Participation of foreign oil companies in the oil and gas complex of Russia.
(Scientific Director Prof.)
RGU oil and gas them.
This paper discusses the current situation in the participation of foreign companies in the oil and gas complex of Russia. The position of foreign investment in the Russian oil and gas complex is rather contradictory. On the one hand, it may be the impression that unbearable conditions have been created for non-residents in the oil and gas complex of the Russian Federation. Licenses and deposits are selected, squeezing out of business. On the other hand, active investments in oil and gas projects on Russian territory continue.
The current situation is such that foreign companies will not be able to do without work in Russia. Achilles of the heel of energy transnational corporations is well known. They are devoid of reserves, which makes their business very unstable. And the other way, how to deal with access to reserves, they simply do not exist. At the same time, promising oil and gas regions in the world is not so much. And most of them are very stringent rules of the game for non-residents.
Russia also becomes an emes of struggle between the EU and the United States for oil and gas resources. However, the rules of the game here are still more understandable than in Africa. Thus, Russia turns out to be far from the worst business place. The tough criticism of the political leadership of the Russian Federation in the Western media is explained by attempts to overtake more favorable conditions for the presence in the Russian oil and gas complex.
The development strategy of Russian companies is also in many ways clear and logical. If foreign concerns seek access to resources and enter the UPStream projects on the Russian territory, then for Russians it is important to enter the final consumer market and become the shareholders of DOWNStream projects in the main regions of the sale of hydrocarbons. Therefore, the focus is on buying and construction abroad of refinery, refueling stations, underground gas storage facilities, gas distribution networks and even electric generating assets.
As a result, a large bargaining begins. Western concerns intend to expand their presence in Russian Upstream. And domestic companies in European and Chinese downstream. From here there is an idea of \u200b\u200bsharing asset. But any exchange is great disputes regarding their conditions. And negotiations (as the situation shows, say, around the South-Russian field) may continue for more than one year. They use any techniques, including direct political pressure.
At the same time, each of the parties understands its need for another, although it is trying not to show it in any way. The EU, which in reality is not able to solve the problem of the energy deficiency without supplying hydrocarbons from the Russian Federation, in every way the development of renewable energy types and expanding the procurement of oil and gas in Central Asia, consciously trying to undertake real dependence on Russia. The Russian Federation responds to this idea of \u200b\u200bfinancial and technological self-sufficiency, assuring that it is able to independently master new deposits and implement breakthrough projects of the type of Shtokman, Eastern Siberia or Yamal Peninsula. Although in reality, the level of technological tasks is so complicated that they independently do not solve them. Not to mention what it would be logical to share financial risks with non-residents. As a result, there is a serious struggle around the exchange strategies, which are involved both both companies and political elites, which gives it a special flavor.
7 Recently, the EU and US countries in foreign policy are paying special attention to such regions as the Persian Bay, the Caspian and the Russian Federation. It is these territories, large Western NCs consider the most promising in terms of the development and extraction of hydrocarbons. Russia has significant hydrocarbon reserves. Therefore, Western NKs seek to participate in mining projects in the Russian Federation. In years, the participation of foreign NK in oil and gas producer Russia increased from $ 0.564 to $ 16 billion.
In the structure of investments of foreign companies in the oil and gas industry, investments in fixed assets are dominated, whose share is about 76%. These investments are mainly aimed at the implementation of specific oil and gas projects, as well as to buy large stakes (more than 10%) of Russian NK, the acquisition of medium and small oil and gas companies.
The Americans were engaged in oil and gas projects in Russia before the collapse of the USSR, although it is impossible to talk about achieving large-scale success. At one time, American oil companies, primarily Exxonmobil and Chevrontexaco, wanted to buy yukos assets, but inthe strength of the known reasons is unreal. Another Corporation -Conocophillips is trying to buy LUKOIL shares, but the Americans will not be able to consolidate even the blocking package. A little big success managed to reach the British. Sumy to create a joint company from the Russian TNK, BP partially strengthened its position on the world oil market. However, despite this, they were not allowed to a row of auctions on large fields, without explaining even the reasons.
Among foreign companies operating in Russia, the main part of oil production is accounted for by BP (36.6 million tons), ConocoPhillips (about 10 million tons), Sakhalin Energy (about 1.5 million tons), "Wangeanneft" ( About 1.3 million tons).
The participation of foreign companies in the production of gas in the Russian Federation is very limited. A peculiarity of the gas industry of the Russian Federation is its large monopolization of the world's largest gas concern, controlled by the Government of Russia. Russian Independent Gas Manufacturers and Foreign Investors have significant problems with access to gas highways and the ability to implement gas projects.
To date, several forms of interaction have developed in the Russian Federation
russian and foreign companies:
Buying a package of shares of a large Russian NK;
Creation of joint ventures and consortiums with Russian organizations;
Signing of product sharing agreements;
The acquisition of small and medium-sized Russian subsoil users;
The implementation of contract work and the conclusion of service contracts;
Direct economic activity of companies registered abroad, including in offshore zones (having Russian roots).
Shopping Package Shares a large Russian vertically integrated structure adhere to British BP and American ConocoPhillips. Negotiations on the conclusion of such a type of transactions go at the level of governments of countries whose companies create a joint business. This type of interaction acquires strategic nature and, as a rule, is politically well protected.
11 Foreign investors entering oil and gas business through creation of joint ventures and consortia rosneft and Conocophillips ("Polar Lights") can be served with Russian companies; LUKOIL ANDONOCOPHILLIPS, Rosneft and Sinopec, Gazprom Oil and Chevron, as well as Royal Dutch, Shell and Sibir Energy (Salym Petroleum).
Projects on the terms of the product sharing agreement (PSA) - now
time is being implemented by three projects: the development of the Harjaginsky field, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2.
Entry of foreign investors in NGK in Russia through purchase, financing of small oil enterprises . Foreign corporations are actively acquiring small companies that are not part of large NCs, as well as register of fragile legal entities to participate in the development projects of small fields: "Eastern Transnational Company", "Baites", "Pecheraneftegaz", "Samara Nafta" and others. Thus, in Eastern Siberia, the license for exploration and the development of the infinity field is owned by the NK "Break" owned by Urals Energy Holdings Ltd. (United Kingdom), and the Tambae deposit is controlled by Tambayneftegaz and Repsol (Spain).
Eastern Transnationalcompany "(VTK - a subsidiary of the Swedish West Siberian Resources Ltd.) works in the Tomsk region since the mid-1990s, owning licenses to sites in the Alexandrovsky and Kargasok district. According to the official report, last year the volume of oil production company amounted to 497 thousand tons.
Cypriot oil-producing and geological exploration company Urals Energy Public PCL was created in the early 1990s. The main assets of the company were three extractive enterprises in Komi - "Tebukneft", "Ukhtneft" and "RKM OIL" - with the volume of oil production of about 1.5 million tons per year. In 2003 These assets were sold to LUKOIL for 4.2 billion rubles. Now Urals Energy owns a number of licenses in Nenets AO and mining assets, in particular "Arcticneft", purchased in 2003. At Lukoil. The Urals Energy Group developing the influence of the oil and gas field in the Irkutsk region plans to the end of 2009. increase the volume of oil production to 19 thousand barrels / day. At the same time, by the third quarter of 2009. Urals Energy expects an increase in production up to 15 thousand. Barr. / day. For the current year, Urals Energy plans to invest about 90 million dollars in the development of the company and considers the possibility of acquiring new assets. By 2011 The company expects to increase oil production to 50 thousand barrels / day. South Tambia field (licensed owned " Tambayneftegaz ") By reserves (1.2-1.3 trillion cubic meters of gas and 40-50 million tons of condensate) is comparable to the largest fields of Gazprom Polar and Bear. In June 2005 - INVEST "acquired from 25.1% of Tambayneftegaz shares.
However, in the same year " Tambayneftegaz "with the filing of his majority shareholder Nikolai Bogachev, he conveyed a license for the South Tambian LNG. " After a series of trials in the fall of last year, Gazprombank-Invest challenged the transfer of a license in court. Mr. Usmanov performed a mediator in this transaction, and the structures affiliated with him were negotiating with Mr. Bogachev. As a result, a global agreement was concluded about the purchase structures of Alisher Usman
nova 75% of the shares of Tambayneftegaz. In May of this year, the invest "acquired the remaining package. According to informal information, the total amount of transactions amounted to $ 350-360 million, while South Tambae is estimated at $ 1.5-2 billion.
Participation of foreign firms in contract work and conclusion of service
contracts . Today, foreign capital stands for the majority of service operators in Russia - the Eurasian Drilling Company, the Integra group and Russian divisions of world service corporations Schlumberger, Halliburton, Baker Hughes and others. The activities of foreign corporations as contractors are mainly concentrated in those sectors where Russian technologies are inferior to Western:
In the exploration and production of hydrocarbons on the shelf;
Design and construction of wells;
Telemetry during drilling;
Evaluation of the layer to optimize drilling and positioning of oblique-directional wells;
Borehole services for the intensification of production (including hydroelectric acid, acid processing, etc.);
Well testing;
Sampling on the surface and from the bottomhole zone;
Use of fruit and pumps MultiPhase;
Well monitoring;
Measurement of temperature and pressures using optical-fiber methods;
Standard and "intelligent" methods for completing wells.
In the 1990s, many Russian oil and gas firms recorded a management company in the offshore zone to minimize taxation. Then initially derived from Russia abroad, funds were returned in the form of foreign investment . Currently, there is a number of small companies that are controlled by Russian business, but formally registered on the territory of other countries (Sibir Energy, Yeniseineftegaz and others). The use of such a form of foreign investment allows to protect the capital previously derived from the country from possible adverse changes in the organizational and economic conditions in Russia. The policy of the Russian Federation in recent years is aimed at the formation of a new organizational structure of the oil and gas complex, which is expressed in the strengthening of state-owned companies (Rosneft, Gazprom) and the transition of all managers and production units of Russian NCs under the state control. In this regard, at the end of 2006, the Government submitted to the State Duma project amendments B. rF Law "On Subsoil". New corrections are more likely multiplied by contradictions, and so
many and in the current edition of the Law "On Subsoil". This is a free reading of the Constitution, and insignificant institutions, and do not bind declarative norms, and elementary editorial carelessness. In practice, this leads to certain objective conflicts between federal authorities and authorities
the subjects of the federation, create serious complications, up to court proceedings, for subsoil users in solving issues of providing subsoil use, procedure for use, taxation, etc. Meanwhile, many problems can be avoided by entering into the current amendments. The law "On subsoil" was adopted 15 years ago, in early 1992. During this time, supplements and changes were made to it 13 times, in 1995 a new edition was adopted. There were repeatedly attempts to its fundamental replacement, for example, the so-called Mountain Code.
There are already more than a dozen options for the new edition. It was proposed to replace the licensed administrative system for providing the rights of use of subsoil to the contractual civil law, replace contests for auctions, etc. All this suggests that the law lives, actively reacts to the changes in the economy, trying to ensure the effectiveness of the subsoil use process. At the same time, the critical reading of the law makes it possible to identify numerous shortcomings in it, complicating the life of subsoil users and authorities.
With all its positive features, the current Federal Law "On Subsoil" contains a number of non-working declarative institutions and norms, as well as inaccurate, mutually exclusive and even erroneous provisions. Some of them in past years have been changed or refined. However, a number of absurdities still remained. Moreover, some significant omissions of the legislator can be eliminated without changing the general ideology of the law and its mechanisms. Indeed, in many cases, problems are created by the negligent attitude of the legislator and serving its legal divisions to the formulation of certain rules and institutions.
The amendments to the law on subsoil, regulating access to the strategic sections of the subsoil, during their consideration at the Government meeting practically did not cause comments. However, such comments arose during the re-coordination of the draft law.
There were proposals to supplement the list of minerals, whose deposits can be attributed to strategic, as well as register more stringent criteria for attributing deposits to strategic. One of the amendments provides for the formation of the federal executive authority authorized by the government to control foreign investment in the Russian NGK to identify the threat of national security as a result of an intended transaction. The strategic activities include mining of minerals in the subsoil area of \u200b\u200bthe federal significance. Amendments to the Law "On Subsoil" include three selection criteria for subsoil areas of federal significance:
The presence of unique resources, such as uranium, diamonds, pure quartz, rare earth metals;
The volume of extracted reserves of the field (installed only for oil, gas, gold and copper);
The subsoil section is considered to be strategic if it is in a strategic territory or within the inner seaside waters (that is, in the offshore zone).
Thus, all major oil and gas fields are attributed to the strategic, including those in a unallocated fund (a total number of about 30 oil and 40 gas objects), as well as absolutely all on the shelf. Oil and gas companies that own licenses for large deposits fall into the category of strategic.
The status of a plot of subsoil of federal significance will significantly limit the ability of foreign investors to buy Russian oil and gas assets. If the transaction falls under these parameters, then the overseas investor, which planning to control the Russian company will be obliged to apply to the above authorized body. At the same time, he may be suggested to take on some additional obligations if government agencies still consider the transaction possible.
In the case of the oil and gas field, its owner can consider selling gas at the prices of the domestic market or supply oil for state needs.
The draft law limits any investment from offshore zones. A company registered in such a zone, even if all the authorized capital will belong to citizens of Russia, is considered as a foreign basis, since the legislation indicates that the status of a legal entity is determined by the country where it is registered. According to the bill, foreign investors are obliged to coordinate the transaction to acquire a strategic enterprise share package, which exceeds 25% plus
1 promotion. A foreign company will be able to get more than a quarter in any major project only with the consent of the Russian government. Foreign or joint firms planning to participate in the auctions for the right to master large deposits will have to create joint ventures with Russian state-owned companies (Gazprom and Rosneft).
High oil and gas prices contribute to the accumulation of Russian NC significant investment resources. This means that the participation of foreign companies in the oil and gas complex as a source of significant investments is becoming less relevant compared to the possibility of attracting technologies to increase the efficiency of work in harsh natural climatic and
geographical conditions (for example, on the shelf of the northern seas). Welcoming foreign companies in its market, Russiahe wants other countries to show an adequate attitude towards Russian companies provided them with access to their market. Exporting the bulk of its products, Russian NK is interested in accessing oil and gas assets in consumer countries. In this regard, the state policy of Russia in the oil and gas industry has changed, which influenced the forms of interaction and interpenetration of foreign and Russian NK. First of all, these are joint projects with Russian state-owned companies (Gazprom, Rosneft), for example: in the Timan-Pechora, Eastern Siberia, in the north of Western Siberia (mainly in the YNAO) and on the shelf of the South, Arctic and Far Eastern seas.
State structures have a political advantage compared to private, and, participating in a consortium with them, a foreign investor can a certain extent to protect itself from further economic and political risks.
In exchange for the right to extract oil and gas in the Russian Federation, foreigners will need to be transferred to Russian partners in gas distribution, marketing or electric power assets in their territories (sales markets). Foreign companies can also acquire a small private oil and gas enterprise, developing deposits that are not included in the list of strategic. The purchase of foreign Russian NK shares (Gazprom, Rosneft, LUKOIL, Surgutneftegaz) is not excluded.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that from the Russian side, the attraction of a foreign investor into large oil and gas projects will be motivated by either imports of technologies, or the possibility of gaining access to market market infrastructure. Receiving funds from abroad playing today a secondary role. It is possible to provide foreign NK services for improving the efficiency of production (for example, on the shelf).
In accordance with the current legislation, the volume of state guarantees exhibited as security for external borrowing should be approved by the Federal Law on Budget. Within its framework, the volumes of state guarantees under the implementation of the SRP projects provided by the future state owners in these projects can be summed up and exhibited.
Today, Russian legislation requires the approval of each SRP project by a separate federal law. This means that in the formation of a budget for the next year, it suffices to sum up according to ratified agreements the volume of profitable oil states for this year, without exposing them to a separate discussion within the budget adoption procedure. On the other hand (no humus without good), the ratification of individual projects (the requirement made to the SRP legislation is significantly "weighting" for the investor to conclude an agreement with the state for each project) provides investors to maximize legal protection in the conditions of high instability of the Russian transitional economy And thereby significantly reduces the risk and increases the long-term financial rating of state guarantees on the basis of the PSA.
True, in our opinion, under one condition - that state guarantees on the basis of a specific project are used for the needs of project financing of this particular project. Such an approach will make it possible to bring these state guarantees from the sovereign risk area and significantly reduce the borrowing price. If state guarantees exhibited on the basis of a specific project will be used not only within this project, but also in the interests of other projects, that is, they will be redistributed through today's budget, they immediately fall under the sovereign risk, which will significantly increase the borrowing price and will put Doubt the feasibility of applying the proposed scheme as a whole.
This approach will provide an opportunity to break the traditional economies to consistently developing (non-transparent) economic, in accordance with which the project's financial rating cannot be higher than the company's rating that it carries out, which in turn cannot be higher than the financial rating of the parent and / or host country in which this project is being implemented.
In world practice, there is the only example known to us when the financial rating of the project exceeds the financial rating of the country in which it is carried out - the "Qatarugaz" project in Qatar (natural gas production at the North Field, located on the border with Iran of the Persian Gulf Waterproof, and His liquefaction at the LNG plant located on the northern tip of the peninsula). The proposed approach will ensure high financial ratings of the new type of state-owned state-owned guarantees in the framework of Russian projects, regardless of the financial rating of Russia itself, to expand the capabilities of Russian companies to attract project funds to the oil and gas projects developed on the terms of the SRP and reduce the price of borrowed capital for them.
Conclusion
Today, the situation in world oil production is somewhat different than a decade ago. The more advanced technologies of exploration and production of hydrocarbon raw materials allowed to open new areas in the world. For example, the area of \u200b\u200bdeep-water mining from the west coast of Africa. The regions such as Saudi Arabia are becoming more open for international companies, where you can get a barrel of high-quality oil for one or two dollars and where it is easy to transport it to export markets. For extractive countries, the world of oil and gas in 2001 became much more competitive than in 1991. In addition, the experience of foreign companies in Russia also did not comply with their expectations of the early 1990s.
Although many joint ventures that started 10 years ago were successful technically, very few of them brought sufficient return on investment, if they paid off at all.
The main problems faced by foreign investors in Russia are well known. This is, first of all, an imperfect legislative framework, unpredictability of the tax regime and excess bureaucratic control.
Can the Russian oil and gas complex for large-scale foreign investment in the future? In my opinion, if large investments of foreign companies will be sent to the Russian fuel and energy industry, this will only happen on the basis of the legislation on the product sharing.
This does not mean that PPP Panacea. And the reason is not that the product section seems to imply "tax breaks" or other privileges: it is well known to specialists that when oil prices are high, oil companies can earn a lot with a licensed system. The true cause of the commitment of foreign companies to work on the terms of the SRP is that the product section can add their projects that essential component that was absent in Russia in recent years is the stability and predictability of investment conditions.
This is not the same as the predictability of profits. When product sharing, the investor takes on geological, technical and financial risks. Under these conditions, it is not necessary to talk about guaranteed profits.
However, with legal and tax stability, which the product section can provide, companies are able to build long-term plans. This means that the profitability of a particular project more depends on the efficiency of the company's functioning (and, of course, from one external factor, which none of us is able to control - oil prices) than from good relations with government officials.
Very often, the product section is associated with foreign companies. In fact, from 22 fields approved for the development of products on the terms of the product, only 9 have foreign investors. All of these 9 deposits also have Russian investors.
Therefore, you can confidently say that Russian companies will receive real benefit from the production section of the production section. Here are direct, and indirect benefits.
The most direct benefit is access to financing, which will bring the product section. Predictability, stability and openness of the production modes - this is what makes them attractive not only for foreign companies, but also for foreign banks and other financial organizations that can provide for projects most of the capital. Let me remind you: many of the SRP projects will require $ 10 billion to $ 15 billion investments.
Banks are interested in attractive and competitive mode of product partition no less than oil companies. Bankers usually want to be confident that they will pay off their investments and gain profit.
If the Russian regime of the product section will not be competitive, then not only foreign companies will not invest in investments, but banks will not finance projects both foreign and Russian companies.
One of the characteristics of the global oil and gas industry is the fact that companies that are usually competitors work on large projects together. Companies benefit from resource unification in several ways: risk is divided into all, and partners can learn from each other. Russian companies will also benefit from the exchange of technology and management skills, which will bring together work with foreign companies in the SRP projects. And vice versa. Obstacles In order for the joint work of work in Russia, there is no widespread practice, no. Successful partnership in Russia could lead to joint work in other countries.
Another indirect benefit from the transparency of the product section belongs to the field of impressions. If you look at the market value of the shares of Russian oil companies in relation to the reserves that they have, we will see that they are evaluated significantly lower than the shares of foreign companies.
Why is this happening? One of the main reasons is the absence of transparency and good corporate governance in Russia. At the same time, the market reacts positively to changes for the better in this area. This is also convincing the example of Yukos, which in the last 4 years managed to reach 40-fold growth of the market course of its shares.
As much positively, the market is able to respond to steps that the government will have decided to show that Russia is moving towards creating a more transparent investment regime.
One of the immediate consequences of the completion of the formation of the production section of the product would be greater investment confidence in the fact that Russia is true and that large continuing deposits may eventually be developed - either within the framework of cooperation between Russian and foreign companies or Russian companies in foreign funding. These factors would increase the market value of Russian companies.
So the product section is an important issue not only for foreign companies in Russia. This is the best and, in the foreseeable future, the only way to attract capital and technologies necessary to develop large new deposits in Russia is the best way.
It is clear that the product section is the question of which Russian and foreign companies can work together. The creation of a clear, stable, predictable, open, favorable and competitive investment regime in Russia is in our common interests. Currently, such conditions do not exist. Therefore, there were no investments in Russia on the terms of the product section, except for the projects of the SRP, concluded to the Federal Law "On PSA".
But this block of laws has its advantages even in the present, not the most effective for investors. However, there are both restrictions on its use. Almost exhausted "Resource" quota of deposits for mastering on the terms of the SRP (30% of the volume of explored stocks of the country). The procedure for obtaining the right to use subsoils on the terms of the SRP is excessively complex and scarcerated. Obtaining all permits and visations required for PSA projects requires a mass of time, and therefore is an expensive process. This reduces the competitiveness of all companies operating in Russia. Investors are supported by the efforts of the Government of the Russian Federation to establish a "single window" for the PSA in order to reduce bureaucratic red tape.
If we talk about other sectors of the economy (production, sphere of services), then the PSA does not apply here at all. Economic, the country's investment legislation needs progressive development not only by the SRP line
To increase the investment attractiveness and competitiveness of the NGK oil and gas industry, it is necessary:
To direct efforts to build the resource base of the oil and gas sector of the Fuel and Energy Sector, ensure sufficient publicity in relation to the state of this database;
Create a centralized bank of domestic progressive types of equipment and technologies that can be purchased and used by investors;
To develop a program of a phased enhancement of the investment attractiveness of the Russian oil and gas complex, including measures to strengthen the stock market, which should be an effective mechanism for mobilizing investments, sending them into the most promising NGK development projects and in the most effective entrepreneurial structures. The regulations have been spent too much time and effort. It's time to finally arrange them (in the form that would have to create an attractive investment regime) and move on.
With the hugeness of Russian distances and the inconsistency of the internal and world prices, oil transport will always be an important issue. But no private company will lay a pipeline that costs several billion dollars if there is no confidence that it will have free access to this pipeline for transporting its products. Therefore, the draft law "On the main pipelines should include pipelines that are paced by private companies and therefore belong to them and are managed by them.
Finally, for product sharing agreements need to operate a management system.
In conclusion, you can draw the following conclusions.
The NGC is and will undoubtedly remain the most important part of the Russian economy, providing even with a modern crisis state a quarter of the value of industrial products, a third of income to the budget and about half of all currency export earnings. It remains the basis of the life support of the nation, a solid foundation for the country's economic security, an important source of repayment of external debt.
The solution of the NGK problems is closely related to the solution of the problems of the entire Russian economy. The situation in NGK worsens - the socio-economic position of the whole country deteriorates. Therefore, the NGK problems should be considered as a primary, along with the problems of APK, MIC, transport and communications.
The role of the NGK in the coming years not only will not decrease, it will be consistently increased, in order to provide Russia with the opportunity to restore its overall economic potential, to make the necessary structural restructuring of the entire economy, to ensure the Russians new quality of life.
NGK will continue to play a crucial role in the foreign economic strategy of Russia. This, first of all, will refer to the possibilities of obtaining export income, so necessary for the implementation of reforms. NGK and its potential opportunities will continue to act the main guarantor in our policy of obtaining long-term loans and loans in foreign countries. Equally important is the role of the fuel and energy complex in promoting the development of integration of other CIS countries with Russia on the basis of the continuing interest of these countries in the supply of Russian fuel and energy products. The "energy factor" is able to promote more active policy of Russia in its relationship with the EU, USA, Japan and other countries.
NGK problems are not worn and will not wear a conjunctural nature, they are long-term and solved only in general conjunction with the problems of the entire economic development of Russia. For this reason, constant coordination is extremely important when implementing the programs "ES-2020" and "Strategy-2010".
Investment volumes that need to be attracted to the NGK of Russia to solve the priority tasks of the economic strategy of Russia are so great that they make a senseless dispute about the priority of certain sources of investment. On this field, there is enough space for all - and private domestic structures, and the state, and foreign entrepreneurs. The question is how and where to get investment funds.
Mobilization of large investments for the needs of the further development of the NGC can only be carried out in the event of a significant change in the investment climate for both domestic and foreign capital.
Prospects for the development of the global oil and gas market are favorable to increase investment in the oil and gas sector of Russia.
Russia has sufficient investment attractiveness, but significant efforts are needed to further increase it.
In conclusion, I want to note that foreign oil companies see enormous potential in Russia. That is why they are still here - despite the problems encountered on their paths. Nevertheless, in order to create the conditions for attracting long-term investments in the Russian oil and gas complex, it is necessary to do a lot more work.
The creation of these conditions is in common interests and Russian, foreign oil and gas companies.
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complex Russia as a resource of economic growth Abstract \u003e\u003e Economic theoryWork is to consider oil and gas complex Russia As a resource of economic ... oil and gas complexwho is not able to quickly turn these resources into internal investments ... with foreign capital either foreign Companies on ...
Studying foreign experience management and development of the oil and gas industry, the study of the main problems of the industry in countries that are russian russia in the world oil and gas market, as well as the trends in the development of the global oil and gas complex as a whole, is a prerequisite for the formation of scientific ideas about the main directions of improving the efficiency of the modern Russian oil and gas industry As an integral part of the world. The Russian oil and gas industry practice is noticeably different from those used in foreign countries. For example, in countries with a liberal approach, private companies can develop fields independently, direct public participation in mining is absent or slightly.
Interesting from the point of view of regulating the oil and gas market is the experience of the United States and Canada. The global economy towards the characteristic features of the American energy market belongs: a tough restriction on the use of foreign capital in hydrocarbon mining; Patent system for the right to conduct exploration and hydrocarbon production; Effective legal support; a rigid antitrust policy, providing for equal access of companies to the market, excluding the monopoly position of any of them even on the territory of a separate state; Trend towards strengthening centralized regulatory impact on NGK. In the US market, thousands of private mining companies operate. At the same time, there is no tax on the extraction of minerals (NPPI), which contributes to an easier achievement of profitability. Oil mining debuticated. Unlike Russia, where control is carried out through the heavyweight system of budget planning with minimal operational adjustment capabilities, in the US, local oil miners have the ability to quickly and flexibly respond to market changes. The presence of a significant number of small oil refineries (refineries) fully removes the problem of selling oil produced. Thus, in Russia there are only 50, and in the USA - more than 8 thousand small and medium-sized businesses in the oil sphere. Canada carries out effective diverse regulation of the subsoil use sphere, which is based on the principles of ensuring the effective use of subsoil, prevent unjustified exhaustion of reserves, ensuring export efficiency in terms of national interests.
In Canada, there is a flexible taxation system of subsoil use: tax rates are governed, tax holidays are provided, a discount system is applied. This Royalty to oil prices, flow rate, oil quality, type of deposits, level of production costs and transport, opening time. Such a mechanism encourages the search and exploration of new deposits and areas, systemically increases the efficiency of oil production. The tax burden of oil production in the country is relatively high. Profit tax is 40.8-45.8%, including the federal - 28%, deductions to the provincial budget - 12.6-17.8%. The cumulative share of the state in income from oil production on expert estimates is 45-52%. In addition, one of the main directions of regulation is to stimulate the attraction of domestic and foreign investment. The law on foreign investment contains such conditions for their involvement that ensure compliance with the interests of Canada in the field of efficient use of resources, the protection of the natural environment, commercial interests, support for geological exploration (including direct subsidies), export control (including control over the return of export income), protectionism in The ratio of rich resources, but weakly mastered areas, as well as the observance of the interests of the indigenous population.
Extremely significant from the point of view of Russian reality, such measures are also applied as a ban on companies and firms with the participation of the state use offshore schemes; ban on the participation of managers of companies with state participation on the creation of its own firms that can be used to bring the assets of companies, including in offshore; Control over the income companies.
In large oil-producing countries, income from oil exports is organically digested and digested by national economies and redistributed among numerous population. In Arab monarchies, the situation is different. Huge oil revenues dissolved a few population.
According to the reserves of oil and gas, the first place occupies the Middle and Middle East. The countries of this region over the past decades are among the top ten leaders of world oil and gas production. Huge oil and gas reserves, as well as the high level of their production at a small number of indigenous population are the main factors for the countries of this type. The oil and gas industry is fully nationalized and monitored by the state through state oil companies.
The largest non-equestrian countries in the Middle and Middle East are very successful in the field of investing in the Western economy through targeted investments in the structure of transnational corporations and major international financial organizations (including IBRD and IMF). The volume of foreign investment of Saudi Arabia is already calculated by hundreds of billions of dollars, and most of the part goes to the United States. Kuwait is a co-owner of dozens of British, Canadian, American, Western European and Japanese companies (British Petroleum, General Motors, IBM, Kodak, Total, Sony, etc.).
In addition to the three refineries, Kuwait owns three European plants in Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy. Owned by Kuwait Thousands of gas stations in Denmark, Sweden, Great Britain, Italy and Norway, ten airlinas in large Western European airports. Possessing the fleet of 25 own tankers, Kuwait, in fact, has today's own sales network (the entire cycle from mining to the final consumer) for a significant part of the oil produced. Profit from foreign capital investments is becoming an increasingly significant source of foreign exchange income. Thus, one of the strategic directions of the oil policy of the countries of the Middle and Middle East is the creation of oil refining infrastructure and sales of petroleum products abroad by purchasing assets of foreign oil companies, which makes it possible to carry out effective control over the full cycle of mining, processing, and sales. Practical interest also represents the experience of Norway, in which the oil and gas industry occupies the greatest proportion in the structure of GDP, while fully controlled by the state. This industry is the largest source of country revenues, as well as the most important driver of technological and innovative development. In 2012, the oil and gas sector accounted for 23% of GDP, 30% of revenues to the state budget, 52% of export revenues and 29% of all investments. Norway takes the seventh place among the world's largest exporters of oil and third - among gas exporters (according to 2013).
Revenues from the oil and gas industry of Norway come to the State Pension Fund, and then invest in foreign securities. The foundation, being simultaneously savings and stabilization, ensures the long-term stability of the country's budget system. The Norwegian government forms the oil and gas sector policy, exercises long-term planning in the industry, chooses the territories to which licenses may be issued, conducts an assessment of reserves, geological exploration of unexplored areas, etc. The state controls the implementation of projects at all stages, demanding from companies a drilling program, a report on the opening of deposits, a production plan, a plan for transportation, a plan for processing mined raw materials and ensuring their observance. The Ministry of Energy and Oil is responsible for the formation of the Energy Policy of Norway. It also plays a key role in issuing licenses.
Operational control over compliance with license conditions is carried out by the Norwegian oil directorate, which is subordinated to the Ministry. The strength of the oil and gas complex of Norway is the selected management model, the main element of which was state regulation. The state was initially developed by an effective program for the development of the oil and gas distribution complex, the correct tasks were delivered: national control and participation in oil projects, rationality of resource management, high level of technological competence, long-term potential. Among the methods of achieving the goals set, the active attraction of foreign leaders of the industry and the rapid borrowing of financial and intellectual resources for investment in oil production were selected. Subpauing foreign companies to their reserves, Norway ordered them to transfer their technological experience and prepare local personnel. Also, transnational oil companies were obliged to contribute to the financing of project engineering programs, which allowed the country to solve many scientific research tasks. The high development of the economy, in particular the social sphere, (to refrain, as the economy and the private sphere is not the same) of Norway testify to the effectiveness of the policy in the field of subsoil use, the oil and gas sector management and its legal regulation. - Why a fragment of the text is highlighted in gray? P
Table 1. Features of the development of the oil and gas market of foreign countries
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Thus, a number of the above approaches are relevant to further improve the mechanisms for the development of the oil and gas market. These include regulation of the industry from the state, a tough position in defending national interests, the use of oil and gas revenues to invest in the national economy, an orientation for innovative technologies, etc. The study and rational use of foreign experience will increase the efficiency of the oil and gas complex of Russia.
13:08 — REGNUM. Iran begins selection of foreign companies that plan to participate in large local oil and gas projects. In particular, in the development of hydrocarbon deposits. This became known from the message posted on the website of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Acceptance of applications from foreign oil miners began on Monday, October 17, and will last until November 19 of this year. NIOC invites to participate in the prequalification selection of interested in the selection and mining of black gold investors. The final list of selected organizations will publish on December 7. However, I still did not announce the specific list of projects about which it was discussed.
After the cancellation in January of this year, Western sanctions against Iran, introduced for the country's nuclear program, IRI is trying to increase oil production and market share before the mining indicators. At first, the Iranian authorities stated that they would increase the production to the planned 4 million barrels per day by June of this year, then by September. Now and at all moved timing for 2019. It became obvious that without financial investments of foreign companies Iran himself could not cope. Therefore, to increase the attractiveness of its oil and gas fields, Tehran in August of this year approved a new model of oil contracts for foreign investors (IPC). According to the Iranian plan, the oil and gas industry of the country requires about $ 150 billion investments in order to increase production by a million barrels per day by 2020. Thus, in the next two years, Iri intends to sign contracts for $ 25 billion with foreign companies.
IPC provides more flexible conditions for foreign companies compared to past contracts. Details of contracts are still not disclosed. But it is known that now foreign investors will be able to conclude contracts for up to 20 years, which will allow companies at least to compensate their costs. Old contracts assumed a one-time payment, and their validity period was only five years.
The Iranian National Oil Company has already signed the first contract for the new model in October, but not with a foreign company, and the local SETAD EJRAYE FARMAN EMAM. This company, American mass media call part of the Iranian leader conglomerate Ali Khamenei. Under the terms of the contract, it is envisaged to increase the methods of oil recovery of reservoirs and an increase in oil production at the field of the Bouche deposit as part of the development of the second phase of the Yara field.
Earlier IA REGNUM. It reported that Norwegian, Dutch, British companies at the end of August of the current year have already stated that they are interested in working together with Tehran in the oil industry, and asked to provide them with the opportunity to study the territories in the Caspian Sea. True, Deputy General Director of the National Iranian Oil Company MANUCHERE MOLOGE I did not specify what companies are we talking about. However, according to Manuchry, Tehran has already proposed foreign investors to participate in intelligence and developing simultaneously in four hydrocarbon production projects in the Caspian Sea. In particular, the Sardar-E Giangal deposits.
As for the Russian-Iranian cooperation in the oil industry, then in August of the Russian Ambassador to Tehran Levan Jagaryan She told that Russian oil companies were interested in Iranian oil projects. Most clearly, it is, of course, it is about mining projects, but it is possible to participate in the field of oil refining and petrochemistry. Moreover, the option of creating a consortium of Russian oil companies to work in Iran, Jagaryan said.
About his desire to work in Iran previously stated "LUKOIL". According to the Russian ambassador, the company considers participation in projects to develop two fields in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Ahvaz in the west of Ire. Perhaps the return of LUKOIL in the Anaran project, where the company worked before the introduction of sanctions. Also, at the coordination stage, there are memorandums about the cooperation of Gazprom Neft, Gazprom with Iranian oil and gas companies NIOC and NIGC in the development of oil and gas fields. Interest in participation in Iranian projects also expressed "Zarubezhneft" and "Tatneft".
History
The development of Soviet oil was obtained by a powerful impulse after the oil crisis of 1973-1974. Revenue from oil exports sharply increased, and investments in the oil industry increased. The Soviet leadership sought to maximize oil production as much as possible, and this task was completed: the peak of production fell in 1988, when production amounted to 11.8 million barrels per day.
However, by the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, serious imbalances arose in the Russian oil industry. The pursuit of the plan led to the rise in the cost of production: a year after year, each new ton of oil demanded all the large investments. In 1970-1973, the share of the oil sector in the investment of the entire industry was about 9 percent, and in 1986 it increased more than twice and amounted to 19.5 percent. Many fields were used irrationally, which led to their premature depletion and damage to the environment. Despite all the efforts, in the late 1980s, oil mining began to fall. By that time, the USSR was already firmly sitting on an oil needle: the share of revenues from the sale of fuel and energy resources in Soviet currency revenues reached the highest level in 1984 and amounted to 55 percent. As you know, the resulting fall in world oil prices had catastrophic consequences for the Soviet economy.
Romance ninety
In the early 1990s, hopes for the restoration of the oil and gas industry were associated with foreign capital. Famous Decree No. 1403, signed by Boris Yeltsin in November 1992, which gave the formation and privatization of Rosneft, LUKOIL, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz, provided for sale up to 15 percent. Shares of these companies to foreign investors.
Moreover, the state ceased financing the oil and gas industry, and in order to attract external investments, there was significant benefits to joint ventures (SP), primarily the right to export 100 percent. All over oil. At the beginning of the 1990s, the real boom of the joint venture in Russian oil was coming. By the end of the 1990s, when exporting preferences were canceled, the joint venture mined more than 20 million tons of oil per year.
At an early stage, the joint venture was created mainly by small foreign companies, but in the early 1990s, the Granda of World Oil and Gas Business came to Russia. In 1994-1995, the Russian government signed three product sharing agreements (PSA). Two concerned projects on the Sakhalin shelf: Sakhalin-1 with Exxon and Sodeco and Sakhalin-2 with Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui. The third agreement on the development of the Harjaginsky field in the Nenets Autonomous District was signed with the French Total.
It was in the three SRP that the changing attitude of the state to Western oil companies was reflected. The history of these projects is different. Thus, the negotiations on Sakhalin-1 began in the 1970s, then the Soviet government decided to attract Japanese companies to the development of the project. In the early 1990s, Exxon entered the project. The story of Sakhalin-2 began in 1991, when the Soviet government announced a competition for the preparation of a feasibility study of the development of Piltun-Astokh and Lunsky deposits. The competition won the consortium of Western companies to which shell and Mitsubishi were joined in the future. Finally, the development of the Harjaginsky field began in 1999. Total has been brought to the development of two of the six production facilities of the field. All three agreements were signed by the Government of Russia a few months before the adoption of the SRP Law in December 1995.
It is noteworthy that in the three PSA, legal protection was provided from any subsequent legislative restrictions that could worsen the positions of foreign investors. The agreements were signed on the terms that put them outside of Russian jurisdiction. In the mid-1990s, such "extraterritorial" status of projects did not confuse the government Russia. Oil mining fell in the country, and there was a disastrously enough investment in new projects. With an average oil price in 1995, 18 dollars. Barrel and imperfection of tax legislation, which at any time could unpredictably change, agreements became the only way to attract multi-billion dollar investments from Western companies. After the adoption of the Law on the PSA, the Government selected more than 20 projects for their development, now in accordance with the rules of the SRP.
Love during cooling
However, the further implementation of the SRP regime stalled. The government could not agree on either within himself, nor interested parties a regulatory framework needed to implement projects in accordance with just adopted by law. And by the beginning of the 2000s, the overall position in the industry has changed: oil prices began to grow, which increased the profitability of investments in mining projects and reduced the attractiveness of the PSA for foreign investors. The hosts of the cubized weight of Russian companies were also not interested in attracting foreign companies on the terms of the product section. The first such transaction was the purchase of BP in 1997 10 percent. Shares of Sidanko from the structures of Vladimir Potanina. In 2003, BP united its Russian assets with TNC and actually acquired about half of the TNC shares at the Alpha-Aksess-Renov consortium. In 2004, ConocoPhillips acquired 7.6 percent from the state. Shares "LUKOIL", and later bought additional shares from Vagit Alekperov and other Russian shareholders of the company. Khodorkovsky himself in 2002-2003 was close to selling a large package of Yukos Exxonmobil, but for known reasons did not take place.
It is worth noting that in the early 2000s, some Western companies were ready to directly invest in oil and gas projects in Russia without PSA, that is, on the conditions of a standard tax regime, and even without major Russian partners. Thus, in the mid-1990s, Shell expects to master the Salym deposit in the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous District on the terms of the SRP, but later agreed to start work in ordinary tax regime and in 2004 made the first investment. In 2003, the American company Marathon began working in Western Siberia, which acquired the Khanty-Mansiysk Oil Corporation.
Error correction
As oil prices grew and Western companies were increasingly interested in investment in the Russian oil sector, dissatisfaction with the Government was increasingly discontent towards the three SRPs concluded in the first half of the 1990s. The main claims were related to the fact that projects became increasingly costly. To the greatest extent from the pressure of the state on the SRP operators, Shell suffered, the largest shareholder Sakhalin-2. In 2005 and 2006, a variety of checks were literally collapsed on the project, which revealed not only an overestimation of expenses, but also a violation of environmental legislation. The then head of Rosprirodnadzor Oleg Mitvol rated the environmental damage from Shell's activities on Sakhalin in $ 50 billion, the amount comparable to the damage from Hurricane "Katrina". At the end of 2006, Sakhalin-2 shareholders sold 50 percent. Plus one share in the company-operator Gazprom project, after which all environmental claims were removed.
The development of the Harjaginsky field by Total was also accompanied by a permanent conflict with state structures. In the early 2000s, the tax authorities annually challenged the costs of TOTAL and refused to approve the estimates of the costs for the project. The French company in 2003 even filed a lawsuit against the Russian government to Stockholm arbitration, requiring the costs of costs incurred. The conflict continued until Total and another foreign member of the project, Statoil, agreed in 2009 to transfer 20 percent. In the project of state "Zarubezhneft".
In order to sell gas to end users in Russia, Exxonmobil should put gas on pipes controlled by Gazprom. Access to these pipes is also needed by an American company if she wishes to sell its gas outside Russia, China or Korea. Over the past few years, ExxonMobil and Gazprom cannot agree on the price of gas from Sakhalin-1. But still, in the main maintenance of control over the ExxonMobil project, succeeded. It remains only to guess which arguments convinced the Russian leadership to abandon the attempts of force on Exxonmobil, similar to what was carried out in relation to Sakhalin-2.
One way or another, the development of the SRP in Russia froze. To date, the share of SRP operators accounts for only 3.2 percent. from the overall oil production and 3.6 percent. From the total production of gas in Russia. Such a production volume is comparable to the indicators of the middle Russian company, such as "Bashneft" or "RussNeft". PGP projects in Russia play a much more modest role than in the resources rich in the CIS countries for example, in Kazakhstan and most countries of foreign countries, where the product partition mode is used.
Freedomfti and gas on Sakhalin projects will grow, but persistent allergies to the SRP in the political leadership of Russia are too much associated with the loss of state control in the "Lichy Ninetieth". In 2008, speaking of the SRP, Vladimir Putin said that Russia would not allow the "colonial use of its resources." Foreign companies are invited to work in Russia as part of a standard tax regime. The trouble is that the development of the oil and gas industry has no prospects for this mode.
Tax Tupik
Manufacturers in Russia pay the same taxes as the other companies for value added, profits, property, social deductions. In addition, oil companies pay tax on mining (NDPI) and, if they export the farmed oil, export duties. NPPI is calculated by the formula approved in 2002: the amount of tax depends on the current price of oil and the ruble exchange rate to the dollar. At the price of the brand URALS per 100 dollars. Barrel and course 29 rubles per dollar, the manufacturer must pay about 18 dollars. With each barrel of oil produced. However, this tax is not so terrible for oil companies as an export duty, which is calculated on a progressive scale: the higher the price of oil, the higher the duty rate. From August 2004, the rate of export duties at the price of oil is above 25 dollars. Barrel is 65 percent.
Thus, if you take into account other taxes, at high oil prices, the tax burden on exporters exceeds 90 percent. The current tax system was established in the middle of zero, when the task of removing excess of oil companies and fill the stabilization fund. High tax burden did not raise oil companies, but made unprofitable investments in new deposits. It is significant that large Russian companies, such as LUKOIL and TNK-BP, have intensified the search for projects outside of Russia, largely due to the unfavorable tax climate.
In recent years, the government has tried to adjust the tax regime, for example, establishing preferential rates of NPPI for old produced deposits. Since October 2011, the maximum export duty rate on oil has been reduced from 65 to 60 percent. Simultaneously, however, export duties on petroleum products were significantly increased. Despite these cosmetic reliefs, the development of new major projects with existing tax regime remains unprofitable. Moreover, those important oil projects that were implemented in Russia in recent years have become only possible thanks to the political influence of companies that have achieved special tax sentigations. These projects include the Filanovsky field in North Caspian, which is developed by LUKOIL, and the Vankor deposit of Rosneft in Eastern Siberia; Both companies received from the state the right of the government enshrined by special regulations not to pay export duties on oil from these projects at the initial stage of their development. It should be noted that Rosneft benefits on the Vanctic deposit expired in May 2011 and were not extended.
Arctic hugging
In recent years, against the background of tightening the tax regime, the state began to exercise a growing interest in the development of new promising oil and gas areas, primarily on the Arctic shelf. The development of Arctic projects is possible only with the participation of foreign companies; The only similar project carried out by Gazprom is the development of the Presentation field on the shelf of the Pechora Sea, in practice, showed that without foreigners, the Arctic projects are not shifted by Russian companies. The long-suffering project was stretched for 16 years. The field development platform was built on the defense enterprises of the North of Russia, primarily at the Sevmash factory. At the same time, the scheme of arrangement of the field was revised several times, and the cost of the project was constantly growing. As a result, it has repeatedly exceeded the initial calculations and amounted to almost 4 billion dollars., Which makes doubt on the return on the project. It is characteristic that Gazprom Neft Shelf, the Gazprom division, which leads the development of the PRAKLOM, still stands for the use of the SRP regime for the project.
So, the development of the Arctic shelf is possible only in partnership with foreign, primarily Western, companies with the necessary technological and financial resources. At the end of the "zero" years, Russia's leadership decided to begin the full-scale development of the Arctic. Next scheme was chosen: the government issues licenses to Gazprom and Rosneft state companies, which then attract foreign partners to develop deposits by transferring them minority stakes. The issuance of licenses turned out to be a simple. Already in 2010, Rosnedra agency under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology, licensed issued six licenses for the development of Rosneft shelf deposits and two Gazprom. In the current year, Rosnedra plans to issue more than 15 licenses, and several dozen will be issued them. At the same time, a more complex task, the development of a clear strategy for mastering the shelf and the tax regime mired in bureaucracy.
The government has not yet approved the State Protection Program of the Shelf. It remains unclear the separation of roles between state-owned companies: initially it was assumed that Gazprom and Rosneft will create a joint company operator of the shelf projects, then they will master the deposit fields: Rosneft oil, Gazprom gas. The section "spheres of influence" between state-owned companies, however, did not take place. First, many licensed areas are not divided, so it is impossible to specifically divide them into oil and gas. Secondly, in the absence of clear political attitudes Rosneft and Gazprom, they began to compete for new shelf licenses, while Rosneft claims for gas-bearing areas in the Barents Sea.
Partnership with many unknown
As a result, a paradoxical situation has developed. For the first time since the mid-1990s, the state is interested in attracting foreign oil and gas companies to projects in Russia. However, since there are no intent strategy and tax regime, foreigners are offered not only to deal with competing state-owned companies, but also to enter projects, the profitability of which cannot be considered. At the same time, state companies prefer not to invest their own funds in exploration of license sites, offering foreign partners to pay for the pleasure of working on the Russian shelf. In other words, foreign companies make the following sentence: you take on the technological and financial risks of the project, and if you are lucky and you will find oil or gas, then we will agree on tax regime. And if they do not find, it means that they are not lucky and the means were wasted.
Some foreign companies seem to be ready to start work even on such conditions. Over the past year, Rosneft has signed several agreements on the development of shelf projects: with Chevron and Exxonmobil companies for sites in the Black Sea and from BP to sites in the Kara Sea and with ExxonMobil for the same sites. However, signed agreements do not mean that Western companies intend to seriously invest in the shelf projects. Rather, they seek to "stroke" their participation in these projects and, spending a minimum of money, agree on the conditions of further work. In addition, the two agreements from the three signed by Rosneft have already raised strength: Chevron left the project to explore Shacksky's shaft in the Black Sea, referring to unfavorable geological factors, and Rosneft transaction with BP was torpedoed by Russian partners of the British company.
The transaction with ExxOnmobil, announced at the end of August 2011, suggests seismic exploration and drilling of search and exploration wells in the Kara Sea. However, the tax regime for the further development of deposits will be determined in the future, and until then, the American company is unlikely to invest in a draft amount close to those who announced representatives of Rosneft and the Russian government. Rosneft is now actively looking for additional partners for exploration and development of shelf fields and is likely to find them, but the lack of a clear tax regime will significantly complicate the implementation of these projects.
A visual example of these difficulties is the project to develop the Shtokman deposit in the Barents Sea. This is a giant deposit located 600 kilometers from the coast, was open in 1988. In the 1990s, control over him was carried out by joint ventures Gazprom and Rosneft; In 2004, Rosneft lost its stake in the project to Gazprom. The sluggish negotiations with potential foreign partners interested in the development of shtokman continued since the early 1990s. In the mid-2000s, Gazprom has intensified the negotiation process with Western companies, however, the Russian gas monopoly when choosing partners showed greater intelligibility, demanding for itself the most favorable conditions. In 2006, Gazprom stated that the proposals received from Western companies did not satisfy it. It was decided to leave control over the field in the hands of Gazprom, and Western companies to attract exclusively as contractors.
As a result of long-term trade, held with the participation of the first persons of the state, in 2007 Gazprom signed agreements with two contractors, Statoil and Total, which received 24 percent, respectively. and 25 percent. In the company project operator. However, the development of the deposit never began. In 2008, the global financial crisis broke out, which led to a sharp decrease in gas demand in Europe. Meanwhile, in the United States, another potential gas consumer from the shtokman, mining of shale gas sharply increased and gas purchases from abroad decreased. Thus, gas from the Shtokman field was inevitably expensive turned out to be uncompetitive before it began to be mined.
After several years of negotiations with Western companies in the summer of 2011, the Government finally decided to provide the Operator of the Development Deposit Deposit for property tax, but this late solution in itself cannot ensure the profitability of the Shtokman project. If additional and more large-scale tax breaks are not provided, the investment decision on the field is unlikely to be accepted. Thus, the unfavorable tax regime remains one of the main factors that prevent the start of developing the field.
At the same time, neither Gazprom nor its Western partners can afford to officially abandon the project: too much effort was spent on the achievement of existing agreements, and, especially for Gazprom, maintaining the showerman on the afloat is the issue of prestige. Instead, the company regularly declare that the project is still committed, but the investment decision and, accordingly, the production of production is periodically postponed for a year or two.
Can if they want
Although the Shtokman project is postponed in a long box, the French Total recently acquired a 20 percentage package in another large-scale gas project. The project for the development of the South Tambia field and the construction of a plant for the production of liquefied natural gas is known as "Yamal LNG". This project demonstrates that in certain circumstances the government is capable of providing oil and gas companies to the most favored regime, including tax issues.
The South Tamba deposit is located in the north of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. In late 2000, Yamal LNG company, which owns a license to a field, resell several times and in 2009 was under the control of NOVATEK, the largest private gas producing company of Russia.
Despite the fact that in the official strategy of Gazprom, the development of the South Tambia field was planned at the 2020s, Novatek decided to forcing the project. The launch of the first stage of the LNG plant with a capacity of 5.5 million tons per year is planned in 2016, two more queues in 2017 and 2018. At the same time, the state reaction to the project of a private company was sharply different from ordinary bureaucratic red tape. Over the past year, the project "Yamal LNG" was provided with unprecedented state support. The government has promised the private company NOVATEK 12-year tax holidays on NPPI. At recent competitions organized by Rosnedari, NOVATEK received licenses for several large deposits on Yamal, thereby increasing the resource base of the project. In addition, NOVATEK can receive state subsidies for the purchase of LNG tankers to develop data from deposits. The crown of generosity was the provision of "NOVATEK" of the export channel actually bypassing Gazprom.
NOVATEKA state support chronologically coincided with the emergence of Gennady Timchenko, as part of its shareholders, co-owner of the GUNVOR oil player and familiar Vladimir Putin. Timchenko himself denies some personal attack of its success in the Russian community business. However, after purchasing Timchenko, Novatek's stake in 2009, according to the press, Timchenko and Leonid Michelson, the chairman of the company's board, own a package of its shares close to the control 10, the cost of shares increased several times. Unprecedented government support for a private gas producer obviously affected the stormy growth of the company's value.
Strategy and risk
For twenty years, foreign companies in Russia experienced both state love and state anger. The climbing of the oligarchs in the 1990s put the cross in the PSA mode, but opened the road to Western companies who wanted to invest in the capital of Russian oil and gas structures. The formation of state-capitalism in Putin's era forced foreign companies to strive for partnership with Rosneft and Gazprom. But the achievement of this goal turned out to be difficult not only because of the ambitions of Russian state-owned companies, but also due to excessive tax pressure on the oil industry. At the end of the "zero" years, the political cycle in the oil and gas sector went to the second round. As in the 1990s, there are those private companies in the best position, whose owners have enlisted support for state leaders.
Under these conditions, two possibilities exist for foreign companies. The first is the development of cooperation with Gazprom and Rosneft. In the foreseeable future, these two state-owned companies will be able to cooperate with foreigners in megaprojects, such as the arrangement of the Arctic shelf. In the exchange of state-owned company will require investments, technologies, as well as assets outside of Russia. In addition, the Foreign Companies will be expected to be assisting, primarily "Gazprom", in the implementation of its pipeline projects in Europe. For example, it is likely that German Wintershall and Italian ENI entered the South Stream Gazprom project in many respects to facilitate access to the fields in Russia.
The second opportunity for foreign companies is cooperation with private Russian companies. As recent practice shows, it is precisely companies like "NOVATEK", can achieve tax preferences for their projects faster and more efficient than, seemingly almighty Gazprom. Total has joined two significant gas projects, Shtokman in partnership with Gazprom and Yamal LNG in cooperation with Novatek. It is likely that Yamal LNG will be implemented faster than Shtokman, in any case, over the past year, NOVATEK has received unprecedented state support, and Shtokman stood on the spot.
The reverse side of the medal in collaboration with private companies is the dependence on their owners, or rather, on their political ties that allow them to seek the location of the state. Over the past 20 years, in the history of the oil and gas sector of Russia, there were quite a few takeoffs and falls. Yukos, the largest private oil and gas company of the country, was eliminated in just two years. Structures that worked closely with Gazprom in the 1990s and received assets from a gas monopoly on favorable terms, for example, "ITERA" and "Stroytransgaz", in the 2000s lost their support and were forced to return most of Gazprom's assets . Mikhail Gutseriev, who created from scratch, from scratch, one of the largest oil companies, RussNeft, was prosecuted and emigrated to London in 2007, to sell "RussNeft" by the structures of Oleg Deripaska. But by the mid-2010, all charges against Gutseriyev were withdrawn, he came to Russia and no matter how he did not come back to the management of Russnefty.
As and 10-15 years ago, foreign companies are forced to bet on the political influence of their partners. Cooperation with state-owned companies is safer politically and opens access to significant projects, but the implementation of these projects can be postponed for years. The bid for private companies whose owners can take advantage of their proximity to the Higher Political Guidelines, promises the momentary favor of the state, but does not guarantee long-term project support, especially in the event of a change in political leadership or exiting the projects of their Russian shareholders.
