second half of 1942, however, in the structure of light oil products, the proportion of aviation and automotive gasoline was significantly increased. Oil production grew in the regions of the "second Baku".
The chemical industry has been expanded by the production of sulfur and nitric acid, oleum, toluene, soda and other products for military needs. Significantly increased cellulose production for explosives, air shocks and specialists.
The quality of the Soviet metal used for tanks, led to the amazement command of the Nazi Wehrmacht and encouraged German metallurgists, designers and breeders to search for ways to melt the steel tightness. In the German laboratories, Methovels again settled for tests, exploring steel with trophy Soviet tanks and guns. And at this time, Soviet metallurgists continued to cook the best steel for plants that produced tanks, guns, shells and mines.
In 1943, the Soviet country joined, having a brilliant victory by Stalingrad, which began the beginning of a native penalty during the Great Patriotic War and the entire World War II. The victory of the Red Army near Stalingrad was at the same time victory of the Soviet rear. By this time, the coherent military economy of the USSR was already created, new economic ties were strengthened.
At the second stage of the development of the socialist military economy, the party and the government have created prerequisites for the successful solution of the task of expanded reproduction by major capital construction in the East, so that it is faster to provide a fundamental fracture during the war. Finally, the second stage was determined in 1943. This year, marked by the largest victories of the Red Army, was a turning point in the development of the USSR military economy.
The Soviet state by its own forces overcomed the greatest difficulties caused by the war with fascist Germany. A military economy created by the efforts of the Soviet people not only reimbursed losses on the battlefields, but also steadily increased the pace of weapons and military equipment.
Military industry provided in the shortest possible development and mass production of modernized and new types of military equipment and weapons. Already in early 1943, the Soviet tank compounds were fully secured T-34 tanks. This terrible force was forced to oppose new types of combat vehicles. So "Tigers", "Ferdinanda", "Panthers" appeared, and subsequently "royal tigers". A 122 mm guns and 152-mm guns, which could break through their armor were used against new German tanks. At the same time, new powerful Soviet tanks and self-propelled installations such as SU-100, IP and ISU, which were armed with 100 and 122-mm cannons and 152-mm and 122-mm cannons and 152-mm can be created for the successful fight against "tigers" and "Ferdinands".
As a result of the quantitative and high-quality growth of military production in the USSR, as well as huge enemy losses in the technique on the battlefields there was a significant change in the ratio of the military power of the USSR and fascist Germany in favor of the Soviet Union.
During the Patriotic War in the USSR, the construction of new industrial enterprises was widely carried out, which significantly increased the military-economic potential of the Soviet state; And in Hitler's Germany, industrial construction, on the contrary, coincided. In addition, as a result of the defeats of the German-fascist armies on the Soviet-German front, Hitlerovskaya Germany became weaker not only in a military, but also in economically. The volume of military production in Hitler's Germany was systematically reduced. If, in the first period of war, fascist Germany, using the production resources of all European countries occupied by it, produced more military products than the USSR, after the completion of the military restructuring of the national economy, the Soviet Union was noticeably superior to fascist Germany for the production of basic types of modern weapons.
In the second period of the Great Patriotic War there were large qualitative shifts in the sectoral structure of the Soviet industrial production.
The military industry was mastered and introduced into mass production new types of weapons, ammunition, military engineering property. Many enterprises of this industry during the second period of war have repeatedly rebuilt their production to produce new, more modern and efficient types and types of weapons, ammunition.
In the metallurgical industry, the proportion of high-quality rental in the total amount of metal produced and, accordingly, the volume of ordinary rental production was reduced, the share of special types of cast iron and high-quality steels increased, the process of producing special steels in Mainensian furnaces, ferrochrome in domain furnaces, armor-leaf rolled, was mastered. Blownigas. In the total volume of products of the oil industry, the share of aviation benzine and high-quality motor fuel, chemical - the proportion of special chemicals has increased.
At the same time, with the development and development of the production of new types of products, the process of improving the use of existing techniques, an increase in production culture, a significant increase in labor productivity. Wide distribution received stream and conveyor methods, progressive methods of processing products. For example, a significant savings of metal gave a casting of large parts in metal forms. Designed under the leadership of Academician E. O. Paton The automatic welding method was widely used in many industries.
Further development of the specialization and cooperation of production in the military industry contributed to the introduction of high-performance equipment, reduced its loss and downtime, stimulated the growth of labor productivity. Specialization made it possible to dispersed industry through the country.
In those years, the forms of subject, valuable, chamber and technological (production of casting, forgings, etc.) were developed.
In the aviation industry there were groups of plants engaged in aircraft production, and groups of factories producing motors. In a separate group, plants producing components and parts of aircraft were allocated: aggregates, screws, wheels, electric and radio equipment, ignition devices, aviation devices, etc. Specialized plants for the production of weapons for aircraft, rubber and paints, glass products were also created.
A large development in the aviation industry has received cooperation. Enterprises of the aviation industry received different semi-finished products from specialized plants: casting, forgings, stamping, fittings, tanks, etc. Specialized on the release of individual nodes or enterprise units, in turn had cooperated relationships with factories specializing in the release of smaller nodes and parts. For example, motor-building enterprises received in the order of cooperation from other plants carburetors, revoltors, fuel pumps, magneto, etc. Often head factories essentially became assembly plants, as they produced finished products from prefabricated nodes and semi-finished products received from other enterprises.
Great opportunities for specialization and cooperation were in the industry of ammunition. Many enterprises of various industries - heavy and medium engineering, machine-tooling, ferrous metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, paper, forest, food, textile and local industries, the People's Food, Food, Textile and Local Industry, People's Commissariat, were attracted to the production of individual components. Before the war, they made civil products. If in 1941 ammunition produced 382 enterprises 34 drug addicts and departments, then in 1942 - already 1108 enterprises 58 drug addicts and departments.
There was such a form of cooperation: civil plants received from military billers and semi-finished products for the production of various parts, processed and collected them, and then the assembled nodes were directed to the recruitment of military factories.
The development of specialization in many ways contributed to the fact that the military industry produced mass production products, which opens up great opportunities for expanding and deepening subject specialization, reducing the range of products produced by individual enterprises.
The characteristic feature of the organization of industrial production during the war years was intra-ionic cooperation. Especially widespread development is such a form of cooperation in areas directly adjacent to the front, and in the front-line strip. For example, Leningrad enterprises in conditions of blockade were forced to limit territorial production relations with the framework of their city. In the same reason, Moscow in October 1941 was, when the enemy was located on the nearest approaches to the capital and as a result of this connection with other countries of the country were extremely limited. In this difficult period, a lot of initiative in finding opportunities for the implementation of production cooperation in Moscow and the Moscow region showed a Moscow automobile plant. On a number of enterprises, he organized the production of component parts for tanks, which previously produced enterprises of other areas. For example, at the Schelkovsky factory, in the suburb of Moscow, granitol began to manufacture.
Internal cooperation developed in the rear areas. Transport difficulties, the need to quickly obtain parts and nodes in the order of cooperation required to organize the production of certain combat vehicles within the region and even one city, since the territorial and production relations that existed before the war were violated. The factories evacuated to the East had to create them again. Of course, first of all, the choice fell to nearby plants that were within the city or within the region. It is this kind of co-separated relationships were created in the Volga region, Siberia and Kazakhstan.
Especially great development received this form of cooperation in the Urals, which during the war of the war was the authentic Arsenal of the Red Army. In the Ripiport of Urals, the Central Committee of the Party said: "On the combat Ural Machines we will put the same guns, motors, bearings, electrical wiring, radio equipment, technical, plastic products. We all learned all this to work out in the Urals. "
The expansion of intraranslate connections was a significant feature of the Soviet economy throughout all sold years. In the context of war, a substantially new system of territorial and production relations was created, which was characterized by the strengthening of cooperation within the framework of the economic region, the region and one city. The war stimulated the process of increasing the role of intra-ionic cooperation and the integrated development of entire economic districts on the eve of the war.
An essential feature of the relationship between customer factories with supplier factories was an increase in the production discipline of enterprises in the fulfillment of cooperative deliveries. In this case, suppliers showed a sense of high responsibility, took the most decisive measures for all orders to fulfill on time.
A great contribution to the development of the military economy was made by the country's scientific institutions. Intensive growth of scientific research during the war years, a high level of development in the USSR of Technical Sciences, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry has been promoted.
An important work associated with the restructuring of the Urals industry for Military Pads was carried out in September 1941, the Commission for Mobilizing the Ural Resources, which was headed by President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Akademik V. L. Komarov. In this commission, the prominent scientists of the Soviet Union were actively involved - Academicians A. A. Baikov, I. P. Bardin, E. V. Brick, V. A. Obruchev and other, more than 800 employees of science and technology, about 60 scientific institutions and organizations. Thanks to the intense scientific search for this large creative team, new technological techniques that contributed to the creation and mass production of more perfect military equipment were developed and implemented.
One of the effective results of scientific research was introduced at Metallurgical plants of Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk and other cities of the Urals of high-speed metal melting technologies in the Mainensian furnaces, the production of complex rolled profiles for tanks, manufacturing pipes for mortars of various systems. Widespread use in industry found by scientists the production of substitutes for deficient raw materials and materials. Its introduction gave great savings of such expensive strategic metals as nickel and molybdenum. Found coke substitutes for the foundry shops of machine-building plants made it possible to avoid long-haul coke transport and thus release a large number of cars in which a sharp deficiency was felt.
Loss of a number of important raw materials and the need to compensate them by engaging in the economic turnover of new resources forced to forcing the search for new sources of raw materials. Particularly needed in the east industry. Already in the first months of war, geological parties have discovered new deposits of iron and other ores, oil, bauxite. Thus, with the participation of geologist scientists A. E. Fersman, K. I. Satpayev and others were found new deposits of iron ore in Kuzbass and in the Urals, new oil reserves in Bashkiria, large deposits of boxites on the eastern slopes of the Urals, Molybdenum Rud deposits in Kazakhstan, etc.
Scientists of the Moscow, Leningrad, Kazan, Kiev universities and other higher educational institutions have completed a lot scientific workwho had important national economic and defense significance. A number of them received industrial applications.
During the war years, the comprehensive conduct of the most pressing scientific research was widely practiced. The planned nature of the socialist economy allowed the most rational to distribute scientific strength and material resources, to focus them on the most promising directions of science. Gamin USSR has developed plans for comprehensive research and development work with a number of research organizations. Their activity was headed, organized and coordinated one of the leading research institutes of the industry. All work was carried out, as a rule, with the wide participation of engineering and technical personnel factories and factories.
Soviet mathematicians P. S. Alexandrov, S. N. Bernstein, Physics S. I. Vavilov, A. F. Ioffe, P. L. Kapitsa, I. V. Kurchatov, I. Kurchatov, I. Kurchatov, I. L. Mandelshtam, Chemists I. D. Zelinsky, I. V. Grebenchikov. Their major theoretical works in the field of further development of the scientific theory of division of the atomic nucleus were laid out the foundation for the development of rocket technology.
Big theoretical and practical importance had fundamental and applied scientific research in the field of biology and agriculture. Widespread use in industrial production has found new plant types of raw materials. Experienced works on the fields of collective farms and state farms contributed to an increase in yield. Sugar beets were introduced in the eastern regions of the country, the methods of its cultivation and increase in yield were developed.
N. N. Burdenko, A. I. Bakulev, L. A. Orbeli, S. S. Yudin, A. V. Vishnevsky and many other prominent figures of Soviet medicine introduced into practice new methods and effective means of treating wounded and patients.
Especially the big step forward made military surgery. Compared to the period of the First World War, mortality in hospitals was much reduced: about 75% of wounded fighters and commanders after cure in hospitals were returned to the front.
The second period of the war was marked by major successes on the battlefield and in the development of the USSR military economy.
In theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 50th anniversary of the Great October, it is said: "Our heroic people under the leadership of the Communist Party managed to overcome the difficulties of the first period of hostilities and achieved a fracture in 1942-1943 during the war. The historical stages on the way to the victory of the Soviet Union over the fascist Germany were: victory in the Grand Stalingrad Battle, the defeat of the Hitler's troops near Kursk, the largest defeats in other battles "^ 20 ^.
Thanks to the heroic efforts of the Soviet rear during the second period of war, a higher level of development of the USSR military economy was reached, which allowed to achieve a decisive fracture at the front. Throughout 1943, an increase in industrial production took place. Gross products this year increased by 17% against 1942, and the growth of production in the eastern regions was much superior to the average growth rate in the country. An increase in the production of industrial products was accompanied by an increase in the technical and economic indicators of the industry, and in particular an increase in the use of the volume of domain furnaces, the reduction of their downtime.
In the whole country and especially in the eastern regions, the leading pace developed the industries and on this basis there was a significant increase in the production of military products. In 1943, engineering and metalworking exceeded the level of 1940 by 42%. Almost approached the pre-war level of the rubber-saving industry (99.8%). However, by other industries, it was not yet possible to achieve a pre-war production level. In 1943, industrial production in the USSR was characterized by the following data (in% by 1940):
+===================================
+===================================
| All industry | 98 | 77 | 90 |
+===================================
| Ferrous metallurgy (including mining ore) | 109 | 69 | 76 |
+===================================
| Fuel industry | 93 | 50 | 56 |
+===================================
| Power stations and power grids | 97 | 62 | 67 |
+===================================
| Chemical industry (including mining) | 97 | 62 | 67 |
+===================================
| Rubber-saving industry | 112 | 76 | 99.8 |
+===================================
| Mechanical Engineering and Metalworking | 112 | 119 | 142 |
+===================================
| Forestry and woodworking industry | 88 | 48 | 51 |
+===================================
| Industry of building materials | 80 | 27 | 31 |
+===================================
| Glass and porcelain-faience industry | 83 | 33 | 52 |
+===================================
| Printing industry | 72 | 35 | 37 | Oil production fell from 22 million tons in 1942 to 18 million tons in 1943, and in 1940 31.1 million tons were produced. ^ 21 ^. The reduction in oil production occurred due to a decrease in the volume of drilling and interruptions in the work of transport, which did not cope with the export of finished petroleum products, which led to the overflow of cash oil and petroleum.
In the oil processing industry and the production of light oil products, the decline in production occurred due to the unbearable of petroleum products, the lack of free containers and lack of raw materials, mainly caustic and calcined soda, oleum, inhibitors and vigorous oil. Therefore, refinery workers worked with part-time, and some of them, such as Batuman, were forced to even temporarily stop working.
Difficult situation has developed in a number of other sectors of the national economy. Thus, the production of lead, zinc reduced; lagging behind the needs of military time the development of aluminum and copper industry; failed to achieve the growth in the production of cotton fabrics and shoes; lowered the condition and use of the car park; slightly increased compared with 1942 the retail trade turnover of state and cooperative trade. These shortcomings were taken into account when approving the national economic plan for 1944.
In 1943, major success reached the military industry. It smoothly supplied the front with weapons, ammunition, gear, military equipment. This year increased dramatically compared with 1942, the production of ammunition of all nomenclatures. Production of shells (without aviation) increased from 73.4 million pcs. In 1942 to 85.8 million pcs. In 1943, airbobes - respectively with 6 million pcs. up to 10.4 million pcs., Min - respectively with 53.9 million pcs. up to 75.7 million pcs.
The production of combat aircraft has sharply increased, their flight and technical characteristics and battle qualities have improved. To flight operations 1943, Soviet aviation almost 2.5 times exceeded fascist aircraft by the number of aircraft on the Soviet-German front ^ 22 ^.
As of July 1, 1943, the consumption of state reserves created for the pre-war period amounted to:
+===================================
+===================================
| Ferrous metals, thousand t | 914 | 145 |
+===================================
| Non-ferrous metals »» | 119 | 121.5 |
+===================================
| Ferroalloys and concentrates, thousand t | 69,2 | 14,7 |
+===================================
| Rubber, thousand t | 1.5 | 19,0 |
+===================================
| Autoresina, thousand kits | 222 | 307.5 |
+===================================
| Petroleum products, thousand t | 3 721 | 858 |
+===================================
| Coal, thousand t | 9 143 | 3 891 |
+===================================
| Firewood, thousand cubic meters. M | 1 694 | 2 246 | 1943 was a year of wide restoration work in areas liberated from the fascist occupation. Restoration of the national economy unfolded in the liberated areas Russian Federation and the Ukrainian SSR.
1944 was marked by new outstanding successes at the front and in the development of the USSR military economy. Soviet land was completely purified from the Hitler's Haling. Military household of the country continued to increase the pace of production.
In 1944, for the first time in the military period, the volume of gross products of the entire industry exceeded a pre-war level by 4%, and the production of production means (group A ") - by 36%. This year, the increase in the processes of extended reproduction was particularly noticeable, which expressed primarily in an increase in the production of heavy industry products, the growth rates of which began to overtake the growth rates of the military industry. But the proportion of military products in the total volume of industrial products continued to increase. In 1944, a monthly aircraft and tanks were 5 times more than in 1941.
In 1944, significant successes were achieved in the restoration of the national economy in areas liberated from the fascist occupation. The release of industrial products in these areas increased 3 times compared with 1943
Capital construction was conducted in the country in the country in high-rise scale. In 1944, the total amount of capital investments in the national economy increased compared with 1943 by 1.4 times. Production funds increased significantly. If in 1943 they increased by 12%, then in 1944 - already by 24%.
The creation of a coherent military economy made it possible to raise in 1944 the production level of the group "B". If in 1942 the production of consumer items was 41% of the 1940 level, then in 1944 - already 54% of the pre-war level. The backlog of the release of products II divisions was mainly due to insufficient supply of fuel, chemicals and electricity of a number of industries. Production of consumer goods, especially food industry products, also contained a shortage of agricultural raw materials.
The most important distinguishing feature of 1944 was the direction of a significant part of the means of production on the development of the capacity of mining and metallurgical and other engineering, production of spare parts for the rolling stock of railway transport, tractors and agricultural machinery, construction and transport.
In 1944, agricultural indicators improved. The sowing area of \u200b\u200ball cultures amounted to 94.1 million hectares and increased by 7% compared with 1942. Gross crop crops and cattle livestock in collective farms increased. Work unfolded on the restoration of the tractor fleet.
An increase in agricultural products created conditions for the restoration and development of industries that produce consumption items for normal circuits between the I and II divisions of social production, as well as between industry and agriculture.
It is characteristic that since 1944 most of the total social product and national income of the USSR, along with the provision of military spending, was sent to an increase in the accumulation and consumption fund.
Since 1944, the process of expanded reproduction of a total public product has significantly increased. If in 1943 compared with 1942 the main funds of the country increased by 12%, then in 1944 - by 23 and in 1945 - by 31%. The national income of the USSR increased in 1943 compared to 1942 by 13%, in 1944 by 33 and in 1945 by 27% ^ 23 ^.
In 1945, the restoration and development of all sectors of the national economy continued, but the war inflicted the Soviet economy deep wounds. The volume of gross production of the entire industry in 1945 amounted to 91.6% of the 1940 level of the pre-war level was not achieved in individual sectors of the national economy, which is seen from the following data ^ 24 ^:
+===================================
+===================================
| Cast iron, mln. T | 14.9 | 8,8 | 59 |
+===================================
| Steel »» | 18.3 | 12.3 | 64 |
+===================================
| Rental »» | | 13.1 | 8.5 | 65 |
+===================================
| Coal »» | 165.9 | 149.3 | 90 |
+===================================
| Oil »» | 31.1 | 19.4 | 62 |
+===================================
| Electricity, billion kWh | 48.3 | 43.3 | 89 |
+===================================
| Sowing area of \u200b\u200ball farm crops in all categories of farms, million hectares | 150.4 | 113.8 | 76 |
+===================================
| including grain crops, million hectares | 110.5 | 85.3 | 77 |
+===================================
| Livestock cattle, million heads |
+===================================
| Cattle | 54.5 * | 47.6 ** | 87 |
+===================================
| Sheep and goats | 91.6 * | 70.0 ** | 77 |
+===================================
| Pig | 27.5 * | 10.6 ** | 38 |
+===================================
| Cargo turnover of all types of transport, billion tkm | 494.4 | 374,8 | 77 | ^ * Data on January 1, 1941 ^
^ ** Data on January 1, 1946 ^
Despite the fact that in 1945, it was not possible to achieve a pre-war level of development of the main sectors of the economy, during the war in the USSR, much more than the most important types of military equipment were made than in fascist Germany ^ 25 ^.
+===================================
+===================================
+===================================
| Tanks and self-propelled installations, pcs. | 95 099 | 23 774 | 53 800 | 13 450 |
+===================================
| Combat aircraft, pcs. | 108 028 | 27 007 | 78 900 | 19,725 |
+===================================
| Tools (medium and large calibers), thousand pcs. | 188,1 | 47 | 102 | 25.5 |
+===================================
| Mortaries (all species), thousand pcs. | 347.9 | 86.9 | 68 | 17.0 | On the increase in the military power of the USSR and its armed forces and the weakening of the fascist Germany and its army also testify the data of the table on with. 121 ^ 26 ^.
For the entire period of the Patriotic War and war with imperialist Japan, i.e. From July 1941 to August 1945, inclusive, the USSR military industry released 482.2 thousand guns, 351.8 thousand mortars, 102.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery plants, 112.1 thousand combat aircraft, 70 warships The main classes, a plurality of small arms and ammunition ^ 27 ^.
In order for the shortest possible time to create a coherent military economy and satisfy the needs of the front, it was necessary to dramatically increase the share of military products in the gross products of the entire industry, send the main labor and material resources to the military industry and at the same time reduce the production of consumption items. This led to the forced single-sided development of the national economy, to a large inconsistency between the material and real form and the cost structure of the social product, which in the conditions of severe war it was quite natural. In the years of the Patriotic War, national economic proportions and territorial and production relations were targeted during the peace construction, the war was dictated to the formation of new proportions in the national economy necessary for the effective development of the military economy.
+===================================
+===================================
+===================================
+===================================
| June 22, 1941 | 2,900 | 1 800 * | - | 34 695 | 1 540 ** | 5 500 | 3712 | 47 260 | 4 950 |
+===================================
| December 1, 1941 | 4 200 | 517 | 1 214 | 21 983 | 2 495 | 5 093 | 1 453 | 26 800 | 2 465 |
+===================================
| May 4, 1942 | 5 500 | 2 070 | 1 995 | 43 643 | 3,164 | 6 200 | 3 230 | 43,000 | 3 400 |
+===================================
| June 4, 1943 | 6,442 | 6 232 | 3 348 | 98 790 | 8 293 | 5 165 | 5 850 | 54 330 | 2 980 |
+===================================
| January 4, 1945 | 6,000 | 7 494 | 3 500 | 91 400 | 14 570 | 3 100 | 3 950 | 28 500 | 1 960 | ^ * Including 1475 new types of tanks. ^
^ ** Only new types of aircraft. ^
Similarly, other sectors of the national economy were translated into military rails to military rails.
From the very beginning of the war, rail transportation, continuing to remain the main binding link of various economic regions of the country, has become an important arterier connecting the front and rear. Railway and water transport militarized. A military disciplinary charter was introduced on transport, centralization in the leadership and planning of transport, the number of goods transported in a centralized manner increased. All shipments were carried out by schedules in which the priority and speedy promotion of military routes and cargo intended for the front was envisaged. For passenger traffic, a special mode was established, which provided for the limitation of their size. The capacity of the railways of the Urals and Siberia and the most important railway units - Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsky, Nizhny Tagil, Novosibirsk, Kirovsky, and others were increased. Construction of a number of new roads in the eastern and northern regions was carried out.
The supply, trade and finance system was significantly rebuilt. Centralization in the distribution and redistribution of material, labor, raw materials and food resources increased. All resources that had been in the country were taken to strict accounting and were essentially mobilized.
Retail turnover was rebuilt towards the transition from the free sale of industrial and food products to strictly rationing and distribution. In industry and transportation organized work supply departments in order to regularly ensure workers and engineering personnel of the leading sectors of the national economy. Despite the war, sustainable state prices are preserved for essential items. Local commodity resources were intensively sought, as a result, their share in retail turnover increased significantly.
To resolve the problem of food supply of the population, a number of measures have been adopted, providing a significant increase in agricultural production: seeds of grain, potatoes and vegetables in the eastern regions increased, individual and collective gardening, etc. increased, widely developed.
In the field of finance, the mobilization of all revenues from the national economy was mobilized, as well as all revenues from the population on the funding of the Military Economy, the regime of tough savings was carried out in the expenditure of all means.
A fast military restructuring of the national economy in the Soviet Union was possible due to the benefits of socialist building, primarily public ownership of the means of production and the planned system of the economy.
During the war, the management of the national economy was rebuilt and improved. The entire state and production and economic apparatus worked extremely organized, clearly and simply.
The organization of the management of the Socialist economy during the Patriotic War was characterized by a reduction in the number of links of the management apparatus. She contributed to the accumulation of material and financial resources, thereby creating the possibility of faster development of the military economy. The introduction of advanced technology and other improvements was carried out without excessive wires and did not reduce the quantitative release of products (translating the production of products to flow, the development of specialization, etc.).
During the war, the reinforced concentration of resources on individual "narrow", but the most important sites of the military economy, which made it possible to obtain a high "return" from the resources invested, created the ability to significantly reduce the construction time and effectively solve the most acute wartime tasks.
During the war years, additional resources were revealed as quickly as possible, which was achieved, firstly, by combining productive forces and, secondly, through the rational distribution and redistribution of all national resources. During the war, the operational connection between industries, enterprises, production and consumption areas, which accelerated the production process and circulation, i.e. reproduction in general, intensified it. The busy rhythm of all socio-economic life during the war was the regularity of socialist economic.
The creation of a single energy system, combining chemistry and oil refining, agriculture and primary processing of raw materials, the formation of complexes of economic areas - all this links of combined production use of resources characteristic of the period of the military economy of the USSR. The production combination of productive forces was carried out with the forced development of individual decisive sections of military production, which was achieved through the appropriate and rational direction of resources. During the war, the principle of distribution and redistribution of resources was fully used as the main lever of ensuring the preemptive development of impact sections of the economic front.
The Great Patriotic War presented new requirements for the planned guide to the military economy: to quickly respond to an ever-changing environment at the front, take into account changes in the proportions in the national economy caused by the needs of the front, to show efficiency and flexibility in planning a military economy. The planned authorities have become the economic headquarters of GKO. Planning the production, distribution of material, labor, financial resources and investments was concentrated in the Unified Center. The role of short-term plans, quarterly, monthly and decadal schedules, daily tasks increased. Intected operational control over the execution of plans.
The main attention in all areas of planning and management of the economy focused on the most rational, efficient use of material, labor and financial resources, on ensuring the priority of military industries and related production. The plans established the compliance of the material and technical supply plans for production and construction plans, used all sorts of resources to eliminate the "narrow" places in the economy.
During the military economy of the USSR, the underlying principles of national economic planning were the fundamental principles in the preparation of plans. War years plans provided a steady increase in the production of the entire social product and an increase in socialist savings; The tasks of saving material resources, as well as on the rational use of labor and monetary resources and the concentration of them at the most important sites of military and economic construction were envisaged. The peculiarities of the Military Economic Plans were the priority satisfaction of the needs of the decisive branches of the Military Economy, from which the fate of the whole country depended, and above all military industry, the heavy industry and transport; Ensuring uninterrupted supply of enterprises with raw materials, metal, fuel and semi-finished products.
The national economic plans of the military years have played a huge role in the development of the USSR economy, in achieving the military and economic victory over Hitler's Germany.
The main direction of planning was high centralization. In order to mobilize the country's production potential on the defense case and defeat the enemy, it was necessary to produce concentration, distribution and redistribution of the majority of material, labor and financial resources from the Unified Center. These events were conducted according to a single state plan and raised their task to priority to ensure the needs of military production by limiting other needs of the national economy. The introduced CPS Central Committee (b) and GKO from the first days of the war of war tight centralized planning Soviet state successfully used both for rapidly restructuring the national economy for military units and to move the productive forces, restoration and development of them in the eastern regions of the country.
Since the beginning of the war, the GCO began to systematically assert military economic plans, submitted to the work of the national economy to ensure the needs of the front and the rapid defeat of the enemy. These plans turned the national economy towards ensuring the needs of war. The plans provided for the forcing the production of military industry and its industries, especially in the eastern regions of the country; Moving to the east of production, construction; commissioning of new capacities; Creating state reserves.
Military-economic annual and quarterly plans are then turned into operational short-term tasks for the production of products necessary for warfare.
In contrast to the period of peaceful construction, the tasks on a more significant circle of indicators specified in the production plans of military years. For example, a forest blank plan was installed on each branch and even by types of deliveries, i.e. railway, alloy, surrender in place, etc., and the limits of cars for transportation were distributed from the center, which allowed to promptly assist in rapidly changing conditions.
A new approach to capital investments has fully justified. Since the beginning of the war, all the most important objects provided military needs were centrally distinguished, and their targeted provision of material resources were envisaged.
At the beginning of the war, plans set their task to ensure the rapid restructuring of the country's economy for military failures and the organization in the shortest term of the coordinated military economy. In subsequent military-economic plans, along with events to maximize the production of military products and products of industries related to military production, the tasks for the restoration of the farm in the liberated areas were determined, the deadlines and the sequence of restoration work, the amount of money and logistical resources for the restored enterprises, primarily military and heavy industries.
An important place in all planning work was to draw up balances and balance sheet calculations. The system of balances during the war years was an instrument of restructuring of the national economy for a military manner, an important tool for providing compositeness and proportionality in the development of a military economy, and then the instrument of transfer of the military economy to peaceful rails.
With a balance sheet planning method, a sharp increase in the total volume of production of military products, the growth of the share and material resources in the military industry was laid out; The indigenous changes in the proportions and economic relations established during peace-building, major changes in the structure of production and distribution of the social product; New proportions and relationships in the national economy were established, which correspond to the needs and needs of wartime.
In the first period of the war in the balances, special attention was paid to the redistribution of resources in the national economy in favor of military industries in connection with the reduction of national income and an increase in military consumption. In the material balances and plans of the distribution developed by the country as a whole and separate areas, the widespread use of domestic reserves and local resources was envisaged, strict norms of consumption of materials, scarce products and strictly centralized target direction of material resources were established.
More than 2 times compared with the pre-war period increased the range of products distributed centrally. The balance sheets and distribution plans covered all types of material and technical resources: equipment, metal, fuel, raw materials, etc.
In general, the material balance system solved the following tasks: Concentration of resources for defense consumers; mobilization of all reserves and reserves; saving material resources by introducing progressive norms, substitutes, technological improvements. According to individual balances, complex problems that occurred were differentiated. Through the material balances, they were established in accordance with the military-political tasks of the plan and its leading links the necessary relationships between the real elements of social production.
The main material balances during the war years were the balances of fuel, electricity, metal, equipment, building materials, chemicals.
In the most important for the military economy, the balance of ferrous metals was highlighted high-quality rolling, which had a great defense significance. The balance sheet was directed to the rational use of all types of rolled products, to replace high-alloy steel and other scarce metal species.
A significant role was played by the balance of electricity, which was compiled not only by industry, but also in power systems. If, before the war, the government approved electricity balances only at six most important electrical systems, then during the war to more complete the electricity of the most important consumers with centralized electricity distribution, 17 electrical systems were covered. This balance, without which it could not be lifting the military economy, made it possible to solve the task of rational use of electricity throughout the war, eliminating the disproportions between boiler and turbines capacities, between the need for electricity to east enterprises and the capacity of Eastern power plants. The balance targeting electricity savings in electrore consumers and networks by reducing losses on the effective use of power reserves.
Exceptional value acquired the balance of fuel during the war. Based on the forever created in the pre-war years, the fuel bases of the country of the country - Kuzbass and Karaganda, the balance of fuel allowed to solve the tasks of the preemptive supply of the fuel and heavy industry, thermal power plants and railways. Special attention The structure of the oilbalance was given, since during the war, the consumption of aviabensine has grown. It is characteristic that it was during the war in the fuel balance of the USSR that the use of natural gases was included.
But during the war years, not only material balances were developed. In the context of the existence of commodity-money relations, along with the determination of the proportionality of material and real elements of the social product in a natural form, it was also required to establish the right relations in the economy in value terms. The balance of the USSR national economy was sent to this. This balance, being in the system of balances the most synthesized balance sheet calculation, was subordinate to the task of transferring to military rails of all sectors of the national economy, creating and developing a military economy by organizing the structure of a social product necessary for the defense and the necessary material costs during its production.
The balance of the national economy in the war years contained such reproduction indicators that are of paramount practical importance as the material and real composition of the social product, dividing it to the means of production and consumption items and its value cut. The combination in planning the reproduction of the social product of the material and value cut was crucial to comply with the required proportionality in the development of a tense military, because it made it possible to establish the right relations between the main divisions of the social production: between the production of means of production and the production of consumption items, between industry and agriculture, between increasing consumption items, an increase in turnover and service sector, on the one hand, and an increase in the incomes of the population - on the other; between the growth of consumption and the growth of accumulation in the national economy.
In the balance sheet work, the balance of the state budget and the balance of money income and the expenditure of the population was occupied.
The balance of state budget provides for the decision of the two main economic problems of the military period: first, the implementation of the redistribution of national income to finance military costs through the mobilization of funds of economic organizations; Secondly, the mobilization of the population and unused balance of the pre-war period.
The balance of money incomes and spending of the population was of exceptional importance for linking consumption and income of the population with an increase in the means of production and productivity of social labor. He gave the opportunity to use the free cash in the population; stimulate in conditions of reducing market funds of goods growth of goods of widespread consumption from local decentralized sources of raw materials; Provide maximum consistency of the expenditure of the population of its income.
The next balance of the cycle of general economic was the balance of fixed assets. This balance makes it possible to monitor the volume of unfinished construction, the input coefficient of commissioning, for the expansion of the reproduction of fixed assets, which began from 1942 (according to comparable territory).
During the war years, the balance of labor resources is also developed. It was designed to address the tasks of increasing the contingents of labor reserves and the creation of sustainable personnel through the internal redistribution of labor resources in favor of the most important industrial sectors and the preparation of new personnel in the system of special educational institutions of mass professions and directly in production.
People's planning during the war was inextricably bonded with an operational verification of the execution of plans, during which the established new proportions were analyzed and measures were developed to overcome the "narrow" places in the development of leading sectors of the military economy.
The Soviet Socialist Economy turned out to be more mobile and viable than the economy of Germany and other countries of the fascist bloc. The entire course of World War II convincingly showed that it is impossible to evaluate the economy of warring states only by simply arithmetic comparison of quantitative indicators. Not only the possibilities, but also the ability of the state to turn them into reality, quickly mobilize their material resources and skillfully use them for the needs of the war.
The Soviet Union, having the on the eve of the invasion of Hitler's armies 3-4 times less machine tools, metal, coal, electricity, made military equipment and weapons 2 times more than fascist Germany.
The power of the Red Army was that it relied on the most durable and stable rear. Fighting at the front, each Soviet warrior knew that all the people stand behind him. In those Terrible years, the front and rear were inseparable. Fighters on the front, workers in the rear were laughed in a single goal, one desire to do everything that depends on them for victory over the enemy. The unity of the front and rear, the army and the people was a decisive condition for the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

... Looking back after the defeat of the external enemy, we saw a picture of the full destruction of the national economy.

("Speeches at the IV conferences of KP (b) of Ukraine" T.4 p.296.)

... You are not right, by qualifying our country as the country of "type of colonial countries". Colonial countries are mainly countries beforecapitalist. Our country is a country bycapitalist. The first did not grow to developed capitalism. The second earned developed capitalism. These are two fundamentally different types.

("Letter Tov. Shatunovsky" T.13 p.18.)

We have in the system of our farm there are some distround - as many as five styles. There is an estring of farming almost natural: it is such peasant farms, the marketability of which is very small. There is a second estimate of the farm, way of commercial production, where goods in the peasant economy plays a decisive role. There is a third way of farming - private capitalism, which is not killed, who revived and will be revived until the famous limits, while we have NEP. The fourth way of farming, this is state-capitalism, i.e. The capitalism that we allowed and have the opportunity to control and limit the way this proletarian state wants. Finally, the fifth way is the socialist industry, i.e., our germing, where there are not two hostile class - proletariat and bourgeoisie, and one class - proletariat.

("XIV Congress WCP (b)" T.7 p.303.)

Part plan:

1. We re-reflect the industry (reconstruction).

2. We begin to seriously re-reserve agriculture (reconstruction).

3. To do this, it is necessary to expand the construction of collective farms and state farms, the massive use of contracting and machine-tractor stations, as the means of establishing production Wamchka between the industries and agriculture.

4. As for the bike preparation difficulties at the moment, it is necessary to recognize the admissibility of temporary emergency measures, supported by public support for the middle offensive-poor masses, as one of the means to break the resistance of fouls and take it the most grained surplus, which is necessary to do without import bread and maintain currency for the development of the industry.

5. Individual Bednikovko-Seednyatsky economy plays and will still play the prevailing role in supplying the country to food and raw materials, but it is not enough for only one thing - the development of the individual poornye-sedotsky farm must be supplemented therefore the development of collective farms and state farms, mass contraction, enhanced development of machinery -Tractor stations in order to facilitate the displacement of capitalist elements from agriculture and the gradual translation of individual peasant farms on the rails of large collective farms, on the rails of collective labor.

6. But in order to achieve all this, it is primarily necessary to strengthen the development of the industry, metallurgy, chemistry, engineering, tractor factories, agricultural machinery factories, etc. Without this, it is impossible to resolve the grain problem, as the reconstruction of agriculture is impossible.

Output: the key to the reconstruction of agriculture is the rapid pace of development of our industry.

("On the right slope in WCP (b)" T.12 p.62.)

It is said that rationalization ( production and management of the economy - approx. Cost.) Requires some temporary victims from some groups of workers, including young people. This is true, comrades.

The story of our revolution says that no major step has done without some sacrifices from individual groups of the working class in the interests of the entire class of workers in our country. Take at least a civil war, although the current minor sacrifices do not go to any comparison with those serious victims who took place in our civil war. You see that those sacrifices will pay for us now with interest.

It is hardly necessary to prove that the current minor victims will pay off in the near future with an excess. That is why I think we should not stop in front of some minor victims in the interests of the working class as a whole.

("Speech at the V All-Union Conference of the WLKSM" T.9 p.197.)

... What could mean for the workers to destroy the foreign trade monopoly? This would mean for them a refusal to industrialize the country, from the construction of new plants and factories, from the expansion of old plants and factories. This would mean for them the flooding of the USSR by goods from capitalist countries, turning into our industry by virtue of its relative weakness, multiplying the number of unemployed, deterioration in the material situation of the working class, the weakening of its economic and political positions. This would mean, ultimately, strengthening the NEPman and generally a new bourgeoisie. Can the USSR proletariat go to this suicide? It is clear that it can not.

And what would mean for the labor masses of the peasantry destruction of a monopoly of foreign trade? It would mean the transformation of our country from the country self-colonial and impoverishing the peasant masses.

("Conversation with the first American working delegation" T.10 p.110.)

... We think that the powerful and complete life movement is unthinkable without disagreement - only in the cemetery feasible "the full identity of views"!

("Our goals" T.2 p.248.)

Comrades! CO time XV Congress passed 2 1 / 2 of the year. The period of time seems not very big. Meanwhile, during this time, there were serious changes in the life of peoples and states. If you characterize the past period in a nutshell, it could be called a period cruel. Only a turning point not only for us, for the USSR, but also for the capitalist countries of the whole world. But between these two fractures there is a radically difference. At the time, this fracture meant for the USSR turn towards a new, more serious economic lift, for capitalist countries a fracture meant turn to economic decline. We, in the USSR, growingrising socialist construction and industry, and in agriculture. They have capitalists, growing crisis Economics and industry, and agriculture.

Such is the picture of the current situation in two words.

("Political report of the Central Committee XVI Congress of the WCP (b)" T.12 p.235.)

The development of our folk economy is under the sign of industrialization. But we need not any industrialization. We need such industrialization that provides a growing advantage socialist forms of industryabove the shapes are small and all the more capitalist.The characteristic feature of our industrialization is that it is industrialization socialistindustrialization providing victory communityindustry sector over the sector partly farming, over the sector is small and capitalist.

("Political report of the Central Committee XVI Congress of WCP (b)" T.12 p.267.)

The growth of the national economy goes not spontaneously, but in a certain direction, namely, in the direction of industrialization, under the sign of industrialization, under the sign of the growth weight of the industry in the general system of national economy, under the sign of turning our country from agrarian to industrial.

("The political report of the Central Committee XVI Congress of WCP (b)" T.12 p.264.)

Some comrades think that the main thing in the offensive of socialism is repressions, and if the repressions do not grow, then there is no onset.

Repressions in the field of socialist construction are a necessary element of the offensive, but an element of auxiliary, and not the main thing. The main thing in the offensive of socialism, with our current conditions, is to strengthen the pace of development of our industry, in strengthening the pace of development of state farms and collective farms, in strengthening the pace of economic displacement of capitalist elements of the city and the village, in the mobilization of the masses around socialist construction, in mobilizing the masses against capitalism. You can arrest and send dozens and hundreds of thousands of fists, but if you don't make everything you need at the same time in order to accelerate the construction of new forms of farming, replace with new forms of farms old, capitalist forms, undermine and eliminate production sources of economic existence and development of capitalist Village elements, - fouls will still be revived and will grow.

Others think that the offensive of socialism is an outward promotion forward, without appropriate training, without regrouping forces during the offensive, without consulting conquered positions, without the use of reserves for the development of success, and if there are signs, say, the lowest part of the peasants from the collective farms, then It means that we have already "reference revolution", the decline of movement, suspension of the offensive.

Is it true? This, of course, is incorrect.

First, no offensive, be it the most successful thing, does not do without some breakthroughs and skullovok in certain parts of the front. Talking on this basis about the suspension or failure of the offensive - it means not to understand the creatures of the offensive.

Secondly, it did not happen and could not be successfuloffensive without regrouping forces during the offensive, without consolidating captured positions, without the use of reserves for the development of success and bringing to the end of the offensive. With a clutter advancement, i.e. without compliance with these conditions, the offensive should inevitably exhale and fail. Last promotion forward is death for the offensive. This is talking about this rich experience of our civil war.

Thirdly, how can the analogy between the "revolution", which usually occurs on the basis declinemovements, and a single part of the peasants from collective farms, which emerged on the basis of the ongoing rise in movement, on the basis of continuing podhimatotal socialist construction, and industrial, and collective farm, on the basis of the ongoing lifting of our revolution? What could be common between these two completely dissimilar phenomena?

("Political report of the Central Committee XVI Congress of the WCP (b)" T.12 p.309.)

It is impossible to deny that in the field of housing and the supply of workers is made in last years Not enough. But what is done is completely insufficient in order to cover the rapidly growing needs of workers. It is impossible to refer to the fact that earlier housing was less than now, and that, in view of this, you can calm down on the results achieved. It is also impossible to refer to the fact that before the supply of workers was much worse than now, and what can, in view of this, be content with the existing position. Tolk rotten and through the fading people can be consurred by references to the past. It is not necessary to proceed from the past, but from the growing needs of workers in the present.

("New furnishings - new tasks of economic construction" T.13 p.58-59.)

Until now, we saved all, including on the light industry, in order to restore the heavy industry. But we have already restored the hard industry. It only needs to turn on. Now we can turn to the light industry and move it forward accelerated dark. The new in the development of our industry consists, by the way, in the fact that we are now the opportunity to develop accelerated pace and heavy, and light industry.

("The political report of the Central Committee XVI Congress of the WCP (b)" T.1.12 p.331.)

Of course, we have not yet achieved to fully provide material demands of workers and peasants. And you can hardly achieve this in the coming years. But we undoubtedly achieved the fact that the financial situation of workers and peasants is improving from year to year. In this may be doubted only the sworn enemies of Soviet power or, maybe some representatives of bourgeois press, including one part of the correspondents of this press in Moscow, who understand the economies of peoples and in the position of workers hardly more than, say, Abyssinian The king in the highest mathematics.

("Results of the first five-year plan" T.13 pm.200.)

Our period is usually called a transition period from capitalism to socialism. He was called a period of transitional in 1918, when Lenin in his famous article "On the" left "guys and about petty-bourgeoisatics" first described this period with its five ways of economic life. It is called transient currently, in 1930, when some of these styles, as outdated, are already going to the bottom, and one of these styles, namely, the new way in the field of industry and agriculture is growing and developing with unprecedented speed. Is it possible to say that these two transition periods are identical that they do not differ from each other radically? It is clear that it is impossible.

What did we have in 1918 in the field of national economy? The destroyed industry and lighters, the lack of collective farms and state farms as a massive phenomenon, the growth of the "new" bourgeoisie in the city and fouls in the village.

What do we have now? Restored and reconstructed socialist industries, developed system of state farms and collective farms with more than 40% of all crops on the USSR one by one only to the Snap Wedder, dying a "new" bourgeoisie in the city, dying fouls in the village.

And there is a transitional period. And here is the transitional period. And yet they are fundamentally different from each other as the sky from the ground. And yet no one can deny that we are on the threshold of the elimination of the last serious capitalist class, the class of Kulakov. It is clear that we have already come out of transition period In the old sense, enhancing the period of direct and expanded socialist construction throughout the front. It is clear that we have already entered the period of socialism, because the socialist sector is now holding all the economic levers of the entire national economy, although before the construction of a socialist society and the destruction of class differences is still far away. And yet, despite this, national languages \u200b\u200bnot only do not die and do not merge into one common language, but, on the contrary, national cultures and national languages \u200b\u200bdevelop and bloom. It is not clear that the theory of dying national languages \u200b\u200band mergers into one common language within one states in the period of unfolded socialist construction, in the period of socialism in one Country, there is an incorrect, anti-Marxist, Antillenskaya.

("Final word on the political report of the Central Committee XVI Congress of the WCP (b)" T.13 p.5.)

Each period B. national Development Has your pathos. In Russia, we have now the pathos of construction. This is her prevailing feature now. This explains that we are now experiencing construction hot. This reminds of the period, will experience the SASS after the civil war.

("Mr. Campbell is brewing" T.13 p. 149.)

Of course, the natural resources of our country are rich and diverse. They are more diverse and rich than it is officially known, and our research expeditions constantly find new resources in our extensive country. But this is only one side of our capabilities. The other side is that our peasants and workers are revealed now from the previous burden of landowners and capitalists. The landowners and capitalists crushed before unproductive what remains in the country and increases the purchasing power of it within the country. The growth in demand is that our industry, despite the speed of its development, lags behind demand. Demand is huge for both personal and production consumption. This is the second side of our unlimited possibilities.

("Mr. Campbell is brewing" T.13 pp. 152.)

We are told that all this is good, many new plants are built, the foundations of industrialization are laid. But it would be much better to abandon the policy of industrialization, from the policy of expanding the production of production tools, or at least postpone the case to the background in order to produce more Citz, shoes, clothing and other widespread items.

Wide consumption items are really produced less than necessary, and this creates well-known difficulties. But then you need to know and need to give yourself a report, why would we have led us such an elevation policy to the rear plan of industrialization tasks. Of course, we could from one and a half billion rubles the currency spent during this period on the equipment of our heavy industry, postpone half of the imports of cotton, skin, wool, rubber, etc. We would have then more Citz, shoes, clothes. But we would not have any tractor nor the automotive industry, there would be no serious black metallurgy, there would be no metal for the production of cars - and we would be unarmed in the face of the armed new technique of the capitalist environment.

We would deprive ourselves then the opportunities to supply agriculture by tractors and agricultural machines, we would have been sitting without bread.

We would deprive themselves the opportunity to win over the capitalist elements in the country, it would be, we would not incredibly raise the chances of restoration of capitalism.

We would have not had all those modern defense tools, without which the state independence of the country is impossible, without which the country turns into an object of military operations of external enemies. Our restorative would be then more or less similar to the situation of the current China, which does not have its heavy industry, does not have its military industry, and which now pecks everything to whom not too lazy.

In such a word, we would have in such a case a military intervention, not the exaggeration packages, and the war, the war, dangerous and deadly, the war bloody and unequal, because in this war we would almost be unarmed in front of the enemies that are in their disposal all modern means of attack .

That's how it turns around, comrades.

It is clear that the self-respecting state power, respecting himself, could not be in such a disastrous point of view.

And it is precisely because the party rejected such an anti-revolutionary installation - that is why it achieved a decisive victory in fulfilling a five-year plan in the field of industry.

("Results of the first five-year plan" T.13 p.181.)

It is said that collective farms and state farms are not quite profitable that they absorb a lot of funds that there is no reason to keep such enterprises that it would be more expedient to dissolve them, leaving only cost-effective of them. But only people who do not mean anything meaning in matters of national economy can speak. More than half of the textile enterprises were unprofitable several years ago. One part of our comrades suggested us then to close these enterprises. What would happen to us if we listened to them? We would commit the greatest crime to the country, before the working class, for we would raise this our risen industry. How did we do then? We have existed a year with too much and achieved that the whole textile industry I became profitable. And our car facility in the city of Gorky? Also because it is unprofiled so far. Will you order to close it? Or is our black metallurgy, which is also unprofitable yet? Do not close it, comrades? If you look at profitability, then we would have to develop in the whole of the only industry industries, giving the greatest rente, for example, - confectionery industry, flourish industry, perfume, knitted, industry of children's toys, etc. I, of course, not against the development of these industries. On the contrary, they must be developed, as they are also needed for the population. But, firstly, they cannot be developed without equipment and fuel, which gives them a heavy industry. Secondly, it is impossible to basket industrialization. That's what's the matter, comrades.

HA Profitability Cannot look at Tarthasski, from the point of view of this minute. Profitability must be taken from the point of view of a nationwide economy in a context of several years. Only such a point of view may be called really Leninsky, really Marxist. And this point of view is obligatory not only in relation to industry, but in more more than - in relation to collective farms and state farms.

Speaking about the unprofitability of collective farms and state farms, I don't want to say at all that they are all unprofitable. Nothing like this! Everyone knows that now there are already a number of high cost-effective collective farms and state farms. We have thousands of collective farms and dozens of state farms, quite profitable now. These collective farms and state farms make up pride of our party, the pride of Soviet power. The collective farms and state farms, of course, are not the same everywhere. Among the collective farms and state farms there are old, new and very young. These are still weak, not completely casting economic organisms. They are experiencing in their organizational construction, about the same period as our factories and factories experienced in 1920-1921. It is clear that they cannot be even profitable in their most. But that they will be cost-effective in a continuation of 2-3 years, just as our factories and plants after 1921 became cost-effective - there can be no doubt. Refuse to help them and support on the grounds that not all of them are profitable in this minute - it means to make the greatest crime before the working class and the peasantry. Only the enemies of the people and counter-revolutionaries may raise the question of the unnecessaryness of collective farms and state farms.

("The results of the first five-year plan" T.13 p. 192-194.)

It is necessary, however, it is necessary to note that the case cannot be limited to the extension of Soviet trade. If the development of our economy is resting in the development of trade, in the development of Soviet trade, the development of Soviet trade in turn rests on the development of our transport both railway and water and automotive. It may happen that the goods are there, there is a complete opportunity to expand the turnover, but transport does not sleep for the development of turnover and refuses to carry goods. As you know, it happens right and next. Therefore, transport is the narrowest place that the whole economy is already beginning to stumble, and, above all, our trade turnover is already beginning to stumble.

There can be no doubt that all these types of transport could work much better if the transport authorities did not have a certain disease called the stationery-bureaucratic manual method. Therefore, in addition to helping transport by people and means, the task is to eradicate bureaucratic-stationery attitudes in the transport and make them more operational.

("Reporting Report XVII Congress of the Party about the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b)" T.13 p.345-346.)

You know that we fought for three years with the capitalists of the whole world in order to conquer these conditions of peaceful development. You know that we have won these conditions, and we consider it the greatest achievement. But comrades, all conquest, including this conquest, has its own negative sides. Conditions of peaceful construction did not go out for us. They put their mark on our work, our employees, on their psychology. Over these five years, we walked smoothly forward as on the rails. In this regard, a number of our employees have been created that everything will go like on the oil that we sit out almost on an emergency train and moving along the rails directly without transplanting to socialism.

("Speech at the VIII Congress of the VLKSM" T.11 p.67.)

... Successes have their shadow side, especially when they get relatively "easily", in order, so to speak, "surprises". Such successes sometimes instrange the spirit of self-existence and zazna: "We can all!", "We are not necessary!" They, these successes, often drink people, and people begins to circle a head from success, a sense of measure is lost, the ability to understand reality is lost, the ability to overestimate their strength and underestimate the forces of the enemy, an adventuristic attempts of "in two accounts" appear. Allow all issues of socialist construction . There is no place to care about consolidating the achieved successes and systematically use them for further promotion forward. Why do we need to fix the achieved successes, - we will be able to run "in two bills" to the complete victory of socialism: "We can all!", "We are not all right!"

("Dizziness from success" T.1.12 p. 192.)

Sometimes they say: if socialism, - why still work? Worked earlier, work now, - is not it time to stop working? Such speeches are rooted incorrect, comrades. This is the philosophy of loans, and not honest workers. Socialism does not deny work at all. On the contrary, socialism is built on labor. Socialism and work are inseparable from each other.

Lenin, our great teacher, said: "Who does not work, he does not eat." What does this mean against whom the words of Lenin are sent? Against the exploiters, against those who themselves do not work, and force others to work and are enriched at the expense of others. And about whom? Against those who themselves lodge and want from others to live. Socialism requires not a Lodzhnya, but that all people work honestly, not working on others, not on the bog and exploiters, but on themselves, to society.

("Speech at the first congress of farmers-drummers" T.13 p.249.)

It should be understood that the power and authority of our party and Soviet, economic and any other organizations and their leaders grew to an unprecedented degree. And it is precisely because their strength and authority grew to an unprecedented degree, now everything or almost everything depends on their work. Reference to the so-called objective conditions has no excuse. After the correctness of the political line of the party is confirmed by the experience of a number of years, and the readiness of the workers and peasants to support this line is no longer in doubt, - the role of so-called objective conditions has been minimized, while the role of our organizations and their leaders became decisive, exceptional. What does it mean? This means that the responsibility for our breakthroughs and disadvantages in the work goes from now on to nine tenths not on the "objective" conditions, but on our own, and only on us.

("Reporting Report XVII Congress of the Party on the work of the Central Committee of the CPS (b)" T.13 p.366.)

During the first five-year period, we managed to organize enthusiasm, pathos new construction and achieved decisive success. It is very good. But now this is not enough. Now this case should we add enthusiasm, pathos mastering New factories and new technology, a serious lifting of labor productivity, serious reduction in cost.

Military economy of the USSR during the period of the Patriotic War. Voznesensky Nikolay Alekseevich

Basics of the USSR military economy

Basics of the USSR military economy

The Patriotic War demanded the immediate transfer of the Soviet economy to the rails of the military economy. In the decisions of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Soviet government and the instructions of the Comrade Stalin in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, a program of transition of a peaceful socialist economy on the rails of the military socialist economy was determined.

The creation of the State Committee of Defense, which united the Soviet executive and legislative power and party leadership in the country, provided the plannedness and unity of actions in mobilizing all the resources of the national economy for the needs of the Great Patriotic War.

The comparative characteristics of the military economy of the pre-revolutionary Russia period of 1914-1917 and the USSR military economy of the period 1941-1945 shows the greatest advantages of the USSR military economy, which allowed the Soviet state, despite the temporary loss of a number of industrial and agricultural areas, ensure the supply of the front with military equipment and food.

The USSR military economy is based on the domination of socialist property to the means of production. Focusing in the hands of the Soviet state of the main means of production ensured the rapid restructuring of the USSR national economy on the rails of war. Domination private property on the means of production in pre-revolutionary Russia with a low level of development of productive forces and dependence on foreign capital Created unresolved difficulties of warfare 1914-1917 for Russia.

The Socialist Revolution destroyed the dependence of our country from foreign capital and radically changed the class composition of the USSR population. If in 1913 in the pre-revolutionary Russia workers and employees of the city and the villages were less than 17% of the total population, in 1939 they were already 48% in the USSR, that is, almost half of the entire population. As is known, the collective farm peasantry, co-separated handles and artisans in Russia before the socialist revolution of 1917, was not, while in the USSR in 1939 they accounted for 46%, i.e. the main and predominant part of the second half of the country's population. The soles peasants, uncompressed workers, brushes and artisans in 1913 accounted for 65% of the population of Russia, and in 1939 they accounted for only 2.6% in the USSR.

Bourgeoisie - landowners, large and small city bourgeoisie, merchants and fists - amounted to 16% of the total population of Russia in 1913. In the USSR, long before the beginning of the Patriotic War exploitative classes - landowners, urban bourgeoisie, fists - were destroyed. This change in the class composition of the USSR population compared to the population of pre-revolutionary Russia ensured the moral and political unity of the peoples of the USSR, a solid Union of the working class and the peasantry and the unrealistic friendship of all the peoples forming the Grand Soviet Union.

In 1913, 139 million people lived in Russia, including the urban population was 25 million people and rural population - 114 million people. Russia was predominantly agrarous, poorly developed in an industrial country. Over the years of socialist construction in the USSR, the city and villages have grown unrecognizable and transformed. Almost at the Soviet state, 364 new cities were built by the Soviet state - the support bases of the Socialist Industry. In 1940, 193 million lived in the USSR in 1940, and the urban population increased by 2.4 times compared with 1913.

The production level of industrial products in the USSR in socialist enterprises both in the pre-war and in the military period was immeasurably higher than the level of industrial production of pre-revolutionary Russia in private-capitalist enterprises. The gross products of the large industrial industry in Russia in 1913 amounted to 11 billion rubles; In the USSR in 1940, the production of large industries amounted to 129.5 billion rubles. In 1943, industrial products of only the eastern regions of the USSR amounted to 83 billion rubles, i.e., exceeded the level of industrial production of all areas of pre-revolutionary Russia by 7.5 times.

Gross products of the large-scale industry of the USSR exceeded in 1940 the level of industrial production of Russia in 1913 by 11.7 times, and the products of mechanical engineering and metalworking in a large industry exceeded 41 times. Production of high-quality rental - the basics of military engineering - increased in the USSR in 1940 compared with the production level in Russia in 1913 in 80 times. Production of cars, tractors, aluminum, magnesium and rubber in pre-revolutionary Russia was completely different.

The Socialist Industry of the USSR, independent of capitalist countries, in contrast to the industry of pre-revolutionary Russia, was capable of providing a temporary loss of a significant territory, to ensure military economy with everything necessary at the expense of internal production. Only in the eastern regions of the USSR in 1943 produced more products than in the territory of all Russia in 1915: coal - 2.3 times, steel - 2 times, hire of black metals - 1.7 times, copper - in 4 , 1 time, lead - 59 times, zinc - 18.8 times. Oil in the USSR was produced to the war 3.5 times more than in pre-revolutionary Russia.

A fundamentally excellent class structure of a socialist society provided in the USSR significantly greater production of agricultural products, and the bulk of the market products was concentrated in the hands of the state of workers and peasants. On the eve of World War I, the pre-revolutionary Russia had the highest gross harvest of bread - about 4.9 billion pounds. In the USSR, on the eve of the Patriotic War, the gross harvest of bread amounted to 7.3 billion pounds. At the same time, the combustive products of bread in the USSR on the eve of the Patriotic War exceeded the size of the market for bread in Russia on the eve of the First World War almost twice.

In pre-revolutionary Russia, 22% of all market products belonged to landlords, 50% of commercial products belonged to cams and only 28% of commercial products belonged to the main mass of the peasantry, i.e., midjaps and the poor. In the USSR, in front of the war, about 10% of the garbage products belonged to state statements and almost 90% of commercial products belonged to collective farms. Thus, in the USSR, in fact, all the combustive products of bread were in the hands of socialist producers.

In Tsarist Russia from 367 million hectares of all agricultural land over 80 million hectares owned fists and 152.5 million hectares owned landowners. In the USSR out of 422 million hectares of all agricultural land before the war, 371 million hectares had a collective farm and sole left-handed peasantry and 51 million hectares in government state farms. It is not surprising that the multi-million Soviet people so heroically led the sacred war for their native land, for their cities and villages.

Comparison of the USSR military economy of 1941-1945 and the military economy of Soviet Russia 1918-1921 shows how far the national economy of the USSR has stepped forward over the years of the Socialist Revolution. Productive forces rose, production relations and classes have changed, the frames of the socialist intelligentsia increased.

In early 1918, the entire population in the USSR, including areas, temporarily captured by the interventionists and whitvents, was 142.6 million people. By the time when the interventions and whitvents were captured the greatest part The territory for the entire time of the Civil War, i.e. by November 1918, the population of Soviet Russia was only 60 million people. In the USSR, during the period of the Patriotic War, the population in the period of the highest occupation by the Germans of the USSR territory, in 1942, did not fall below 130 million people, therefore, exceeded more than twice the population in 1918.

The level of industrial production during the military economy of Soviet Russia 1918-1921 does not go to any comparison with the level of industrial production that the USSR has placed during the military economy of 1941-1945. Gross products of the entire USSR industry in 1940 exceeded the level of industrial production of Soviet Russia in 1920, 38 times, and the products of mechanical engineering and metalworking exceeded even 512 times.

In the USSR, during the Patriotic War in 1943, only in the eastern regions, gross manufacturing industry exceeded the production level of all Soviet Russia in 1920, 20 times. In the eastern regions of the USSR, in 1943, products were produced more than what was produced in the territory of all Soviet Russia in 1919: coal - 60 times and cast iron - 65 times.

In the USSR in 1942, i.e., during the period of the greatest decrease in the territory, and therefore sowing areas in agriculture, gross grain harvest exceeded the grain harvest in all Soviet Russia in 1919 several times. To this, it is necessary to add that the USSR on the eve of the Patriotic War has placed significant state reserves of grain and food, which, of course, did not have Soviet Russia in 1918.

The share of socialist production in the gross production of the USSR industry increased from 76% in 1923 to 100% on the eve of the Patriotic War; The share of socialist production in gross agricultural products increased over the same period from 4% to 99.7%; The proportion of socialist enterprises in retail trade in the same period increased from 43% to 100%. All this meant the complete victory of socialism in the city and the village and the creation of the prerequisites for the further growth of the manufacturing forces of the USSR.

Growth in the USSR, the number of qualified workers - the foundations of the industrial development of the national economy. The entire population of the USSR for the period from 1926 to 1939 increased by 16%, while qualified worker personnel increased several times: the number of drilling masters increased 5.7 times, the number of turners increased 6.8 times, milling mills - at 13 Once, Machnikov - 14 times, the tools - 12.3 times, the number of pressrs and stampers increased by 6.3 times, monterers and electromontoes - 6.4 times, operating mechanics - 9.5 times, the number of locomotive machinists It has increased 3.3 times, ship machinists - 3.2 times, chaffins - 40 times, the number of tractor drivers increased by 215 times.

The number of intelligentsia of the USSR also increased, which in 1939 11.8 million people in 1939, not counting qualified workers having a secondary education. At the same time, the number of engineers has increased from 1926 to 1939 by 7.7 times, the number of agronomists increased 5 times, the agricultural personnel increased 8.8 times, the number of science workers increased 7 times, the number of teachers increased by 3.5 times, Cultural and educational workers grew 8.4 times, the number of doctors increased 2.3 times. Raising the culture of the USSR population and the growth of qualified personnel in the city and the village transformed the composition of the Soviet Army and provided its historical victories in the Patriotic War.

To characterize the USSR military economy during the Patriotic War, it is also necessary to compare the period of the peaceful and military economy of the USSR. The period of the peaceful economy of the USSR is characterized by universal expanded socialist reproduction of public wealth in all parts of the country. Extended socialist reproduction took place during the period of the military economy of the USSR, although it was limited by a number of economic regions of the country. In the eastern regions of the USSR, the process of expanded socialist reproduction occurred in a rapid pace. This expanded reproduction during the Patriotic War primarily provided a compensation for public wealth lost due to the temporary occupation of a number of areas and destruction, which was carried out by German barbarians in the Soviet areas temporarily captured by them.

A feature of the expanded reproduction during the USSR military economy is the change in the ratio and size of accumulation and personal consumption in favor of specific military consumption. At the same time, a significant proportion of the social product goes to the production of military equipment, which directly does not reproduce the country's fixed assets. However, specific military consumption, without which the defense of the Fatherland is impossible, is the condition and prerequisite for the very existence and development of expanded socialist reproduction.

During the USSR military economy, the relationship between accumulation and consumption and temporarily, at the first stage of the military economy, has changed, their absolute dimensions decreased. Compared to the pre-war 1940, the production of the total social product of the USSR in 1942 decreased due to the occupation by the Germans of a number of industrial areas. The absolute dimensions of production consumption also decreased, although the proportion remained unchanged. The personal consumption fund has declined somewhat. The specific weight and accumulation dimensions temporarily decreased, although the accumulation continued during the entire period of the military economy.

In the history of the USSR military economy, 1943 is the year of the indigenous fracture, it is characterized by the largest victories of the Soviet Army, the strengthening and development of military economy with sharply pronounced features of expanded reproduction. The entire aggregate social product has increased significantly compared with 1942. Production consumption increased, the population increased, the personal consumption of workers and accumulation increased, the main and current funds of the national economy increased.

In 1944, during which the Soviet land was completely purified by the Soviet army from the Hitler's uncleani, in the military economy of the USSR, the increase in the processes of expanded reproduction continued. Increasing military spending in 1943 and 1944, along with the absolute increase in manufacturing and personal consumption and accumulation, and not at the expense of their absolute reduction, as was in 1942. This affects the features of extended reproduction at various stages of the USSR military economy period.

The USSR military economy is basically fundamentally different from the military economy of capitalist countries, as well as the laws of socialist and capitalist reproduction. This difference is seen from the comparison of the basics of the USSR military economy and, for example, the military economy of the United States of America.

First, in the USSR, the military economy is a socialist economy based on social ownership of the means of production. In the United States of America, the military economy is a capitalist economy, and at such a stage of development, when the dominant position occupies capitalist monopolies and financial capital. During the Second World War, the domination of capitalist monopolies in the United States based on further concentration and centralization of capital intensified. Conversations of naive people, and more often - malicious liars about the "folk" capitalism in the United States - fairy tales for fools. It is enough to say that in 1944, in the United States, 75% of all military orders received 100 largest capitalist monopolies, and 49% of all military orders received 30 monopolist capitalists. These are the All-Russia Military Economy of the United States of America.

Secondly, in the USSR, the driving force of the military economy is a socialist state based on the moral and political unity and patriotism of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In the United States of America, the driving force of the military economy are capitalist monopolies for which the war is an extremely profitable article and a way to conquer world markets. The profits of monopolist capitalists in the United States increased from $ 6.4 billion in 1939 to $ 24.5 billion in 1943, and in four years of war - amounted to $ 87 billion. Correction of some theorists who consider themselves by Marxists, The "decisive role of the state in the military economy of capitalist countries" are trifles that do not pay attention. These "Marxists" naively think that the use of predators of the monopolistic capital of the US state apparatus to obtain military superfits seemed to indicate the decisive role of the state in the economy. The US bourgeois state is characterized by the splicing of the state apparatus, primarily its top, with the refivisions and agents of capitalist monopolies and financial capital. The strength of monopolist capitalists in the United States is, by the way, in the fact that they set themselves the US state. Such naive reasoning about the planning state in the US military economy. Obtaining profitable orders from the state by the capitalist monopolies of the United States is not yet planning a national economy. Sorry attempts to "plan" the economy in the United States suffer collapse as soon as they go beyond the facilitation of monopolists in making a profit.

Thirdly, the USSR in the period of the military economy, the colossal costs associated with military expenses and the temporary occupation of Germany of a number of Soviet districts. In contrast, the capitalist United States was laid in the war, avoiding the next pre-war economic crisis and ensuring the previously unprecedented profits and new world markets for monopolist capitalists. However, the high level of capitalist accumulation, labor productivity and production techniques achieved during the war in the United States, exacerbates the contradiction inherent capitalism and creates the basis for a new devastating economic crisis and chronic unemployment. The unevenness of the development of capitalist countries, intensified during the Second World War, creates new contradictions and conflicts and exacerbates the overall crisis of capitalism. All this means that the foundations of the military economy of the USSR and the US military economy are opposite as - the system of socialism and the system of capitalism.

In this way, economic Fundament The USSR Military Economy is the domination of socialist ownership of the means of production, which ensured the concentration of all the material forces of the USSR national economy for the victorious conduct of the Patriotic War. Perestroika of the national economy on the rails of the military economy, the movement of the productive forces and their restoration in the eastern regions prepared the universal rise of the USSR military economy.

From the book the results of the Second World War. Conclusions defeated Author Specialists German military

The development of the military economy In 1942-1943, the crisis of the German army in Russia in the winter of 1941 created an extremely threatening situation and in relation to the problem of weapons. The German army lost a lot of military equipment in Russia. It was necessary to re-equip entire divisions and

From the book 1941. The victorious parade of Hitler [the truth about Umansky is closer] Author Runov Valentin Alexandrovich

Appendix 18 Materials from the Investigation Board of the USSR Supreme Court of the USSR from February 1956 on the revision of the indictment to Cyril's Nikolai Kuzmich, who made the USSR Supreme Court of the USSR Supreme Court on August 25, 1950 by the court sentence, Kirillov

From the book Military memoirs. Call, 1940-1942. author Goller Charles de

Telegram General de Gaulle delegate "Free France" in the USSR Roger Garro and the head of the French Military Mission in the USSR General Petit London, March 30, 1942 Sending our light motor-mechanized division to Russia in these Terms is impossible, given our operations in

From Blitzkrieg's book: How is it done? [The secret of the "Lightning War"] Author Mukhin Yuri Ignatievich

Telegram Chief of the French Military Mission in the USSR General Petit General de Gaulle, in London Moscow, April 1, 1942 On March 31, at 18 o'clock I was adopted by General Panfilov, who solemnly, in unambiguous and heart expressions, said that "Soviet government,

From the book, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people (in the context of World War II) Author Krasnova Marina Alekseevna

Telegram of the head of the French Military Mission in the USSR General Petit General de Gaulle, in London Moscow, April 1, 1942 I answer your message on March 30. Annotated decision taken by the Soviet command about the pilots, about which I expected clarifications requested earlier,

From the book walking in Katyn myths Author Tereshchenko Anatoly Stepanovich

The effectiveness of the planned economy because it was not so long ago - Soviet deli, dried goods, and lists of the mandatory range on their walls, and sellers, as hardening, casting queues of buyers Tons of domestic products: croup, sausages, canned and

From the book Great Patriotic Wagon: True against myths Author Ilinsky Igor Mikhailovich

2. From the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the strengthening of military physical training of students in the VIII-X classes of secondary schools on August 11, 1941 Soviet Council of People's Commissars The Union of the SSR decides: to strengthen military and physical training of high school students

From the book Secrets of the Russian Fleet. From the archives of the FSB. Author Christophers Vasily Stepanovich

"Evidence" of the fault of the USSR, collapsed by investigators of the main military prosecutor's office for the objectivity of the study of this topic I would like to bring the full text of the expert opinion of the main military prosecutor's office from the criminal case No. 159 t.1/19 l.1- 247, whose original in 1994

From the book Submariner No. 1 Alexander Marnesco. Documentary portrait, 1941-1945 Author Morozov Miroslav Eduardovich

Annex 5. List of military intelligence report on the preparation of Germany to war against the USSR (January - June 1941), the end of June 1941 No. P / p. Who is the source when a message has been received. Start of attack Contents of the report 1 Max 2.11.40. After victory Above England Stick

From the book Paradise for the Germans Author Plenkov Oleg Yuryevich

German submarines and cruxmarine bases in the Arctic waters of the USSR (1941-1945). According to documents of military counterintelligence. The actions of the German underwater fleet during the Second World War on the expanses of the World Ocean are constant interest of domestic and foreign

From the book essay the history of Russian external intelligence. Volume 3. Author Primakov Evgeny Maksimovich

From the book Strategy "Big Roys" Author Glazyev Sergey Yuryevich

Document number 7.8 Exposure from the response of the Institute military history The National People's Army of the GDR on the appeal of the Research Historical Group of the Main Staff of the USSR Navy ... Study ... did not make confirmation that Hitler allegedly announced the Soviet commander

From the book of the author

The main features of the German military economy Unlike the wars of the past epoch, the success in which they depended on the regimental skills, strategies, courage, organizations and dedication of soldiers, - the first and second world wars were predominantly wars of factories and factories,

From the book of the author

No. 7 from the report of the NKGB of the USSR in the Central Committee of the CSP (b), SNK of the USSR, NKO USSR and the NKVD of the USSR dated March 6, 1941. Message from Berlinpo information received from the Committee's official for a four-year plan, several employees of the Committee received an urgent task to calculate the stocks of raw materials and

From the book of the author

No. 9 Possed by the Commissar of the State Security of the USSR V.N. Merkulova in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), SNK and the NKVD of the USSR with the text of the telegram of the English Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Iden Ambassador of England in the USSR S. Cryprps about the intentions of Germany to attack the USSR No. 1312 / m on April 26, 1941 to send secretly

From the book of the author

2.2. Deofshorization of the economy, patriotization elite Property to the main part of the largest private Russian enterprises is brought to offshore, and their real owners in a number of cases are also citizens foreign states. If you take into account the scale

The Patriotic War was a special period in the development of the national economy of the USSR, a severe test for the strength of the socialist economy. This period was one of the most difficult and difficult in our homeland.

The USSR military economy has passed two pronounced stages in its development.

The first stage continued from June 1941 to mid-1942 and is characterized by the fact that during this period the folk economy was restructuring for military universities, there were mobilization of cash material and technical resources accumulated before the war, and their redistribution in favor of the military industry and other industries. serviced by military production and needs of the army, by reducing the production of civilian products. Sources of these resources were the reduction of the non-production sphere (in favor of production) and the sphere of civil consumption, as well as additional equipment loading, an increase in the working time fund, etc. Labor productivity during this period rises mainly due to the growth of the working time fund; The number of workers in the military industry increased by reducing it in other sectors of the national economy; Investments in the military industry increased by reducing investments in other industries and conservation of a number of buildings. These sources were temporary and relatively limited, so their use could not wear a long character.

From mid-1942, these sources could no longer provide a significant increase in military production, and in order to achieve further growth of military and lifting heavy industries, it was necessary to find additional internal accumulation resources. Since that time, the second stage of the development of the USSR military economy began, which is characterized by the fact that military expenditures in the crowded scale began to be covered at the expense of a military economy developed on their own basis, i.e. The normal economic sources in the development of the economy have become leading in the development of the economy, in which the basis for increasing the production of military products was the growth of raw materials and energy resources. At the second stage, the main source of costs were expanded reproduction, the absolute growth of social product and national income. It was the pattern of the USSR military economy.

During the second period in the social product, along with military equipment, the proportion of heavy industry products began to increase, resumed and began to expand the normal circuit of public reproduction, and the national income in increasingly sizes began to be sent not only to ensure military spending, but also to increase the accumulation in folk economy. The redistribution of resources in favor of military production has ceased to play the role of the main source of military costs, which were now provided by the created coherent and rapidly growing military economy, which was a prerequisite for lifting economic Forces Countries in the final period of war.

Although in the summer of 1942, the country was forced to conduct the second evacuation of the productive forces and suffered large losses on it, by this time the conditions were already created for the successful solution of the task of expanded reproduction by mass commissioning of evacuated equipment and major capital construction in the eastern regions. By the end of 1942, it was possible to materialize the fracture during the war, which was finally determined in 1943. This year was marked by the largest victories of the Red Army and became a turning point for the USSR military economy.

Relying on a coherent and rapidly growing military economy, created by the beginning of 1943, the Soviet state has reached major success in increasing the production of military products and expanding the combat reserves of the Soviet Armed Forces. Since 1943, the USSR military economy on its scale, the technical level and structure, fully satisfied the requirements of the war and reliably ensured the successful decision of the strategic, tactical and operational tasks of the Red Army.

Before the Great Patriotic War, the story did not know the state, which would have begun during the war, so decisively turning into its own favor, such a disadvantageous ratio of forces and military-economic potentials initially, as the USSR reached. The achievement of the general economic and military advantage of the USSR over the fascist Germany was prepared by the heroic Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party. Already in the winter of 1942/43, during the Stalingrad battle, the superiority of the German fascist troops in the number of combat technology was liquidated.

Both in peacetime and in the war period The USSR economy developed on the basis of knowledge and purposeful use of the Communist Party economic laws Socialism. And although the whole life of the Soviet state was rebuilt into a military manner, and 57-58% of national income, 65-68% of industrial and about 25% of agricultural products were sent to the satisfaction of military needs, the country's economic development, like the entire Soviet society, continued. This was evidenced by the growth of the main production facilities, a large capital construction, an increase in national income, the concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government on the material and cultural conditions of the working people.

In the conditions of war, the role of the subjective factor in the formation and development of the military economy, the relationship between production and adhering phenomena, conscious activities of people has significantly increased. The objective nature of the action in the military period of the most important economic laws of socialism remained immutable. The Communist Party did not open new ones and did not abolish the current economic laws of socialism, but learned the features of their manifestation during the war and on this basis developed its economic policy, determined the tasks, methods and techniques to create and develop military economies.

The achievement of military, political and economic victory over fascist Germany to a great extent depended on the depth of reflection of objective conditions in the policies of the Communist Party, in the system of public administration and in all conscious activities of Soviet people. Communist Party, based on the requirements of the economic laws of socialism, developed forms and methods of organizing and managing military economy, has affected their policies for the consciousness of Soviet people, sent their efforts to create a powerful and well-coordinated military economy. The economic laws of socialism thus received a relevant reflection in the events held on the parties to improve management and planning and in the daily activities of Soviet people.

During the period of war, the manifestation of economic laws of socialism was essential features due to the specifics of the military situation. The military economy as a whole, its requirements were not a "green street" for the action of economic laws of socialism. The most important feature of the use of economic laws of socialism in the formation and development of the military economy was the narrowing of the sphere of their action compared with the period of peaceful construction. This was primarily manifested in a substantial change in pre-war economic proportions: between production and consumption, I and II divisions, accumulation and consumption, industry and agriculture, production and transport, manufacturing and resources of labor.

So, in 1944, all industrial products of the USSR amounted to 104% of the pre-war level, the production of production facilities increased compared with 1940 by 36%, and the production of consumer goods fell to 54% of the 1940 level of the preferential increase in the production of military and The heavy industry contributed to the fact that during the war years they sent the main cash, material and labor resources.

In contrast to the peaceful period, when normal value relations were provided between I and II divisions of socialist production, in a military period, compliance between production and consumption due to necessity was violated, as the heavy industry was forced to drastically reduce the production and supply of means of production for the sectors of the national economy, producing consumption items.

While the distinctive feature of the economy of the USSR of the Peacery years was the proportional development of all sectors of the national economy with the leading pace of development of the heavy industry, in the war years there was a forced development of the military industry and related industries, mainly the metallurgical and fuel industry, mechanical engineering and energy, Low rates of reproduction of industries II divisions, non-industrial industries of material production, including agriculture, and restricting the development of the non-production sphere, which made changes in the proportion of public reproduction.

For example, during the war years, there was a well-known disproportion between the growth of industry and the development of agriculture. The level of agricultural development was lower than the level of industry development. In agriculture until 1944, the process of reducing the production of products was happening, while in the industry, this process has ceased already in 1942, and in 1943 the growth of industrial production began.

At the same time, the law of preferential law continued in the military economy of the USSR, i.e. ahead of the growth of production tools. True, its actions were also narrowed, because society used it in one direction - in order to ensure proper proportions in the field of military economy due to the forced assumptions of certain disproportions throughout the national economy and temporary infringement of the needs of the population. If in 1945 the products of the group A "A" exceeded the level of 1940 by 12%, then the products of the group "B" group amounted to only 59% of the pre-war level. However, at the final stage of the war, the party and the government began to intensively switch part of the military industries for the production of both the equipment for the group "B" and its products in order to increase the supply level of the population.

As in peacetime, and during the war, the main source of national income of the USSR was the industry, but its share in national income was changed and increased, reaching 56.4% in 1944, 51.2% against 50.6 % In 1940, which was due to the growth of the specific gravity of mechanical engineering and metalworking in the industry itself. In 1945, the share of industry in the national income of the USSR temporarily declined due to the fact that the need for military products began to decrease, and the release of more laborious civilian products could not compensate for the reduction of military production during one (second) half of the year.

The share of agriculture in the national income of the USSR, in 1942, 27.3% decreased in 1943 to 24.6%, and in 1944 and 1945. exceeded the pre-war level.

During the war years, an increase in the national income of the USSR of the specific gravity of capital construction from 5.5% in 1940 and 5% in 1942 to 6.8% in 1945, which led to the accumulation of fixed assets.

During the war years, despite the huge material damage caused by the National Economy of the Nazis invasion, our country has strengthened and developed its productive forces. The socialist state turned out to be sufficiently strong in order for the difficult conditions of the war to direct significant funds for the fulfillment of huge capital work in the leading sectors of the national economy. Meanwhile, in most participating in the Second World War, capitalist countries, including in fascist Germany, the volume of capital construction decreased.

Capital investments in the national economy of the USSR rose from 18.6 billion rubles. in 1942 to 27.4 billion rubles. in 1944 and 36.3 billion rubles. In 1945, in just over the war years, capital investments amounted to 94.6 billion rubles. The most important feature of the USSR economy in the period of the Great Patriotic War was deploying as the Soviet territory of the Soviet territory of the restoration of the national economy destroyed by Nazis. Thanks to the enormous efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, the industry, agriculture, quickly revived. In this regard, in 1944, the total amount of capital investments in the national economy of the USSR increased by 1.4 times compared with 1943. In the whole country, only for three years (1942-1944), new and recovered production facilities were commissioned with a total cost of 77 billion rubles.

The most important factor in the growth of national income of the USSR was a systematic increase in the number of workers engaged in the field of material production. The decisive factor in the growth of national income was the rise of labor productivity. During the war years, labor productivity rose 1.5 times, and in the military industry - even more.

The growth in labor productivity was mainly achieved without major capital investments by conducting such effective measures as improved organization of labor; consolidation of the most important sectors of the national economy of the main qualified personnel of workers and specialists; improving production technology; equipment equipment with high-performance tools and devices; mechanization of labor; the introduction of the flow lines and the conveyor system of production in assembly, mechanical processing and procurement workshops; preferential logistical supply of the most important sectors of the national economy; creation on military production of normal nearests; Equipment of military factories with new types of high-performance machines; upgrade part of the equipment; Ensuring the preemptive supply of best industrial workers; Development of the material and moral promotion of the production initiative and labor lifting of workers.

An important source of productivity growth was an increase in labor skills. For a military period, new personnel workers received the necessary vocational training and acquired production experience.

But the main factor in the growth of labor productivity was the labor lift of Soviet workers. The working class, the collective farm peasantry, the Soviet intelligentsia worked inspired and selflessly. Patriotism, high ideological conviction, consciousness, and the popular desire to contribute to the victory over fascism were served as the source of their great labor. In enterprises, collective farm fields, construction projects, transport - everywhere many times were exceeded pre-war rates. The All-Union Socialist Competition for the fastest and high quality execution of the front tasks has unfolded throughout the country. It was an important factor in the mass development of the initiative in solving production issues, identifying production reserves, increase production, productivity growth.

In the military period, the socialist principle of labor distribution continued and continued. In industry, construction and in transport, this has been facilitated by the development of premium forms of wages and the introduction of medium-industrial norms, in agriculture - improving the payment system in work, taking into account the quality of work, increasing the yield of fields and productivity of animal husbandry.

The essential source of national income growth was the savings of material costs. As a result of the Government taken by the party and the Government to reduce production costs in the military period, prices for military equipment were reduced by more than 50 billion rubles. During the war years, the rigid regime of material and financial resources was carried out. In industry, events were widely carried out on the introduction of new equipment and modernization of old, specialization and cooperation of production, the use of substitutes for deficient raw materials.

In the war period, regularities were preserved and manifested themselves, peculiar to the reproduction of the country's national income in peaceful years. Due to the growth of national income and the use of accumulated reserves, the tasks of consumption, accumulation and compensation for military costs were ensured. The national income of the USSR, which decreased in the first period of the war, continuously increased over the next military years. If in 1942 the national income of the country fell to 66% of the pre-war level, in 1944 it increased to 88% of the 1940 level. This growth was the result of expanded reproduction and was not associated with the release of the temporary occupied by the enemy of the districts, for the products developed by the enemy In 1944, the industry of liberated areas was only 18% of the volume of 1940, and in the rear districts, the gross products of the industry increased against 1940 2.3 times.

During the war years, the process of increasing the share of accumulation of national income was happening, although it was 7% compared with the pre-war period in 1943 and in 1944 - 15% of the total amount of national income against 19% in 1940

During the war, a significant part of the gain of the accumulation was destroyed without a trace (means of military equipment) and, therefore, did not return to the national trade turnover, which limited the material and technical basis for the reproduction of civil products. Of course, these factors could not take place in the period of peaceful construction.

During the military economy, the community circulation has changed significantly, since the predominant part of the social product was to satisfy the needs of the front. Thus, the heavy industry supplied the means of production mainly by the defense industry and the branches associated with it, and industries producing consumer items are significantly less than in pre-war years. In this regard, the rate of reproduction of the main production facilities in many civil industries decreased sharply.

Compeced proof that during the war years the development of the economy was carried out on the basis of conscious use by the Soviet society of economic laws of socialism, the process of expanded socialist reproduction was carried out on a comparable territory. The war imposed by the Soviet Union could not only be conducted only at the expense of the established state reserves and required extended reproduction. The presence of expanded reproduction in the USSR during the war testified to ensure the needs of the front, which during the whole war grew from the quarter to the quarter, and the front needs were satisfied almost completely at the expense of their own resources, since the supply of Western allies on Land Lases was only 9,800 million . dollars and had the importance to eliminate individual "narrow" places.

In a military period, extended socialist reproduction was the unity of the systematic expanded reproduction of such productive forces and production relations, which contributed to the rapid rise in the military economy as a whole. The expanded reproduction of socialist production relations was based, as in peace years, based on the development of socialist property, strengthening and developing the socialist principles of the organization of production and distribution. For expanded reproduction, a systematic product and the national income of the USSR were scenario and appropriately used.

Socialist reproduction was performed on the basis of using the main economic law of socialism in the framework of new production relations caused by economic conditions Wartime, in the course of socialist expanded reproduction, reproduction of social product, labor resources, the development of new production relations was reached.

The process of extended reproduction in the conditions of war had specific features and qualitative features that significantly distinguished him from the advanced reproduction process in peacetime. Along with a fundamental change in the reproduction conditions of the social product and its real structure, compared with peaceful time, expressed in switching production capacity and the use of a huge mass of material and labor resources for the production of military products, a distinctive feature of reproduction during military time was also a special nature of the redistribution of social product. and national income - reinforced concentration of resources on "narrow", but the most important sections of the economy.

During the war, the process of extended reproduction of fixed assets began not immediately. The first year and a half of the war were extremely adversely affected by the state of fixed assets, since they were destroyed at the temporary occupied enemy of Soviet territory.

From the second period of war, a significant increase in fixed assets took place in the country, which was the result of the growth of capital investments in the national economy. Capital investments in industry have several times surpassed the depreciation of fixed assets. The volume of capital work in 1944 was 1.5 times more than in 1943. Thanks to this, the main funds of the industry have significantly updated, its technical re-equipment has occurred on the basis of equipment modernization, the introduction of numerous improvements, new fixtures and tools.

Despite the tremendous difficulties associated with the war, the production facilities of the national economy increased significantly. In 1943, the main production funds (without livestock) increased compared with 1942 by 20%, in 1944 - by 24, in 1945 - by 29%. The volume of fixed assets markedly approached the pre-war level. If in 1942 the cost of fixed assets decreased to 68% of the 1940 level, in 1943 it increased to 76%, in 1944 - to 84, in 1945 - up to 88%. This increase testified that during the war years in the national economy, accumulations were obtained, some of which were sent to an increase in fixed assets in size overlapping their disposal.

Along with this during the war years, there was a progressive change in the structure of fixed assets: the share of fixed assets of industry has sharply increased, and among its industries, the share of fixed assets of the heavy industry has increased more rapidly. In general, the sectoral structure of production assets provided the necessary proportions in the field of material production.

The main production facilities grew in agriculture. True, in 1942, the main funds of agriculture fell to 55% of the pre-war level, but in 1945 they rose to 74%, although their growth rates were lower than the growth rates of industrial foundations. In terms of distraction to the front of millions of employees, the mechanization of agriculture and the industrial structure of its main production facilities allowed to support agriculture at the minimum possible and necessary level at war. In the structure of the Fundamental Funds of Agriculture of the USSR, even during the war, equipment, cars and other means of mechanization occupied more than 50%.

During the war, transport funds also grew, which ensured the normal appeal of the entire commodity part of the social product. In 1945, the main production facilities of transport and communication amounted to 87% of the 1940 level against 67%, in 1942

In the war period, non-production major funds increased. Although they are not a means of labor, but their role in the economy is great, therefore the proportions between production and non-production funds are essential for the growth of public labor productivity, for the optimal combination of accumulation and consumption.

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, the restoration and use of depreciation deductions for major repairs of fixed assets began. From the state budget of the USSR, additional appropriations have been allocated for major repairs and replenishment of repairs not performed for the war years on industrial main funds.

Extended reproduction included the recovery process. Although at the beginning of the war, the pace of economic development was kept, but as the difficulties of wartime, the restored enterprises themselves became an additional factor in the acceleration of economic development.

The high rates of extended socialist reproduction during the war is a bright manifestation of the advantages of a socialist public system, a convincing testimony of its enormous opportunities.

In the military economy, they acted, although not in full force, other economic laws of socialism. For example, a law was acted as a limited framework of the most complete satisfaction of the needs of the people, expressing the goal of socialist reproduction, since in the conditions of the war in the state there were no sufficient funds to implement such a goal. The scope of this law was narrowed by the objective public need for the maximum satisfaction of the front needs. Nevertheless, this economic law did not lose its strength, since the conditions were operating, his groomed: public property for the means of production and socialist production relations.

The Soviet state, based on the conditions of social proceedings, invariably took into account the economic law of the most complete satisfaction of the needs of the people. During the period of the war, his action was manifested, firstly, in conservation at the same level of state retail prices for folk consumer items both in the state and in cooperative trade throughout the war; Secondly, in the continuation, although in a limited amount, financing the socio-cultural services of the Soviet people. In the USSR did not have freezing or decrease in wages in the field of material production. It was thanks to the conscious use of this law and the economy planning to the Soviet state managed to establish an organized supply of the population without resorting to the balance of budget due to workers, as is the case under similar circumstances in capitalist countries.

During the war, the ratio of the need for a public product gain, acute needs of war, and the balance of labor resources limited in wartime should cause the use of the law of savings of social labor, but this did not happen.

It is necessary to delimit the savings of living work and savings of all social labor. If the productivity of living work during the war years has increased, the effect of the law of savings of all social labor was suspended by the insufficient growth of labor armed and decrease in the average level of labor qualifications due to involvement in the production of unskilled workers. The limited action of this law was also manifested in an increase in the development of one worker due to an increase in not only labor productivity, due to improving the technique and technology of production and other similar factors, but also spent time by lengthening the working day and the introduction of overtime works. Of course, the productivity of public labor as a whole has increased primarily due to the heroic work of Soviet people.

Thus, the law of savings of public labor and time continued to act, but with some deviations. Features of the manifestation of this law during the war affected the action of the law of value. Characteristic deviations in the action of the law of value were caused and explained by the changes that occurred in the action of other economic laws with which it is connected.

The law of value, as an expression of an objective need for economic management, during the war was realized by Soviet society as a particularly relevant to managing social production. But the war limited the possibility of using this law, since, first of all, the role of money was decreased, through which the law of value is valid, and, secondly, the inorganized market has increased the effect of natural forces due to the reduction of commodity resources in the hands of the state and plurality of prices. The action of the law of value is evidenced by both centralized measures for saving material, labor and financial costs and the mass initiative of workers on rational use and resource saving. But the effect of this law has undergone significant deviations, because during the war, the basis of the law of value was visible to a certain extent, the production of the product in socially necessary costs.

In the war period, the law of work distribution was weakened. The highest wage was associated not with the highest qualifications of workers, but with the importance of the industry in which they were busy for defense. Since most workers were concentrated in the defense branches, a significant part of the salaries' wages were concentrated here, and therefore purchasing funds. For the same reasons (the concentration of human and material resources in the defense industries), the production of the group "B" was absolutely reduced, as a result of which the unrealized demand for consumer goods was formed. All this led to a violation of equilibrium between supply and suggestion - one of the parties to the action of the law of value.

Thus, the reduction in the supply of goods by the state strengthened the demand for them in the collective farm market, where prices rose. As a result, the purchasing power of the ruble has slightly decreased. In some industries, wage growth was not compensated by the growth of labor productivity, which led to an increase in production costs. In agriculture, due to the decrease in the means of mechanization, the cost of production increased and through the law of the value of the value had its impact on the price and value ratio: prices broke away from the cost. For this reason, non-equivalence of exchange increased between industry and agriculture. In the city, the card system led to some equability in real wages. All this undermined the law of value.

In the process of the formation and development of the military economy, the Soviet state took into account the economic law of the rational placement of the productive forces, whose scientific principles formulated V. I. Lenin. Although the action of the law of rational placement of the productive forces to a certain extent was violated due to the need to send evacuated and new equipment to items, where there were free production areas for this, but in general, the placement of evacuated production capacity was carried out not spontaneously, not by gravity, but organized, with Accounting for approximation to sources of raw materials, energy resources, the availability of a transport network, etc.

The placement of evacuated productive forces, as well as the construction of new industrial enterprises in the eastern regions, was crucial for the development of the military economy, had a positively affected by the rational use of a variety of natural wealth of the country, accelerated the process of expanded reproduction and the growth of labor productivity.

An important means of organizing the military economy of the USSR and achieving the economic victory over the fascist Germany was the strengthening of the organizational centralism in the public administration and planning of the national economy.

The struggle of the Soviet people against treacherously attacked the Enemy was headed by the Communist Party, its Central Committee, the Soviet Government and the State Defense Committee. The organizing and guiding role of the Communist Party was brightly manifested in the unity of political, economic and military leadership by the country and armed forces. All of the fullness of state power was focused in the same body - the State Committee of Defense, all the activities of which took place in close contact with the bid of the Soviet Supreme Command. This made it possible to ensure a comprehensive and prompt decision of the issues of armed struggle and the work of the Soviet rear. Issues with the most important military-political importance were considered at joint meetings of the Politburo WCP (b), GKO and rates.

Attitution of the activities of party, Soviet and economic bodies for the mobilization of all resources of the country, authorized GKOs were appointed to the coordination of the activities of party, Soviet and economic bodies. In areas located in close proximity to the front, urban defense committees were formed.

Creation of the State Committee of Defense, the Institute of Commissioner PC and Local Defense Committees ensured the strengthening of centralization in the leadership of the military economy, made it possible to quickly and specifically implement the policies of the party, to carry out the most complete mobilization and use of the material and human resources of the state to defeat the enemy.

According to the decision of the State Commission, the Public Commissars of the Tank Industry, weapons, ammunition, mortar weapons were created, with the Soviet University of the USSR, the Committee on Accounting and the distribution of labor, the Evacuation Council, Soviet Informburo, were formed. I. V. Stalin, A. A. Andreev, N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Zhdanin, M. I. Kalinin, A. P. Kosygin, A. I. Mikoyan, V. M . Molotov, N. M. Churchnik. The heads of the main sectors of the USSR military economy were M. G. Perezhin, B. L. Vannikov, V. A. Malyshev, D. F. Ustinov, I. F. Tevosyan, A. I. Shahurin, P. I. Parshin, . K. Baybakov, B. V. Vakhrushev, A. I. Efremov, P. F. Lomako et al.

In relation to the conditions of military time, the work of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, the regional and regional committees of the party, the Soviet Republic of the USSR and the Soviet Committee of the Allied and Autonomous Republies, the Cores and Soviet borders, the local party and Soviet bodies was rented. In the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, the regional collars and the entities were formed by new industry departments for the defense industry and transport. The composition of the partnerships of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Commissions of the Central Committee of the VLKSM at factories and factories. For prompt execution of solutions hasional organs The rights of the Council of Allied and Autonomous Republic were expanded, as well as local government bodies.

The Great Patriotic War subjected to severe checks party and Soviet governing bodies, their organizational and business abilities. They withstood this check with honor.

Under military time, a strict manner was strictly observed with a rigid and production discipline, the personal responsibility of the leading personnel was increased.

During the war years, centralization has increased in the planning of the national economy due to the needs of wartime. The redistribution of national economy resources primarily in favor of military production, as well as the restriction of the issue of a number of important goods caused by a central distribution in a planned procedure of a much larger amount of products than in peacetime. During the war, the number of products distributed from the Unified State Plan, increased more than 2 times.

People's planning was conducted on a scientific methodological basis. Among the most important scientific principles of planning, the principle of the leading link and the principle of the greatest economic efficiency have become of particular importance. The military-economic plans contained such use of the potential opportunities of the socialist economy, which gave the opportunity to exceed the production of military equipment Hitler Germany, despite the fact that it used economic and labor resources almost all of Europe occupied. The plans were taken into account the main, decisive sites of the military economy and they focused on the maximum of material, monetary and labor resources. The planning of the balance sheet method, economic calculations of the most efficient use of production facilities, labor resources, raw materials, materials, etc. were widely used.

The planned nature of the Soviet economy, due to the domination of public socialist ownership of the means of production, provided the possibility of establishing proportions between sectors and enterprises based on the state plan and provided the opportunity to radically change the proportions of the peaceful period in the interests of victory over the enemy. In the distribution of labor and material assets, the prevailing share was taken by military production and co-separated branches of the Military Economy.

The change in proportions in the national economy, aimed at the fastest development of the military economy and ensuring the needs of the front, was reflected in the balance sheet of the national economy. He included a scientific analysis of the main proportions and mutual relations between the sectors for the previous planning period and scientifically based calculations on the most important indicators of the production and use of social product and national income on the planned period. The balance of the national economy was based on the use of economic laws of socialist reproduction, allowed to rationally distribute production, material, financial, labor resources and determine the optimal tasks for the development of the military economy in the interests of the defeat of the enemy.

During the war years in planning when developing plans, coordination and coordination of all parties and branches of reproduction, the law of the systematic, proportional development of the national economy was used to ensure the fastest creation of a coherent military economy, but with some restrictions. This manifested that a single national economic plan was balanced on a unilateral basis as much as possible to meet the needs of the front when limiting and limiting the other needs of the Company and therefore could not provide that optimal combination of consumption and accumulation inherent in socialism, as well as I and II public production units, which Provided in peacetime. The action of this law has affected that the production capacity of industries interrelated with military industry was fully used. It has consistently meant that the law of planned, proportional development acted in conditions of several limited manifestation of the main and other economic laws of socialism, and therefore the scope of its action also had some limitations.

During the war, he did not receive due space in the planning and principle of democratic centralism, since it was in planning that the centralization was particularly intensified.

From the first days of the war, all the work on restructuring the economy for military universities, the deployment of military industry and other defense industries was strictly according to plan. Compiled by the USSR of the USSR and the Armed Forces of the USSR SCC and the Military Economic Plans have had the strength of the law, contained an extensive program of military production, gave a clear perspective of the development of the military economy. They played a large mobilizing and organizing role. Along with the main task - the maximum development of the military industry in the plans also provided for the relevant level of development of metallurgy, fuel industry, energy, engineering industries, transport, agriculture, i.e. those sectors, without the development of which could not be a solid rise in the military economy.

During the war years, a systematic strict control over the implementation of the planned tasks was carried out, "narrow" places and disproportions in the development of military economy were promptly identified and decisive measures were taken on their urgent elimination.

State planning, being the most important instrument of centralized distribution and redistribution of material, labor and financial resources, ensured the rapid mobilization of the country's production potential for defeating the enemy.

Decisive factors that provided the victory of the Soviet Union over the fascist Germany were: unparalleled on-scale and complexity Guideline and military organizational activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during the war years; Fortress and power of the Soviet Socialist State - the state of the new type; the prowess and the courage of the Soviet people who came out of the depths of the Soviet people and closely related to it the unity of the goals and interests of the Soviet Armed Forces, with the honor of fulfilling their patriotic and international debt; Labor feat of the workers of the Soviet rear.

The Communist Party is a guide and inspiring power of Soviet society - from the first days of the war mobilized the masses to the sacred struggle with the fascist invaders and the protection of the conquests of socialism. During the years of the Patriotic War, the Communist Party was a worthy organizer and an inspirer of the fighting Soviet people. Guided in all its activities by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, the party has developed a scientifically based program of defeating the German fascist invaders, all the peoples of the USSR rounded around themselves, combined the efforts of the front and rear, warriors and workers, led the nationwide struggle with fascism and brought it to a victorious end .

In the wise leadership of the Communist Party, the skillful use of all the objective possibilities laid out in the socialist basis for the creation of a solid military organization of the entire Soviet society was pronounced. The efforts of the party and the government, the Soviet rear turned into a single combat camp that feeds the front with human reserves, weapons, ammunition, food that supports the moral spirit of the fighting warriors.

The Communist Party launched colossal activities on the organization of the national struggle at the temporary occupied territory of the USSR. In the rear of the enemy, underground party organizations were created, a mass partisan movement unfolded. Over a million Soviet people actively operated in the ranks of partisan detachments, compounds and underground organizations.

In the initial, particularly difficult period of the war, when the Soviet people had to experience the failures, and bitterness of defeats, the party did not silence the entire severity of the tests that were treated for our country. In the Directive of the USSR Council and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) dated June 29, 1941, it was said: "... In the war and the death of the Soviet state imposed on the war and the death of the Soviet state, to be the peoples of the Soviet Union free or in enslavement." The party and the government demanded "commit to complacent and carelessness and mobilize all our organizations and all the forces of the people to defeat the enemy, for merciless reprisals with the hordes of the attacker german fascism» .

Party, using the advantages of the socialist method of production and planned management of the economy, in an exceptionally short time transferred all branches of the Soviet economy to military rails: industry, transport, agriculture. In the course of the creation and development of the military economy, the party warned against the danger of reassessment of their own forces, indicated the inadmissibility to be content with the success achieved, revealed the shortcomings in the work of the military economy and called on to focus all the forces on the satisfaction of the front needs to ensure the fastest defeat of Hitler Germany.

Based on the deep analysis of the main patterns, objectively determining the course and outcome of the entire war, the party showed those major factors, as a result of which the German fascist troops succeeded in the first period of the war: the suddenness of the attack on the USSR, the economic and military superiority of the aggressor, and convincingly proved, That they had a temporary, transient character, because the Soviet state, by virtue of the advantages of the socialist economy, fully had military economic opportunities for a decisive change in their own way the relationship between the Armed Forces and Foreign Poland.

"The war showed," the "history of the Second World War" is noted, that the outcome of the armed struggle is not determined by the simple ratio of the material and human resources of the parties. The outcome of the continuous struggle is solved by a combination of political, economic, social and moral factors, skillful and purposeful use of all cash and potential forces, the achievement of superiority in the decisive stages and the most important directions. "

The party skillfully and strongly enforced all the forces and funds of the Soviet state for the entire development and strengthening of the country's economic and military potential, determined the political and strategic goals of the war, carried out the leadership of all the spheres of public and state life of the USSR. Under its leadership, the most important operations of the Great Patriotic War were preparing and conducted, actual issues of the construction of the Armed Forces, the Organization of Soviet troops, their technical equipment and combat use were solved. She led the distribution of labor, material and technical and financial resources of the Soviet state, organized a coherent military economy as soon as possible.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was truly the battle party. Communists were the first to go to the front. The CCP Central Committee (b) was redistributed to party forces in favor of the organizations of the Red Army and the Navy. In just four years of war, 1,640 thousand communists were mobilized in the Armed Forces, which was half of the entire composition of the party by the summer of 1941. By the spring of 1945, every fourth Soviet warrior was a communist, while at the beginning of the war - every ninth. Party members have always been in the forefront of the fighting troops.

In the Soviet rear, the party had a cohesive combat party organism, which had almost 2 million communists who selflessly fought in the labor front.

The Communist Party has turned the friendly of the Peoples of the USSR in peaceful construction in the mighty construction of the USSR in the mighty source of victory over Hitler's Germany, even closer to the unified multi-million army of fighters for victory over fascism all nations and nationalities of the country.

The Communist Party found the slogans that are visible and understandable to the widespread masses that were on the fight against Hitler's invaders, to win the victory. Soviet people, responding to party appeals, showed high political consciousness and dedication to the party.

During the war years, Soviet people brightly demonstrated the greatest courage, durability, high patriotism and internationalism, selfless work, creative and political activity.

Thanks to the solid unity of political, state and military leadership, the army and the people, the front and rear, the Soviet Union turned into a huge combat camp, embraced by a single impulse - to break the enemy, expel it from the Soviet land, destroy fascism.

Local party bodies conducted great work on the development of the military economy. During the period of restructuring the national economy, they often took on the functions of direct economic leadership.

Local party organizations were mobilized and sent the efforts of the workers of the Soviet rear to the fastest provision of urgent needs of the front, improving the work of industry, agriculture and transport, the most efficient use of materials, equipment, increased productivity, managed the activities of scientific institutions and public organizations.

The party attached great importance to intensifying and enhancing the role of local bodies of Soviet power and public organizations in the creation and development of the military economy. The Central Committee of CPS (b) determined the content and methods of work of state and public organizations. Local councils of workers deputies conducted military mobilization in the rear, engaged in universal military training, a household device of evacuated population, assisted the families of military personnel, provided sanitary and epidemic security, headed centralized supply of the population, etc. They were loyal and reliable party assistants.

The most important plot of activity of local party and Soviet bodies was the work on the rise of agriculture. In order to strengthen the party guide to agriculture in military conditions, the MTS and state farms were re-established. Alone with the local party and Soviet bodies strengthened the influence of the party to the development of agriculture, helped collect farms and state farms to fulfill their duty to ensure the needs of the front and population in food and industry in raw materials.

Local party and Soviet organizations were widely attracted to the help of agricultural workers urban populations and teams of industrial enterprises. In the order of patrimony over collective farms, MTS and state farms, workers factories and factories repaired tractors and other agricultural equipment, participated in construction and restoration work.

A great job of mobilizing forces, the development of the military economy, to ensure the front to all necessary for the successful management of armed struggle with the Hitler's invaders, trade unions were performed and the Komsomol. The trade unions everywhere and widely deployed a socialist competition, actively participated in the fulfillment, in mass preparation and retraining of work personnel, in organizing the treatment of wounded and helping the families of military personnel. In the harsh years of war, as in peacetime, the battle assistant was Leninsky Komsomol. From the first days of the war, he rebuilt and subordinated all his work mobilization of young people to a decisive oppositor to the enemy, to protect the Motherland and selfless work in the rear.

During the war, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Unit of the working class and the peasantry was further strengthened - the unshakable class basis of the socialist building, his military organization, which became the most important source of victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

The Communist Party in its organizational activities relied on solid connection with the working class, the peasantry, intelligentsia. Friendly cooperation, mutual assistance, patriotism, loyalty to the socialist system, the high labor and political activity of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia were the foundation, relying on which party in an exceptionally short term mobilized human, material, production, money resources in the country and used They are with such high efficiency that is impossible in a capitalist society, torn-in class contradictions.

Thanks to this, the Soviet Union had the most durable rear. The workers of the Soviet rear during the war created a powerful military economy and won the economic victory over Hitler's Germany. This fully revealed the superiority of the Soviet experience and leadership of the national economy and the possibilities of the socialist production method.

The victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War showed the whole world which country of socialism and its people and its people, who got under the leadership of the Communist Party to defend their revolutionary conquests, freedom and independence under the leadership of the Communist Party.

The victory of the Soviet people and the crushing defeat of the forces of fascism and militarism is historically determined, natural phenomenon. The Great Patriotic War convincingly showed that there are no strengths that could crush socialism in the world, put on his knees, the faithful ideas of Marxism-Leninism, a dedicated socialist homeland, cohesive around the Leninist party. The invincibility of socialism is the main lesson of war and the formidable caution of imperialist aggressors.