Basic research. Mobilization economy of the USSR in the pre-war period (1917

Regulation of issues related to the formation and procedure for using the state reserve and mobilization reserve of the Russian Federation is regulated by the Federal Law of February 26, 1997.

No. 31-FZ “On mobilization preparation and mobilization in the Russian Federation” and Federal Law of December 29, 1994 No. 79-FZ “On the state material reserve”.

Mobilization preparation is understood as a set of activities carried out in peacetime for the advance preparation of the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, the preparation of state authorities, local governments and organizations, the training of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations , bodies and special formations created for wartime in accordance with Federal Law of May 31, 1996 No. 61-FZ “On Defense” to ensure the protection of the state from armed attack and meet the needs of the state and the needs of the population in wartime.

Mobilization is understood as a set of measures to transfer the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, the transfer of government bodies, local governments and organizations to work in war conditions

time, the transfer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces to the organization and composition of wartime.

The basic principles of mobilization preparation and mobilization include, in particular, the following:

Development of mobilization plans for the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, mobilization plans for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces (hereinafter referred to as mobilization plans);

Preparing the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, preparing organizations for work during the period of mobilization and in wartime;

Carrying out measures to transfer the economy of the Russian Federation, the economy of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, transfer of organizations to work in wartime conditions;

Creation, development and preservation of mobilization capacities and facilities for the production of products necessary to meet the needs of the state, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations, bodies and special forces and the needs of the population in wartime;

Creation, accumulation, preservation and renewal of stocks of material assets of mobilization and state reserves, irreducible stocks of food products and petroleum products;

Creation and preservation of an insurance fund of documentation for weapons and military equipment, critical civilian products, high-risk objects, life support systems for the population and objects that are national treasures, etc.

During the period of mobilization preparation and mobilization, the Government of the Russian Federation is vested with a number of additional functions, in particular:

Determines the procedure for concluding agreements (contracts) on the implementation by organizations of mobilization tasks (orders) and on providing the specified tasks (orders) with material and technical resources;

Determines the procedure and sources of financing for mobilization preparation and mobilization activities;

Resolves, within the limits of its powers, issues of allocations for mobilization preparation and mobilization from the federal budget and the provision of benefits to organizations that have mobilization tasks (orders);

Determines the procedure for the creation, accumulation, preservation, renewal and use of mobilization reserves, material assets of mobilization and state reserves, irreducible reserves of food products and petroleum products;

Determines the procedure for creating, maintaining and using the insurance fund of documentation for weapons and military equipment, the most important civilian products, high-risk objects, life support systems for the population and objects that are national treasures, etc.

Federal bodies and executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments during the period of mobilization preparation and mobilization, within the limits of their powers, enter into agreements (contracts) on the implementation of mobilization tasks (orders) with enterprises whose activities are related to the activities of these bodies or which are in the sphere of their management.

In the event of insolvency (bankruptcy) of enterprises that have mobilization tasks (orders), federal bodies and executive authorities of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments, within the limits of their powers, take measures to transfer these tasks (orders) to other enterprises whose activities are related to the activities of these bodies or which are within their jurisdiction.

During the period of mobilization preparation and mobilization, enterprises do not have the right to refuse to conclude agreements (contracts) on the implementation of mobilization tasks (orders) in order to ensure the defense of the country and the security of the state, if, taking into account the mobilization deployment of production, their capabilities allow them to complete these mobilization tasks (orders). Compensation by the state for losses incurred by enterprises in connection with their implementation of mobilization tasks (orders) is carried out in the manner determined by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Financing of mobilization preparation is carried out from the federal budget, funds from the budgets of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, funds from local budgets and funds from organizations.

Collection of scientific articles.
Chelyabinsk: Encyclopedia, 2009. - 571 p. ISBN 978-5-91274-073-2 Contents:
Materials of the plenary session
Sedov V.V. Mobilization model of the economy: from theory to practice
Bokarev Yu.P. Mobilization economy in Russia and Germany during the First World War. Comparative research experience
Senyavsky A.S. Soviet mobilization model of economic development: historical and theoretical problems
Borodkin L.I. On the efficiency of the camp economy: labor incentives in the early Gulag
Mobilization resources of the state and economic management mechanisms
Abramovsky A.A. Organizational and legal basis for the fight against economic crimes in the Urals in the first year of Soviet power
Anokhina Z.N. Mobilization resources of the state during the First World War in the views of deputies of the IV State Duma
Arnautov N.B. Mobilization elements of Soviet ideology of the 1930s.
Bratchenko T.M., Senyavsky A.S. Imperial liberal-conservative and Soviet mobilization models of economic development: comparative analysis
Zubkov K.I. The phenomenon of mobilization economy: historical and sociological analysis
Ivlev N.N. Financial authorities of the Chelyabinsk region during the Great Patriotic War
Kochneva K.A. The process of reform A.N. Kosygina. How and why the plan for transformation was distorted
Kravtsova E.S. Tax reforms of the Russian government during the First World War
Poberezhnikov I.V. Mobilization mechanisms in the context of modernization (theoretical aspects)
Romanov A.P. Anticipation of mobilization processes in education projects for Russian peasants at the beginning of the 20th century.
Rynkov V.M. Anti-Bolshevik regimes in eastern Russia: mobilization capabilities of the state and society
Strakhov V.V. I.S. Bliokh and A.A. Gulevich on the financial and economic problems of Russia’s participation in the future “big” war”
Timoshenko A.I. Historical experience of mobilization decisions in Russian public policy in the 15th - 20th centuries.
Fokin A.A. Building communism as an option for modernizing the economy at the turn of the 1950s-60s.
Khaziev R.A. Mobilization in the Urals in 1917-1921: economic efficiency of state administration of economy
Shaposhnikov G.N. Mobilization mechanisms of communications in the Urals during the Civil War
Possibilities and limitations of the mobilization model in industrial development processes
Abramovsky A.P. The second congress of representatives of nationalized enterprises of the Urals on the prospects for the development of the mining industry
Bakanov S.A. The problem of providing labor for the coal industry of the Urals in the context of mobilization processes of the first half of the 20th century.
Bespalov S.V. The consequences of Russia's accelerated industrialization in the debates of the late 19th and early 20th centuries
Budanov A.V. Military mobilization work at industrial enterprises of the Chelyabinsk and South Ural Economic Councils in 1957 - 65.
Zharkov O.Yu. Implementation of the mobilization capabilities of the USSR in organizing a management system for plutonium production
Karpov V.P. West Siberian oil and gas complex - achieving a mobilization-type economy
Konysheva E.V. Formation of an industrial city in a mobilization economy
Meerovich M.G. Assimilated production and the Soviet model of mobilization of the national economy
Novoselov V.N. Realization of the mobilization capabilities of the Soviet economy in the process of development of the military-industrial complex of the USSR (1946-1965)
Paramonov V.N. Toolkit of industrial policy in the Soviet period
Tolstikov V.S. Structure and mechanisms of management of the nuclear industry of the USSR (1945 - 1955)
Feldman M.A. Mobilization economics: theoretical postulate and reality of execution (Ural version)
Churikov A.V. Possibilities and limitations of evacuation of heavy industry in the realities of a mobilization economy
Human factor and human capital in the conditions of the mobilization model
Gomanenko O.A. Material and living conditions and cultural services for river transport workers of the Lower Volga Shipping Company during the Second World War
Gorshkov A.V. Models of man in a mobilization-type society
Didenko D.V. Socio-economic aspects of modernization of the Soviet educational system in conditions of catching-up development
Dolgolyuk A.A. Housing conditions of Siberian builders in the first post-war decade
Zaparii V.V., Zaitseva E.V. Education and professional level of workers as the main content of human capital in the conditions of the mobilization model of industrial relations in the USSR
Isaev V.I. The human factor in conditions of forced industrialization: some aspects of the standard of living of workers in Siberia in the 1920s - 1930s.
Kostrikina L.P. Foreign specialists at Magnitostroy during the first five-year plans: an attempt to integrate into Soviet society
Makarova N.N. Daily life of Magnitogorsk in extreme conditions (1929-35)
Matveeva N.V. Russian-German ethnos in conditions of mobilization economy
Fedorov A.N. Social aspects of the mobilization economy during the First World War (based on materials from the Central Industrial Region)
Labor organization and labor relations in a mobilization economy
Buryak E.M. Coercion in the organization of labor relations within the framework of the mobilization economy in the first years of Soviet power
Goncharov G.A. “State labor” as an element of the Soviet model of mobilization economy: the formation of the system 1917-1940.
Kirillov V.M. Forced labor in the context of a mobilization economy
Lonchinskaya L.Ya. Labor motivation of the Urals in the 30-40s of the XX century.
Mukhin M.Yu. A forgotten experiment. Search for non-standard ways to combat staff turnover in the Soviet aviation industry in the late 1930s.
Potemkina M.N. Mobilization model in war conditions: labor relations under the pressure of evacuation
Rudometova I.V. Labor relations at light and food industry enterprises of the Chelyabinsk region during the Second World War (1939-1945)
Suleymanova R.N. Women's labor in the national economy of the BASSR during the Great Patriotic War: regional and national characteristics
Surzhikova N.V. Economy under duress: organization of labor of prisoners of war in the Urals in 1914 - 1717.
Tsepkalova A.A. Forced labor in the context of mobilization policy: labor use of Gulag prisoners at capital construction sites of Glavpromstroy
Shchetkin S.V. Problems of the development of the Stakhanov movement in places of detention in the mid-1930s (based on materials from the Chelyabinsk region)
Non-state sector of the economy in the conditions of the mobilization model
Alevras N.N. Adaptation model of the mining district system of the Ural industry as an expression of the mobilization nature of the regional mining culture
Bulatov V.V. How private Japanese fisheries exploited our Far Eastern waters (1907-1928)
Vorobyova A.Yu. Cooperative industry during the recovery period in the Chelyabinsk region (1945-1950)
Dorozhkin A.G. The private sector in Russian industry during the First World War and the problem of state regulation in the coverage of German Russian studies of the 20th century
Kung P.A. Documentary heritage of military-industrial committees: formation of a source base for historical and economic research"
Motrevich V.P. Procurement of agricultural products on collective farms as a form of mobilization economy during the Great Patriotic War
Narsky I.V. “A mortally wounded winner”: The Ural peasantry during the years of “war communism” and the transition to NEP
Panga E.V. The private sector of production in the conditions of the mobilization economy of the 1920s. (On the example of the Saratov Volga region)
Pass A.A. Reserve and resource functions of non-state enterprises in the Soviet mobilization economy, 1939 - 1945.
Rodnov M.I. Gornozavodsk grain market of the Ufa province at the turn of the 19th - 20th centuries.
Timoshenko V.P. Mixed Economy" NEP: from a means of salvation to expropriation
Khazieva M.A. The revival of the “Ural traders” during the NEP period: the thaw of the command-administrative model of socialism"
Chernova N.V. Organization and work of a cooperative artel in a city under construction (using the example of the Magnitogorsk artel “Uralshvey”)
Long-term consequences of implementation and experience of reforming the mobilization model
Barkhatov V.I. The influence of the globalization process on modern international economic relations
Barkhatov I.V. Forms and models of globalization as a fundamental trend of world development
Bersenev V.L. Between centralism and independence: the experience of reforming the domestic economy in the 20th century
Gavrilov D.V. Strategic resources for the development of ferrous metallurgy in Russia and the Urals in the context of the current global financial and economic crisis
Davankov A.Yu. Economic efficiency and social justice
Kondratyev N.I. Integration of the national economy into the process of globalization
Latov Yu.V. The resource curse of the Russian economy in the 20th - 21st centuries.
Makarova E.P. Forms of behavior of economic entities in the transition from a mobilization to an optimization model of the economy
Makarova L.I. Comparative characteristics of informal norms of behavior of economic entities in conditions of mobilization and market economies
Nikitin L.V. Demobilization and decentralization: the evolution of the Russian banking space in the post-Soviet period
Orudzhieva A.G. Quality of the population in the context of socio-economic development of the territory (using the example of the Ural Federal District)
Plekhanova A.V. Social capital in the Russian economy
Trofimov A.V. On the question of the historical effectiveness of the Soviet development model
Materials from the Round Table
Grishina N.V., Kuznetsov V.M. The concept of “mobilization economy” in modern Russian textbooks on Russian history

On Monday Vedomosti, the Ministry of Finance proposes to reduce state budget expenditures by 10% from 2016. The reason for this is the weakening of the ruble, falling oil prices and Western sanctions.

But as an alternative, some experts propose moving to a mobilization economics model.

What it is? What sacrifices and costs will it require? Is the country even ready to set the economy on a new track? Let's figure it out.

The 2015-17 budget is based on an assumed average oil price of $100 per barrel. Now oil costs $85, and no one knows how much it will fall in price in the near future. Next year, the treasury deficit is planned to be covered from the Reserve Fund, but it is not bottomless, and already in 2016 the expenditure side of the budget will have to be significantly revised.

For a long time, from high stands in our country they have been talking about the need to “get off the oil needle” and modernize industry. We cannot yet boast of real success in this direction. The aggravation of relations with the West also deprives us of access to high technologies. Now you will have to independently make scientific discoveries and gain experience in introducing innovations. At the same time, the West showed the vulnerability of our other areas, from agriculture to payment systems.

There have been many examples in history when this or that country, finding itself in a difficult situation, made a sharp leap. Singapore, Malaysia, China, post-war Japan... We can also recall our national history: the years of the NEP, industrialization, post-war reconstruction. But in all cases, a colossal concentration of effort was required to achieve a common goal. And this, in turn, forced the population to abandon many familiar things. And work a lot, a lot.

However, history knows other examples of how to get out of a difficult situation. Let's say, Iceland after emerging from the crisis of 2008-09. In an absolutely market economy, the country's government took unprecedented measures and froze the accounts of legal entities, and sent state aid not to the banking sector, but to citizens. That is, the emphasis was placed on increasing domestic demand. At the same time, investments outside the country were prohibited. Thanks to the measures taken, the economy recovered.

In Russia, as in the United States and many European countries, they acted differently: they stopped the growth of wages, reduced social spending and sent funds to commercial banks. The results didn't make anyone particularly happy. But maybe now our authorities will make a more reasonable decision?

Doctor of Economics, Professor of the Department of International Finance at MGIMO Valentin Katasonov believes that Russia will not be able to avoid harsh methods:

– Mobilization economics helps any country that is waging a war or preparing for it to win or at least not lose. Russia is a special country in this regard; “hot” or “cold” wars were fought against it throughout the 20th century. Russia as a state, as a civilization can only exist in conditions of a mobilization economy. This is, as they say, a “medical fact.” All attempts to transfer the economy to market relations are simply attempts to destroy our state.

– What is characterized by a mobilization economy?

– First of all, the high rate of accumulation, that is, the volume of investment in increasing fixed capital (real production). Countries that at different times demonstrated economic miracles, like Germany or Japan after the war, increased the rate of accumulation. It reached up to 30-35% and sometimes 40% of GDP. In the USSR after the Great Patriotic War, the accumulation rate was at the level of 25%, and during industrialization, according to experts, it was 50-60%.

In addition to statistical indicators, it is important to keep in mind qualitative characteristics. The mobilization economy implies maximum protection from external factors.

The first group of such factors are changes in the foreign market, such as falling oil prices, global financial crises. The second group is targeted efforts to undermine the economy, for example, a trade war. To protect the economy from external factors, spontaneous and deliberate, it is necessary to have a monopoly on foreign trade and currency transactions.

There must be centralized management, maximum state intervention in the economy, and an increase in the share of state-owned enterprises, especially in the production of means of production.

Naturally, there must be planning. And not short-term, as we have now. In fact, we don’t have planning at all, but forecasting. And medium- and long-term planning is necessary.

When planning, it is necessary to use primarily natural indicators, rather than cost ones. The Kosygin-Liberman reform showed that as soon as the main indicators of enterprises and industries became value-based, the economy began to develop in the wrong direction.

– What changes in social life does the mobilization economy imply?

– Such an economy presupposes, first of all, the mobilization of people. It is strange to ask whether people would lose warm toilets and the ability to go to restaurants if they went to war. And in this regard, the economic front is not much different from the battle front.

People think that you can win wars without reducing consumption, but this is not true. But how to mobilize people is no longer an economic task, but an ideological, spiritual one. And in the future it is possible to improve the standard of living.

I can give an example of the first Stalinist five-year plan. At that time, people did not fully understand why industrialization was needed at all. In the first five-year plan there was an element of coercion, especially since the level of well-being decreased. Income and consumption of the most basic goods decreased, and they even switched to a card system. But in the second five-year plan all indicators went up. The main thing is that not only material, but also moral incentives for work were earned.

Let me emphasize that switching to a mobilization economy is not an easy task. It is impossible to solve it right away without preparing a person, without explaining to him why such an economy is needed. We need to explain to people that they have a choice between a warm toilet, comfortable furniture and existence itself - you, your family and your country.

– How pressing is this choice for Russian society today?

– It is quite obvious to me that such a dilemma exists. I was born immediately after the war, lived during Soviet times, and studied the history of our country a lot. My experience and my knowledge say that the people have a very tough choice to make.

Another thing is that the country's leadership does not formulate such an alternative. Moreover, he tries to combine the incompatible. This worries me very much.

I understand that our country is controlled by the West. But even in Soviet times, on the eve of industrialization, Russia’s dependence on foreign powers was great. But we managed to overcome this dependence. I think that mobilization consciousness should come to people.

– Is the Icelandic experience of overcoming the crisis applicable to us, in particular, when money is sent to people and not to banks? Then no extra effort will be required.

– The “duck” of the Icelandic experience was launched into the mass consciousness quite a long time ago. This is a pretty clever trick. I wrote several articles on it. If desired, Iceland could be “taken down” in 24 hours. But the country turned out to be the first in a long chain of possible defaults of European countries. Yes, Iceland avoided default thanks to unconventional decisions, but these unconventional decisions were not initiated by the people of Iceland, but by the global financial international that saved Europe.

Some of our patriots like the Icelandic experience. But, in my opinion, it is impossible for Russia.

Doctor of Economic Sciences, Professor Alexander Buzgalin The main problem of saving our economy is that the state does not want to affect the interests of the wealthiest strata:

– The transition to a mobilization economy is understood differently by the government and scientists. From the government’s point of view, the transition to such an economy means that we will live in the same market conditions, the degree of social differentiation will increase, the oligarchs will get rich, but at the same time we will sharply reduce spending on social purposes, education, healthcare, and long-term development programs.

There are concepts about mobilization economics in the “Soviet-nostalgic” style. As a system built according to the type of directive planning, strict orders from above, backed up by authoritarian power.

Finally, there is a third option, when the mobilization economy is understood as the concentration of resources in key areas, supporting them institutionally and ideologically.

The Ministry of Finance is talking about the first option, when nothing changes, but the budget is significantly reduced by reducing support for the poorest strata, spending on education and nature conservation. This principle was laid down when the current budget was formed, and the same will happen in the future. A 10% reduction in expenses will lead to large losses in the social sphere and in the development of high-tech industries.

I believe that there are alternatives to this path. Budget revenues can be increased not only through rising oil and gas prices, but also through the development of modern production, the introduction of a progressive income tax scale, and support for investment projects.

Alas, no one wants to do this. So there will be a repetition of the model of the 1990s, that is, an attack on the rights of the least protected citizens.

I am also happy about the annexation of Crimea. But it is impossible to live only on this joy without solving systemic problems in the economy. Crimea was annexed, but negative social policy continues.

– Is it possible to move to a mobilization economy so that you don’t have to work seven days a week?

– Those in power now have a great temptation to use the situation to say, “You don’t want events to develop like in Ukraine. Therefore, work more, and the oligarchs will get even richer.”

I believe that mobilization can be neither market nor Stalinist. You can use public investment and reduce social differentiation. Then there will be some decline in living standards, but then serious growth. Unfortunately, the government will not take this path. Just like Stalin's.

– I believe that the need to switch to a mobilization economy is visible, but the ability to do this is highly doubtful. And it is impossible to implement serious measures without the support of citizens,” says Head of the Department of Economic Theory of Moscow State University, Doctor of Economics Andrey Kolganov.

– Are the authorities preparing people for a new format of economic life?

– So far I see no signs that our government wants to move to mobilization economic measures. Until recently, the authorities treated this very concept more negatively than positively.

In general, there is nothing good in the mobilization economy. It is only needed in an extreme situation. But everything indicates that these circumstances are now taking shape. However, we do not yet have social and economic mechanisms for mobilizing resources, and they will not fall from the sky.

– Mobilization economics involves a complete departure from market mechanisms?

– Completely optional. Of course, in its extreme forms, mobilization economics can completely suppress the market. But the historical experience of the military economies of a number of countries shows that it is possible to combine a mobilization economy with market relations.

Of course, market mechanisms will be squeezed out. One can recall the US economy during World War II. Price controls were introduced there, and coercive measures were applied in the area of using strategic resources. At the same time, market mechanisms continued to operate there.

For now, I don’t think our situation is so difficult that we need to turn on the mechanisms of mobilization economics. But I have concerns that such a need will arise. And you need to be prepared for this. We need to know what we can do and what results it will lead to. If a fire starts, it will be too late to understand how to extinguish it.

“The sanctions imposed against us are only the first stage of the financial war,” he believes Head of the Department of Philosophy of Politics at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophy Vladimir Shevchenk O. – The economic stranglehold will be stronger than all other threats and blackmail against Russia.

Our economy is very open to outside influence. I was recently in China and saw how much the Chinese are doing to protect their yuan. And that is why the United States is afraid of China. We have a completely outdated housekeeping model. The financial flow within the country is not closed, but is directed to the USA and Europe. This means that in this area we are helpless and cannot resist the financial war against Russia.

Therefore, we need to take extraordinary measures to create a national independent financial system. In the meantime, we have joined the WTO, and our GDP growth has fallen, some factories have closed, and agriculture is suffering.

There is no need to scare people with the word “mobilization”. This just means closing the “holes” through which our money goes abroad.

– Are people ready to endure inconvenience?

– Mobilization economics means a turn of policy towards the creation of a real sector, new industrialization. It is necessary to block the channel for the export of capital from the country. I don't think this will cause a drop in living standards.

In my opinion, discontent can only exist in three cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg. They are, in a sense, outposts of the Western way of life. The rest of Russia lives in poverty, with a large share of naturalization of personal farming.

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Subtitles

Definition options

“A type of economic relationship in which all the country’s resources are directed to one or several priority goals to the detriment of other sectors, which violates the harmonious development of the country.”

“Economic activity that allows for the fullest use of available production resources.”

"Anti-crisis economics associated with emergency circumstances".

History of the concept

The concept of mobilization economics was introduced into scientific circulation by the famous economist, representative of Keynesianism Seymour Harris in his work “Inflation and the anti-inflationary policies of the American states.” In the USSR, the term entered the scientific lexicon in the late 1950s.

Signs

The presence of a threat to the existence of society as an integral system and its awareness by state leaders.
State leaders setting a goal to eliminate or counter this threat.
Development of a state plan or program to achieve a set goal.
Organization by relevant government agencies of actions to mobilize the country's resources necessary to implement the plan or program.

Principles

1. The principle of the main link. It involves the concentration of resources in that link of the economic system on which the success of countering the threat hanging over the system depends, including through their withdrawal from other less important, from the point of view of achieving the goal, links of the economy.

2. The principle of achieving a goal at any cost and the primary use in this regard of non-economic methods of influencing those on whom achieving the goal depends.

3. The principle of teamwork. It assumes that all economic entities represent a single team, jointly solving a common problem.

4. The principle of discreteness. Mobilization cannot be a permanent phenomenon. If the achievement of a set goal is delayed over time, then a weakening of mobilization is inevitable, due to the occurrence of a certain fatigue among the people involved in it.

5. The principle of consciousness. The need for mobilization and the sacrifices associated with it in order to counter the threat hanging over the system must be understood by the subjects involved in it. In this case, this principle can counteract the previous one, and mobilization in society can be maintained for a relatively long time.

Examples

Traditionally, the practice of mobilization economics is associated with the 20th century, when “total wars” arose and the state needed to use all available potential. But similar examples can be found in earlier periods.

During the Thirty Years' War 1618-1648. advanced Dutch methods of warfare and imported military production technologies were actively mastered by both belligerents with the help of invited specialists. Economic modernization in the countries of the European “semi-periphery” of the 17th-18th centuries. (Sweden, Prussia, Russia, etc.), in fact, were initiated by “military revolutions”: the desire of this group of countries to keep up with Western Europe in building up military capabilities and issues of military technology gave a strong impetus to the development of advanced forms of military production, which then spread their influence on other related industries involved in equipping and supplying the armed forces.
Most of the large enterprises created in Russia during the period of Peter’s reforms (the first quarter of the 18th century) produced products that were in one way or another connected with the military needs of the state (iron, weapons, gunpowder, canvas, cloth, etc.), widespread emergency measures were introduced

“Economic activity that allows for the fullest use of available production resources.”

"Anti-crisis economics associated with emergency circumstances".

History of the concept

Signs

Principles

2. The principle of achieving a goal at any cost and the primary use in this regard of non-economic methods of influencing those on whom achieving the goal depends.

3. The principle of teamwork. It assumes that all economic entities represent a single team, jointly solving a common problem.

Examples

According to N.M. Morozov, the concept of mobilization type of development, in a narrow sense, is used to highlight in Russian history periods of action of short-term strategies focused on achieving emergency goals using emergency means and emergency organizational forms, covering various spheres of society and occurring after the next period of stabilization, i.e., a time when the issue was not on the agenda about its survival, but the withdrawal of resources was carried out in favor of privileged social groups.

Use of this concept in a broad sense– in the civilizational context (V.V. Amaeva, O.V. Gaman-Golutvina, A.V. Lubsky, V.P. Nikiforuk, A.G. Fonotov, N.M. Morozov) is based on the statement that Large communities are characterized by their own specific relationships between needs and development conditions, determined by a complex of determining factors. Their special spatiotemporal dynamics are defined as a historical trend, meaning a specific (mobilization) type of development. In the history of Russia, stable stereotypes of the mobilization type of development have been identified: a focus on extensive growth, borrowing innovations, which indirectly indicates signs of the manifestation of an archetypal image, which is consonant with I. V. Poberezhnikov’s assumption about the mental nature of the mobilization type of development of Russian civilization.