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Goals and objectives Goals: Expand knowledge of bank cards and the safety of their use Uncover technical methods of fraud Objectives: Obtain information about bank cards Study ways to protect bank cards Study technical methods of fraud
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Bank card Bank card (eng. Bank Card, BCard, BC) - a plastic card linked to one or more bank accounts; a tool that allows you to access your personal bank account. Used to pay for goods and services, including via the Internet, as well as withdraw cash.
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Rules for safe card use To avoid the use of your card by another person, keep the PIN code separately from the card, do not write the PIN code on the card, do not share the PIN code with other people (including relatives), do not enter the PIN code when working online Internet To avoid fraud using your card, require transactions with it only in your presence, do not allow the card to be taken out of your sight
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Rules for safe use of a bank card If you have been contacted by phone, on the Internet, through social networks or other methods, and under various pretexts they are trying to find out your bank card details, passwords or other personal information, be careful: these are clear signs of fraud. If you have any doubts, we recommend that you stop communicating and contact the bank by phone number indicated on the back of your bank card. Do not listen to the advice of third parties, and do not accept their help when carrying out transactions. If necessary, contact employees at a bank branch or call the numbers indicated on the device or on the back of your card
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Rules for safe use of a bank card Destroy receipts with passwords from Internet banking systems if you do not plan to use them. Do not transfer checks to third parties, incl. bank employees Keep your card out of reach of others. Do not give the card to another person, except the seller (cashier). It is recommended to store the card separately from cash and documents, especially when traveling
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Fraud Fraud is the theft of someone else's property or the acquisition of rights to someone else's property through deception or abuse of trust. A person who does this is called a fraudster or fraudster.
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Main types of fraud with bank cards Theft of bank cards Technical tricks Copying card data Theft using viruses Phantom ATM Scotch method Impact on the psyche Technical tricks Skimming Letters and calls from scammers Phishing
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Theft of bank cards Theft is the most common method of fraud. Your wallet was stolen, and there are several of your cards in it, including credit cards. If all cards have a chip, then the criminal will need to know the PIN code, without which you cannot pay for goods in a store, and you cannot withdraw money from an ATM. If there is an old-style card, you can cash it in the store by purchasing any product.
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Technical tricks. Copying card data by service workers The seller or waiter rolls your card through a special miniature hand-held skimmer. The PIN code or other card details are easily recorded on a video camera, after which a clone of your card is also made and money is withdrawn from it.
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Theft with the help of viruses A very dangerous type of technically advanced fraud, when a smartphone or computer is “infected” with a virus program, for example, a Trojan (details in the article). This is such a smart “digital pest” that it can not only corrupt data on your computer or “steal” valuable information, but also act on behalf of the owner of the phone (and more will happen!).
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Theft using viruses For example, you installed some free program from GooglePlay on your Android, and along with it a virus entered your smartphone. Your phone number is linked to the card, i.e. The mobile banking service is connected to your phone. So, a Trojan that you accidentally installed can use SMS banking commands to find out your balance, send an SMS command to transfer from your card to another, and independently respond with an SMS to a message confirming the operation. Moreover, the owner of the smartphone may not see any signs of activity, the virus will simply hide them from him, or he will see them, but it will be too late.
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Phantom ATM Instead of a real ATM, scammers can build a plastic frame with a skimmer built into it. From the card inserted into the card reader, all the necessary information for its subsequent cashing can be read, and at the same time, the attackers will find out your PIN code typed on the “pseudo-keyboard”. Alternatively, the ATM may swallow the card altogether and not return the card.
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Scotch method A person approaches an ATM, wanting to withdraw money from his card, inserts the card into the card reader and enters the PIN code on the keyboard. A characteristic rustling sound is heard from the dispenser, but for some reason no money is visible. The person “writes it off” to a malfunction of the ATM, shrugs, takes out his card and goes to another ATM. What's the result? The money was indeed withdrawn from the card and even the ATM dispensed it, but in reality it was stuck to double-sided tape stuck in the dispenser by the fraudster, who will take the money out for you.
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Letters and calls from scammers A typical example of SMS fraud is receiving an SMS message from a supposed bank number about blocking funds on your card due to an attempt to gain unauthorized access to them, with a recommendation to call the number provided in this message. Over the phone you will be informed that to unlock money on the card account you need to provide its details: card number, full name, expiration date and a three-digit secret code on the back of the plastic (CVV/CVC).
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Letters and calls from scammers Thus, the unlucky card holder, in order to save his money, transfers all the important data - he is not given time to think and analyze the situation, which is the calculation of cunning attackers. Moreover, the scammers will also ask you to dictate the password that was sent to the victim’s cell phone (and this is the same one-time password with which they need to confirm the operation of transferring money from the attacked card). If a person is not blind, then in the SMS he receives he will see a phrase about the inadmissibility of transferring the one-time password to an outsider. But he will read this only later, when he realizes that a decent amount has been taken from his card account.
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Phishing A very common type of fraud, when, for example, an Internet user is “slipped” to a pseudo-site of his Internet bank, very similar to the original, on which they will try to fish out (catch) his card data by any means. Hence the name of this method of fraud, translated from English. "fishing" is fishing. The main thing is that a person goes to a fake site and believes that he is on the original resource. A link to such fake sites may contain, for example, an email from a fraudster, made in a standard banking form (colors, logo, etc.), and the text will encourage you to click on it, scaring you of possible problems with money in your card accounts. At the same time, the names of such sites are similar in appearance, but still differ slightly. Find, for example, the differences between the original name of the site sberbank.ru and the pseudo-site sbepbank.ru. The differences are not so easy for the “inexperienced” eye to notice.
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The client asks to open an account for an offshore company, the intermediary company gives him to sign a bank card and a letter to the bank, then either adds signatures of non-existent persons to the client’s signatures (so that in case of something specific persons who signed the signatures can evade responsibility), or simply replaces bank card.
After the money arrives in the account, the bank receives an order to transfer it somewhere to an offshore account controlled by the scammers. Another scenario is that fraudsters periodically check with the bank about the account balance and transfer money only at the moment when a large amount has accumulated there.
The second type of fraud is that the intermediary sells the client an offshore company at a very favorable price and at the same time very unobtrusively offers to open an account for it in a certain bank. The bank may have a very respectable name; its name may even almost duplicate the name of a well-known international bank (for example, Barclayes Bank instead of Barclays; the example is fictitious).
The client will be told that it is now very difficult for a Russian client to open an account in an internationally renowned bank, but this bank, on the contrary, loves Russian clients. It is also possible that interest rates will be promised higher than those offered by other banks, for example 7 -15%). The details of this bank will finally lull the client’s vigilance: he can have correspondent accounts in Switzerland, the USA and other seemingly reliable places.
(As for the place of registration of the bank, they will most likely lie to the client, saying that the bank is registered in the country where he has a correspondent account (for example, Switzerland). As you guessed, in fact, the bank is not Swiss, but the cheapest offshore bank - for example, from Nauru (the cost of creation is 20-25 thousand dollars). And the owners of this bank are the owners of the company that offers offshore companies.
The first is that the bank owners will “spend” the client’s money in risky projects, hoping to both save the money and earn high interest rates. You can guess the fate of most of these projects. Secondly, the scammers will simply run away with the money. Be careful - this scam is very, very popular.
How bank management managed to steal money from company accounts. HERE IS A SIMPLE CLIENT MONEY MOVEMENT SCHEME:
1. The client brings a payment receipt to the bank, with which he “instructs” the bank to transfer money from his account to the recipient’s account; 2. The bank operator (accountant) checks the correctness of the order, the correspondence of the signature of the top officials of the client company with the sample signatures on the bank card, the correspondence of the client’s seal with the sample seal on the same bank card, the presence of the transferred amount in the client’s account and, if all signs match and the correct execution of the payment order includes this operation in the list of bank transfers;
3. On one of the copies of the payment order (which remains with the client and is stored in his accounting archive), the bank operator puts the stamp “Paid” and formally from this moment the payment receipt for the client is considered completed, and the money is transferred to the recipient; 4. The bank manager (or his deputy) authorizes a banking transaction several times a day and the money (or rather, information about the fact of its transfer) goes through computer networks to the bank (banks) - the recipients of the money. 5. A paper notification of the fact of the transfer of money arrives at the recipient bank and at the recipient enterprise 7-10 days after processing the payment order.
This is the ideal scheme for a simple banking transaction for transferring money. What needs to be changed so that the client receives confirmation of payment, money is debited from the client’s account, but does not actually end up in the recipient’s account?
Probably, point 4 of our process should have looked like this: 4. 1. A certain specialist (or specialists) looks through the list of transfers and breaks it into two categories:
-the first category is money that cannot be ignored (this is, first of all, transfers to the account of the tax inspectorate, pension and other funds for payment of energy resources). Failure to receive money into the accounts of these recipients can lead to the rapid detection of the scam and the cessation of the scammers’ activities; -the second category is money that can be “lost” and that neither the recipient nor (even more so) the payer will look for immediately. These are, in particular, payments to housing organizations (DEZs and REUs), which, generally speaking, are extremely negligent in confirming the regularity of the facts of payment/non-payment of their clients.
4. 2. Money from the list of “second category” accounts was withdrawn from these accounts and transferred (?), cashed (?), converted (?), exported (?) to distant countries? It is quite difficult to develop such a procedure, much less to carry it out in real banking practice, unless we assume the existence of a prior conspiracy among the bank’s top management and the presence of a trusted specialist, presumably in the computer service
Fraudsters staged a masquerade for bankers. Real masquerades were staged for bankers by scammers who passed off the poor as successful managers and businessmen. The show was necessary to obtain large loans. Finding people who had neither property nor a stable income was not particularly difficult for swindlers.
The scammers explained to the poor that they could not get a loan on their own, but were willing to pay interest for the services to obtain it. The guarantors were also selected using the same scheme. During the interviews, the scammers dressed borrowers in stylish suits, gave them certificates about their supposed salaries, and explained how to behave in the bank. Working off the promised fee, Muscovites received loans and gave them to benefactors. As a rule, these were amounts from 10 to 15 thousand dollars. When it was time to pay, the bankers
unexpectedly they found out that their clients were in fact insolvent. Moreover, such simpletons had no apartments, cars, or other property to compensate for the bank's losses. For a long time it was not possible to find the real recipients of the money. The scammers acted too cautiously. Nevertheless, on the eve of the weekend, when the swindlers staged another masquerade, they were caught in one of the central offices of a large bank. As it turned out later, this office was a favorite among scammers. Only here they carried out their scam 4 times.
"Mirror bills" Several organizations at different times purchased bills issued by Bank "X". At the time of purchasing the bills, they checked their authenticity. Moreover, the authenticity of the papers was confirmed by the issuer himself (that is, the bank that issued these bills). However, when the organizations presented the bills for payment, the issuer refused to accept them, stating that they had already been repaid. The bank that issued these bills even provided documents confirming payment of exactly the same bills.
They could not answer the question of whether the bills were genuine or the examinations carried out. The forms were recognized as genuine, but there is no exact conclusion regarding the signatures on the bills. It became clear that the “mirror bills” were produced in the same printing house in which the forms of the bank’s real bills of exchange are printed. It is unlikely that they will be able to force the issuer to pay, because it is very difficult to prove that the bank itself is involved in issuing counterfeits. Usually at this stage of verification the case “hangs.”
One Company purchased a bill of exchange from the company to which it was drawn. However, the problem is that now they cannot find this company. Another organization has been sitting at her address for a long time.
Many users received emails asking them to confirm their banking details on a special web page due to alleged technical problems.
An example is an email sent to CITIBANK customers with the subject line “Important Fraud Alert from Citibank.” The message itself states that in order to carry out an operation aimed at detecting illegal banking activities, users need to check the correctness of their details on a special website.
Panda Software warns that all these messages are falsifications, their main purpose is to obtain confidential information about the client (account numbers, user names, passwords, PIN codes and other secret data). The messages sent were carefully crafted in HTML to resemble the original online banking messages as closely as possible. Fake emails use the yet unpatched URLSpoof vulnerability in the Microsoft Internet Explorer browser. This hole causes the user to think that the web page they are accessing via a link from an email is an official banking site, when in fact it is just an exact copy of the original located on a different server.
If the user enters the requested data, it will fall straight into the hands of the scammer who created this letter and web page. This type of online scam involves using fake emails, pop-ups and websites.
In the banking industry, abuse by staff is a fairly common phenomenon. World practice shows that abuses occur much more often in small banks than in large ones. This is primarily due to the combination of several positions in small banks by one person, which makes it possible to commit theft as a cashier, and then hide it as an accountant.
Most domestic banks are small by world standards. In addition, domestic business is now going through a stage of high criminalization and small banks are more easily influenced by criminal structures or even created by them. It is quite common for clients (“scammers”) to take out a loan in advance without intending to repay it. Bank employees, who have low wages by world standards, are often bribed. There are many “pocket” banks that are focused on serving their founders. Such founders are often given virtually free loans and the repayment of which is not particularly carefully monitored.
Recently, in Russia, Belarus and the Baltic states, the founders themselves have bankrupted a significant number of small banks. The scheme was standard: after registering the bank, new clients were attracted, who switched to settlement and cash services at the established bank or deposited money into it, and resources for interbank lending were actively attracted. After accumulating a fairly substantial amount in the bank, the bank’s founders were given particularly large loans, which together made the bank insolvent. After this, the founders left the game (if they had time), and third-party clients of the bank suffered losses.
Abuses can occur in many departments of the bank. Let's consider the main methods of possible fraud in banking divisions. Fraud occurs quite often when providing cash services to clients. Particularly wide opportunities for fraud open up when one person combines the functions of an accountant and an operator. The most common methods are the following.
1. “Brazen” shortage. A large sum is stolen from the bank's cash register and this is not hidden in any way, so the cashier hopes to escape before the audit of the cash register begins. A man comes to the bank director: - Are you looking for a new cashier? - And the old one too.
This method, like some of the frauds discussed below, has mainly historical value, since most banks currently have fairly strict controls and carry out a daily inventory of cash balances.
2. Fabrication of monetary documents covering the shortfall After taking money from the cash register “for a while” and the inability to return it, it is possible to fabricate monetary documents to cover the amount of the shortfall (for example, issuing a debit order).
3. The cashier allegedly made a mistake. A small amount of money is withdrawn, a shortage is reported, which allegedly arose due to an error in previously made calculations, and it is proposed to redo the old documents to achieve “complete openwork.” In this way, small sums are stolen, but if you skillfully “fool the head” of the higher authorities, who unquestioningly accept corrections, the sum can be quite large.
4. Theft of money by an unauthorized person This possibility arises in case of negligence of cashiers who allow unauthorized persons to enter the cash register premises. There are also many ways for scammers to deceive a careless and inexperienced cashier. In foreign practice, there is a known case when, when checking a cash register, the auditor destroyed his own check. However, such actions are not effective if the check is already entered in the check register. In some cases, the partner's checks are destroyed. As a result, the cashier will have a shortfall in the amount of the check, and the auditor and his companion will receive income. The person committing the crime does not have to be a bank employee. In the absence of a suitably equipped cashier's workplace, theft can also be committed by an unauthorized person.
5. Concealment of the attracted deposit The client is given all the necessary documents about attracting his money to the deposit, but this money is not recorded. Upon expiration of the deposit period (and fraudulent transactions are usually carried out with long-term deposits), the money is returned to him by non-receipt of funds deposited by another client (the so-called “overlap operation”). Almost always, with such fraud, the shortage continues to increase until the trick is revealed with sad consequences for the cashier.
A type of concealment of a deposit may be some underestimation in bank documents of the actual amount deposited. If the understatement of the amount is insignificant, the term and interest are quite large, and the client does not like to check the correctness of calculation of the income received, then there may not even be a need to compensate for the previously taken deposit, since the “accumulated” interest will disguise the theft.
6. Write-off of funds from client accounts If an accountant is lazy and does not carefully monitor the movement of money in the account of his company, the money may be written off to a third company. If the client discovers a write-off, the fraudster apologizes to him and the money is returned. If the client does not notice anything, the income is received.
7. Transfer of money on behalf of the bank Money is not withdrawn from the client’s current account, but a payment is made on behalf of the bank to some company, for example, “for the purchase of a computer”, “for consulting services”, income on a deposit, etc. absence (or fabrication) of supporting documents.
8. Substitution of counterfeit real currency The majority of clients still believe in banks and their employees. This makes it possible to sell counterfeit banknotes through the bank.
Although the slipping of counterfeit dollars and German marks happens quite often (especially at exchange offices), tellers of large banks prefer to take fewer risks. Their main “prank” in this regard is handing out old and tattered bills instead of new ones, which are difficult to sell for the full denomination.
There have been cases where the same cashiers, after some time, accepted previously issued banknotes from a client who was desperate to sell them for part of the face value. Then these bills were again slipped into the packet of the inattentive client and the story repeated itself. In foreign practice, it is also common to slip counterfeit bills and other securities.
9. Pulling money out of bundles If a client receives a fairly large amount of money, then at the bank he often does not have the opportunity to recalculate the amount of money in each bundle. The money is taken away from the bank without being counted and only in the client’s office does the cashier count it. A shortage is discovered, to which the bank teller reacts with Olympian calm: “I should have recalculated it at the bank!” If a client discovers a shortage in the bank, they apologize to him and give him the money correctly.
In domestic banks, in an era of non-payments, it is possible to marinate clients until almost lunchtime, and then start giving them money to everyone at once, creating chaos. In addition, clients' employees are waiting for wages, so accountants often have no time for recalculations. In foreign practice, bills of exchange are removed from standard packages or bills of exchange for large amounts are replaced with bills of smaller denominations.
10. Deception of illiterate, gullible or sick clients The domestic population can be considered as universally literate and intelligent only for propaganda purposes. In practice, not only many grandfathers and old women, but middle-aged people and young people are ready to sign everything that the bank does not offer. The same method is also applied to those with poor vision, for whom the cashier fills out all the documents and says: “Sign here.”
11. Write-off of the shortage to other divisions of the bank When employees of the cash settlement center have access to accounting documents, the shortage that arises is often written off to other divisions of the bank, where the shortage can only be discovered after a certain period of time. The delay in time allows you to confuse the situation.
12. Methods of combating cash and settlement fraud In order to minimize the possibility of fraud in the cash and settlement centers of banks, it is necessary to: Carry out frequent unannounced cash recalculations both at the cash desks and in the vault. Cash desk work should have as little connection as possible with accounting banking operations. Cash desk employees should not be involved in drawing up deposit agreements or issuing certificates of deposit.
Only cashiers should handle cash. If an inspector or auditor checking the cash register is allowed to access the money, then control must be organized over him by the cash desk employees. Cashiers should not be allowed to fill out paperwork for their customers. If the client is poorly educated or ill, a special employee who is not involved in cash management services should help draw up documents. All transactions passing through the cashier must be properly identified as having been processed by him. All wrapped money should be marked with the cashier's name and the date the money was placed in the package.
It is unacceptable, even at the client’s request, for the client’s savings book, his certificate of deposit, the client’s copy of the deposit agreement, etc. to be kept by an employee of the cash settlement center. It is strictly forbidden to leave large amounts of cash in sight of visitors or unauthorized bank employees. There are many tricks to distract the cashier and "fish" for money. All transfers of funds must be verified by an official so that fictitious movements of funds cannot be used for the "overlap" operation.
Shortages or surpluses found in the cash register must be immediately reflected in the consolidated accounting records. Client complaints about the cash settlement center are considered by an official not directly related to the employees of the specified structure.
Fraud in the credit department (management) The very specifics of the work of credit departments (in large banks - credit departments) provide significant opportunities for abuse. The following types of fraud may occur in banks that do not take proper security measures.
A loan secured by a “bogus” collateral or guarantee. The favorite pastime of domestic scammers is to take a loan and then not repay it. Moreover, when taking out a loan, they often do not have sufficient collateral or guarantee, and therefore they need a trusting relationship with the staff of the credit department, unless, of course, they have access to the bank’s senior management. It is not uncommon for employees of this department to help a dubious client obtain a loan, receiving a commission of up to 30 percent of the future non-repayable loan.
All collateral offered as security for a loan must be examined by responsible persons of the bank who are not directly related to the employees issuing the loan. This study should have the purpose of determining the real value of the collateral both before obtaining a loan and as the loan is repaid.
Unjustified loans to companies in which there is a personal interest It is not uncommon for senior bank officials to have shares or other economic interests in commercial structures. Moreover, they often themselves or through figureheads are members of the management bodies of such structures. Naturally, they are interested in the prosperity of their commercial enterprises, even to the detriment of the bank. As a result, “their” enterprises often receive a loan at a preferential interest rate even in the absence of collateral or a guarantor.
If a loan is issued by decision of the bank's senior management, all documents regarding the loan are filled out relatively correctly. However, if a loan to “your” enterprise needs to be extended by a mid-level bank manager, then the method of replacing the first sheet of the loan agreement, which indicates the loan amount, its term, and interest rate, is used. The signatures of the bank's management are usually on the second (non-replaceable) sheet. Naturally, problems arise in connection with the availability of consolidated reporting on loans, but in practice they are completely solvable.
Wrongful release of collateral The bank may suffer significant losses due to the release of collateral for a loan. In domestic practice, everything is done quite primitively. A client who has taken out a loan begins to understand at a certain stage (if he did not foresee this from the very beginning) that he will not be able to repay the loan received. Under normal conditions, he does not have the opportunity to get back his collateral, which, according to the rules, should not be at the client’s disposal. However, he sometimes tearfully begs for it on the grounds that he is urgently needed for work.
One domestic client provided several MAZ trucks as collateral. When the loan repayment period began to expire and the credit department began to worry, the client ran to the bank and joyfully reported that the goods with the sale of which he would pay for the loan had already arrived at the Brest customs and had already been released, as he showed the corresponding faxes. All that remains is to bring the goods to stores. But since the client’s money is running out, he cannot rent a vehicle. Therefore, he asked to return the pawned cars for a few days and promised that then everything would be fine.
And although the bank knew how easy it was to falsify fax messages, they accommodated the client halfway and disclosed the deposit. As a result, the loan money went abroad irrevocably, and the cars were sold to an unsuspecting buyer. In foreign practice, everything is done more elegantly. At an American bank, a cotton broker was heavily indebted to the bank for bills of exchange, guaranteed by sales receipts covering large quantities of cotton. The decline in the cotton market has led
to the fact that the bank refrained from selling the collateral in the hope that the market value of cotton would increase. This should have allowed the loan to be repaid. Meanwhile, the broker needed additional funds, but his loan applications were rejected. To solve the problem, the bank teller, without the knowledge of the board of directors, released to the debtor the above sales receipts covering a large amount of cotton. The broker then drew up bills of exchange for one of his country offices, attached exempt sales receipts to them, and presented them to the bank teller for accounting.
The amount paid upon discounting the note was deposited in the account of the broker, who promptly used the capital to pay the temporary obligations. Subsequently, the broker's country office paid the bill of exchange and returned the sales receipts to the bank teller, who replaced them in the collateral paper file. This operation was repeated several times until the bank controller eventually discovered the fraud.
Underestimation of income received from loans issued In practice, the most common practice is for a mid-level manager, vested with appropriate authority, to issue a loan at a lower interest rate than the average for the bank. It is not difficult to find a justification for a low interest rate, especially if the issuance of such a loan is accompanied by a bribe
In banks with poorly established accounting for loan repayments, there are certain opportunities for misappropriation of funds by understating the interest received on the loan. In addition, it is possible to temporarily misappropriate funds in case of early repayment of loans. When working with cash, the corresponding amount of funds is withdrawn from the cash register. In a foreign bank, an assistant cashier serviced interest on loans. When compiling the accounting register at the end of the working day, he understated the total interest income received and took the corresponding amount of cash from the cash desk.
Taking on an unreasonably large loan amount Most banks give their employees the opportunity to take out a certain amount of loan on favorable terms. In some cases, a credit line is opened for them within the established limit. Such loans are periodically reviewed by bank management and credit committees. Nevertheless, some bank officials in practice manage to obtain an unreasonably large loan without notifying the bank management about it, for example, by fictitiously distributing it to several subordinate bank employees.
Forging signatures on clients' bills This operation is still exotic for domestic businesses, but is quite common abroad. Foreign banks issue loans against borrowers' bills of exchange, and in this case, to commit theft it is enough to forge such a bill of exchange. The existence of counterfeit bills is sometimes discovered when the bills are reviewed by officials familiar with the borrowers' signatures. However, in practice bills of exchange are checked quite rarely.
The most effective way to establish the authenticity of bills of exchange is their direct confirmation by the borrowers. Other methods include comparing signatures on documents with signatures of the same person on previously submitted documents held by the bank, as well as tracking the payment of amounts on documents. In large banks, work should be distributed among department employees in such a way as to eliminate the very possibility of counterfeiting (provided that there is no conspiracy between them). In small banks, such precautions are unlikely due to the limited number of employees.
Fraud with discounted bills Another method that is still exotic for our conditions. When using it, bills of exchange already discounted by the bank are withdrawn for re-discounting in another bank or even in the same bank. The official responsible for accounting and storage of discounted bills of exchange has the opportunity to perform such an operation.
Loans against false debtor accounts This method is used when issuing loans secured by funds in the accounts of the loan recipient. In this case, there is scope for abuse by issuing false invoices. To prevent fraud, the bank must verify the authenticity of accounts receivable.
Misappropriation of funds by gaining confidence in the recipient of the loan In foreign practice, there have been cases when a bank employee misappropriated large sums of money using checks left at the bank by borrowers in order to pay for the received loans at the end of the term. The employee convinced his clients to write checks dated at a future date and give them to him for safekeeping. He then changed the dates of the checks and received cash on them, motivating his actions by the fact that the checks were issued to repay a debt that was due on the day the money was received.
The citizen who received the loan died. Employees of foreign banks servicing loans to the population with repayment in installments discover that the borrower has died and there is no one to ask for the loan. In some countries (for example, in the USA), it is easy to obtain a death certificate even for a living person. As a result, it becomes possible to defraud both the bank and the borrower's life insurers by submitting false death claims.
Combating abuse in obtaining bank loans A policy against unjustified obtaining of bank loans should include the following points. Decisions on issuing loans are made only collectively at a meeting of the credit committee or a similar body. The powers of managers of various ranks to issue loans and set interest rates are clearly delineated.
All issued or extended loans are fully secured by liquid collateral at the disposal of the bank or by sureties (guarantees). Constant and careful monitoring of the availability of collateral for loans is carried out. Regular checks are carried out to verify the legality of issuing loans and setting interest rates. The spending of funds from the special loan account of the client who took out the loan is strictly controlled. Disinterested employees are appointed to verify the obligations of each borrower.
The structure of most banks has departments (departments) for working with free financial resources and with securities (bonds, shares) for profitable investment of both their own funds and the free financial resources of clients. Typically, the same department also carries out trust operations. In small banks, such operations are usually carried out by one of the managers, and accounting documents are kept by an ordinary executive, who also exercises control over securities.
The most common types of fraud are: “Selling” clients to another bank. It is a common practice for low- and mid-level bank employees to provide information about their clients to competing banks. At the same time, clients who wish to deposit significant amounts of money are specifically informed of reduced deposit rates. a) With a “brazen” approach to the client, the latter is informed that the namerek bank’s rate is much higher. The client thanks and takes the money to the specified bank. A bank employee regularly visits the name bank and lists clients whom he has “discouraged” from his bank and receives a commission from a competitor’s bank. If the management of a bank that has lost a client finds out about the tricks of its employee, he responds to the deposit that he was only fighting to reduce bank interest costs.
b) With a more subtle approach, when it comes to a client who is a legal entity, the client is “discouraged” from his bank without saying anything extra, and then the potential client is reported to a competing bank. The latter processes the client himself and, if successful, pays a commission to the employee who provided the information. c) This option consists of creating a personal financial company of a bank employee, the founder of which is a figurehead. The scheme for raising funds is standard: the client is convinced that the bank’s deposit rates are low, while the financial company’s are high. The client gives the money to the financial company, which the fraudulent employee immediately deposits in a deposit account at his bank at a significantly higher interest rate.
Lowering rates when selling resources on the interbank market An employee confidentially negotiates with another bank to sell resources at a reduced interest rate. Then the difference (or part of the difference) in income at the real and reduced rate is given to the employee who ensured the sale of cheaper resources.
Withholding Part of the Proceeds from the Sale of Client Securities Clients who sell their securities through a bank broker often do not compare the interest income reported on the securities sale report received from the bank broker with the market price of the securities on the date of sale. This makes it possible to understate the real price in the report on the sale of securities and thereby provide personal income, often registered to a third company as a commission for intermediary.
In practice, such activities have little control and a specialist in such operations has practically no problems until the client becomes indignant at the constant unsuccessful transactions of the bank broker with his securities. Since complaints about a broker are primarily made to the broker himself, the latter has the opportunity to re-register the results of transactions and peacefully resolve the conflict without informing the bank’s management about it.
He will work more carefully with a corrosive client, taking it out on other clients. As a result, bank managers will be “ignorant” of these thefts and will not take measures to stop them. This type of fraud occurs not only when selling client securities, but also when purchasing them, when the report on the purchase of securities shows a price higher than the actual exchange rate.
Concealment of funds intended for the purchase of securities A bank broker usually requires that when a client submits an application for the purchase of securities, funds sufficient to cover the cost of the securities applied for purchase at the time of delivery are also transferred. In foreign practice, there are cases when a broker, accepting a client’s order, forces him to write a check for an amount approximately equal to the value of the securities. The bank employee then cashes the check and steals the proceeds from the securities sale using
In small banks, it is extremely difficult to prevent this type of fraud. Typically, securities transactions are completely supervised by one employee, and in rare cases, some part of the transaction is reviewed by another officer or employee. If the broker is smart enough to hide his illegal actions, the shortage can be endless.
“Brazen” seizure and sale of bank securities for personal purposes. Such theft is quite common in both foreign and domestic small banks, when transactions with securities are controlled primarily by one employee. It is clear that shortages of this type are easily discovered during the first audit, but nevertheless, such thefts are committed in the hope that the shortage of securities will be repaid by the time of the audit.
Deliberately ineffective purchase of securities The broker enters into agreements with issuers of securities that are not very profitable or the price of which is artificially inflated using non-standard methods. He then persuades the client to buy the securities he offers, receiving a commission from the issuers.
Conspiracy to sell stolen securities to a bank This method is based on a secret conspiracy between bank employees and holders of stolen securities to place the latter in the bank's debt portfolio. Such cases usually occur in small banks with ineffective internal control systems.
Replacing depreciated securities with profitable ones from the bank portfolio. The essence of the technique is that a bank employee replaces his securities that have lost high yield with securities owned by the bank. Of course, it is necessary to make changes to the bank’s securities register, but if the fraudster employee himself runs it, then no serious problems arise. Such transactions are also easier to carry out in small banks, where there is no necessary separation of functions and management does not properly control the investment portfolio.
Using Bank Accounts for Personal Securities Speculation Illegal use of bank accounts by bank employees for personal trading in securities can cause major shortages in the securities department.
Preventing abuse in the management of resources and securities One employee should not be allowed to accept a buy/sell order, organize a purchase/sale, or exercise control over the securities associated with these transactions, unless the reporting thereof is periodically reviewed by a competent person.
Accounting has always attracted scammers. According to international statistics, accountants rank second among bank scammers. A competent accountant always has good opportunities to hide his transactions. Below are the main dishonest transactions that can be carried out through the bank's accounting department.
Unauthorized overdraft on an account The accountant, by his own will, debits from the account an amount that significantly exceeds the balance in the account. As a result of such posting, the next day a debit balance will appear on the account and they begin to sort it out with the accountant. The accountant repents and says he made a mistake. He may even be fired or given credit for partial (very minor) repayment of the damage. But still, this scam may make sense for an accountant if he acts in collusion with the persons to whom he transferred the money. Some banks have computer networks blocked to prevent unauthorized overdrafts. In this case, fraudsters can make unauthorized debits of large amounts from checking accounts.
Assigning Own Expenses to Client Accounts Accounting employees typically do not have access to cash or accounting entries outside their department. Therefore, they are forced to limit themselves to manipulating their own records. Typically, fraud is committed by charging personal expenses to the client's account or to the account of a shell company created for the purpose of absorbing such expenses. In foreign practice, it is common to debit a client's account twice with the same check and credit one's own account with the amount of this check. This creates a balance against which accountants can write checks to themselves while maintaining a balance between debits and credits.
Understatement of commission fees on client accounts With this method, the amount of commission fees due to the client is understated, and the difference is charged to the accountant’s personal account or to the account of a shell company
Manipulation of interest accrued on customer deposits This fraud is carried out by inflating the actual interest accrued on accounts and using the inflated amount to compensate for fictitious expenses. In smaller banks, where accountants are allowed access to cash and other people's accounting records, the opportunity for abuse increases by obtaining cash and concealing shortfalls in accounting entries.
Seizure of checks of bank employees before they are reflected in accounting In foreign practice, there have been cases of an accountant destroying his personal check or a check of a partner in a scam before posting it to the account. To cover up this operation, manipulations are carried out with the accounts of clients who do not particularly delve into the issues of reconciling their bank reports. Small deposits are passed through these accounts to compensate for the amounts of destroyed checks. In this case, postings are made to the appropriate accounts, but the amounts of these deposits are not included in the new balances.
Falsification of balances in accounting cards The methodology is generally similar to that described above. When making entries, the old balance sheet on which the documents were posted was taken as a basis, and then the entered amount was deducted. Overestimation and understatement of transaction amounts Changing transaction amounts in order to direct the “saved” money to the account of a fictitious company. The degree of detection of such fraud depends on the thoroughness of control over the activities of accountants by bank management, auditors and auditors.
Use of funds from temporarily unused accounts The balances of temporarily unused accounts are transferred to the account of a fictitious company, which is debited for the amounts stolen by the accounting employee. Preventing abuse by bank accountants In large banks, a strict internal control system gives good results, however, in a small bank this preventive measure is ineffective. The small number of employees does not allow for a rational distribution of responsibilities and deprives accountants of the possibility of abuse.
In order to minimize the possibility of fraud in the cash and settlement centers of banks, it is necessary: However, the following measures are always useful for both small and large banks: rotation of the responsibilities of accountants so that the same customer accounts are not controlled by one employee; Frequent surprise audits or examinations of accounts by experienced bank auditors. The element of surprise is very important in detecting fraud. Any warning about an audit or verification of accounts gives the accountant time to conceal abuses, which will be difficult to find if an experienced accountant is involved in fraud; no accountant should make entries to transfer funds from one account to another under any pretext;
the presence of an authorized signature on all transactions, except for checks and deposit forms sent to the accounting department, must be constantly monitored; all temporarily unused accounts must be under the control of one of the bank employees from among the management team; personal accounts of accounting department employees should be constantly checked for unusual deposits; At the close of each day, you should make a list of all overdrafts (if any). Such lists should be checked regularly; Accounting employees should not have access to cashiers' cash.
Writing off foreign clients' accounts using fictitious documents This type of fraud is especially common when managing coded accounts by fax. This type of management is used in many foreign banks (in the CIS countries - primarily in the Baltic states). When opening a coded account, the client receives a code table from which he calculates the code number. This number is indicated on the payment document, which the client submits to the bank by fax. It must indicate that the debit from the account is carried out by the person who has the right to manage the account.
But a bank employee also has a similar code table, which he informs his partner in the city where the account owner lives. A corresponding fax is received from the partner, the money is transferred to another bank, where it is quickly cashed out and traces of the fraudster are lost. Such frauds have occurred in Baltic banks, but the illegal withdrawal of a large amount of money from a Cypriot bank has received wide attention among offshore account holders. The specified amount was transferred to Israel and cashed there. For the bank, such a scam had no consequences, since all owners of coded accounts were forced to sign a document according to which the bank was not responsible for getting the code
tables into the wrong hands. It was a priori assumed that it was the account owner, and not the operator, who failed to ensure the secret storage of the code table. After illegally withdrawing money, the account owner tries to find the truth in the bank. But achieving anything can be extremely difficult, especially when the money is debited from the account of an offshore company with fictitious founders and directors. In case of illegal debiting of money from the account, instead of the registered fictitious director Jonathan Johnson, our Vanka Ivanov starts running around the bank with the seal of an offshore company, who also strives to sign as Jonathan Johnson. Naturally, no one takes him seriously.
The main recommendation to owners of coded accounts is not to transfer or keep large sums on these accounts, since scammers usually do not exchange small amounts. In addition, tellers in foreign banks prefer not to risk their jobs because of small amounts.
Writing off funds from correspondent accounts of one's bank in a foreign bank On the part of a bank employee, there may be a “brazen write-off” of money to his own account or the account of a partner (wrote it off and ran away). Usually, forged documents are used for such write-offs. Abuses during currency conversion Currency conversion is a very common operation in Baltic banks for clients from Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and some other countries where there are fairly strict currency regulations.
Such conversion is usually made through offshore companies, the rate is agreed upon over the phone. However, if the real rate turns out to be less profitable for the client compared to the one agreed upon over the phone, he is nevertheless forced to agree. This creates opportunities for abuse by the bank employee involved in the conversion. The bank employee can even send a fax to the client about the currency conversion rate. But today only the laziest do not falsify faxes.
A computer can make currency out of thin air. In the context of constant and dynamic changes in exchange rates, additional opportunities for fraud open up. They are based on incorrect conversion of exchange rates. Scammers can put this kind of error directly into a computer program. In one of the leading Moscow banks, the head of the non-trading operations automation department modernized the computer program for recording the movement of the bank's currency funds through citizens' accounts. As a result, this program, when introducing a commercial ruble exchange rate, overestimated the exchange rate difference intended for crediting to citizens' accounts by 700 thousand US dollars.
In one of the leading Moscow banks, the head of the non-trading operations automation department modernized the computer program for recording the movement of the bank's currency funds through citizens' accounts. As a result, this program, when introducing a commercial ruble exchange rate, overestimated the exchange rate difference intended for crediting to citizens' accounts by 700 thousand US dollars. This difference had to be “scattered” across the accounts. For this purpose, amounts ranging from four to six thousand dollars were transferred to 121 bank accounts of citizens. In this case, the accounts of owners with insignificant balances (from a few cents to 10 dollars) were used, and whose recourse to the bank was unlikely.
Since there were not enough such accounts, the fraudster was forced to restore already closed accounts, as well as open new ones. Naturally, there were no legal cases for newly opened accounts, and cases for closed accounts were already in the archives. All that remained was to “pull out” the currency assigned to the accounts. The computer program helped here too. Through its next modernization, all the money was redistributed to the accounts opened by the accomplice. The latter used six stolen or lost passports of other citizens, into which he pasted his photographs. He presented these passports at the bank and calmly withdrew money. The stolen currency was shared with the head of the automation department.
Theft of currency transfers This method does not require any special explanation. We will only make some comments about methods of countering such thefts. If there are several transfers on one form, then it is necessary to check the addition of both types of currencies, since there have been cases of fraud when incorrect addition was deliberately carried out. In order to prevent theft of currency received by mail, it is recommended that all incoming foreign mail be opened in the presence of two persons. Currency must be counted by one employee and verified by another.
Sometimes funds received for transfers are stolen. Fraud consists of transferring only part of the amount intended for transfer. In case of “brazen” theft, the transfer may not be made at all. If the cashier’s duties include both accepting money and processing the transfer, then theft is quite difficult to detect. However, they are quite easily identified when complaints are received from abroad that money transfers were not received and turned out to be less than expected.
Travelers' Check Frauds Travelers' check fraud is often carried out by concealing money transfers to the company for which the traveler's checks were issued. In international practice, there are cases when a bank employee writes checks to himself and then cashes them. The shortfall is covered from income received from additional sales of checks. To prevent this type of fraud, travelers checks should not be allowed to be held by the person who issues them. You might also recommend issuing checks only when payment has been confirmed.
Along with standard proposals like “strengthen accounting and control,” the following can be recommended: ¾Foreign currency conversions should be carried out by one person and checked by another. ¾Responsibilities of employees should be divided so that fraud is only possible if there is collusion. It is more difficult for two people to commit a fraudulent transaction based on collusion than alone, and for three people it is more difficult than for two people.
¾To the extent possible, all incoming mail, especially mail from overseas, should be opened in the presence of two people. ¾Commission fees for foreign exchange transactions must be regularly checked to ensure correct collection and correct postings. ¾Payment of traveler's checks must be made by a person other than the person who issues the checks.
Some banks accept securities, important documents and material assets from their clients for safe storage. Such items are provided with the same security and protection as bank property. However, in the absence of the necessary control, fraud is also possible in storage facilities. The most common storage scams are:
Penetration into storage chambers in the absence of the owner In most cases, unauthorized access of bank employees to storage chambers is carried out using: a) secretly made duplicates of client keys; b) the client’s key, which the client leaves (out of laziness or excessive gullibility) to the bank employee. In both cases, theft is not a significant problem. Losses from unauthorized access to storage chambers are usually discovered when customers inspect their chambers. It can be very difficult for a client to prove the theft from his cell. If the thief is not found, compensation for damage to the client is very
Therefore, take care of your key, do not give it even to people who inspire great trust. Theft of Camera Rental Fees These types of losses typically occur when there is no control over the storage facility's revenue, and an employee may pocket the cash paid by customers for the use of cameras. Upon inspection, it is easy to discover that some of the “empty” cells were rented, so to speak, confidentially, without proper registration and without receiving income from the bank. The check may also show the absence of key sets for cameras not recorded as being handed over to clients.
Theft of securities Securities left at the bank are not always locked in a chamber, which can only be accessed if you have several keys at once, including the client’s key. Some securities (especially bonds with coupons) require regular income. Clients often entrust this work to bank employees. Then theft becomes an elementary matter. Losses from fraud in warehouses for clients can be prevented primarily through strict control over warehouse employees.
Fraud with rented property Misappropriation of rental income Usually only the employee who controls the rental payments has contact with the tenant of the property. It is with him that the tenant usually decides on the amount of rent. Then the bank employee applies to higher authorities with a request to reduce rental payments. Having received a positive decision, he nevertheless collects rental payments in the same amount, and pockets the difference between the initial and reduced payments. There are known cases when apartments were rented out at a low price in which close friends of employees responsible for rent lived. These individuals explained the low rent by objective reasons (for example, the tenant is sick and cannot pay much).
"Brazen" misappropriation of rental payments This case is characterized by the fact that rental payments are collected, but are not handed over to the bank and appear in bank statements as arrears of rental payments. A crime like this is easily solved by changing the rent collector. The new collector quickly learns that his predecessor collected money, but used it for his own needs. An effective way to monitor premises for rent is to personally check the occupancy of the premises. Reviewing long-term lease agreements and reconciling them with tenants' books will help monitor overall income and identify improper adjustments to rental income.
Issuance of deliberately incorrectly executed bills of exchange A bill of exchange is a debt document, drawn up in a strictly defined manner with a set of standard details. In order for a bill to be invalidated, fraudsters deliberately violate the legally established procedure for issuing a bill. In a number of cases, bills of exchange are issued by divisions or branches of a large business structure to which the head office did not give such permission. As a result, such bills are also invalidated. And in this case the client suffers.
One of the large Belarusian banks raised funds through its branches by issuing bills on behalf of these branches. When the bank went bankrupt and customers began to demand their money back, it turned out that the head office of the bank did not give its branches the right to issue bills. Through the courts, all these bills were declared invalid. Clients could no longer receive interest on bills. Since transactions were declared invalid, clients could only count on a refund of the amount they transferred to the bank. Naturally, they lost a lot due to inflation. Moreover, due to the bankruptcy of the bank, many lenders were unable to return this amount.
Deliberate abuse by a manager of his powers The charters of enterprises usually stipulate the limits of the competence of the head of the enterprise. In particular, the charters of joint stock companies usually stipulate the maximum size of transactions that a hired director of an enterprise can enter into without the approval of the company's Board. In addition, there are often restrictions on the director’s use of the company’s property. Directors of enterprises, when concluding transactions, do not have the habit of informing partners about the limitations of their powers. Moreover, unscrupulous managers deliberately enter into contracts beyond the limits of their rights with subsequent refusal to fulfill contractual obligations.
The director of a joint stock company took out a large loan secured by the property of the enterprise. The company did not repay the loan on time. When the creditor tried to take the pledge, it turned out that the director, according to the charter, did not have the right to pledge the property. The court declared the pledge invalid and at the same time ordered the debtor to return the money. Only one question remains unclear: when and how this loan will be repaid.
The main organizer and ideological inspirer of this scam was a Russian citizen, a former banker, who came up with a new scheme for honest defrauding. The scheme invented by the fraudster, as a result of which various companies from many regions of Russia lost billions of non-denominated rubles, could well have qualified for some kind of economic award if its implementation had not ended so disastrously. Moreover, its scale is quite comparable to the scams of the early 90s involving counterfeit Russian checks and the notorious advice notes.
At first, the criminals bought some small Moscow bank in distress, from which by that time the Main Directorate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation had revoked its license to conduct some operations and even deprived it of its license altogether. And then, having received the right to manage, appointing their people to leadership positions and legally at this stage taking possession of seals, stamps and other official bank documents, the criminals, either by force or for money, bought blank forms of bills from the previous management, which were also at that time were still real, but no longer liquid. Having filled it out, the false bankers sometimes, through their intermediaries or directly by fax, sent their proposal to various commercial firms, which, according to their information, had significant debts to the federal and local budgets, to help pay off the state.
Suspecting nothing, businessmen came to Moscow, saw decently dressed people who claimed that they were honest bankers, a bank building, after which they paid with some surplus goods they had for the amount indicated in the bill of exchange through, again, front companies and received a payment order and assurances that all their debts will be transferred by the bank to the state. The resolution, as a rule, came after a few months. By that time, of course, it was almost impossible for deceived entrepreneurs to find ends on their own.
Some typical schemes There are a number of historically proven fraud schemes. The list below is not exhaustive and contains only some of the most commonly used circuits. ¾incorrect accounting entries; ¾unauthorized withdrawal of funds from accounts; ¾unauthorized payment of funds to third parties; ¾payment of personal expenses from bank funds; ¾theft of property; ¾ unauthorized and unaccounted cash payments; ¾theft and unauthorized use of pledged property.
Transferring funds from inactive or dormant client accounts Authorized persons make journal entries or issue payment orders to transfer client funds to other accounts without the client's knowledge. It is not possible to establish written or telephone contact with the account holder to confirm the transaction. Lending to non-existent borrowers Loan officers intentionally or unintentionally accept false loan applications. These statements may be supported by misleading financial statements. This type of credit fraud is committed both by persons who are third parties to the credit institution (“external fraud”) and by credit officers, directors or employees of the credit institution (“internal fraud”).
Fictitious lending, accompanied by “kickbacks” and redistribution of borrowed funds The loan officer issues a loan to his accomplices, who then transfer to him all or part of the funds received. In some cases, loans may be written off as bad debts. Sometimes fictitious loans are repaid at the same time that new fraudulently obtained loans are issued. Loan agreements on the principle of “you - me, I - you” Bank insiders arrange lending to others or sell loans to other banks in exchange for an agreement to purchase their loans in order to hide lending and trading transactions behind them.
Chain financing The bank is offered large deposits (usually brokered deposits) with the condition of providing loans to certain persons who are affiliated with the intermediary owner of large deposits. Fraudsters promise the bank huge profits, but the loan repayment period is longer than the deposit period (so-called “hot” money). The intermediary or banker may be paid a commission on the transaction (the so-called “kickback”).
Construction loans Construction lending is characterized by a number of features that distinguish it from other types of open-ended or intermediate lending. Construction projects have a higher level of risk than, for example, completed projects. There are many fraudulent schemes used in this area. Some of the most common schemes include estimating completion costs, building contractor overheads, contractor drawdown requests and the use of retention schemes. Given the prevalence of fraud in the construction industry, below is additional information on the most common risks.
Estimating the costs of completing construction Typically, an applicant applies to a credit institution for a construction loan, already having in hand all the necessary design and estimate documentation. As the project progresses, the estimate is revised to reflect actual costs.
During construction, actual costs may exceed or be less than those included in the estimate, which should be reflected in the order to make changes to the project. If the loan agreement was correctly drawn up and executed, then no changes should be made to the estimate without the consent of the lender. However, there is a risk that the contractor or borrower may misrepresent budget variances to the lender.
Overhead costs of the construction contractor In some cases, when financing construction, the overhead costs of the contractor are included in the estimate. Here, great horizons open up for scammers. Overhead costs are included in the estimate so that the construction contractor has operating capital at his disposal while the project is being built. No profit margin should be taken into account when allocating overhead costs since the contractor makes a profit after the project is completed. Historically, the disbursement of nonperforming construction loans or foreclosures due to fraud was charged to the construction contractor's overhead expense.
Drawdown Applications Advances on construction loans are generally disbursed on the basis of drawdown applications. A Drawdown Request is a document documenting certain expenses incurred by a construction contractor who wants to receive those funds in the form of reimbursement or direct payment. A typical scam in this area involves applying for an advance loan to pay off inappropriate expenses, such as personal expenses or construction costs not included in the project. Applications for withdrawal of funds create enormous opportunities for construction organizations to deceive the lender, who pays the contractor on the basis of the documents submitted to him.
A significant number of considered petitions (submissions) to bring sentences into compliance with Federal Law No. 207-FZ of November 29, 2012 concerned fraud in the field of lending. And the largest number of persons (807) out of 2133 citizens to whom the State Duma Resolution “On Amnesty” dated July 2, 2013 No. 2559-62 was applied, were convicted of fraud in the field of lending.
According to analysts from the National Bureau of Credit Histories (NBKI), as of January 2014, the damage from this type of fraud amounted to 153 billion rubles, while a year earlier it was 66.8 billion rubles.
The object of fraud in the field of lending coincides with the object of general fraud. This is explained by the location of the norm in Chapter 21 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Crimes against property” and the fact that previously responsibility for this act was provided for under Art. 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. An additional object taken under protection by this composition is the social relations that develop in the field of banking, in particular in the field of lending.
Credit (credit relations) is a subtype of economic relations arising on the basis of an agreement regarding the movement of value. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Chapter. 42 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation (credit), credit relations arise on the basis of a loan agreement and are a subtype of a loan. Since the disposition of Art. 159.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation indicates only credit relations, it seems that all other types of loans remain outside the scope of this composition. According to the provisions of Art. 816 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, a loan agreement is understood as an agreement between the lender (bank or other credit organization) and the borrower, according to which the lender provides the latter with funds (loan) in a certain amount on the terms of repayment and payment of interest for the use of funds. The agreement must be concluded in simple written form. The most typical terms of a loan agreement include: amount of funds; purpose of the loan; term; repayment guarantees provided; interest rate and procedure for making loan payments.
From the above we can conclude that the subject of the crime is only money. The loan can also be provided in foreign currency (Part 2 of Article 819 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, Part 1 of Article 807 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation). Only a bank or other credit organization can act as a victim. In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Law “On Banks and Banking Activities,” a bank is understood as a legal entity whose main goal is to make a profit, whose activities are based on a special permit (license) of the Central Bank, authorized to perform the following exclusive actions: attracting deposits of funds from individuals and legal entities; placement of these funds on your own behalf and at your own expense on the terms of repayment, payment, urgency; opening and maintaining bank accounts for individuals and legal entities. Another legal entity, which means a foreign bank, i.e., can also act as a creditor. a bank with foreign investments or a branch of a foreign bank.
If you follow the logic of the legislator, it turns out that a bank or other credit organization is more protected compared to other persons acting as borrowers, since liability under Art. 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is more strict compared to Art. 159.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In the event of fraud for other types of loans, the actions of the borrower will be qualified according to the general norm of Art. 159 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The fact that large and extra large size in Art. 159.1, 159.3-159.6 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was increased to 1.5 million rubles. and 6 million rubles. Accordingly, this once again indicates that for the bank, losses in the amount of 250 thousand rubles. and 1 million rubles. are not as significant as for ordinary legal entities or citizens. Thus, the minimum authorized capital for a newly registered bank is 300 million rubles, and for an ordinary legal entity - 10,000 rubles. (for LLC).
An analysis of judicial practice has shown that in most cases such fraud is associated with commercial lending, which is issued directly at the points of sale of consumer goods. Thus, by the verdict of the court district No. 1 of the Rasskazovsky district of the Tambov region, D. was found guilty of committing a crime under Part 1 of Art. 159.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In order to steal someone else's property, she provided the bank with deliberately false and unreliable information about her place of work and income when receiving a consumer loan, the proceeds of which she spent on purchasing a camera. Subsequently, she did not fulfill her loan obligations.
The objective side is characterized by the theft of someone else's property through deception. It is assumed that the act cannot be committed in the form of acquiring the right to someone else’s property, which postpones the end of the crime to a later date. It is considered completed from the moment the amount of money specified in the loan agreement is transferred to the borrower, as well as the acquisition by him of the legal right to dispose of these funds, which also meets the provisions of Part 2 of Art. 819 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Part 1 of Art. 807 Civil Code of the Russian Federation. The method of execution of the objective party is abuse of trust, as defined in accordance with the resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated December 27, 2007 No. 511, although, as previously emphasized, abuse of trust does not exist as an independent method of fraud.
An analysis of judicial practice has shown that often the activities of attackers are stopped due to circumstances beyond their control, for example, due to the discovery that the data provided is false. Thus, according to the verdict of the Stupino City Court in case No. 1-294/13 in December 2013, S. was found guilty of committing a crime under Part 3 of Art. 30 hours 2 tbsp. 159.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. She entered into a criminal conspiracy with N. aimed at stealing funds by concluding an agreement between themselves and some bank to provide a loan, by providing the bank with knowingly false and unreliable information. C., handed over to the manager
LLC "HKF BANK", a passport of citizen B., forged by N., into which a photograph of S. was pasted. When trying to conclude a loan agreement, employees of LLC "HKF Bank" had doubts about the authenticity of the documents, as a result of which the police were called and detained S. , and N., who entered into a criminal conspiracy with her, hid from the investigation.
However, providing false information when concluding a loan agreement should not prejudge the guilt of the person. The point of view of V.S. seems ambiguous. Minskaya, that the fact of providing deliberately false (unreliable) information already constitutes a danger to society. The person providing such information may be guided by various motives, not necessarily related to the subsequent extraction of property benefits or saving himself from costs, and not pursue the goal of stealing funds. In each specific case, the courts should consider the reason why the funds are not returned. It seems that victims should initially try possible civil remedies rather than immediately turn to law enforcement agencies.
In accordance with the materials of case No. 1-7/2014 of the verdict of the court district No. 2 of the Zheleznodorozhny district of Penza, in January 2014, the accused S. was found guilty of committing 3 crimes under Part 1 of Art. 159.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Based on the case materials, it was established that S. entered into 3 loan agreements for the purpose of purchasing household appliances, for none of which not a single payment was made to repay the debt, thereby causing damage to the credit institution. He left deliberately false information about his place of work and income. Defendant S. did not plead guilty to committing crimes, because had no intent to steal funds. Previously, he also took out two loans, which he fully repaid ahead of schedule. Then he again took out three loans to purchase equipment, but due to family difficulties he was unable to return the funds to pay off the debt. He provided false information about his place of work, since he did not have regular income due to the fact that after his release from prison he was engaged in private driving, and the car was damaged as a result of an accident.
Characteristics of the conditions for the implementation of the project Characteristics of the conditions for the implementation of the project
- Type of student activity: extracurricular activities
- Number of lessons on the topic/sequence number in the topic: 4 / 1
- Type of lesson: learning new knowledge
- Form: group
- Equipment and/or characteristics of the educational environment: demonstration PC (multimedia projector, screen), presentation, cards for practical work;
- Educational and methodological support:
- Financial fraud on the Internet. Volkov S.E., Glotov V.I. edited by Karataev M.V. Moscow
- Scientific work project
- Topic: “Financial fraud” recommended for 11th grade
- Purpose of the lesson:
- study the types of phishing financial scams,
- practical consolidation of skills in developing a personal strategy for competent behavior in situations of growing financial risks and fraud.
- formation of socially significant competencies
- Subject educational results
- familiarize students with the types of “financial fraud”,
- prepare a “memo on minimizing financial risks.”
- Meta-subject educational results
- ability to choose actions in accordance with the task at hand
- put forward versions, choose means to achieve goals in a group and individually.
- development of students' communicative culture;
- express your thoughts and ideas, discuss information in the work group.
- Personal:
- develop the ability to work in a group,
- education of rational conduct of financial transactions,
- formation of social activity and independence,
- development of cultural communication skills.
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- Grade 11
- topic: “Financial fraud”
- Group work
- Working with the concept
- Brainstorm
- Summarizing
- Did you like this form of teaching?
- What would you change about the lesson?
- Where can the acquired knowledge be useful to you in life?
- 2.1 Historical excursion.
- Report on the topic “Financial fraud - phishing”.
- 2.2 Formulation of the lesson goal and lesson problem
- Types of phishing.
- Phishing
- "The Bay on the Map"
- Pseudo-brand promotions
- Phishing sites
- Phishing messages
- Situation No. 1
- A message comes to you on VKontakte: “Hello!!! I almost win the “Best Photo for March 8” competition, less than a percent is missing! The main prize is a smartphone, almost mine)))! ... (Your name), can you help me? You need to send an SMS with the text “photo8” without quotes to the number ****. If it's not too hard, vote for me, I won't be in your debt! Of course, if 1.5 rubles is not a pity ;-) Thanks in advance!!!” Will you try it?
- Situation No. 2 On the bulletin board and on social networks you saw a proposal: “Money from the gambling business. I withdraw through third parties, for which I pay 50%.” They offer you a profitable operation. A fairly large amount of money will be credited to your account, which must be withdrawn from an ATM and divided into two parts (in half). Send the first part to another account (or electronic wallet), and keep the second half for yourself. Will you take the risk?
- Memo: “How to avoid falling into the hands of scammers?”
- * It is not advisable to post personal information on the Internet. Personal information includes your mobile phone number, email address, home address and photographs of you, your family or friends.
- * If you publish photos or videos on the Internet, everyone can see them.
- * Do not respond to Spam (unsolicited email).
- * Do not open files sent by people you do not know. You cannot know what these files actually contain - they may contain viruses or photos/videos with “aggressive” content.
- * Do not add strangers to your contact list in IM (ICQ, MSN messenger, etc.)
- * Remember that virtual acquaintances may not be who they say they are.
- *If you don't have any relatives nearby, don't meet people you met online in real life. If your virtual friend is really who he says he is, he will be ok with your concern for his own safety!
- * It's never too late to tell adults if someone has offended you
