The financial system, as a rule, is a set of financial markets and the public finance system (tax system, state budget, monetary policy, system of public financial transfers, etc.).
It is generally accepted that, in turn, financial markets are a combination of the money market, as well as securities and capital markets. A clear separation of these institutions is almost impossible. However, the prevailing view is that "money markets" are those financial markets in which short-term liabilities are exchanged for external money,
and the term "capital market" covers both financial markets and markets in which transactions with "real" property are conducted.
All components (parts) financial system have a certain similarity: in financial transactions there is an increased risk compared to non-financial business agents, which, of course, is compensated by an additional premium (additional bonus). In economic theory, this phenomenon has been described by models of the formation of prices for capital assets in space (CAPM, average dispersion), intertemporal models and arbitrage pricing theory.
It seems to us that the financial system is a subsystem of the economy and is designed to provide (1) the money circulation of the movement of goods and services, (2) the redistribution of funds and (3) the transformation of financial
assets. Our study is aimed at revealing the essence of the last, third component of the financial system - financial intermediation for the transformation of assets.
In the most general way, financial intermediaries- These are enterprises engaged in the purchase and sale of financial assets. Thus, financial intermediaries are the main participants in organized financial markets. The financial business, unlike the usual one, and the financial market, unlike the organized (material, non-financial) market, are branches of non-price competition, where the quality and nature of the services offered are important (very often they are differentiated and specified by consumers), traditions of interaction with clients. Historical experience has shown that non-price factors are quickly monopolized or oligopolized. Economic theory proceeds from the assumption that financial transactions are epiphenomena that form a "veil" that hides the inner content of real processes from a superficial observer. The Modigliani-Miller theorem implied that the cost
financial assets is exactly equal to the value of those external assets that are claimed by the owners of financial assets. However, modern economics has completely refuted these assumptions: the financial economy not only serves the real economy, but also has the properties of self-expansion and self-generation. With further analysis, we will be convinced that in terms of scale and profits, the financial economy has become significantly ahead of non-financial corporations.
Financial intermediation is the sphere of activity of agents of the financial system. According to some economists, the financial system transfers purchasing power from economic units with budget surpluses (or with surplus finances - A.B.) to economic units with budget deficits. At the same time, financial intermediaries transform financial claims in such a way
in a way that they become more attractive to the final investor. The process of buying direct claims of economic units with a shortage of funds, and their transformation (transformation) into indirect claims, is financial intermediation. At the same time, the transfer of funds from enterprises with a positive budget to enterprises with a negative budget is carried out through (1) direct or (2) indirect financing.
This is an overly classic and honest definition. Everything is changing rapidly these days. The development of the financial system in the world over the past decade and a half has largely refuted the above point of view. First, by the beginning of the 20th century and during its first 15 years, financial intermediation was not only about the transformation of claims. Secondly, in order to lend money, it is not necessary to have a surplus in the balance of financial flows (in the budget). And in order to borrow them, it is not necessary to have a shortage of funds. A prime example is the US and US companies, which have the largest deficits.
among the OECD countries, but it is they who are engaged in large-scale mediation projects.
D. Blackwell, D. Kidwell, R. Peterson under financial intermediation understand such activities of firms in which EEBP buy financial claims of EEDB. One could agree with this approach completely, if not for one very important circumstance: who defines a firm with a surplus and a firm with a deficit budget? Some states themselves artificially create a deficit or surplus of financial resources (for example, the budget). Soon, the results of such decisions affect the activities of financial intermediaries, increasing their scarcity or surplus.
R. Levin identifies financial intermediation as the ability of this subsystem of economic relations to reduce risks, mobilize savings, raise awareness of business entities, stimulate exchange processes, etc. According to A. Darbinyan and E. Sandoyan, financial intermediation is work in the following four areas: possession of information, consumption smoothing, delegation of investment monitoring and positioning in
as a “liquidity pool” or “coalition of contributors”
According to other scientists (E.A. Pomogaeva), financial intermediation is a joint activity of a set of financial institutions to ensure the continuity of the movement of capital between economic entities, implemented through a double exchange of debt claims and obligations. With such a definition, we see no problem, except that it is overly general.
In our opinion, the system of financial intermediation in the sense of professional entities should be recognized as a set of non-price competition institutions designed to transform one type of requirement into another, one type of asset into another (for example, external assets into internal ones), potential income of the future into actual expenses of the present, relative time financial surpluses in some
acceptors into other real money. The time for financial intermediation has come: it fell to the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. The development of the financial system has surpassed all expectations. Therefore, statements that were “fresh” yesterday about the essence of the modern system of financial intermediation turn out to be outdated or insufficient.
Typically, financial intermediation instruments should be considered such as: deposit, loan, seigniorage (share premium), currency exchange, stocks, bonds, options, mortgages, markets for derivative financial instruments (futures, forwards, options), the provision of guarantees and guarantees, insurance contracts (policies, premiums, payments), shares, financial leasing and factoring, pawnshops. And the institutions of financial intermediation are banks, treasuries, international financial institutions, insurance companies, mutual and investment funds, stock markets, hedge funds, other derivatives funds, etc. Recently, as a separate type of financial services, they have been seriously analyzed
Money transfers labor migrants (LTM), has reached
534 billion dollars in 2012 Not always, but more often
27 Gaidutsky A.P. Banks and migration capital. K .: Information Systems LLC, 2013. P. 39. According to the WB, these transfers in
just after the transfer, these funds are also transformed from one type of asset to another. According to the WB, remittances almost reach the level of 50%
from FDI in the world and account for about 0.5% of the world
GDP, and the number of migrants over the past 5 years is already 213 million people. Therefore, in our opinion, TTMs have also become an instrument of financial intermediation in our time.
Until recently, it was customary to represent the essence of financial intermediation through a system of services provided by financial intermediaries (splitting the loan amount; transferring one national currency to another; establishing a flexible repayment system; diversifying the risk of non-payment; ensuring illiquidity). At the same time, the following types of financial intermediaries were noted: (1) deposit-type institutions (commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions); (2) savings institutions operating on
on a contractual basis (life insurance companies; accident insurance companies; pension funds); (3) investment funds (mutual funds; money market mutual funds) and (4) a number of other types of financial intermediaries (consumer, business, and trade finance companies; government financial institutions and agencies, institutions of financial derivatives or derivatives) . To this list, no doubt, should be added insurance brokers and agents, currency dealers, pawnshops and exchange offices, payment and settlement organizations. The list of types of services has changed a lot over the past 20 years (among the new products are hedge funds, wealth management, natural resource insurance, etc.). In this regard, some confusion in the systematization of types and types of services is obvious.
For example, in F. Fabozzi we find the following system of structuring financial intermediation institutions: he divides the entire range of financial institutions into 2 camps. He calls the first camp "financial
institutions”, and subdivides them into (1) insurance companies, (2) depository organizations (banks, savings institutions, etc.) and (3) investment companies. In the second camp, he notes non-financial institutions: savings funds, savings of non-financial
owl corporations, etc.
Of course, each researcher has the right to decide for himself regarding the research methodology. But in the case of financial intermediation institutions, there is one important circumstance: it is impossible not to notice that some of these institutions are associated with the processes of accumulation of funds, the second part is more due to the transformation of these accumulated funds into savings, the third turns savings into investments, and, finally, the very last part transforms investment into income. There are also financial intermediation institutions that simply turn one type of asset into another type and, the most “fashionable” of them, turn future income into present time expenses. At the same time, in our opinion, it is very important to avoid cross (double, triple, etc.) accounting when structuring and evaluating the financial system. Very often, sometimes at the level of reputable international financial institutions, when assessing total assets or financial
out markets, there is a mechanical summation of the respective assets. For example, the IMF in 2011 estimated capital markets by summing up the capitalization of stock markets, public and private debt bonds, and bank assets. Basically, you can do this. But a significant part of bank assets is pegged to bonds, and about half of the purchases of
tions is carried out, therefore, with the help of capitalization of stock markets through bank loans.
Schematically, the main structural units of the financial intermediation market are shown in Figure 1.1.
The scheme is built taking into account that the following requirements are imposed on money (as well as financial) market instruments: (1) low risk of non-payment; (2) low risk of fluctuations in their value (or short payment period); (3) high marketability and (4) low transaction costs. At the same time, the process of withdrawing newly issued financial claims referred to by the EEDB as the "primary offering".
In this regard, we propose to divide the entire set of financial intermediation institutions into 4
groups: structures that transform income into savings and savings; structures that transform savings into investments and income; structures that transform future income into present expenses, and structures that transform one type of asset into another (Fig. 1.2.). Such a model approach to the problem introduces a certain clarity and logical sequence of presentation.
According to the sources of origin, methods of functioning and purposes of lending, the financial system, in our opinion, can be represented as follows:
Corporate securities market;
Derivatives market (including hedging);
Payment systems;
pension funds;
Mutual Funds and the Asset Management Industry;
Rice. 1.1. Financial intermediation market and its elements.
Government securities market;
Banking system;
Consumer lending (including credit cards, loans and pawnshops).
Some other institutions of the financial system should also be mentioned here. For example, it would be appropriate to mention the monetary system under government control (budget, guarantees, guarantees), etc. However, as noted above, in our work we will study only the institutions of financial intermediation and only professional entities. In this regard, for example, public finances are not the object of our study. Along with this, hedging institutions have recently begun to be considered an important institution of financial intermediation. All
the hedging system is based on efficient market theories, opportunity costs, efficient markets hypothesis (EMH), dual concepts of return and risk, price determination of close substitutes in the absence of arbitrage, etc. All this is becoming increasingly important. In our work, however, hedging institutions are not specifically considered. Their development is connected with the presence of a mature system of financial intermediation.
Rice. 1.2. The structure of financial intermediation institutions.
As for operations on currency exchange, sale and purchase of bonds, investment-dealer offices, etc., we also do not consider them. Currency transactions and, to some extent, transactions in bonds are institutions of external (formal in relation to the financial system) transformation of assets and, as it were, instruments of financial intermediation - they are no less interesting.
Thus, our attention will be fully devoted to such structural elements of financial intermediation as: banks and credit institutions, pension funds and Insurance companies, mutual and investment funds (banks), intermediate borrowers and stock markets.
The presence in the country of a specialized system of financial intermediaries allows, in our opinion, the transformation of assets, money, funds, which are carried out more efficiently and quickly. Indeed, in this case, the following work: (1) economies of scale, (2) savings on transactions, (3) increasing the speed of action and reducing the likelihood of errors for customers, (4) the ability to systematize events and predict the actions of transaction participants. J. Tobin's research showed that the velocity of money, calculated according to
GNP in the US economy is 6-7 times the growth per year. But if not only final, but also intermediate transactions with goods and services are considered, the number of turnovers per year can be 20 or 30, and in the case of deposits in banks, even 500. And here the main accelerator is the financial system.
The question arises: what determines the volume and scale of the modern financial system? According to R. Goldsmith, the modern financial system is a "superstructure" in the economic system. N. Hakansson believes that the essence of financial intermediation institutions is the financial market, which consists of such instruments as stocks, bonds, options and insurance contracts. As you can see, this author does not have a loan or a deposit as financial market instruments.
The representative of the Paris School of Economics T. Piketty, whose work aroused great interest at the beginning of 2014, believes that the impact of finance on the economic
growth is cyclical. So, in his opinion, for 1700-1820. return on capital (profit) was 5.1%, although the magnitude of global growth was then at the level of 0.5%. For 1820–1913 the figures have changed: respectively, 5 and 1.5%, for 1913-1950. - 5.2% and 1.9%, for 1950–2012. 5.3% and 3.8%. But, in his opinion, for 2013-2100. there will be a decrease in these indicators, respectively, to 4.3% and 1.5%. The author believes that in this way the times have come when the marginal efficiency of investments and financial intermediation will fall, as was the case in the late Middle Ages.
The development of the financial system is also influenced by the requirements of taxation: the higher the development of the financial institutions of the state, the more chances
rather low taxes.
R. Goldsmith's approach may have been relevant earlier - 28-30 years ago, when, for example, in the USA, the cost of operations in the stock market was 1/3 of GNP. Today (2014), the capitalization of the stock market of this country is 151.2% of GDP, and in the world in
on average - 94.6% (peak value - 114.7% in 2007). Many are already beginning to doubt - is it right to consider the financial sector as a "superstructure"? In 2011 The US produced only 9% of goods and services sold in the world, 22% world GDP($15.09 trillion out of $66.99) and 65% of all financial services. The losses of this country in world exports and in the production of world GDP were offset by a sharp increase in its share in financial services. The United States is the only country in the world for which a decrease in the share of world exports does not threaten to weaken the economic influence of this country. Due to the well-organized financial sphere in this country For 30 years now, dollars have been returning, “gone” due to a negative balance of payments. The opinion of T. Piketty is of serious scientific interest, but so far we are witnessing the unrestrained growth of the financial intermediation industry all over the world.
Now let's answer the following question: what determines the value of the total assets of financial institutions?
mediation? How to decide in order to more or less correctly diagnose: what level of financial services is sufficient for a given (discussed, considered) period of time? Starting with, to what extent could further growth in financial services harm the development of the real economy? Only for 2007-2013. the Fed's assets to US GDP rose from 5.5% to 21%, the Bank of England - from 6 to 26% and the Bank of Japan - from 21 to 45%. All this gives rise to the need to reassess the activities of financial intermediation institutions (for example, banks). After all, the growth of any industry means the expansion of resource consumption. Therefore, growth in one sector of the economy is always forgone growth in another sector. Hence, in our opinion, excessive swelling of the financial intermediation system always means, to one degree or another, a suspension or slowdown in growth in the real sector of the economy. For example, the construction of a residential building, of course, needs to be insured and, possibly, reinsured. But "reinsurance reinsurance" means from
an extra overflow of resources into the financial sector. Rather, it generates GDP growth, but is in no way connected with the needs of economic growth.
According to some authors, the growth limit of the financial intermediation system is the substitution of external assets, namely: the transfer of resources from one sector of the economy to another will continue until all spheres have equal opportunities for economic growth. One way or another, the behavior of financial intermediation institutions has always been unpredictable. A good illustration of what has been said can be a comparison of the fact and analysts' forecasts for the S&P composite index for 1985–2009. Only in 1998. analysts managed to predict
index face.
The process of replacing external assets (assets that are outside the operation of a particular business) or internal money (money “arrives” in the industry of direct use) occurs through depositary instruments. J. Tobin thinks so
same that financial intermediation reduces inventory, redistributes risk towards those savers who are more willing to do so, and finally reduces the need for money by pooling risks. But Tobin, being a representative of the Keynesian school, is looking for a certain deterministic explanation. Monetarists may not like this approach. In their opinion, one should not look for artificial differences between the various sectors of the economy (real and financial), each of them plays its irreplaceable role in expanding consumption. Some authors went further: in their opinion, instead of the system of national accounts, it is necessary to use the system of international accounts, in connection with which they propose the use of the indicator of the aggregated financial and economic result within individual countries, and in international comparison, they propose to take into account only the exported value added of financial companies.
So, where should we look for the boundaries of the development of the overall system of financial intermediation? Are these boundaries permanent or do they evolve?
In our opinion, there can be no single and permanent opinion on the issue of the boundaries of the financial intermediation system. Historically, for a certain period of time, the essence of the financial system has changed. For example, if a few decades ago banks (the main financial intermediaries at that time) created a certain value of financial services by accumulating savings, now the ratio of deposits to loans is constantly decreasing. The mobilization of "savings" also occurs through the institutions of bonds, the issuance of banknotes, the pledge of real estate (the so-called "wealth management"), the demonetization of foreign exchange reserves, the sterilization of the "surplus" of the balance of payments (sterilization of foreign exchange earnings from the sale of oil, gas, raw materials, transfers of labor migrants , excess of exports over imports). Thus, in general, the development of financial intermediation, the multiplicity of financial services (lending, on-lending, on-lending insurance, on-lending reinsurance, on-lending insurance, on-lending reinsurance, etc.) are normal phenomena. It is also normal that this generates a certain amount of GDP and the share of financial
intermediation in the economy is constantly growing. To achieve a certain economic growth, it is absolutely unimportant that at the same time there is a strong growth in financial services, the share of the real economy is decreasing. Such a financial economy is needed and must be reckoned with. However, there are and should be certain limits to the spread of financial services. First, it must be clearly defined whether these services lead to the current use of the resources of future generations? In particular, does not any development of debt and bond institutions cause the absolute and comparative poverty of future generations, does not narrow the field of their economic activity? And is this not the reason for the salaries of the heads of financial institutions, unprecedented in comparison with other sectors of the economy? Secondly, does the system of financial intermediation lead to an artificial transfer of resources from one industry to another, does it stop the growth of certain sectors of the economy? Thirdly, doesn't the flexibility of financial instruments in today's global world make it possible to minimize economic risks in this system and increase them in other sectors of the economy?
Table 1.1.
| Region | Capital | Duty | Assets |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Asia | 13.1 | 17.6 | 27 |
| USA | 15.1 | 31.6 | 14.2 |
| Europe | 10 | 32.8 | 46.4 |
Volume of financial markets, trln. dollars (2011).
Table 1.1 data. shows the impressive size of the financial markets today. It is characteristic that in Asia, which still lags behind America and Europe in terms of economic development, and in other developing regions, the indicators of the development of financial markets (57.7 trillion dollars) are no less (USA - 60.9 trillion dollars, Europe - 89.2). Thus, according to indicators, loans (issued banking sector) / GDP (Table 1.2.) some Asian countries or countries with economies in transition, despite many times lagging behind in terms of GDP per capita, in 2012 were at a level comparable to developed countries. For example, China is ahead of Germany and France in this indicator, and Ukraine, where the development of the economy (GDP per capita) is on average 11 57 The Economist. May 14th-20th, 2011. R. 4.
times lower than in developed countries and 3.5 times lower than the world average, according to the considered indicator is at the level of 61% compared with the indicators of Germany. In Armenia, the dynamics of the financial system is also significantly ahead of the growth of other sectors of the economy. However, in 2013 the credits/GDP ratio in Armenia was 44.8%: its growth rates slowed down. With regard to Russia, as E. D. Sorokin rightly notes in his analyzes, the share of the economy in the structure of the world economy is insignificant (3.2%). But in the capital and investment markets, this share is even smaller: 2.8% and 1.5%, respectively 58 .
Table 1.2.
Ratio of domestic lending to GDP, 2012, %. 59
| Country | Credits / GDP |
| USA | 228,6 |
| Japan | 346,1 |
| EU | 156,5 60 |
| Germany | 123,6 |
| France | 136,4 |
58 Sorokin D.E. Strategic guidelines for anti-crisis policy (http://shabrov.info/elbrus/sorok.pdf). C. 53.
59 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS
60 Average for 2011
| Great Britain | 210,1 |
| Poland | 63,8 |
| China | 155,1 |
| Russia | 42,5 |
| Ukraine | 74,1 |
| Turkey | 71,9 |
| Armenia | 44,4 |
| Georgia | 35,0 |
| Azerbaijan | 25,3 |
| World average | 164,9 |
1870–1960s this indicator decreased by 8-10 times. This means that in 1960 banks, in order to lend to the economy, needed 10 times less funds than in 1870. After 1960 the cost of banking services rises sharply, but their cost is growing even faster. At the very end of the 20th century, the cost of banking services was already 3 times higher than in the 60s of the 20th century. After the financial crisis of 2008–2009, when the Basel-III system was activated in order to ensure further stability, with a sharp increase in the capital adequacy requirements of banks and credit institutions,
the cost of loans increased by another 1.5–1.7 times and returned to the level late XIX- the beginning of the 20th century.
Rice. 1.3. The ratio of capital / assets in the banking systems of the USA and Great Britain for 1870-1990. 62
Consequently, the financial system has gone through a cycle of 120 years: it is less and less efficient and worthwhile in ensuring the growth of the world economy. Below, in view of the foregoing, we will try to outline a certain model that regulates the “fair” volumes and share of the financial system in the economy at this stage of development of the country's economy.
Economic behavior as decision making. Within the framework of economic theory, the behavior of economic agents - actions aimed at the rational use of limited resources - is considered as a sequence of decision-making acts. An economic agent, based on its objective function - a utility function for a consumer, a profit function for an entrepreneur, etc. - and the available resource constraints, chooses such a distribution of resources between possible areas of their use that ensures the extreme value of its objective function.
Such an interpretation of economic behavior is based on a number of explicit and implicit premises (which are discussed in detail in the final chapter of the textbook), among which it is important to single out one here: the mentioned choice the option of using resources is conscious in nature, i.e., it involves knowledge agent as the goal of his actions, and the possibilities of using resources. Such knowledge can be both reliable, deterministic, and include knowledge of only some probabilities, but in any case without information about the purpose of the action and resource constraints, the choice of the variant of the action (use of resources) is impossible.
The information necessary for making a decision can either already be in the memory of an economic agent (individual) or be specially collected by him to select a course of action. In the first case, the decision can be made immediately, in the second case, a certain period of time, necessary to obtain (collect, purchase, etc.) the necessary data. In addition, obtaining the necessary information (in addition to what is already in the memory of the individual) inevitably requires the expenditure of resources, i.e., the incurring of certain costs by the agent.
Restrictions in decision making. This means that the constraints that arise within the framework of the decision-making task that mediates economic action include not only "standard" constraints on the available material, labor, natural, etc. resources. They also include restrictions on the available information as well as time limit- by the amount of that period of time during which it is necessary to optimally (from the point of view of a particular objective function) allocate resources.
If the time for collecting the necessary information in the context of the existence of other restrictions (for example, on funds for its acquisition) exceeds the maximum allowable, the individual is forced to make a decision with incomplete information obviously losing in efficiency use of the resources available to him.
Let us suppose that the government announced a competition for the contractor of a very lucrative contract, setting a limited time for submission of proposals, and announcing that the winner is determined not only by the criterion of price, but also by the criterion of the quality of the project for the execution of the contract. Under such conditions, a firm that is unable to due date develop a detailed contract execution plan, may be a loser, despite adequate ability to perform the contract on the merits.
Obviously, in this example, the time limit determines the increased costs of other resources for its implementation. If a company, for example, did not strive to develop a business plan only with its own (limited) resources, but hired third-party specialists to develop it (naturally, incurring high costs), it would enter the competition with better documentation and could become its winner. In other words, this example demonstrates some "interchangeability" of time and resource constraints.
Consider, however, another example: suppose that a worker is given the task of turning a piece on a lathe. Obviously, this task involves the performance of a whole series of separate actions, each of which, in principle, can be carried out in many different ways: the workpiece can be carried quickly or slowly from its place of storage to the machine, in a straight line or in another line, the workpiece can be fastened by tightening nuts with greater or lesser force, you can cut with different cutters, you can also choose the cutting speed in a fairly wide range, etc. If our worker decided to optimize all his actions, explicitly setting and solving the corresponding resource allocation problems, it is easy to guess that, having received a task last year, he would still solve such problems this year. The fact is that, say, only the optimization of cutting modes requires setting up hundreds of experiments to obtain the necessary data, and formulating, for example, a criterion for optimizing the trajectory of an individual's movement in general is a task that is not clear how to solve. This example also highlights the importance of this type of constraint, such as limited calculative abilities of people, the impossibility of carrying out long-term and large-scale calculations by them without appropriate tools.
Let's take another example. Let a group of citizens wishing to jointly engage in business in Russia seek to register as legal entity. She can prepare some set of documents which, as it seems to her is quite sufficient for this, having spent your efforts, time and money on it, and come with it to the registration authorities. If this set does not comply with the requirements of the law, these bodies will naturally not register such a legal entity. Our group of citizens can repeat their unsuccessful attempts for an indefinite period, using, in essence, the method of trial and error, but not succeed. After all, the
above limited calculative and predictive abilities will not allow them to guess which documents and in what form must be submitted to the registration authorities in order to obtain the desired status.
The above provisions, examples and reasoning clearly show that real economic agents - business entities - make decisions not only on the basis of incomplete, limited information about resources and how to use them, but are also limited in processing capabilities and processing this information to select the best course of action. Thus, real economic agents, according to the terminology proposed by Herbert Simon, are boundedly rational subjects.
Bounded rationality is a characteristic of economic agents that solve the problem of choice in conditions of incomplete information and limited opportunities for its processing.
Meanwhile, of course, no normal person in the situations outlined above with the processing of a part on a lathe or the preparation of documents for registering an enterprise sets and solves the problem of consistently optimizing each of his actions, or predicting a set of document requirements. Instead, people use samples(templates, models) behavior.
So, in relation to the example of making a technological decision, instead of calculating the optimal trajectory and speed of movement from the warehouse of blanks to the machine, the worker goes as used to walk: habit is typical and common sample behavior. Instead of experimentally discovering the best cutting conditions for a material with which he has not yet worked (if there is already experience in working, then habit is in effect), the worker will take advantage of reference book, in which the optimal modes of processing of various materials are recorded.
For the example of preparing documents for registering an enterprise, instead of "experimental" identifying the requirements for this set, people use legal documents, for example, the text of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (Part 1, Chapter 4) and other regulations.
It is easy to see that such an entry in a directory or a provision of a normative act (and also a habit, if one tries to reconstruct it logically) is finished model rational (optimal) action:
if the current situation is S, proceed as A(S).(1.1)
This implies that the method A(S) is such that the resulting result is the best possible from the point of view of the decision criteria typical for situation S.
Regardless of whether there is a ready-made pattern of behavior directly in the individual's memory (it was developed on the basis of one's own experience, a series of trials and errors, or received in the learning process, it also does not matter), or is found in external sources of information, its application occurs according to quite standard scheme:
situation identification;
selection of a template of the form (1.1), including the identified situation;
Action in a manner that matches the pattern.
If we compare the above stages with the stages of the decision-making process, there is an obvious saving effort(and therefore saving resources and time) when determining which action to take. Adding to this the fact that the listed actions are often performed unconsciously, in an "automatic mode", it is easy to come to the conclusion that
Patterns and patterns of behavior are means of saving resources within the framework of the tasks of determining best ways actions.
The highlighted characterization of the behavior models used by economic agents in the course of rationalizing the use of their limited resources to determine how to use them implicitly assumes that individuals either use internal patterns (habits) or choose some external patterns to follow (to follow). them). At the same time, following patterns and patterns, in full accordance with the provisions of economic theory, they behave rationally, maximize their utility (value, value, etc.).
However, direct observation shows that there are other patterns and patterns of behavior in life, following which hinders individual to maximize his utility function.
Let us consider one more example, which this time is not conditional, but quite specific. In Western universities, when conducting written exams, there are often no teachers or other faculty members in the classrooms. It would seem (from the point of view of a typical domestic student) that ideal conditions have been created for cheating, using cheat sheets, etc. However, none of the examinees behave in this way. The explanation (more precisely, its first, superficial layer) is very simple: if one of those taking the exam decides to do this, his colleagues will immediately inform the teacher about it (“they will inform” or “trick”, as they say), and the dishonest student will receive a well-deserved zero score (if not expelled at all).
On the part of students who write honestly in their papers, such behavior (“whistleblowing”) will be simply following a habit that, like many other habits, has a completely rational basis. Indeed, depending on the results of the exams, students receive an appropriate rating, and depending on the rating, the demand for graduates from employers is formed. Consequently, a student who uses a cheat sheet or cheats on an exam gains an unreasonable competitive advantage in hiring and determining his salary. By reporting his misbehavior, other students eliminate, thereby, an unscrupulous competitor, which is a completely rational action.
At the same time, for those of the examinees who have insufficient knowledge to pass the exam successfully, the mentioned habit of others is clearly hinders take action that can bring to him benefit. At the same time, being confident that the deception will be revealed (which threatens with a significant loss of usefulness), such a student, despite the skill, will still refrain from trying to get an inadequately high score.
In this situation, it can be said that he follows the pattern or pattern of behavior - however against your will, rationally comparing the benefits and costs of deviation from this model, actually imposed on him by others.
Models or patterns of behavior that speak of how one should behave in a given situation are commonly called rules or norms.
Summarizing the above, we can conclude that in real life, in addition to the resource, time and information restrictions known from economic theory on the choice of areas of action and ways of using resources, there are other types of restrictions associated with the existence of norms or rules1.
Norm (rule). The study of norms, primarily social ones, i.e., those that operate in society and its individual groups, and are not individual habits, has traditionally been (and is) engaged in by philosophers, sociologists, and social psychologists. In neoclassical economic theory, which is the core of all modern economic science, this category is absent. The explanation for this, in the light of the above information explanation the emergence of rules is quite transparent: if the information about the decision-making situation is complete, free and instant, there is no need for the emergence of rules and, moreover, for their introduction into economic theory.
Since, nevertheless, there are rules in reality, and they significantly affect the behavior of economic agents, their costs and benefits, this phenomenon deserves a fairly detailed and close study.
The most general category within the discussed range of concepts is the concept social norm.“Social norms are the most important means of social regulation of behavior. With their help, society as a whole and various social groups that develop these norms present their members with the requirements that their behavior must satisfy, direct, regulate, control and evaluate this behavior. In the most general sense of the word, normative regulation means that an individual or a group as a whole is prescribed, "given" a certain - proper - type of behavior, its form, one or another way of achieving a goal, realizing intentions, etc., "given" a proper form and the nature of relations and interactions of people in society, and the real behavior of people and the relations of members of society and various social groups are programmed and evaluated in accordance with these prescribed, “given” standards - norms, ”wrote the Russian philosopher M.I. Bobneva2.
The presence in society of norms as patterns of behavior, deviation from which gives rise to the punishment of the violator by other members of society, limits, as noted, the choice for the individual, preventing the implementation
1 In principle, the concept of norm and the concept of rule can be distinguished, but such a distinction is purely "tasteful" in nature, so we will not do this here, assuming that the respective terms are synonyms. The use of one or the other of them will be further regulated only by the stylistic Social norms and regulation of behavior, M.: Nauka, p. Z.
tions of his striving for rationality. “Rational action is result-oriented. Rationality says, "If you want to achieve goal Y, take action X." On the contrary, social norms, as I understand them, not result oriented. The simplest social norms have the formula "Take action X" or "Don't take action X". More complex norms say: "If you take action Y, then take action X," or: "If others take action Y, then take action X." Even more complex norms might say, "Take action X because it would be nice if you did." Rationality is inherently conditional and future-oriented. Social norms are either unconditional or, if conditional, they are not future-oriented. To be social, norms should be shared by other people and to some extent be based on their approval or disapproval of this or that type of behavior,” Yu. Elster noted3.
It should be noted that the "formulas" of social norms given by J. Elster are their abbreviated expressions that do not reflect logical structure appropriate type of expression. The latter includes:
description of the conditions (situations) in which the individual is obliged to follow the model;
a description of the pattern of action;
a description of the sanctions (punishments that will be applied to an individual who behaves not in accordance with the model, and / or rewards that the individual who follows the model will receive when he finds himself in an appropriate situation) and their subjects; the subjects of sanctions are also called guarantors norms.
It is important to emphasize here that the term “description”, used to characterize the structure of any norm, is understood quite broadly: it can be any sign construction, from spoken or thought words to records on paper, stone or magnetic media. In other words, the above structure is characteristic of any norm - both existing (as a sign model of proper behavior) only in the minds of a group of people or in the form of a record of a researcher of their behavior, and recorded in the form of a certain official text and sanctioned by the state authorities or the leadership of any organization.
IN logical research usually a more complex characteristic of the norms is considered. When analyzing them, they distinguish: content, application conditions, subject And character norms. “The content of a norm is an action that can, must or must not be performed; application conditions - this is the situation specified in the norm, upon the occurrence of which it is necessary or permissible to implement the action provided for by this norm; the subject is the person or group of persons to whom the norm is addressed. The nature of the norm is determined by whether it obliges, allows or prohibits the performance of some action, ”wrote the Russian logician A.A. Ivin4.
Such a characterization of norms does not contradict their complete logical structure introduced above. The fact is that from the point of view of economic analysis,
3Elster Y. (1993), Social norms and economic theory // THESIS, vol. 1, no. 3, p.73.
4Ivin A.A. (1973) The logic of the rules M.: Publishing house of Moscow State University, p.23.
the character of the norm - binding, prohibiting or allowing - is not its essential feature. After all, any norm, regardless of its nature, in the implementation of economic action acts as a certain selection limiter. Even a norm that clearly provides new opportunities does so only for a relatively limited circle of the latter, adding to the set of acceptable alternatives, but by no means making it universal, comprehensive.
The restrictive nature of any norm is very important for understanding many forms of economic behavior observed in practice. If the agent sees that his action A is capable of bringing him a significant benefit, but is prohibited by some norm N, he may well have incentive to break this norm. How is the decision usually made in this case? If the expected benefit from the breach, B, exceeds expected costs of violation, C, then it turns out to be rational break N. The expected costs of a breach depend on whether the perpetrator is identified and punished, so behaviors such as deceit, misinformation, cunning, etc., will help reduce the likelihood of punishment.
Behavior aimed at pursuing one's own interest and not limited by moral considerations, i.e., associated with the use of deceit, cunning and cunning, is usually called opportunistic behavior in economic theory.
However, the violation of this or that rule, being individually beneficial, can lead to negative externalities, i.e. impose additional costs on other individuals, which in total may exceed the individual benefit of the violator (for example, the costs associated with the increase in uncertainty that is generated by deviations individuals from the expected ways of acting in a “normalized” situation). Therefore, from the point of view of maximizing value, such violations are undesirable. Sanctions act as a means of preventing them - certain punishments for violation of the norm, i.e. actions aimed at reducing the usefulness for their object, for example, by imposing some additional costs on it. The subject of sanctions is the guarantor of the norm - an individual who identifies a violation and applies sanctions to the violator.
Quite often, breaking a rule can, however, lead to value maximization. Suppose a merchant has agreed with a wholesaler to buy from him a batch of 100 teapots at a price of 200 rubles. This agreement led to the emergence of some temporary rule of their mutual behavior. Having hired a truck for 1000 rubles, he arrives at the wholesaler, and finds that the teapots have already been sold to that other merchant, for example, at a price of 220 rubles. a piece. This violation of the agreement (a temporary rule formed by two private individuals) created an increase in value of 2,000 rubles, but imposed a cost of 1,000 rubles on the first merchant. The total balance still remains positive, but there are negative externalities - direct losses of one of the subjects of the rule. These losses will obviously be eliminated if the wholesaler reimburses the defrauded buyer for his costs, but does the wholesaler have an incentive to do so? Such incentives will arise if the original rule is secure, i.e., if there is some guarantor that will force the wholesaler to either fulfill the first agreement (which is not economically rational) or compensate the costs of the first merchant. In the latter case, violation of the rule will lead to an increase in cost, and there will be no negative external effects, i.e., there will be a Pareto improvement in the initial situation.
Thus, in view of the above,
The norm includes: situation B (conditions for applying the norm), individual I (addressee of the norm), prescribed action A (the content of the norm), sanctions S for failure to comply with order A, as well as the entity applying these sanctions to the violator, or norm guarantor G.
It is obvious that this complete the structure (or formula) of a norm may often not exist in reality. In other words, she is only logical reconstruction, model a complex set of behavioral acts, subconscious ideas, images, feelings, etc.
Institute as a unit of analysis. The norm formula given above describes a wide variety of different rules, from individual habits that often change under the influence of circumstances to centuries-old traditions, from rules of conduct in a school signed by its headmaster, to constitutions of states adopted by referenda by the majority of the population of the country.
Within the framework of this variety of rules, it is important to distinguish, at this stage of the analysis, two large classes that differ in the mechanisms for forcing them to be executed. In general enforcement mechanism we will refer to the set consisting of its guarantor (or guarantors) and the rules of its action governing the application of sanctions to identified violators of the "basic" rule. On this basis, the set of various rules is divided into:
matches its addressee I; such rules have been described above as habits; they can also be called stereotypes of behavior or mental models of behavior; for habits interior a mechanism for forcing them to comply, since the addressee of the rule imposes sanctions for their violation;
Rules in which the guarantor of the norm G notmatches its addressee I; such rules are characterized external a mechanism for forcing them to comply, since sanctions for violating such rules are imposed on the violator from the outside, by other people.
Accordingly, the concept of institution can be given the following definition:
An institution is a set consisting of a rule and an external mechanism for forcing individuals to comply with this rule.
This definition differs from other definitions widely used in the economic literature. For example, Nobel Prize winner in economics Douglas North gives the following definitions:
“institutions are the “rules of the game” in society, or, more formally, the man-made restrictive framework that organizes relationships between people”5, these are “rules, mechanisms that ensure their implementation, and norms of behavior that structure repetitive
5 North D. (1997), M.: Nachala, p.17.
interactions between people”6, “formal rules, informal restrictions and ways of ensuring the effectiveness of restrictions”, or “humanly invented restrictions that structure human interactions. They are formal restrictions (rules, laws, constitutions), informal restrictions (social norms, conventions and codes of conduct adopted for oneself) and mechanisms for forcing their implementation. Together, they determine the structure of incentives in societies and their economies.
Summarizing these definitions, A.E. Shastitko interprets the institution as
“a number of rules that perform the function of restricting the behavior of economic agents and streamline the interaction between them, as well as the corresponding mechanisms for monitoring compliance with these rules”9.
In practice, any of these definitions can be used, if we clearly remember the fact that the mechanism for enforcing the "basic" rule within the framework of the institution is an external mechanism, specially created by people for this purpose.
Attention to the definition of the concept of an institution is important because institutions represent the basic unit of analysis institutional economic theory, and their totality is subject this theory. Obviously, a clear definition of the subject of research is necessary for the systematic presentation of any scientific theory. At the same time, separating the content of one concept from those similar to it is also important from a purely practical point of view, since it guarantees against erroneous transfer of conclusions made in relation to one objects and situations to other, different objects and situations.
To clarify the importance of this role of a rigorous definition of the concept of institution, let us pay attention to the following points. The behavior of economic agents following a particular rule demonstrates a certain regularity, i.e. is repetitive. However, it is not only existing institutions that lead to repetitive behavior of individuals, but also other mechanisms having a natural origin, that is, not at all not created by humans.
The existence of an institution suggests that the actions of people depend from each other and affect each other, that they cause consequences (externalities, or in other words, external effects) that are taken into account by other people and by the acting economic agent himself. Natural mechanisms, as a result of their objective existence, lead to similar results, but repetitive actions turn out to be the consequences of decisions made by individual economic agents. independently of each other and without taking into account the possible sanctions that the guarantor of one or another rule may apply to them.
6North D. (1993a), Institutions and Economic Growth: A Historical Introduction// THESIS, v. 1, issue 2, p.73.
7North D. (19936), Institutions, Ideology and Economic Efficiency// From plan to market. The future of the post-communist republics, L.I. Piyasheva, J. A. Dorn (eds.), M .: Catallaxy, p. 307.
8North, Douglass C. (1996), Epilogue: Economic Performance Through Time, in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Lee J. Alston, Thrrainn Eggertsson, and Douglass C North (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 344.
9Shastitko A.E. (2002) M.: TEIS, p. 5 54.
Let's look at a few hypothetical examples. People living on the upper floors of high buildings, wanting to go outside, use elevators (if they break down, they go down the stairs), thereby demonstrating the unconditional repetition of their behavior. None of them (with the exception of suicides) jump out the windows: a person understands that such an act of his will be “punished” by the law of gravity. Is it possible to speak of the noted regularity as an institution? No, because the mechanism of "punishment" of deviation from the general order of actions has nothing to do with the creation of it by people.
In a competitive market, prices for homogeneous products, showing a certain dispersion, nevertheless, have the same level. The seller who sets twice the price in such a market will definitely be "punished" by ruin. Is it possible to speak here about the existence of the institution of establishing an equilibrium price? No, since buyers who avoid buying goods at an inflated price do not at all set themselves the goal of punishing the relevant merchant, they simply make (independently of each other) rational decisions, the unplanned result of which is the “punishment” of such a seller.
People tend to eat regularly: a person who deviates from this regularity risks sacrificing his health. Is regular nutrition an institution? The reader who reads the above examples will confidently answer “no”, but he will be only partially right: there are situations in life in which regular eating is an institution! For example, the regularity of feeding children in the family is supported by various punishments for those who evade from the elders; the regularity of meals for soldiers in the army is supported by the formal norms of the charters; the regularity of feeding patients in hospitals is ensured by sanctions from the staff. Thus, the same observed behavior can be both the result of rational choice (say, a creative worker in the process of creating a work of art forces himself to break away from work in order to eat) or habit (the bulk of people who eat regularly), and the result of action social institution.
The importance of distinguishing patterns of behavior between those determined by institutions and determined by other causes is associated with a correct understanding of values of institutions in the economy and other spheres of society, with the solution of practical problems of improving the welfare and efficiency of resource use. If analysis shows that some mass actions are irrational, the source of this can (and should) be sought both in the realm of objective causes and in the realm of institutions that regulate behavior.
The value of institutions. From observations of economic life it is easy to make sure that the laws adopted by the state power, which determine certain rules for the implementation of various business transactions, - the conclusion of contracts, accounting, advertising campaigns, etc. - most directly affect both the structure and levels of costs, and the efficiency and results of economic activities of enterprises.
Yes, tax credits venture capital stimulate risky investments in the innovation process - the most important resource for economic growth in the modern economy. The ban on the use of aircraft engines with excessive noise levels in the countries of the European Community can lead to tangible negative consequences for the domestic aircraft industry and tourism. Various options for resolving conflicts between employers and employees, in particular those related to the participation or non-participation of trade unions in them, can significantly change the situation on the labor market. The rules of tariff and non-tariff regulation of exports and imports, along with the ratio of prices in the domestic and world markets, directly affect the incentives for the implementation of relevant operations, etc.
The rules mentioned (and others similar to them) are, as it is easy to see, forms of implementation state regulation economy, i.e., conscious actions of the state and its individual bodies aimed at changing the behavior of economic agents. Obviously, some special
no further proof of the influence of the institutions formed and conditioned by such actions is needed. Another question is more relevant more often: why the introduced rules do not affect on the real behavior of economic agents and the economy as a whole, or affect completely not this way, as intended by their authors?
From an economic theory point of view, established rules economic activities are nothing more than a special type of restrictions on the possibility of using resources, or resource restrictions, and the latter, of course, affect economic results.
However, the same direct observations of economic processes do not give a clear answer to another question: do the rules (both introduced through laws and formed in the past in some other way) affect the economy? not being forms of state regulation, ways of conducting economic policy? In other words, do all institutions matter for the functioning and development of the economy, or only those that directly prescribe or limit the actions of agents in the distribution and use of resources?
The question of the significance of institutions, their impact on economic growth and efficiency of the economy, is repeatedly discussed in the classic works of researchers who laid the foundations of a new institutional economic theory.
Thus, in the already mentioned book by D. North "Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy" there are many historical examples that clearly demonstrate the diverse nature and scale of such an impact.
One of the most striking examples of this kind is the explanation by D. North of the sharp divergence in the economic power of England and Spain that occurred in modern times, after a long state of approximate equality of their forces in the 16th-17th centuries. In his opinion, the reason for the growth of the economy of England and the stagnation of the economy of Spain were not resources as such (Spain received more of them from the American colonies than England), but the nature of the relationship between the royal power and the economically active nobility. In England, the power of the crown in the field of seizure of income and other property was significantly limited by the Parliament, which represented the nobility. The latter, thus having reliable protection of its property from power encroachments, could make long-term and profitable investments, the results of which were expressed in impressive economic growth. In Spain, the power of the crown was purely formally limited by the Cortes, so that the expropriation of property from potentially economically active subjects was quite possible. Accordingly, it was very risky to make significant and long-term capital investments, and the resources received from the colonies were used for consumption, and not for accumulation. As a long-term consequence of the basic political and economic (constitutional) rules adopted in these countries, Great Britain became a world power, and Spain was transformed into a second-rate European
Institutions that were by no means ways of state regulation of the economy, in this example, proved to be powerful in Spain. restrictions on business activity, which actually suppressed economic initiative. In modern Russian history, the period 1917-1991. in this respect can be characterized as decades during which the economic initiative
The issue of the influence of the level of property protection on economic decisions and economic development will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3 of the textbook.
was suppressed not only indirectly, but also formally legally: in the Criminal Code of the USSR, private entrepreneurial activity was interpreted as criminal offense. At the same time, the political institutions of Great Britain acted as powerful accelerators of economic growth.
The following examples show economic importance at first glance, non-economic institutions, have one feature: they are all in fact only possible interpretations observable social processes.
In this regard, the evidence obtained in the studies of the second half of the 1990s, which used the technique of econometric analysis to conduct cross-country comparisons and identify the impact of various factors on economic growth, is of particular importance for convincing evidence of the economic significance of various groups of institutions. To date, about a dozen such large-scale and expensive projects have been completed, which, differing in details, show a statistically significant positive relationship between the economic growth indicators of countries and the “quality” of institutions functioning in them: the higher the indicators of the latter, the higher and more stable, in general, demonstrated indicators of economic growth.
Here is a brief summary of the results of one such study conducted by the staff of the World Bank11. It compared data for 84 countries for the period 1982-1994, characterizing, on the one hand, their economic growth, and, on the other hand, the quality of the economic policy pursued and the degree of protection of property rights and contracts. The growth rate of real GDP per capita was used as a measure of economic growth. The quality of economic policy was assessed by three indicators: inflation rate, tax collection and openness to foreign trade. The degree of protection of property rights and contracts as an expression of the quality of the institutional environment in the country was measured by the indicator developed in the International Guidelines for Country Risk Assessment. This indicator includes numerous assessments of the security of property rights and contracts, grouped into five groups: the rule of law, the risk of expropriation of property, the refusal to fulfill contracts by the government, the level of corruption in power structures, and the quality of the bureaucracy in the country.
At the first stage of the study, F. Kiefer and M. Shirley built a typology of countries according to the values of these qualitative indicators, highlighting two gradations for each of them - a high level and a low level, then determining for each of the formed four groups of countries the average values of the economic growth indicator . It turned out that in countries with a high quality of economic policy and a high quality of institutions, economic growth rates amounted to about 2.4%; in countries with a low quality of economic policy and a high quality of institutions - 1.8%; in countries with high quality policies and low quality institutions - 0.9%; in countries with low quality of both factors -0.4%. In other words, countries with inadequate economic policies but a high-quality institutional environment grew on average twice as fast as countries with an inverse combination of quality levels of the corresponding factors.
At the second stage of this study, an econometric equation was constructed that links the growth rate of real per capita income with indicators characterizing political and institutional indicators, investment activity, and the level of quality of the labor force in the country. This more subtle analysis showed that the qualitative conclusions obtained on the basis of a typological comparison are fully confirmed quantitatively: the degree of influence of an institutional indicator on the growth rate of real souls
11 Keefer, Philip and Shirley, Mary M. (1998), From the Ivory Tower to the Corridors of Power: Making Institutions Matter for Development Policy, World Bank (mimeo).
output income was almost twice as high as the degree of influence of political indicators.
So, based on theoretical provisions and empirical evidence, we can conclude:
"Institutions Matter"
Douglas North
Coordinating and distributive functions of institutions. Through what mechanisms do institutions acquire and realize their economic significance? To answer this question, it is necessary to characterize the functions that they perform in economic life, in the activities of economic agents.
First of all, as noted earlier, institutions limit access to resources and the variety of options for their use, i.e., they perform the function restrictions in the tasks of making economic decisions.
limiting possible ways actions and lines of conduct, or even by prescribing only one permissible course of action, institutions also coordinate the behavior of economic agents who find themselves in a situation described by the conditions for applying the relevant norm.
Indeed, the description of the content of an institution operating in a certain situation gives each of the economic agents in it, knowledge about how his counterparty should (and most likely will) behave. Based on it, agents can and most likely will form their own line of behavior, taking into account the expected actions of the other side, which means emergence of coordination in their actions.
We emphasize that the condition for such coordination is awareness of agents about the content of the institute, regulating behavior in a given situation. If one of the subjects knows how to behave under certain circumstances, and the other does not, coordination may be disrupted, as a result of which the participants in the interaction may incur unproductive costs. A typical example is the rules of the road: a driver who does not know them, when crossing his path with the main road, may try to pass without letting cross-traffic pass, which, in turn, can lead to a collision of cars.
The performance by institutions of the function of coordinating the actions of economic agents generates and causes the emergence coordination effect. Its essence is to provide savings for economic agents at the cost of studying and predicting behavior other economic agents that they encounter in different situations.
Indeed, if the rules are strictly observed, there is no need to make special efforts to predict how the partners will behave: the range of their possible actions is directly outlined by the current institution.
Thereby,
the coordinating effect of institutions is realized through reducing the level of uncertainty the environment in which economic agents operate
Reducing the level of uncertainty of the external environment, ensured by the existence of institutions, allows you to plan and implement long term investment to create more value. In addition, the money saved on research and prediction of the behavior of counterparties can also be used for productive purposes, enhancing the coordination effect. On the contrary, in an uncertain environment, in the absence of existing institutions, economic agents not only face low expected benefits from the planned investments (which, obviously, may lead to their refusal to implement them), but are also forced to spend funds on various precautionary measures in the implementation of economic measures, for example - for the insurance of transactions or their individual components. Thus, the coordination effect is one of the mechanisms through which institutions have an impact on the efficiency of the economy.
It should be noted here that the coordinating effect of institutions arises and manifests itself as a factor positively affecting the economy only if the institutions agreed among themselves according to the prescribed directions of actions of economic agents. If different rules, coinciding in terms of their application, determine different types of behavior, the uncertainty of the external environment for economic agents increases if there is no “meta-rule” in the totality of institutions that regulates the actions of conflicting rules.
For example, in systems of national laws, such a meta-rule is usually present in the form of a provision that, in the event of a conflict between national and international law, the rules of international law apply; in the event that a state administration body adopts two conflicting by-laws, it is generally accepted that the one adopted later should be applied, etc.
Therefore, the coordination effect inherent in any individual institution, when considering the totality of the latter, may not be observed if the institutions are not coordinated with each other (see also the section of this chapter “Variants of the correlation of formal and informal rules”).
Any institution, by limiting the set of possible courses of action, therefore influences resource allocation economic agents, performing a distributive function. It is important to emphasize that the distribution of resources, benefits and costs is affected not only by those rules, the content of which is directly the transfer of benefits from one agent to another (for example, tax law or rules for determining customs fees), but also those that do not directly address these issues.
For example, the introduction of zoning of urban lands, according to which in certain areas only housing construction and the construction of trade and service enterprises are allowed, while in others it is possible industrial engineering, depending on the capacity of the respective territories, can significantly affect the direction of investment activity. Establishing complex rules for issuing licenses to engage in certain types of entrepreneurial activity can significantly reduce the influx of start-up entrepreneurs into it, reduce the level of competition in the relevant market, increase prices for the good traded on it, and ultimately redistribute buyers' funds.
In addition to a variety of specific distributional consequences, any institution is also characterized by some general, “typical” distributional effect: by limiting the set of possible courses of action, it either directly switches resources to their permitted subset, or at least increases the costs of implementing prohibited methods of action, by including them in the composition of the expected damage from the application of punishment (sanctions) to the violator of the rule.
The scale of the distributive consequences of the institution's actions can vary within very wide limits, and the connection between these scales and the content of the norm, with its "proximity" to the processes of the functioning of the economy, is far from direct.
For example, discussed in the winter of 2001-2002. changes in the rules of the Russian language, could, if adopted, cause serious economic damage, causing significant additional costs for almost all economic agents, diverting their resources to studying new rules, reprinting codes of laws, official forms, texts of instructions, etc., dooming secondary school graduates to relearning the rules they have learned, diverting their attention from other subjects, requiring the reprinting of all textbooks, editions of classics of literature, etc. on the other hand, it switched it into the sphere of managerial activity, significantly changing the entire structure of preferences in the labor market. Faced with the long-term consequences of these redistributions, today Russian economy experiencing a distinct shortage of small businesses.
Thus, the impact of institutions on the distribution of resources, benefits and costs is the second mechanism that determines their economic significance.
Formal and informal rules. The description of any functioning institution with varying degrees of completeness is contained in the memory of individuals who follow the rules included in it: the addressees of the norm know how they should behave in the corresponding situation, the guarantor of the norm knows what violations of the norm are and how to respond to them . Of course, all this knowledge may be incomplete, and also differ from each other in some details.
In addition, the content of the institute can also have an external representation - in the form of a text in a particular language.
For example, an ethnologist studying the customs and behavior of a newly discovered tribe of Indians in the Amazon basin can describe the existing forms of interaction between members of the tribe and publish them in a scientific journal. Similarly, the rules governing the behavior of agents in the shadow sector of the economy can be described and published. E. De Soto's book "Another Path", which analyzes the functioning of the shadow sector of the Peruvian economy, is a classic example of such a description.
Along with this kind of description of the customs followed by various groups of people, the content of institutions is also presented in the form of other texts - laws, codes, sets of rules, instructions, etc.
What is the fundamental difference between these two groups of texts? Publications containing descriptions of customs are the result of initiatives
the work of researchers, they are of no use to anyone are not obligated. Publications containing the texts of laws and regulations are official publications on behalf of states, or registered, i.e. recognized by the state, private organizations (for example, the internal regulations of a university or a trading company), and they oblige all to whom they refer, to comply with the rules of conduct contained in them.
However, the knowledge of customs by members of the tribe or illegal entrepreneurs very strictly oblige both of them to behave in accordance with the norms prevailing in these groups: apostates are expected to have serious sanctions applied to them by other members of these groups - those who discover significant, with its point of view, deviation from the "correct" behavior. Since the behavior of the members of these groups is actually monitored by all their other members, it is clear that the probability of detecting a violation is high, which determines the rigidity of the implementation of this type of rules.
On the contrary, knowledge of officially adopted laws and instructions does not mean at all that the citizens of the state or employees of the organization will strictly comply with them. After all, the control of compliance with such norms is usually not carried out by all citizens or employees, but only by a part of them that specializes in performing the functions of a guarantor of the relevant rule - law enforcement officers or executives of an organization. Thus, the probability of detecting a violation may be lower than in the previous case.
The rules that exist in the memory of members of various social groups, in the role of the guarantor of which is any member of the group who noticed their violation are called informal rules
Rules that exist in the form of official texts or verbal agreements certified by a third party, in the role of guarantors of which individuals act, specialized on this function are called formal rules
These definitions differ from the more widely accepted definitions, which refer to formal rules as approved by the state or any organization recognized by the state. Accordingly, all other rules are called informal. This understanding of formal and informal goes back to sociology, in which the state is a special phenomenon that differs sharply from other social phenomena.
In the framework of the new institutional economic theory, the state is one of many organizations, which, of course, has significant differences from other organizations, but these differences are not fundamental. Therefore, in the proposed definitions of formal and informal rules, the distinguishing feature is the presence or absence of people's specialization in the implementation of the function of enforcement of the rules.
At the same time, the proposed definitions do not contradict the “sociological” understanding of formality, since the specialization in enforcement of rules follows logically from the fact that the relevant rules are established or recognized by the state.
Ways to enforce rules. Formal and informal institutions differ not only in these characteristics, but also in other features. Chief among them are the ways or mechanisms to enforce these types of rules.
Regardless of the type of rules, the general logic of any rule enforcement mechanism can be characterized as follows:
(A) The guarantor of the rule observes the behavior of its addressees and compares their actions with the behavior model defined by this rule;
(B) In the event of detecting a discernible deviation of the actual behavior of agent X from the model, the guarantor determines what sanction should be applied to X in order to make the latter comply with the corresponding rule;
(B) The Guarantor applies a sanction to the agent, ordering his current and future actions.
This simplest scheme of the rule enforcement mechanism can be refined and complicated in terms of describing stages A and B. Thus, at stage A, the guarantor can not only directly observe the behavior of agents, but also receive information from other subjects who accidentally noticed deviant actions X; at stage B, he may discover not the process of breaking the rule, but the consequences of such a violation; in this case, the guarantor faces an additional task - the search for the intruder and his identification.
Above, a classification of the mechanisms for enforcing rules for execution was given, dividing them into internal and external. The logic of the rule enforcement mechanism, highlighting its components, makes it possible to build theoretical typology possible specific mechanisms for such enforcement. Like any theoretical typology, it can be built on the basis of particular classifications of variants of each of the selected components of the mechanism under discussion. Let's take a closer look at these classifications.
Rule guarantor. This role can be played, as noted above, by (1) either any member of the group in which the institution operates, or (2) an individual (several individuals or an organization) specialized in performing the function of a guarantor, or (3) both at the same time.
The behavior model of the addressees of the rule. Such a model can be (1) formal, fixed in the form of an official text, the exact knowledge of which is both in the memory of the addressees and in the memory of the guarantor of the institution, or (2) informal, existing only in the memory of people, or (3) exist formally and at the same time in the form of people's knowledge of the real practice of implementing the rule, different from a formal order.
The last case, as observation shows, is the most typical, frequent case of the existence of formal institutions. The practice of their existence may differ from formal prescriptions for several reasons, ranging from the impossibility of foreseeing in the formal norm all the variety of real situations, and ending with the deliberately inaccurate and incomplete fulfillment of the norm by its addressees, which, however, is not punished by guarantors, for example, due to their bribery with side of the perpetrators. This practice of executing formal rules can be called their deformalization.
Comparison of actual behavior with model. It can be carried out by the guarantor of the rule both (1) based on its own discretion (its own understanding of what constitutes a punishable deviation from the norm), and (2) in accordance with a certain formal rule (a list of violations).
Choice of sanction. It, as in the previous classification, can be carried out (1) in accordance with the free decision of the guarantor, or (2) be prescribed by some formal rule that assigns its own specific sanction to each possible violation of the norm.
set of sanctions. This classification can be built in various ways, for example, by dividing sanctions into social and economic, formal and informal, one-time and long-term, etc. Obviously, in the aggregate, such separate classifications will determine a certain typology of sanctions. However, for the purposes of describing the mechanisms for forcing rules to be enforced
ing, a different, simpler way is more productive: the formation empirical classification of sanctions that directly generalizes the practice of their application:
public condemnation, expressed in disapproval of an act by a word or gesture, loss of respect or deterioration in the reputation of the sanctioned subject;
official condemnation, in the form of an oral or written comment made by the formal guarantor of the rule; such a censure, in particular, may contain the threat of a subsequent more serious sanction, which will be applied to the offender in the event of a repeated violation of the rule;
money penalty, imposed on the offender;
forceful termination of the initiated action;
coercion (or its threat) to repeat the committed action, but according to the rules - in cases where the violation committed is not irreversible;
restriction of the violator in some of his rights, for example, a ban, under the threat of a more severe punishment, from engaging in a certain type of activity;
deprivation of liberty(imprisonment);
the death penalty.
The listed types of sanctions can also, in some cases, be applied jointly, in the form of various integrated sanctions.
Implementation of the sanctions. The chosen sanction can either (1) be directly imposed at the site of the violation by the guarantor himself, or (2) be carried out by other entities or organizations, or (3) combine both of these methods (for example, a policeman separates or restrains the fighters by applying sanctions of type (4), and the court subsequently awards a monetary fine to the detainees, i.e., applies a sanction of the type (3)).
Options for the correlation of formal and informal rules. The above characteristics of formal and informal rules and ways of forcing individuals to comply with the rules allow us to discuss the issue of ratio options formal and informal rules. The importance of this discussion stems from the fact that informal rules are often understood as non-rigid, violations of which are quite possible and permissible, while the formal ones are interpreted as hard, strictly enforced, since their violation is necessarily associated with the punishment of violators.
Meanwhile, since enforcement of formal rules presupposes specialized activities of guarantors carried out by them on the basis of remuneration for their labor efforts, the success of this activity is largely determined by the incentives of guarantors for the conscientious performance of their official duties. If such incentives are small, the formal rules may actually be less rigid than the informal ones. Therefore, the question of the relationship between formal and informal rules operating in the same situations becomes important for a correct understanding of the observed facts.
We will consider this relation first in statics and then in dynamics. IN static two options are possible: (i) formal and informal norms correspond to each other; (II) formal and informal norms do not correspond (contradict) to each other.
Case (I) is ideal, in the sense that the behavior of the recipients of formal and informal rules is regulated by all possible guarantors acting in concert, so that the probability of inappropriate behavior in regulated situations can be assessed as minimal. We can say that the formal and informal rules in this case mutually support each other.
Case (P) seems to be more typical, since many formal rules introduced either by the state or by the leaders of various organizations are often aimed at realizing their narrow interests, while informal rules shared by various social groups meet the interests of their participants. Of course, the contradiction between such interests is by no means inevitable, but it is quite probable.
In appropriate situations, the actual choice by addressees of uncoordinated norms of one of them (and, consequently, the choice in favor of violating the other) is determined by balance of benefits and costs adherence to each of the compared norms. At the same time, along with the direct benefits and costs of each of the actions, such balances also include the expected costs of applying sanctions for violating the alternative rule.
Correlation between formal and informal rules in dynamics is more complex. Here are the following situations:
a formal rule is introduced on the base a positively proven informal rule; in other words, the last formalized, which makes it possible to supplement the existing mechanisms for forcing it to be executed also with formal mechanisms; an example of such a correlation can be medieval codes, in which the norms protected by the state, the norms of customary law, which were guided by the townspeople in resolving conflict situations, were recorded and acquired the force;
a formal rule is introduced for opposition established informal norms; if the latter are assessed negatively by the state, the creation of a mechanism for forcing behavior that differs from that implied by informal rules is one of the options for the state to act in this area; a typical example is the introduction of bans on duels, which were practiced among the nobility until the first half of the nineteenth century;
informal rules push out formal, if the latter generate unjustified costs for their subjects, without bringing tangible benefits either to the state or directly to the guarantors of such rules; in this case, the formal rule seems to “fall asleep”: without being formally canceled, it ceases to be an object of monitoring by the guarantors and, due to its harmfulness to the addressees, ceases to be executed by them; Numerous case studies can serve as examples judgments in the US states, adopted on separate conflict cases and subsequently forgotten, such as a ban on peeling vegetables after 11 pm;
12. emerging informal rules contribute to the implementation introduced formal rules; such situations arise when the latter are introduced in a form that does not clearly and fully characterize the actions of either the addressees or the guarantors of the rule; in this case, the practice of implementing the "spirit" of the introduced formal rule (if, of course, its implementation is generally beneficial for its addressees) develops and selects such informal behaviors that contribute to the achievement of the goal of the original formal rule - deformalization of rules; examples are the norms of relationships in organizations, which are actually developing “around” formal instructions aimed at achieving the goals more effectively.
In general, as can be seen from the analyzed situations, formal and informal rules can both contradict each other, compete with each other, and mutually complement and support each other.
Williamson's chemo. Discussion of the concept of an institution, its relationship with the concept of a norm (rule), as well as other general issues associated with the role of institutions in determining economic behavior, allows us to move on to characterizing the entire aggregates institutions within economic system generally. To solve this problem, it seems useful to take as a basis the three-level analysis scheme proposed by O. Williamson, in some way modifying its interpretation (see Fig. 1.1). This scheme visually represents the interaction of individuals (the first level) and institutions of different types: those that represent institutional agreements(second level), and those that are components institutional environment(third level).
Figure 1.1. Interactions between individuals and institutions
Institutional environment
Institutional agreements
In accordance with the terminology proposed by D. North and L. Davis,
Institutional agreements are agreements between economic units that determine the ways of cooperation and competition.
Examples of institutional agreements are, first of all, contracts - exchange rules voluntarily established by economic agents, rules for the functioning of markets, rules for interaction within hierarchical structures (organizations), as well as various hybrid forms of institutional agreements that combine signs of market and hierarchical interactions (they will be discussed in more detail in later sections of the tutorial).
Institutional environment - a set of fundamental social, political and legal rules that define the framework for establishing institutional agreements
The components of the institutional environment are norms and rules social life society, its functioning political sphere, basic legal norms - the Constitution, constitutional and other laws, etc. A more detailed description of the components of the institutional environment will be presented in subsequent sections of this chapter. In principle, it would be possible to include the components of the institutional environment directly in the above scheme, but this would significantly complicate the entire presentation, without bringing tangible benefits in terms of clarifying the content of interactions.
Consider the main connections between the blocks of the scheme, indicated in the above figure by numbers.
As a general remark to all the types of influences described below, it should be emphasized that all influences, influences, etc. in the economy, strictly speaking, are carried out, according to the principle of methodological individualism (see the final chapter for more details), only individuals. This means that when we talk, for example, about influence of institutional arrangements on each other(below, item 2), this expression has essentially metaphorical character and is used simply for brevity. Using strict language, one should speak here about the impact of individuals who have entered into one institutional agreement on other individuals when some other institutional agreement is formed between them. However, such an overcomplication of the presentation, in view of the remark made, would, of course, be superfluous.
1. The impact of individuals on institutional arrangements. Since institutional arrangements, by definition, are voluntary agreements preferences and interests of individuals play a decisive role in the emergence (creation) of certain institutional agreements(of course, within the limits determined by the institutional environment).
Depending on what behavioral premises the researcher accepts—that is, depending on how the researcher interprets the economic agent—the explanations for the observed institutional arrangements will also be different. For example, if we assume that individuals have the completeness of all the information necessary for making decisions, including the perfect prediction of future events, as well as the perfect ability to perform inference and perform optimization calculations, it becomes impossible to explain the existence of many types of contracts. It becomes incomprehensible why individuals spend time and resources on their preparation, if the aforementioned complete knowledge should initially give them an answer - it is worth implementing
to influence some long exchange or it is not necessary. If, however, we assume that knowledge is not complete, and computational capabilities are not perfect, the role of contracts becomes quite clear - such (temporarily established) rules bring certainty into the unknown future, streamline the future interactions of economic agents. The issues raised will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of the textbook.
Influence of institutional agreements on each other. The content of this type of relationship is quite diverse: the behavior of individual organizations affects the nature of a changing market (for example, building entry barriers can bring the market closer to a monopolistic one), comprehensive agreements predetermine the types of more private contracts, the rules for the actions of contract guarantors affect the choice of types of contracts concluded by economic agents, and the nature of the market (for example, its segmentation) - on the structure of the company, etc.
Influence of the institutional environment on institutional agreements. The content of this connection follows directly from the definitions of the institutional environment and institutional agreements: the rules that are part of the institutional environment determine the disparate costs of concluding various institutional agreements. If some type of them is prohibited by general rules, then the costs of individuals who decide, despite the prohibition, to conclude such an agreement anyway, increase (for example, the costs of hiding information are added); the expected benefits of such an agreement are also reduced, since the likelihood of success is reduced, etc.
Influence of institutional agreements on individual behavior. Although institutional agreements are entered into by economic agents voluntarily, unforeseen circumstances may change the decision-making situation in such a way that following, for example, a previously concluded contract, may turn out to be unprofitable for an individual. However, the termination of the contract by one party may cause losses to the other party, and in amounts exceeding the benefits of the first (for example, if the second party has already made non-switchable investments). Under these conditions, the existence of a mechanism for forcing a contract to be executed (for example, a judicial one) clearly affects the decision of the first party, thus preventing the occurrence of unjustified social losses.
Influence of institutional agreements on the institutional environment. The most typical way of such influence is closely related to the distributive effects of institutions: an institutional agreement that provides tangible benefits to its participants can form a so-called special interest group - a set of individuals interested in maintaining and increasing the benefits received. For this purpose, under certain circumstances, such a group is able to influence, for example, the legislative process in order to achieve the adoption of a law that consolidates the benefits obtained by formalizing the previous private agreement.
In economic theory, this mode of action refers to rent-oriented behavior, the analysis of which was paid much attention to by such well-known economists as J. Buchanan, G. Tulloch and R. Ackerman.
Influence of the institutional environment on individual behavior. Such an impact turns out to be fundamental rules both directly (for example, the Constitution of the Russian Federation is a direct action law, i.e. a citizen can directly go to court if he believes that someone violates his rights guaranteed by the Constitution), and through institutional agreements, also formed, as noted above, under the influence of the institutional environment.
The influence of the individual on the institutional environment. Individuals influence the institutional environment in two main ways: firstly, through participation in the elections of the legislative bodies of the state that adopt laws, and secondly, through the conclusion of institutional agreements, the content of which, as noted above, is also capable of influencing the institutional environment.
Not all of the considered interactions are currently studied in economic theory to the same extent. However, the described scheme is useful tool for a systematic representation of institutions and their interactions through individual behavior. In fact, we will encounter the relationships outlined in it throughout the presentation of the content of the foundations of the new institutional economic theory in this textbook.
Hierarchy of rules. The three-level structure shown in fig. 1.1, in a visual form reflects the hierarchical nature of the relationship of socially protected rules operating in society and the economy. At the same time, the division of the entire set of institutions into the institutional environment and institutional agreements is only the first approximation to the actual correlation of the mentioned rules in terms of subordination, the degree of influence on each other and the rigidity of determining the behavior of economic agents.
The idea of subordination (subordination) of rules is given by the ratio of any zavena and normative acts adopted on its basis by executive authorities, or by-laws: the law defines the principles, strategies of behavior, while the by-laws specify these principles into action algorithms. For example, the legislation on taxation determines the income tax rate, and the instruction fixes the rules for calculating the amount of taxable income, linked to specific accounting forms, invoices, etc. A long-term contract entered into by two firms regarding their cooperation in the field of research and development, fixes that the firms will jointly conduct research in which they are interested; at the same time, for each specific research project, a special agreement is concluded that fixes such points as the subject and purpose of the project, the forms of participation of the parties, the amount of funding, the distribution of copyrights, etc.
The subordination of rules is, as follows from the above examples, a widespread phenomenon that takes place both within the institutional environment and in the totality of institutional agreements. The examples given also demonstrate the general principle meaningful order rules: a norm of a lower order clarifies and reveals the content of a norm of a higher order. The latter, more general, outline the framework, the details within which regulate more particular norms.
Of course, not all rules are interconnected by similar content-logical relationships. A significant part of them in this respect do not correlate at all with each other, that is, with regard to their pairs, it cannot be said that one rule is more or less general than the other. Say the rules of the road and the rules of calculation income tax are not comparable within the framework of the principle of content-logical order.
However, any rules become comparable if, as a basis for comparison, we choose such a characteristic of them as costs of introducing (or changing) rules having under costs not only monetary costs, but also the totality of the efforts of economic agents, including psychological costs, as well as the time required to introduce or change an institution12.
With this approach, the more general, standing higher in the hierarchical ladder, are the rules, the costs of changing or introducing which are greater than those of the rules compared with them.
The "economic" hierarchy of rules is strongly correlated with their content hierarchy (of course, if the latter exists). Thus, it is obvious that the costs of drafting and adopting a Constitution through a referendum are higher than the corresponding costs for laws, which, in turn, are higher than those for by-laws. Therefore, the convenience of the economic hierarchy of rules lies primarily in the fact that it allows you to compare and order such rules, between the content of which there is no semantic connection.
Now, based on the division of the entire set of rules into those that form the institutional environment, and those that represent institutional agreements, as well as from the introduced ideas about the hierarchy of rules, let us consider in more detail the content of the institutional environment and institutional agreements.
supra-constitutional rules. All components of the institutional environment are rules that determine the order and content of the "subordinate" rules. Such "meta-rules" can be both formal and informal. The most general and difficult to change informal rules that have deep historical roots in the life of various peoples, are closely related to the prevailing stereotypes of behavior, religious ideas, etc., and are often not realized by individuals, i.e., they have passed into the category of stereotypes of the behavior of large groups of the population , are called above constitutional rules. They determine the hierarchy of values shared by broad sections of society, the attitude of people towards power, mass psychological attitudes towards cooperation or opposition, etc.
The supra-constitutional rules are among the least studied, both theoretically and empirically. In fact, with regard to them, there are only separate speculative constructions and disparate
12 In this case, the cost of time does not necessarily correlate with the cost of money, since changes in the rules of behavior are also influenced by natural forgetting of information, not associated with special expenses incurred for this purpose.
actual observations of researchers (mainly philosophers and sociologists) that do not allow for a rigorous logical reconstruction of this layer of the institutional environment.
Probably the first (at least the most famous) work devoted essentially to the study of supra-constitutional rules was the book by Max Weber "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism", in which this German sociologist convincingly showed the influence of religious behavioral attitudes and moral values inherent in Protestantism, on the relationship and rules of interaction between economic agents and their attitude to work, i.e., the rules of labor behavior.
constitutional rules. In economic theory constitutional It is customary to call the rules of a general nature, structuring the relationship between individuals and the state, as well as individuals among themselves. In fulfilling these functions, constitutional rules, firstly, establish the hierarchical structure of the state; secondly, they determine the rules for making decisions on the formation government agencies authorities (ministries, departments, agencies, etc.), for example, voting rules in democratic states, inheritance rules in monarchies, etc .; thirdly, they determine the forms and rules for controlling the actions of the state by society.
Constitutional rules can be both formal and informal. For example, the rules for the succession of power in monarchies may take the form of an unwritten custom or tradition, while the rules for voting in the election of the legislature of a state may take the form of a carefully written law.
Constitutional rules as a special layer of the institutional environment can be distinguished not only at the level of the state, but also at the level of other organizations - firms, corporations, non-profit foundations and so on. Their function in them is performed, first of all, by charters, as well as various corporate codes, mission statements, etc. The identification of such local, intra-organizational rules with constitutional ones is possible on the basis of functional understanding of the latter, since from a legal point of view, the relevant documents have, of course, nothing to do with the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state.
In this regard, it is necessary to draw attention to the significant difference between the economic and legal understanding of constitutional rules, which prevents the establishment of mutual understanding between representatives of the respective branches of science. If, as follows from the above, the economic understanding of constitutional rules is very broad and is in no way connected with the form of presentation of the corresponding rules (recall, they can be informal), then the legal understanding of the constitution has a much stricter and narrower meaning. For example, the above-mentioned rules for the succession of power in monarchies, which have the form of custom or tradition, from a legal point of view, are not related to the constitution, as well as internal company codes, mission statements. non-profit organizations etc. This distinction must be kept in mind by economists when reading legal studies that touch upon questions of constitutional law.
economic rules and property rights. Economic rules are called directly defining forms of organization of economic activity, within which economic
agents form institutional agreements and make decisions about the use of resources.
For example, economic rules include quotas for the import or export of certain products, prohibitions on the use of certain types of contracts, legally established deadlines for the validity of patents for inventions, etc.
Economic rules are the conditions and prerequisites for the emergence property rights: the latter arise when and where and when rules are formed in society that regulate their choice of ways to use limited goods (including resources). In this connection, it can be said that when we study property rights, we study economic rules, and vice versa.
Probably, one of the first economic rules that regulated economic activity were the rules defining the boundaries of territories where primitive tribes searched for and collected edible plants and animals. This rule determined the property rights of the tribe in the corresponding territory: inside its borders, gathering could be carried out without hindrance, while outside it a member of one tribe could collide with representatives of another, which would result in a conflict over who owns the found plant or captured animal.
Confirmation that the "rule of the territory" could be one of the first economic rules is the fact that many animals leading a (relatively) sedentary lifestyle have such territories (ethologists - specialists who study animal behavior - call them revirs). ). Some of the animals (for example, dogs, wolves) mark the boundaries of their revere in a certain way, while the marks serve as signals for other individuals of the same biological species that the territory is “occupied”, “belongs” to one of the other individuals.
Property rights define those actions in relation to an object that are permitted and protected from obstacles to their implementation by other people. From this point of view, we can say that the situation of choice is determined by property rights.
Property rights are those permitted and protected ways of using scarce resources that are the exclusive prerogative of individuals or groups.
Essential to understanding property rights is, on the one hand, their specifications, and on the other - blur.
Ownership specification is the creation of an exclusivity regime for an individual or group by defining a subject of law, an object of law, a set of powers that this subject has, as well as a mechanism to ensure their observance.
In order to understand the property rights specification, it is important that who (what the guarantor) provides it and how it is carried out broadcast law (if it is allowed at all).
When it comes to formal rights, they are usually specified state. At the same time, within an enterprise, for example, certain formal property rights can be specified by its management. Along with the formal impersonal specification, which is based on the daily practice of interaction between economic agents, i.e., the guarantor is any member of the group noticing the violation. It refers usually to informal property rights that exist as a consequence of the existence of informal rules.
The most important function of the property rights specification process is to give the latter properties exclusivity.
The right of ownership is called exclusive if its subject is able to effectively exclude other economic agents from the decision-making process regarding the use of this right.
The exclusivity of a property right does not mean that it belongs to individual i.e. to a private person. A group of people, an economic organization (legal entity), and finally, the state can have exclusive rights. These issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, which deals with the analysis of different ownership regimes.
The exclusivity of property rights is economically important because it creates incentives for the efficient use of resources: if the subject's property rights to the result of using his resources are not exclusive, he has no incentive to maximize this result, since all or any part of it can go to another.
For example, if the cultivators of a settled tribe are regularly raided by nomads who take most of their crops and leave enough grain so that the cultivators just do not starve to death, there is no incentive for the cultivators to strive to maximize the productivity of the land. They will seek to grow only necessary minimum grain, spending the "liberated" resources for other purposes, for example, on the specification of their rights by hiring armed protection, or simply spending time in idleness.
In a sense, the reverse of the specification process is erosion of property rights. This term refers to the practice of violating the exclusivity of rights, leading to a decrease in the value of the object of law for the subject, since the expected income stream should be discounted at more than high rate percent (taking into account the risk of expropriation). The regular raids of nomads, which figured in the previous example, just represent a form of erosion of farmers' property rights to crops. Thus, the actual level of exclusivity of a given ownership right is a function of the process of specification/dilution of ownership.
Contracts. As noted above, contracts (agreements) are the most typical types of institutional agreements. In terms of the latter, a contract can be defined as a rule structuring in time and / or space the interaction between two (or more) economic agents regarding the exchange of property rights on the basis of obligations voluntarily assumed by them as a result of the agreement reached13.
In principle, any rule can be interpret like a contract. For example, the relationship of a slave owner and a slave, despite their obvious inequality of rights, was subject (especially in the late period of the existence of slave ownership) to quite certain rules. Accordingly, these rules can be interpreted like some exchanges: the master provided the slave with housing and food in exchange for his work; the master restricted the freedom of the slave in exchange for his protection from
13 The topic of contracts is discussed in detail in the 5th chapter of the textbook.
encroachments of other, perhaps more cruel, masters, etc. Of course, since the mentioned rules were by no means the result of a voluntary agreement (with the exception of the conscious sale of oneself into slavery by a previously free citizen), the identification of such “exchanges” is precisely a possible interpretation of the rules of slavery . An expanded interpretation of contracts, similar to the one given, is called contract approach to the analysis of economic institutions.
The essential points of a contract as a rule that distinguish it from other types of rules are:
Consciousness and purposefulness of the development of this rule by its addressees (contract parties); other rules may be formed without prior thought or design, by trial and error;
voluntariness, mutual benefit of participation in the contract of its parties; other types of rules may be highly asymmetric in terms of the distribution of costs and benefits;
the limited effect of this rule only by its addressees - the parties to the contract; other types of rules - for example, state-imposed laws - apply not only to legislators, but to all other citizens;
the direct connection of the contract with the exchange or other transfer of property rights (for example, a donation agreement of any property that does not imply a “counter” movement of other property from the beneficiary to the donor); other kinds of rules may not directly affect transfers of property rights.
Contracts are rules that "serve" (i.e. coordinate) various exchanges. Market exchanges are considered to be the most common form of exchanges, but in general, the variety of types of exchanges is much wider.
We will call an exchange the alienation and appropriation of property rights for certain goods between two or more agents, due to their conscious interaction.
Alienation and appropriation of property rights means their redistribution. The exchange is such a redistribution of property rights, which is associated with the adoption of decisions by its participants. The results of the redistribution of property rights (exchange) obviously depend on how, under what conditions, its participants make decisions. It is important to distinguish between these conditions, or decision-making situations, on the basis of selectivity And symmetry. On the basis of selectivity, the whole set of exchanges can be divided into selective, - those where the subjects have the opportunity to choose the counterparty, subject and proportions of the exchange (in particular, the price), - and non-selective, where such an opportunity is absent. On the basis of symmetry, exchanges are divided into symmetrical and asymmetric. Within the framework of the first group, the possibilities of choice are the same for the parties; within the framework of the second group, they are not the same.
Combining these features, it is easy to obtain a theoretical typology that includes 4 types of exchanges, of which two are asymmetrically selective and
asymmetrically non-selective - actually describe one asymmetric type of exchanges.
An additional variety in the typology of exchanges is introduced by the sign "guarantor of exchange" - a subject or social mechanism that protects the new distribution of property rights to the object (s) of exchange. The following options are distinguished here: (1) one of the participants in the exchange; (2) both participants in the exchange; (3) third party - an individual or a private organization; (4) the state represented by one or more state law enforcement organizations; (5) tradition, custom. In this case, a typical case is the protection of the exchange simultaneously or sequentially by several guarantors.
For example, for market contracts corresponding symmetrically to selective exchanges, a typical case is their multi-layer protection, which includes all the listed types of guarantors, some of them in several different versions. Thus, to prevent violation of the agreement under option (3), the following are used: large and reputable trading companies, associations of enterprises, arbitration courts, as well as criminal organizations; under option (4) - representatives of the regional administration, regional legislative assemblies, as well as courts14.
Since contracts are consciously developed rules that structure the interactions of their parties for some (finite or indefinite) period of time, each contract can be considered as joint activity plan these sides. If any rule provides the agents who know it with only some descriptive information about future possible actions of other economic agents (in situations regulated by the relevant rule), the contract, being a set of mutual obligations, carries normative, directive information about actions that must be committed parties in the future.
Of course, like other rules, contracts may not be enforced, i.e., violated (torn) by the party that considers that the benefits from the rupture (i.e., from switching the violator's resources to another type of activity) exceed the costs associated with sanctions imposed on her for failure to fulfill her obligations. However, the probability of violating the contract can generally be estimated as less than the probability of violating other rules. After all, the contract is developed and concluded purposefully; this means that its parties have the opportunity to take into account their own interests in this joint action plan. On the contrary, many rules are focused on the realization of the interests of their developers, while completely different economic agents must comply with such rules. If such rules impose excessive unproductive (for them) costs on the latter, and enforcement is not too tight, or the sanctions are small, the rule will not be enforced with a high probability.
Rules and rights. In the section Economic Rules and Property Rights, we defined property rights as derived from economic rules. This ratio is maintained for any rights and rules. Any right of an individual (or organization) is the ability to freely carry out certain actions, in particular, actions in order to
14 The classification of exchanges is described in more detail in the book: Tambovtsev V.L. (1997) The state and the transition economy: the limits of manageability, M.: TEIS.
or other object (property). This possibility is a direct logical consequence of the rule that such actions are not subject to sanctions by the guarantor of this rule. Actions punished within the framework of forcing the rule to be executed do not constitute the content of anyone's right.
When an individual acts in accordance with a rule, that is, becomes its addressee, he automatically acquires the rights inherent in this role. This means that, in performing the actions permitted by the rule, he will not encounter any opposition and, therefore, will not have to bear the costs necessary to protect himself from such opposition. This means that, from an economic point of view, rights are means of saving resources in the process of taking action.
Of course, individuals can perform actions to which they have no rights. However, as noted above, they may be subject to sanctions and incur losses. Therefore, the expected benefits from taking such an action will be less than if the individual had the right to do so.
It can thus be concluded that it is the rights are another (in addition to the effect of coordination) specific social mechanism with the help of regulations provide cost savings.
Conclusion
The content of this chapter, devoted to the basic concepts of the new institutional economic theory, of course, does not exhaust all the problems associated with them. A number of important, but more "subtle" issues, remained outside its scope. These include, for example, issues of diversity forms of description of institutions and their comparative advantages for solving various theoretical and applied problems, problems explanations origin of institutions (discussed in part in Chapter 6) and predictions the emergence of new institutions, etc. Many of these problems are only discussed in current scientific research, there are no generally accepted solutions for them, which is an obstacle to including them in a textbook, while others are sufficiently developed, but are of a private nature, and considered in the framework of training at the master's level.
Basic concepts of the chapter
Bounded rationality
Behavior pattern
Norm (rule)
Opportunistic behavior
Rule Enforcement Mechanism
15 Unless, of course, this rule contradicts some other rule shared by an individual who also claims the benefits with which the first individual acts. See above for the relationship between formal and informal rules.
Institute
The restrictive function of the institution
Institute coordinating function
The distributive function of the institute
Formal rules
informal rules
Institutional environment
institutional agreement
Hierarchy of rules
Supra-constitutional rules
constitutional rules
economic rules
Contracts
Ownership
Exclusive ownership
Ownership specification
Erosion of property rights
Review questions
Is information a constraint on economic decision making?
What is the relationship between limited information and the emergence of habits?
Do patterns of behavior always maximize utility?
Is breaking a rule always undesirable from an economic point of view?
Is every rule an institution?
Does the presence of regularity in behavior always mean the existence of a corresponding institution?
Is it true that any institution creates a distributional effect?
How do formal rules differ from informal ones?
How can formal and informal rules be related in statics and dynamics?
What is the logic of the rule enforcement mechanism?
What is included in the institutional environment?
What are institutional agreements?
What types of rules are, from an economic point of view, constitutional rules?
What are rights?
How are rules and rights related?
What are property rights?
What is the main function of a property rights specification?
Is it true that the exclusivity of property rights is possible only when their subject is an individual?
What is an exchange and how can exchanges be classified?
Questions for reflection
How, with the help of what research procedures, can one single out among the various observable regularities in people's behavior those that are due to the existence of institutions?
Are institutions public goods? If they are, what is the overall effect of underproduction of public goods for them?
Is the state always interested in a clear specification of property rights?
Literature
Main
North D. (1997) Institutions, institutional changes and the functioning of the economy, Moscow: Beginnings, preface, ch. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7.
Eggertsson T. (2001) Economic Behavior and Institutions, M.: Delo, ch. 2.
Additional
North D. (1993a), Institutions and Economic Growth: A Historical Introduction// THESIS, v. 1, issue 2, p. 69–91.
Tambovtsev V.L. (ed.) (20016), Economic analysis of regulations, M.: TEIS, ch. 1–3.
Shastitko A.E. (2002) New Institutional Economics, M.: TEIS, ch. 3, 4, 5.
Elster Yu. (1993), Social norms and economic theory // THESIS,vol. 1, no. Z, pp.73–91.
The market is a set of institutions that ensure the organization of joint economic activities of people, economic exchange between them in the form of the sale of goods and services. The functioning of the market is based on such basic principles as:
Private property;
Voluntary and equivalent interaction of independent and independent economic entities;
Competition.
The totality of institutions forms an integral system or institutional environment. The “market character” of institutions is determined by the correspondence of their nature to the basic principles of a market economy:
Freedom of economic activity;
Generality of market relations;
Pluralism and equality of forms of ownership;
Self-regulation of economic activity;
Free pricing;
Self-financing and economic responsibility;
A harmonious combination of the state and the market.
In accordance with the most recognized formulation, institutions are understood as formal and informal rules that structure the forms of social relationships in all spheres of public life, as well as the mechanisms for their observance. From what has been said, it follows that institutions act as restrictions on social actions in the broadest sense, or as rules of the game in those other sectors of the common social space.
The most important markets where real market institutions, processes and mechanisms operate are markets for factors of production, financial and commodity.
The system-forming function in a market economy is played by factor market(they are divided into four groups: land, labor, capital, entrepreneurial activity). They are also considered as supply factors. Sometimes, depending on the purpose of the analysis, they include technology, information and ecology.
Institutional and organizational basis the functioning of the market for factors of production is the exchange mechanism (commodity and stock exchanges, labor exchanges, etc.).
Financial markets cover the money market, foreign exchange market, gold market, capital market. The latter is often subdivided into the securities market (stock market) and the loan capital market.
To the main institutions commodity markets(markets of goods and services) include trading enterprises (wholesale and retail), trading houses and commodity exchanges.
Questions of the functioning of markets, including the requirements for its participants, are regulated both by state bodies and by market mechanisms proper. IN transitional economies, including in Belarus, key market institutions not yet developed enough. Monopolies remained in the economy, many of them even strengthened their positions. However, as the openness of the Belarusian economy grows and the state masters the methods of antimonopoly policy, gradually emerging competitive environment; almost all created basic elements market system, non-state financial institutions, including commercial banks, insurance companies, investment funds, stock exchanges, etc.; operate market financial mechanisms and market regulators(prices, taxes, interest rates, exchange rates, dividends, etc.).
But for the full functioning of the economy deeper and more comprehensive institutional changes are needed, including capacity building and improvement of established institutions (for example, the tax system), as well as formation of new structures (capital, land, labor markets), which are still at the initial stage of their development. All this requires comprehensive and consistent measures to strengthening the institution of private property, effective privatization, improvement bankruptcy mechanisms insolvent enterprises and their removal from economic circulation without causing significant damage to the teams of workers.
key element transition to a market economy is the creation efficient labor markets. As a factor of production, labor is the most significant of all of them. In industrialized countries, labor accounts for up to 75% of GNP.
Labor market- this multilevel system of market institutions, organizations and institutions of the public sector, the business community and public associations (trade unions, etc.), solving the whole set of problems reproduction of the labor force and the use of labor.
Well-functioning labor markets are needed to facilitate transfer of an employee to another job where his work is most productive.
The effective functioning of labor markets in conditions of free enterprise requires the characteristic of a developed market economy economic infrastructure that provides for private property, competition, capital markets and labor mobility. And until such an infrastructure is created, the most important functions in regulating the labor market remain with the state.
The state policy in the social and labor sphere during the transitional period is aimed at keeping unemployment at the lowest possible, economically efficient and politically acceptable level.
Leading strategic direction development of the labor market in Belarus, it remains to transfer it to effective market (including exchange) mechanisms with maintaining the key role of the state in the creation of system-wide conditions for the formation of market institutions, the legal protection of workers, the establishment of social standards and the level of minimum wages, the regulation of the tax burden on labor, the development of social partnership (state, business, trade unions) in the field of employment.
Capital as a factor of production- these are human-made resources used to produce goods and services, or means of production, investment goods that are not directly involved in meeting human needs (equipment, buildings and structures). From these positions the capital market is the market for financial capital(primarily the credit market), i.e. financial resources intended for the purchase of equipment, buildings and structures.
Capital flows, including international ones, are classified according to forms. According to the functional purpose, movements are distinguished loan capital (in the form of a loan) and entrepreneurial capital (in the form of investments); allocate according to belonging private and public capital, for the intended purpose - private and public, direct and portfolio investments; by timing - short, medium and long term capital.
The market for short-term loan capital, or money market, is a market for transactions in short-term securities with a low level of risk. Main money market securities are treasury bills, commercial paper, banker's acceptances and freely tradable certificates of deposit.
As the development of the world economy shows, dominating place in the system of financial markets occupy capital markets. The capital market itself is functionally subdivided into the market valuable papers and market loan capital.
Loan capital market- this is a market for medium-term (from 1 to 5 years) and long-term (over 5 years) loans, mediating the connection of the supply of money savings of the non-financial sector and the demand for loans necessary for financing (investment). It is often referred to as the capital market. He covers the bank loan market and the debt securities market(bonds, bills, etc.).
Stocks and bods market- part of the capital market, where the issue, purchase and sale of securities and rights to them are carried out. Securities- payment documents (checks, bills of exchange, letters of credit, etc.) and stock values (shares, bonds, etc.) in national and foreign currencies.
The securities market (stock market) performs two functions. The first is to ensure flexible intersectoral redistribution of capital and mobilization of public money. The second suggests mobilization of temporarily free funds to meet the needs of the state and other organizations.
The securities market, in turn, is divided into primary and secondary, exchange and over-the-counter, urgent and spot.
In this way, the capital market is a long-term segment of the loan capital market, including primarily the issuance of bonds and shares and their secondary markets. It accumulates and circulates long-term capital and debt obligations. In a market economy, it is the main type of financial market, through which companies seek sources of financing for their activities.
It is the existence and development of capital markets that distinguish industrialized countries from developing countries and countries with economies in transition, where the possibilities for mobilizing industrial and commercial capital are either absent or very limited.
Status and development trends of the capital market in Belarus. The formation of the capital market in the country began in 1990 with the adoption of the Law "On the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus" and went in such directions as the formation of a national financial and credit system, interbank, currency and stock markets. In 1994, the Interbank currency exchange(MVB), in 1999 - the Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange (BCSE).
The capital market in the form of trade in industrial and technical products has been developing in the country since the late 1980s. 20th century and now functions in the system of financial and commodity markets of the country.
The most important problem of the current stage of development of the capital market is the lag of its potential, volume and dynamics from the growth rates of the Belarusian economy, from the need to form domestic investment resources and their redistribution to the real sector. This hinders the creation of an effective investment and innovation development model in Belarus.
Currency market- this is a system of economic and organizational relations that arise between households, firms, commercial banks and other financial institutions for the purchase and sale of foreign currencies and payment documents in foreign currencies.
Institutional participants in the foreign exchange market are commercial and central banks, currency exchanges, brokerage agencies, international corporations (both exporters and importers).
The republic began to form a foreign exchange market in 1992. The main foreign exchange market is the Interbank Currency Exchange (since 1999 - Belarusian Currency and Stock Exchange OJSC). Members of the MVB are banks or other financial institutions licensed to conduct foreign exchange transactions. Direct trading and determination of the current rate is entrusted to a special employee of the exchange - a rate broker.
In the context of limited foreign investment, the situation in the country's foreign exchange market mainly depends on trends in foreign trade and mechanisms for financing export-import flows.
Stock market is part of the capital market where issue and purchase and sale of securities.Its main purpose is to provide accumulation of temporarily free funds for investment in promising sectors of the economy. In addition, the stock market, or securities market, solves such problems as servicing the public debt, redistributing property rights, and speculative transactions.
General structure stock market is represented investors(strategic and institutional), issuers(organizations interested in raising funds for the development of production), infrastructure- a link between investors, issuers and regulators his activities.
The functioning of the stock market (primary and secondary) is ensured by professional members: operators (brokers, dealers); exchange organizers(trading platforms); clearing organizations, banks and depositories; registrars.
In a modern market economy, an efficient stock market is regarded as the main national asset. The securities market is one of the main sources of investment financing in the real sector of the economy.
From the totality stock market functions especially important:
investment, those. formation and distribution of investment resources necessary for the development of production;
redistribution of property by using blocks of securities, primarily shares.
Belarus began to form a national stock market in 1992, when the Law "On Securities and Stock Exchanges" was adopted.
Transparency and controllability of the stock market on the part of the state is ensured by the Securities Department under the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Belarus
At present, the role of the stock market in the development of the country's economy is insufficient. There are problems in the development of the stock market itself. One of them is the lack of significant foreign investment in its instruments. The other is in the low level of capitalization of the national stock market, which is explained by low market demand and supply on it.
Thus, at present, a situation has developed in the republic when, on the one hand, the infrastructure, the regulatory framework of the stock market, systems of state regulation and regulation of interstate circulation of securities that meet the requirements of international standards have been created, and on the other hand, dimensions foreign portfolio investment and capitalization of the national stock market do not correspond to the level and dynamics of macroeconomic indicators of the Belarusian economy and lag behind other countries with economies in transition.
The formation and formation of market institutions in the transitional economy of Belarus is uneven.
So, commodity market(market of consumer goods and products for industrial purposes) and service market in transition slightly different from similar markets of economically developed countries of the West in terms of saturation with goods and services, assortment, organizational and legal forms and other parameters.
State of the art labor, capital, land and other markets significantly lower due to the weakness of their institutional and organizational framework, including the exchange mechanism. As long as it remains low labor mobility due to the excess number of employees in most enterprises and the difficulties associated with moving to a new place of residence when changing jobs. minor role in mobilizing financial resources playing and selling corporate securities.
The uneven development of various market segments gives rise to a huge number of very difficult problems, or “growth difficulties”, in the transformational activities of the state, society, business entities, which is the subject of further reforms.
Social institutions are the most important component of society as a system.
The word "institute" in Latin instituto means "establishment". In Russian, it is often used to refer to higher educational institutions. In addition, as you know from the basic school course, in the field of law the word "institution" means a set of legal norms that regulate one social relationship or several relationships related to each other (for example, the institution of marriage).
In sociology, social institutions are called historically established stable forms of organizing joint activities, regulated by norms, traditions, customs and aimed at meeting the fundamental needs of society.
This definition, to which it is expedient to return after reading to the end of the educational material on this issue, we will consider based on the concept of "activity" (see § 1). In the history of society, sustainable activities aimed at satisfying the most important vital needs have developed. Sociologists identify five such social needs:
- the need for the reproduction of the genus;
- the need for security and social order;
- need for means of subsistence;
- the need for knowledge, socialization of the younger generation, training;
- the need to solve spiritual problems of the meaning of life.
According to the named needs, the society also developed the types of activities, which, in turn, required the necessary organization, streamlining, the creation of certain institutions and other structures, the development of rules that ensure the achievement of the expected result. These conditions for the successful implementation of the main activities were met by historically established social institutions:
- institution of family and marriage;
- political institutions, especially the state;
- economic institutions, primarily production;
- institutes of education, science and culture;
- institute of religion.
Each of these institutions brings together large masses of people to meet a particular need and achieve a specific goal of a personal, group or public nature.
The emergence of social institutions led to the consolidation of specific types of interaction, made them permanent and mandatory for all members of a given society.
So, social institution- this is, first of all, a set of persons engaged in a certain type of activity and ensuring in the process of this activity the satisfaction of a certain need that is significant for society (for example, all employees of the education system).
Further, the institution is fixed by a system of legal and moral norms, traditions and customs that regulate the corresponding types of behavior. (Remember, for example, what social norms regulate the behavior of people in the family).
One more characteristic social institution - the presence of institutions equipped with certain material resources necessary for any kind of activity. (Think about which social institutions school, factory, police belong to. Give your examples of institutions and organizations related to each of the most important social institutions.)
Any of these institutions is integrated into the socio-political, legal, value structure of society, which makes it possible to legitimize the activities of this institution and exercise control over it.
A social institution stabilizes social relations, brings coherence into the actions of members of society. A social institution is characterized by a clear delineation of the functions of each of the subjects of interaction, the consistency of their actions, and a high level of regulation and control. (Think about how these features of a social institution show up in the education system, particularly in schools.)
Consider the main features of a social institution on the example of such an important institution of society as the family. First of all, each family is a small group of people based on intimacy and emotional attachment, connected by marriage (wife) and consanguinity (parents and children). The need to create a family is one of the fundamental, i.e. fundamental, human needs. At the same time, the family performs important functions in society: the birth and upbringing of children, economic support for minors and the disabled, and much more. Each family member occupies his own special position in it, which implies appropriate behavior: parents (or one of them) provide a livelihood, run household chores, and raise children. Children, in turn, study, help around the house. Such behavior is regulated not only by intra-family rules, but also by social norms: morality and law. Thus, public morality condemns the lack of care of older family members about the younger ones. The law establishes the responsibility and obligations of spouses in relation to each other, to children, adult children to elderly parents. The creation of a family, the main milestones of family life, are accompanied by traditions and rituals established in society. For example, in many countries, the marriage ritual includes the exchange of wedding rings between spouses.
The presence of social institutions makes people's behavior more predictable and society as a whole more stable.
In addition to the main social institutions, there are non-principal ones. So, if the main political institution is the state, then the non-main ones are the institution of the judiciary or, as in our country, the institution of presidential representatives in the regions, etc.
The presence of social institutions reliably ensures regular, self-renewing satisfaction of vital needs. The social institution makes connections between people not random and not chaotic, but permanent, reliable, stable. Institutional interaction is a well-established order of social life in the main spheres of people's life. The more social needs are met by social institutions, the more developed the society.
Since new needs and conditions arise in the course of the historical process, new types of activity and corresponding connections appear. Society is interested in giving them an orderly, normative character, that is, in their institutionalization.
In Russia, as a result of the reforms of the late XX century. appeared, for example, such a type of activity as entrepreneur-. stvo. The streamlining of this activity led to the emergence of various types of firms, required the issuance of laws regulating entrepreneurial activity, and contributed to the formation of relevant traditions.
In the political life of our country, institutions of parliamentarism, a multi-party system, and the institution of presidency arose. The principles and rules for their functioning are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and relevant laws.
In the same way, the institutionalization of other types of activity that have emerged over the past decades has taken place.
It happens that the development of society requires the modernization of the activities of social institutions that have historically developed in previous periods. Thus, in the changed conditions, it became necessary to solve the problems of introducing the younger generation to the culture in a new way. Hence the steps taken to modernize the institution of education, which may result in the institutionalization of the Unified State Examination, the new content of educational programs.
So, we can return to the definition given at the beginning of this part of the paragraph. Think about what characterizes social institutions as highly organized systems. Why is their structure stable? What is the importance of deep integration of their elements? What is the diversity, flexibility, dynamism of their functions?
Legal Institute - this is a legally separate set of legal norms that provides integral regulation of this type of relationship or its side.
The legal institution is the basis of the branch of law. This is “the primary independent structural subdivision of the industry, the first and most important step in the formation of the industry, where legal norms are grouped ... according to their legal content ...”.
Legal norms form a branch of law not directly, but through institutions; moreover, the legal originality of a particular norm is revealed taking into account the peculiarities of the entire complex of norms.
Thus, if the system of law consists of branches, then the branches themselves consist of legal institutions. So, for example, in labor law, the “institute of labor discipline”, “the institute of material liability of workers and employees”, etc., are distinguished, in civil law - “the institute of limitation period”, “the institute of obligations arising from causing harm”, etc. .
A legal institution has three characteristics:
a) Homogeneity of the actual content. Everyone is right
the institute is dedicated to the regulation of a strictly defined time
novelties of social relations covered by this
industry or side of a relationship group. Hence the homogeneity
the actual content of the institute.
b) Legal unity (complexity) of norms. It's heads
ny sign of the institution. The norms that form the institution
solder as a single complex, an integral system, more precisely - relate
a distinctly isolated "block", "aggregate", in conjunction with other
by the institutes that make up the normative mechanism of industries
whether. Each institute provides a complete (in its own area)
"finished") regulation of this type of relationship
or side of a relationship group. That is why inside the institute
here there is a specialization of legal norms: complex
combination of various regulatory, definitive and other
norms is intended to provide integral regulation of the relevant
relations.
c) Legislative isolation. As the main structural subdivisions of the industry, institutions receive an external separate fixation in normative (legislative) acts in the form of independent chapters, sections, etc.10. This or that arrangement of legal norms, their combination into chapters, sections, parts - this is in most cases the process of differentiation and integration of normative material, leading to the formation of legal institutions.
In their place and functions, legal institutions are very heterogeneous. Thus, general institutions (containing “bracketed” normative provisions relating to the industry as a whole or its large subdivision) can be distinguished), material and regulatory institutions (the content of the norm that directly regulates the behavior of subjects), protective institutions (containing protective and related they have other norms), procedural institutions, etc. In other words, specialization, “division of labor”, occurs not only between individual norms, but also between legal institutions.
Between institutions within the industry there may be relations of subordination, subordination. The "fractional" parts of the institute often form independent subdivisions, which are called sub-institutions. In general, in cases where such a "multi-storey" is observed, there is always, so to speak, the final link - an institution that unites a group of institutions and sub-institutions, which can be called a general institution. Such, for example, are the institution of labor discipline, the institution of crimes against property, the institution of contracts, etc.
Specific associations of institutions are also formed within the industry. So, as legislation develops, the level of normative generalizations rises, general institutions are isolated into an enlarged subdivision, which in codified legislative acts receives the name "general part" or "general provisions".
Along with this, in developed branches of law, general and other institutions often also develop into enlarged divisions - sub-sectors. The latter are such vast communities of sectoral institutions (general sub-institutions) in which “their own” common part is isolated. These are, for example, the law of obligations, inheritance law, copyright and others - in civil law, administrative and economic law - in administrative law, military criminal law, etc. Some large branches of law, for example civil law, appear in modern conditions in the form of a combination of the “general part” and a group of sub-sectors.
Every legal institution- this is, in principle, a legally homogeneous legal entity, i.e. it is part of a strictly defined industry. But the division of socialist law into branches does not at all mean that there is a "Chinese wall" between them, which would divide the branches into spheres completely isolated from each other. There are not only separate points of contact between the branches of law, but also extensive areas of contacts and close interaction. Mixed institutions are emerging in these frontier regions.
A mixed institution is an institution in a given industry that includes some elements of a different method. legal regulation. In general, the legal content of a mixed institution is homogeneous; therefore it is included in a certain branch of law. But elements of the method, characteristic of another branch of law, penetrated into its content, leaked out.
As an example of a mixed institution, we can name civil law institutions that mediate credit and settlement relations. The State Bank of the USSR, acting in relations with its clientele as a legal entity, at the same time performs the authoritative, controlling functions of the body t of state administration. Therefore, within the limits of credit and settlement legal relations, some administrative powers of the State Bank of the USSR are also manifested. The institutions that regulate relations related to the implementation of the plan for the carriage of goods by rail, relations in the field of postal services, relations on compulsory insurance, etc., are also of a mixed nature.
