World economic and social crisis (1914-1945)

feudalism industrial revolution crisis

The previous period of human history was marked by the formation of a new industrial society. If the former agrarian society was characterized by peasant, largely subsistence farming, now people lived in cities, produced manufactured goods and exchanged them for food and raw materials brought from distant countries. With the growth of industrial society, competition between firms and companies producing goods gradually increased; already in the first half of the 19th century, periodic crises of overproduction began to be observed. During the years of crises, many companies went bankrupt and were taken over by larger companies; thus, there was a process of concentration of production and capital. By the end of the 19th century, mergers and acquisitions resulted in huge industrial monopolies, trusts and syndicates, consisting of many smaller companies. At the same time there was a process of merger of industrial and banking capital; banks acquired shares in industrial companies, and trusts created their own banks, attracting funds from small investors.

The possibilities for the development of industrial production depend on the size of the market for foodstuffs and raw materials for which these goods are exchanged. On a global scale, this market remains limited, and by the end of the 19th century it was largely divided among the industrial powers. One form of market division was the creation of colonial empires, the other was agreements on "spheres of influence". England took advantage of its superiority and created a huge colonial empire with a population of 390 million people, France seized territories with a population of 55 million people, Germany got lands with a population of 12 million. The markets of the powers and their colonies were protected from the penetration of foreign goods by customs duties, often exceeding half the value of the goods. The few countries that remained independent were divided into "spheres of influence" in which one or another power had commercial predominance.

England and France, having seized most of the markets, did not allow German goods to enter them and, thereby, hindered the further economic development of Germany. Meanwhile, Germany vastly outnumbered these countries industrially and militarily; thus, the question arose about the redistribution of markets by military methods. In 1914 the First World War began. Germany hoped to defeat its opponents in a couple of months, but these calculations did not take into account the role of the new weapon that appeared then - the machine gun. The machine gun gave the defending side a decisive advantage; the German offensive was stopped and a long "trench war" began. Meanwhile, the English fleet blockaded German ports and cut off food supplies. In 1916, famine began in Germany; the military government introduced a surplus appraisal, all the grain produced was bought up by the state at nominal prices and issued to the population on cards, all enterprises worked according to state plans. A difficult situation also developed in Russia, the tsarist government paid for military expenses by printing money, as a result, the landowners refused to sell their grain for depreciated credit cards; the government, as in Germany, tried to introduce a surplus appraisal and cards - but it did not have enough strength, they began to hide bread, famine began in the cities and at the front - as a result, a revolution broke out. The main slogan of the revolution was the same as in 1905: "Land to the peasants!" The Bolsheviks confiscated the landlords' lands and distributed them to the peasants; the result was a civil war. During the war, a surplus appraisal was introduced and industry was nationalized - as in Germany, these measures were dictated mainly by military necessity. After the end of the war, the surplus appraisal was canceled, many enterprises were returned to the old or transferred to new owners - this was called the "new economic policy" (NEP).

In general, the revolution of 1917 was a manifestation of the usual patterns of an agrarian society; it was caused by overpopulation and brought to power new kings who gave land to the peasants. It was a crisis that ended another demographic cycle. As usual, the crisis was accompanied by a demographic catastrophe - the population decreased from 170 to 147 million people.

By 1925, the post-war economic recovery was largely completed, and the Bolshevik government began to hatch plans for the industrialization of the country. As in the previous period, money for the purchase of equipment could only be obtained by exporting grain. In 1926-1928 the government tried to get this money by buying bread from the peasants and selling it in the West. However, the peasants refused to sell bread at low state prices. Under these conditions, the Bolsheviks took a course towards collectivization, the creation of collective farms, which would become a mechanism for seizing grain from the peasants. At the same time, in order to accumulate financial resources, the private sector in industry was liquidated.

Hasty and forced collectivization led to the famine of 1932. The grain harvest fell to 70 million tons, the peasants did not want to give their livestock to collective farms - as a result, 10 out of 30 million cows were slaughtered. The situation in agriculture was restored only by 1940, when the grain harvest exceeded the level of 1913. At the same time, yields remained low, but great progress was made in the introduction of new equipment, tractors and combines.

The withdrawal of grain from the countryside and the accumulation of all funds for the construction of new enterprises made it possible to industrialize the country. In 1928-1940, several thousand large enterprises were built; compared with 1913, industrial production increased 8.5 times. This growth was all the more striking because the industry of the West was in a state of crisis and stagnation. The Soviet Union became a powerful industrial power, in terms of production it caught up with Germany - although it was much inferior to the United States.

The First World War brought ruin to Europe, but fantastically enriched the United States. England and France, in their predicament, were paying huge sums of money for war materials, and American entrepreneurs, who were making huge profits, hurriedly expanded production. During the war years, US industrial production increased by 2.5 times, and exports by 3 times. In 1920, the United States produced 42 million tons of steel - 60% of world production. However, after the war, the crisis began, production fell by one third. American companies had to start fighting for foreign markets; in China, the US's main rival was Japan; in Latin America - England and Germany. A massive export of capital began, and the United States soon overtook England in terms of the amount of capital exported. In 1923, a new boom began, it was associated with the development of mass production of cars. Even before the war, Henry Ford set up assembly line production, and the car became affordable for farmers and workers. Between 1921 and 1928, US automobile production tripled, from 1.5 million to 4.8 million, accounting for three-quarters of world production. By 1929, however, the market was saturated and the "great crisis" set in. On October 24, 1929, a panic began on the stock exchange, the average share price fell by half, the shares of the leading automobile company General Motors fell 80 times. Production cuts and mass layoffs began; by 1932, production had halved and half of the workers had become unemployed. Millions of starving people roamed the roads from state to state in search of work, and food riots broke out in some places.

In the previous period, Americans were so accustomed to a prosperous life that only a tenth of them were in trade unions, there were no unemployment benefits or old-age pensions in the country. In the 1932 election, Democratic candidate Franklin Roosevelt proposed the introduction of a social security system and became president. To bring the country out of the crisis, Roosevelt proclaimed a "new course" in the economy. The reforms were based on the ideas of the famous English economist John Keynes, who argued that capitalism had ceased to be a self-governing system, and the government should move to state regulation of the economy. In 1933, the "National Act on the Restoration of Industry" was adopted, in accordance with which the state determined for each enterprise the volume of production, markets, prices and wages, and the length of the working day. A social security system was created and collective agreements were introduced. Public works and labor camps were organized for the unemployed. America began to gradually emerge from the crisis, and over time, measures to regulate the economy became less stringent. By 1939, the US economy had reached its pre-crisis level.

In Germany, as well as in Russia, the World War caused a national catastrophe and an acute social crisis. In the political sphere, the result of the crisis was the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic with universal suffrage; an 8-hour working day and social guarantees were introduced. Germany was able to get out of the crisis only thanks to American loans provided to it in accordance with the so-called Dawes Plan. The post-war economic recovery was completed only by 1924, but then development ran into an old obstacle: the markets of most countries remained closed to Germany. In addition, Germany lost its colonies and had to pay heavy reparations that turned into taxes and undermined the competitiveness of German goods. All this led to the fact that the global economic crisis that began in 1929 dealt the main blow precisely to Germany. By 1932, half of the population lost their jobs, the authorities were unable to pay benefits, and violent demonstrations of the starving took place in the cities.

In this situation, the National Socialist Party of Adolf Hitler won the election; Hitler promised to give everyone a job. After the Nazis came to power, the nationalization of the economy was carried out; the owners of the enterprises practically lost their ownership and turned into "fuhrer" managers. In their work, the "fuhrers" obeyed instructions from the center; they were given a small percentage of the profits. In the countryside, the surplus appraisal was restored, and all products were handed over to the state at fixed prices. Just as in the Soviet Union, all economic activity was regulated by state plans.

Hitler's main goal was a new war for the redistribution of food and raw materials markets. For this purpose, the military industry was built up, industrial production was restored and by 1939 exceeded the pre-war level by 40%.

The revolutions in Russia and Germany had a great influence on the development of other European states. Under the influence of the mass strikes of 1918-19, an 8-hour working day and collective agreements were introduced in France, universal free primary education was introduced in England and women were granted the right to vote. In 1923-24, socialist parties came to power for the first time in England and France. However, higher wages and increased social spending led to capital flight - a phenomenon that later became a characteristic consequence of socialist rule. It leads to a slowdown in economic development and to the return of power to the bourgeois parties. In general, the development of England and France during the interwar period was slow; compared with 1913, production increased by only 20-30%. At the same time, dominance over vast markets softened the effects of the 1929 world crisis; in England and France there was no such unemployment as in the USA and Germany. Germany demanded from England and France access to the markets they controlled and the return of the colonies - the conflict that caused the first world war, in the end, broke out into a new war.

Economic crises began almost 200 years ago, during the formation of industrial societies. Their constant companions - a decline in production, high inflation, the collapse of banking systems, unemployment - threaten us to this day.

1857-58 years

The financial and economic crisis of 1857-1858 can be called with full confidence the first world crisis. Starting in the United States, it quickly spread to Europe, affecting the economies of all major European countries, but Great Britain, as the main industrial and commercial power, suffered the most.
Undoubtedly, the European crisis was exacerbated by the Crimean War, which ended in 1856, but economists still call the unprecedented growth of speculation the main factor that caused the crisis.

The objects of speculation were mostly shares of railway companies and heavy industry enterprises, land plots, grain. The researchers note that the money of widows, orphans and priests even went into speculation.
The speculative boom was accompanied by an unprecedented accumulation of money supply, an increase in lending and a rise in stock prices: but one day it all burst like a soap bubble.
In the 19th century, they did not yet have clear plans for overcoming economic crises. However, the influx of liquidity from England to the United States helped at the beginning to ease the effects of the crisis, and then completely overcome it.

1914

The outbreak of the First World War gave impetus to a new financial and economic crisis. Formally, the cause of the crisis was the total sale of securities of foreign issuers by the governments of Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States in order to finance military operations.
Unlike the crisis of 1857, it did not spread from the center to the periphery, but arose simultaneously in many countries. The collapse occurred in all markets at once, both commodity and money. It was only thanks to the intervention of the Central Banks that the economies of a number of countries were saved.
The crisis was especially deep in Germany. Having seized a significant part of the European market, England and France closed access to German goods there, which was one of the reasons for Germany to start the war. By blocking all German ports, the British fleet contributed to the onset of famine in Germany in 1916.
In Germany, as in Russia, the crisis was aggravated by revolutions that abolished monarchical power and completely changed the political system. These countries overcame the consequences of social and economic decline the longest and most painfully.

"Great Depression" (1929-1933)

October 24, 1929 became "Black Thursday" on the New York Stock Exchange. A sharp decline in the value of shares (by 60-70%) led to the deepest and longest economic crisis in world history.
The "Great Depression" lasted about four years, although its echoes made themselves felt until the outbreak of World War II. The United States and Canada were the hardest hit by the crisis, but France, Germany and the United Kingdom were also hard hit.
It would seem that the crisis did not portend anything. After the First World War, the United States embarked on a path of stable economic growth, millions of shareholders increased their capital, and consumer demand grew rapidly. Everything collapsed at once. In a week, the largest shareholders, according to the most conservative estimates, lost 15 billion dollars.
In the United States, factories were closed everywhere, banks collapsed, and about 14 million unemployed people found themselves on the streets, the crime rate increased sharply. Against the backdrop of the unpopularity of bankers, bank robbers in the United States were almost national heroes.
Industrial production during this period decreased by 46% in the USA, by 41% in Germany, by 32% in France, and by 24% in Great Britain. The level of industrial production during the years of crisis in these countries was actually thrown back to the beginning of the 20th century.
According to American economists Ohanian and Cole, researchers of the Great Depression, if the US economy had abandoned the measures of the Roosevelt administration to curb competition in the market, the country could have overcome the consequences of the crisis 5 years earlier.

"Oil Crisis" 1973-75

The crisis of 1973 has every reason to be called an energy crisis. Its detonator was the Arab-Israeli war and the decision of the Arab member countries of OPEC to impose an oil embargo on states supporting Israel. Oil production dropped sharply, and during 1974 the price of "black gold" rose from $3 to $12 per barrel.
The oil crisis hit the United States the hardest. The country faced the problem of shortage of raw materials for the first time. This was also facilitated by the Western European partners of the United States, who, in order to please OPEC, stopped deliveries of oil products overseas.
In a special message to Congress, US President Richard Nixon called on fellow citizens to save as much as possible, in particular, if possible, do not use cars. Government agencies have been advised to save energy and reduce car fleets, while airlines have been ordered to reduce the number of flights.
The energy crisis has seriously affected the Japanese economy, which seemed to be invulnerable to global economic problems. In response to the crisis, the Japanese government is developing a number of countermeasures: increasing the import of coal and liquefied natural gas, and starting to accelerate the development of nuclear energy.
The crisis of 1973-75 had a positive effect on the economy of the Soviet Union, as it contributed to an increase in oil exports to the West.

"Russian Crisis" 1998

On August 17, 1998, the Russians first heard the terrible word default. This was the first case in world history when a state defaulted not on external, but on internal debt denominated in the national currency. According to some reports, the country's domestic debt was $200 billion.
This was the beginning of a severe financial and economic crisis in Russia, which launched the process of ruble devaluation. In just six months, the value of the dollar rose from 6 to 21 rubles. Real incomes and purchasing power of the population decreased several times. The total number of unemployed in the country reached 8.39 million people, which was about 11.5% of the economically active population of the Russian Federation.
Experts cite many factors as the cause of the crisis: the collapse of Asian financial markets, low purchase prices for raw materials (oil, gas, metals), the failed economic policy of the state, the emergence of financial pyramids.
According to the calculations of the Moscow Banking Union, the total losses of the Russian economy from the August crisis amounted to 96 billion dollars: of which the corporate sector lost 33 billion dollars, and the population lost 19 billion dollars. However, some experts consider these figures to be clearly underestimated. In a short time, Russia has become one of the largest debtors in the world.
Only by the end of 2002 did the government of the Russian Federation manage to overcome inflationary processes, and from the beginning of 2003 the ruble began to gradually strengthen, which was largely facilitated by rising oil prices and the influx of foreign capital.

Nesterov A.K. History of economic crises // Encyclopedia of the Nesterovs

The history of economic crises goes back over 200 years. Industrial development on a global scale has led to the actualization of a number of processes that contribute to the emergence of crises.

Causes of world economic crises

All crises were characterized by a decline in industrial production, an oversupply of goods, a decrease in demand, prices, bankruptcies of banks and enterprises, and an increase in unemployment.

A crisis is an imbalance in the balance between supply and demand for goods and services.

Crises first began as a result of underproduction of agricultural products, and then became the result of overproduction of industrial goods against the backdrop of a decrease in effective demand.

It should also be noted that until the 20th century, crises occurred within several countries and did not have the nature of world economic crises, as it began to happen later.

Despite the wide possibilities of anti-crisis and anti-cyclical regulation mechanisms, new global crises cannot be avoided.

World economic crises of the late 18th - early 19th centuries

First economic crisis general overproduction took place in 1825. However, it was preceded by a whole period of economic development in which industrial crises were a relatively frequent occurrence.

But at that time there were still no conditions for these crises to take on the character of regularly repeating cyclical crises of general overproduction. At that time, the process of maturation of these conditions was still taking place; such conditions under which crises became cyclical and became crises of general overproduction.

In 1788, there was a crisis in the cotton industry in England. It also affected other branches of the textile industry, but in general the economy of England did not experience serious shocks. In 1793 in England there was a monetary crisis associated with credit expansion. But it was also associated with the crisis state of production. This was the first monetary crisis in history, expressing a crisis in industry and commerce. In 1797 in England there was again a monetary crisis associated with the overproduction of goods. It hit the cotton industry the hardest.

The next crisis of the English economy occurred in 1810. Having begun in the sphere of trade, the crisis again struck the industry, primarily cotton. But rising unemployment and falling wages have created a difficult situation for other industries producing consumer goods.

During the next crisis in 1815, overproduction spread to the iron and steel industry and the coal industry. This coincided with the agricultural crisis. During that period, for the first time in history, the fixed capital of many enterprises depreciated. The crisis affected the economies of European countries and the United States.

The next crisis occurred four years later in 1819, and at that time the level preceding the crisis of 1815 had not yet been reached. This seriously aggravated its consequences, greatly reducing the standard of living of the population.

Such a series of economic crises is not typical for today.

Crises of the late 18th - early 19th centuries. have the following features:

• these were partial crises, they meant the overflow of the market, difficulties in marketing, reduction in production;
• their influence was also felt in other countries, but they did not yet have a global character;
• monetary crises, formerly independent, were now an expression of the overproduction of commodities;
• the alternation of crises was not cyclical, there was no clear periodicity in their alternation, and the timing of the onset of the crisis was determined by external factors, for example, wars, and there was still no clear alternation of the phases of the cycle;
• overcoming the consequences of crises was carried out on the basis of bankruptcies and ruins of viable enterprises, a strong reduction in prices, wages, and the ruin of small-scale manual production.

All other crises up to our time can be divided into pre-monopoly and monopoly. Of the pre-monopoly crises, the crises of 1857 and 1890 are of great importance.

World economic crises of the 19th century

Crisis of 1857 was the first global crisis and the most serious of all the economic crises that occurred before. During the year and a half of the crisis in England, the volume of production in the textile industry decreased by 21%, in shipbuilding - by 26%. Iron smelting in France decreased by 13%, in the USA - by 20%, in Germany - by 25%. Cotton consumption fell by 13% in France, by 23% in the UK, and by 27% in the US. Russia has experienced major crisis upheavals. Iron smelting in Russia decreased by 17%, production of cotton fabrics by 14%, woolen fabrics by 11%.

The next global economic crisis occurred in 1873, starting in Austria and Germany, it is an international financial crisis. The prerequisites for the crisis were a credit boom in Latin America and speculation in the real estate market in Germany and Austria. May 1873 was marked by the fall of the Vienna stock market, followed by the collapse of the stock markets in Zurich and Amsterdam. After the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange and numerous bankruptcies, German banks refused to extend loans to Americans and, as a result, the US and European economies fell into a long depression, which caused a drop in exports from Latin America. It is believed that this was the longest crisis of the capitalist system, since it ended only in 1878.

Crisis of 1890 was a global monetary crisis. At the same time, there was also a global crisis of overproduction. All countries passed through it: England, France, with some delay (1893) the USA, Russia, Argentina, Australia. The crisis accelerated the transformation of pre-monopoly capital into monopoly capital, the concentration of production and the centralization of capital.

World economic crises of the XX century

In 1914, the first world economic crisis in the 20th century was caused by the outbreak of war and was due to the mass sale of securities of foreign issuers by the governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. A characteristic feature of this economic crisis was that on a global scale it had no center and periphery, since it began in several countries at once, which ended up in different military camps. The fall of both commodity and money markets led to a banking panic in several countries at once: the US, the UK and others. At that point, central banks intervened massively in declining markets.

In fact, the continuation of this crisis was the imposition of deflationary processes on the decline in production, resulting in economic crisis of 1920-1922 in Denmark, Italy, Great Britain, the USA and a number of other countries.

Of the 11 monopoly crises, the most significant were the crises of 1929–1933. and 1974–1975

World economic crisis 1929–1933 lasted more than 4 years and covered the entire capitalist world, all spheres of the economy. Its effect was like an earthquake in the economic sphere. The total volume of industrial production of the capitalist countries decreased by 46%, steel production fell by 62%, coal mining - by 31%, shipbuilding production - by 83%, foreign trade turnover - by 67%. The number of unemployed reached 26 million people, approximately 25% of all those employed in manufacturing. The income of the population decreased by 58%. The value of securities on stock exchanges fell by 60-75%. The crisis was marked by a huge number of bankruptcies. In the US alone, 109,000 firms were bankrupt. Several thousand people died of starvation, despite the fact that there was an excess of food that the Americans simply destroyed, so as not to give it to the needy for free. The crisis showed that the transition to the monopolistic stage of development of capitalism did not lead, as economic theory believed, to overcoming the contradictions and spontaneity of capitalist reproduction. The monopolies proved unable to cope with the market forces. And the bourgeois state was forced to intervene in economic processes. In order to mitigate crises, monopoly capitalism began to grow into state-monopoly capitalism.

V 1957 the first global economic crisis after the war. The crisis affected the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and a number of other countries of the capitalist system. More than 10 million people were unemployed, industrial production fell by 4%.

occupies a special place in the post-war development of the economy. The crisis engulfed all the capitalist countries, there was a huge decline in production and investment, consumer spending by the population and the total volume of foreign trade were sharply reduced. The increase in unemployment was accompanied by a fall in real incomes of the population and huge inflation. Prices rose rapidly even during the most acute period of the crisis, which had never happened before in the entire history of the cyclical development of the economy. The phenomenon of rising prices with a general stagnation of production is called "stagflation" (from the words "stagnation" and "inflation"). The crisis was accompanied by structural crises in the energy sector, coal mining, agriculture, the monetary and financial system; it disrupted the system of world relations and the international division of labor. Due to the rapid increase in prices for oil - 4 times, and for agricultural products - 3 times, prices for products manufactured by enterprises have risen sharply. Under these conditions, extractive industry companies were granted tax breaks in the United States and Canada, and the nationalization of these industries was carried out in the UK, France and Italy and the development of the public sector was undertaken.

World economic crisis 1974–1975 discovered the failure in the postwar years of the system of state-monopoly regulation. State recipes - lowering the discount rate, increasing government spending did not give the desired results. Regulation affected only national economies, but due to the internationalization of production, the crisis had an impact on the entire world economy. In addition, the activities of international monopolies, which played an active role in the disorganization of the world market and in the emergence of financial and currency crises, turned out to be outside the control of the states.

The next global economic crisis is called Black Monday 1987. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Average collapsed by 22.6%, followed by the collapse of the stock markets of Canada, Australia, and Hong Kong. This crisis, due to its colossal destructive impact and the scale of the fall, has been reflected in many feature films. As one of the possible reasons for the fall, a massive sale of shares was named after a strong drop in the capitalization of large American companies. Another version is called the deliberate influence of speculators in order to strengthen the impending fall, which they knew about in advance. Evidence of the second version was not made public. There are other reasons for Black Monday, more scientific and discussed in detail.

Mexican Crisis 1994-1995 had a long history: since the late 1980s, the Mexican government actively attracted investment in the country, a stock exchange was opened, which brought most of the state-owned companies in Mexico. In the period from 1989 to 1994, a large flow of foreign investment was observed in Mexico, the overheating of the financial market led to the fact that foreign investors were afraid of the economic crisis and began to massively withdraw capital from the country. In 1995, 10 billion dollars were withdrawn - the banking crisis began.

1997 was marked by the Asian crisis- the largest collapse of the Asian stock market since the Second World War. Like the Mexican one, the Asian crisis was the result of the withdrawal of foreign investors from the countries of Southeast Asia and the massive withdrawal of capital. This was preceded by the devaluation of many national currencies and the growth of the deficit in the balance of payments of the countries of this region.

In 1998 there was a Russian crisis- the most severe economic crisis in the history of Russia came because of the huge public debt, lower oil and gas prices, non-payment of government short-term bonds. From August 1998 to January 1999, the ruble against the dollar fell 3.5 times from 6 rubles. up to 21 rubles per dollar.

It should be noted that at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century, the next global economic crisis was predicted for 2007-2008. If the dates came true, then the causes and consequences of the crisis were completely wrong.

History of economic crises in Russia

Most economists in our country agree that the economic crisis in Russia does not fit into the usual cycle theory. The slowdown in growth rates in the USSR began already in the second half of the 1970s. the country's leadership continued to adhere to the policy of accelerated development of material-intensive, energy-intensive and extractive industries, while the industrial countries set a course for the development of science-intensive technologies that can significantly reduce production costs. With the policy of suppressing market relations in our country and the commitment to the monopoly of state property, the slowdown in the pace of development only intensified. The real collapse of national production happened in 1991, after the use of "shock therapy" by Ye. Gaidar.

In the early 80s. the position of the economic system predetermined the need for its reform.

The lag behind Western countries was too significant, but this did not mean the collapse of the entire economy during the long reforms, but it did not require the use of shock therapy. Without the application of fundamental changes in the economic system, a relatively small decline in production in the first half of the 1990s could have been achieved.

This could be achieved by resorting to a policy of solving problems with reforms that stimulate the development of the national market. Taking into account the possible positive effect of the development of the private sector in a stable economic environment and targeted stimulation of key industries in the conduct of a prudent economic policy, there were grounds to expect a continuation of the depression with zero growth in 1995-1996. and achieve sustainable growth at an annual rate of up to 7% since 1997. But this policy was not adopted in our country, as a result of which, in 1995, the consequences of the economic recession that hit our country after the collapse of the USSR became comparable to the American Great Depression of 1929-1933.

In their views on the current situation and ways out of it, domestic economists are divided into radical liberals and gradualists.

Radical liberals are supporters of the course of shock therapy. They advocate radical systemic and institutional economic transformations. They consider it necessary to break many state structures of the command economy. The central positions of the radicals are the release of prices, the demand for strict regulation of the money supply, government loans and subsidies, and the elimination of the budget deficit. For radicals, financial stability is more important than anti-crisis policy. Radicals in promoting shock therapy relied on two considerations. On the speed in carrying out transformations in the economic sphere and on the unfounded assertion that the total losses from shock therapy will be less than in the case of an evolutionary reform of the economy. Accordingly, the liberals believe that the only reason for the protracted depression in Russia is the lack of radical reforms; they are not used to blaming themselves.

According to liberals, economic growth in the country is associated with the so-called index of economic freedom. This index consists of the following indicators:

• the growth rate of the money supply is higher than the growth rate of real GDP;
• inflation rates;
• production volumes at state-owned enterprises as a percentage of GDP;
• the share of government consumption as a percentage of GDP;
• the level of taxation of imports and exports to foreign trade turnover.

The values ​​of the index components are determined as inverse ratios of the values ​​of the corresponding indicators of each country. Then 100% is an indicator of an absolutely liberal policy, and 0% is an indicator of an absolutely anti-liberal one.

Economists of this direction believe that it is necessary to get rid of a part of the industrial potential of the country, which they consider unviable. Moreover, this part varies from 1/3 to 2/3 of the total industrial fund. According to their concept, the mythical stabilization will come when the national economy will get rid of 60% of engineering, 50% of the coal and 65% of the woodworking industry, 36% of metallurgy, and the GNP will be reduced to 30-35% compared to the 1990 level. At the same time, the liberals did not offer and do not offer options and ways for further economic growth and development, limiting themselves to the need to destroy what, in their opinion, does not work well ...

Gradualists are the opposite pole in the debate about the further development of the country's economy. That is, they are in favor of a slow transition to the market with the preservation of most of the Soviet structures. They call to follow the example of China or Vietnam. At this stage, gradualists consider it necessary to intervene in the economy, to support the public sector. Nor do they deny the application of economic planning policies. In fact, gradualists rely on the Keynesian concept of the development of the economic system. In contrast to the radical liberals, they see the decline in GNP as a catastrophe, the collapse of the entire economy. The gradualists explain the decline of the Russian economy by a total decline in production, the loss of the domestic market for most domestic goods, and a drop in the standard of living of the population.

Literature

1. Shishkin A.F. Economic theory: In 2 books. Book. 1. - M.: VLADOS, 2002.
2. "Economic Theory (Political Economy)" ed. IN AND. Vidyapina, G.P. Zhuravleva. – M.: Publishing House of the Russian Academy of Economics. - 2002.
3. Economic theory. / Ed. V.D. Kamaev. – M.: VLADOS, 2004.
4. Salikhov B.V. Economic theory. – M.: Dashkov i K, 2014.

Much has gone forever from history with the volleys of the "salute of nations" that sounded on November 11, 1918 - too much for the historian's thoughts not to turn again and again to the events of the World Crisis.

The point is not only and not so much in the human victims of the Great War and not in the huge material and financial losses. Although these losses were many times greater than the conservative estimates of pre-war theorists, calling them "incalculable" or "beyond the human imagination" is unjustified. In absolute terms, human losses were less than from the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919, and material losses were inferior to the consequences of the 1929 crisis. As for the relative figures, the First World War bears no comparison with the medieval plague epidemics. Nevertheless, it is the armed conflict of 1914 that is perceived by us (and was perceived by contemporaries) as a terrible, irreparable catastrophe that led to the psychological breakdown of the entire European civilization. In the minds of millions of people who were not even directly affected by the war, the course of history was divided into two independent streams - “before” and “after” the war. "Before the war" - a free pan-European legal and economic space (only politically backward countries - like tsarist Russia - humiliated their dignity with passport and visa regimes), continuous development of "ascending" science, technology, economics; gradual but steady expansion of personal freedoms. "After the war" - the collapse of Europe, the transformation of most of it into a conglomerate of small police states with a primitive nationalist ideology; a permanent economic crisis, aptly called by Marxists the “general crisis of capitalism”, a turn towards a system of total control over the individual (state, group or corporate).

In itself, this already marked the nature of the next war - World War II - and the post-war "cold peace".

This essay offers you an unconventional approach to the study of the events of military history. Exploring the events of the First World War, we will try to "unpack" their meaning. To do this, we will have to accept the inexorable logic of the development of an antagonistic intercivilizational conflict. The logic embodied in the clash of ideas, worldviews and strategic plans of the parties. Logic, manifested in the interaction of individuals - the arbiters of fate and the executors of the will of opposing egregors.

Most often, military-historical works are either memoirs or analytical reviews. Memoirs are characterized by the construction by the author of his own personal universe, which sometimes has very few points of contact with what we call reality. In this case, the work of the memoirist is the construction of a Reflection that is comfortable for the author.

Note that almost always "official stories" are memoirs and are written in the style:

"Yes! We won, although it was strong with the Unrighteous Power of Knowledge - That side ... ”(Ryan, Tolkienist Epic.)

Analytical history, on the other hand, tends to reject the official versions, or at least "test them for germination." This creates the illusion of objectivity for everyone, not excluding the authors. However, in my opinion, it is precisely this claim to objectivity that is the main shortcoming of "analysts".

“Memoirists at least realize how accidental the outcome of many combat episodes was. Constantly looking for an excuse for the mistakes they have made, they cannot get rid of the thought: “It could have been different. If I had then listened to the opinion of X ... If I had not turned east of Paris ... If I had gone to sea an hour earlier ... ”“ Analysts ”are so carried away by the desire to explain what happened as the only possible one that chances refuse (as well as subjective factors) in the right to exist and draw far-reaching conclusions from completely insufficient premises.

1. The structure of the conflict.

Usually the story about the political aspect of the history of the First World War begins with the annexation of Lorraine and Alsace by Germany. Being in a hopeless military situation, France was forced to sign a peace treaty, which even the Germans did not consider in the least fair. The annexation, objected to by Bismarck, who personifies the political leadership of the new empire, was demanded - and achieved - by the victors from the Prussian General Staff. Both sides had their reasons.

France - represented by the government, parliament and people - refused to recognize the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine.

This meant that from now on, under any government and under any circumstances, Paris would pursue a consistent anti-German policy, and the desire to return the lost territories would become in France a national super-idea, if not a national paranoia. This in itself, of course, made inevitable (in a more or less distant future) a new Franco-German war, but in no way predetermined its all-European character.

It should be noted that, having set as its indispensable goal the return of the eastern departments (and orienting propaganda accordingly), France did not show due statesmanship. Her politics became predictable. This meant that regardless of the authority of its army and the degree of economic prosperity, France ceased to be the subject of international politics and became its object. By judiciously exploiting the restrictions that the "great goal" of the return of Alsace placed on the foreign policy actions of the Third Republic, France became possible to manipulate. But in this case, French policy should be recognized as dependent and it is impossible to talk about German-French contradictions as a cause or even one of the causes of the First World War.

Looking carefully at the pre-war political map of Europe, we will see that it is impossible to explain the nature and origin of the World Crisis of 1914, starting from the geopolitical interests of the countries participating in the conflict. Germany plays the role of the attacking side in the World War, having no meaningful territorial claims at all.

(The ideologists of pan-Germanism spoke, of course, about the annexation of Belgium, Russian Poland and the Baltic states, but these conquests were never considered as a serious political goal, since the theory of “living space” did not yet exist, and from a geopolitical point of view, the space of the empire was already redundant. As for the demand for a redistribution of the colonies, it is doubtful that it was ever put forward at all.). France, acting under the banner of revenge and the return of lost territories, on the contrary, is on the defensive. Russia, which is destined by historical fate for the southern direction of expansion (the Straits and the Middle East), is planning operations against Berlin and Vienna. Perhaps only Turkey is trying (albeit unsuccessfully) to act in some way in accordance with its geopolitical goals.

Let's compare this situation with the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. In this conflict, the economic interests of the countries clashed in Korea and Manchuria. The Japanese islands blocked the Russian fleet's access to the Pacific Ocean. On the other hand, the geographical "overhang" of the Russian Empire over Japan held back Japanese expansion in any strategic direction. With a strong Russian Pacific Fleet, Japan could not advance either to the continent, or to the southern seas, or to the archipelagos of the islands of the central Pacific Ocean. The effect of the "strategic shadow" was demonstrated to Japan immediately after the conclusion of the victorious Shimonoseki treaty with China.

Before us is a typical geopolitical conflict, when neither side can achieve its foreign policy goals without suppressing the other. Such a conflict did not lead fatally to war: Japan could not decide on an extremely risky attack. In this case, it would remain a second-rate power.

The desire of the Japanese Empire for an active foreign policy (due to the logic of the struggle for sources of raw materials and markets) provoked the development of the conflict and its transition to a military stage. It should be noted that, despite the fierceness of the fighting at sea and on land, the war was considered by both sides as limited. Neither for Japan, nor even for Russia, dominance in Korea and the Pacific was a matter of survival. That is why Russia concluded a peace favorable to Japan, far from having exhausted its possibilities to continue hostilities. The war ended as soon as its cost exceeded the significance of the conflict in the eyes of Russia.

So, in the case of the Russo-Japanese war, the parties acted in accordance with their geopolitical interests. They resolved the conflict that arose in the form of a limited war.

In the First World War, the parties act, if not directly against their own interests (Germany, Austria-Hungary), then at least “perpendicularly” to them (Russia). The result of the resolution of the conflict that has arisen is a general war and the collapse of civilization. It is reasonable to assume that this conflict did not have a geopolitical nature at all.

Orthodox Marxism, which explains the origin of the Great War by economic reasons - primarily by the most acute competitive struggle between Germany and Great Britain, is probably closer to the truth than the geopolitical concept. In any case, the British-German economic rivalry did take place. The sharp increase in industrial production in Germany (with a relatively low cost of labor) seriously undermined the position of the "workshop of the world" in the markets and forced the British government to switch to a protectionist trade policy. Since preferential tariffs for the countries of the British Empire (the idea of ​​Joseph Chamberlain) could not be passed through Parliament, protectionism led to a marked increase in the "transport resistance" of the empire. This could not but affect the state of the financial and credit world system with the center in London and indirectly - on the world trading system. Meanwhile, it was the position of the “world carrier” that ensured Britain's economic prosperity and political stability.

At the turn of the century, Germany moved on to the construction of a huge military and civilian fleet. With the support of the state, the largest German shipping companies (GAPAG and Norddeutschland Line) come out on top in the world in terms of the total tonnage of ships with a displacement of more than 5,000 tons. The vessels of these companies consistently win the most prestigious award in merchant shipping - the Blue Ribbon of the Atlantic. We are talking, therefore, about the very basis of the economic and political power of Great Britain - about the "ownership of the sea."

The economic content of the structural conflict that led to the First World War is obvious. Alas, it is in this case that the dynamics of economic indicators is only a reflection of deeper social processes. In the end, Great Britain paid a price for participation in the war, a price immeasurably higher than any real or imagined losses from German competition. During the four war years, the world's financial and credit flows, previously closed to the City of London, reoriented to Wall Street. The consequence was the rapid flow of British capital across the ocean. Great Britain started the war as a world creditor. By the end of it, she owed the United States over £8 billion. (For comparison - the total cost of Great Britain during the "dreadnought race" of 1907-1914 did not exceed 50 million pounds.)

Of course, the financial circles in Great Britain perfectly assessed the situation and opposed the country's entry into the war in 1914. (Equally, the German industrialists were categorically opposed to the war.) In other words, the legend of the "bankers' conspiracy against peace" does not stand up to scrutiny. In general, justifying an unlimited war on trade, financial or other business reasons is not too serious ...

“Things that are more important than peace and more terrible than war” are rarely due to mercantile reasons and are usually determined by the psychology of the masses, that is, within the framework of the views of C. Jung, they are of an archetypal nature. The fierceness with which the peoples fought indicates that it was not about money, not about relatively insignificant territorial gains, not about political prestige. This is how they protect their hearth, their way of life, their culture.

The colossal advances of civilization in the nineteenth century were, above all, the advances of Great Britain, the "workshop of the world." Throughout the English literature of the Victorian era, the imperturbable pride of the Englishman in his country is emphasized.

But "the one who has the advantage is obliged to attack under the threat of losing this advantage." And it is not easy to realize this obligation - again and again to risk ships, people, honor, the fate of the people - in order only to preserve dignity, pride, civilizational priority.

Germany during the second half of the 19th century turned from a conglomerate of third-rate states into a superpower. The speed of its economic development significantly exceeded the English pace. At the turn of the century, the Germans felt for the first time that they were a great nation with a great future.

Thus, the main question of the war is the question of civilizational priority - the right to leadership, in fact, the possession of the world. (Of course, here “possession” should be understood, not as an occupation, but rather in a spiritual sense. Once Satan showed Christ “all the kingdoms of the earth” and said: “Bow to me, and you will possess them.” Speaking with the Son of God, The Prince of Darkness wasn't referring to the "lentil soup" of conquest either.)

The conflict was further exacerbated by the fact that the British and German empires belonged to different civilizations.

This statement looks quite unexpected, but it is confirmed by the entire course of the war. In the end, as A. Toynbee has shown, it is inter-civilizational conflicts that are characterized by maximum bitterness.

When it comes to the fate of that unique translator between the information space and Reality, which we call our civilization, no price seems excessive.

Exploring the semiotic culture of the Third Reich, Bergier and Ponel came to the conclusion about its magical character. Under the guise of a machine, rationalistic, Western civilization, there was a completely different - alien to us - structure. Intuitively sensing this, many authors associated German fascism with the Middle Ages. However, this is nothing more than a simplification, an attempt to find a suitable word for an object that does not and cannot have a name. Bergier's formula is just as simplistic: Nazism is magic plus tank divisions.

Determining the structure of the magical civilization of Nazi Germany is beyond the scope of this work. It is reasonable, however, to pose the question: could an advanced alien civilization have been created in the incomplete decade and a half of Nazi domination? Wouldn't it be more natural to assume that its formation began long before Hitler? After all, the Thule Society was created under the Kaiser...

The difficulty is that the German civilization in many ways is close to the classical Western one. (Therefore, it is always tempting to explain deviations as mistakes or crimes.) One might even say that these civilizations coincide statically. The difference is in dynamics. The German civilization initially contained a much larger share of Chaos than the European one. That is why it developed faster. Therefore, it was less stable, with clearly visible tendencies towards social suicide.

It is difficult to imagine the Germans, the personification of order, paragraph, law, as inhabitants of Chaos. However, let us pose the question: why exactly did the Germans, and precisely at the turn of the century, that is, at the pinnacle of their development, become the caricature incarnation of discipline?

Will there be a revolution in Germany?

No, because revolutions in Germany are forbidden by the Kaiser's order.

Do you know how to fly an airplane?

According to the first paragraph of the third section of the seventh Instruction, a German officer must be able to do everything.

Apparently, it was precisely such (ridiculous from the point of view of an external observer) attempts to “order Chaos” that maintained the connection of the state and the nation with an ordered Reality.

Let us note here that the intelligent and observant Blok calls the German genius "gloomy", that is, obscure, indefinable, and contrasts it with "sharp Gallic sense."

So, two civilizations, one of which became great, and the other wanted to become it, collided in a fight not for life, but for death. A fight in which the future picture of the world was at stake.

Due to the lack of the necessary conceptual apparatus (the formalisms of information theory, cybernetics, the systems theory of L. von Bertalanffy, the theory of quasi-objects describing the structures of the mass unconscious), such an analysis could not, in principle, be carried out at the beginning of the century. This meant that the people of that time were doomed to misunderstanding the situation. In fact, even the most informed of them saw only the surface of the iceberg. In examining the events of the Great War, we must keep this in mind at all times.

2. Von Schlieffen and the German land war plan.

The conflicts of civilizations have been developing for decades. Countries entered the World Crisis of 1914 in different ways, but none of them had the right to call themselves unprepared.

The preparation of the state for war includes military planning, the creation and training of the army and navy, and the development of the economy. And, finally, the mobilization of the spiritual forces of the nation. These tasks, of course, must be solved jointly.

Since we have defined the First World War as an intercivilizational conflict driven by Great Britain and the German Empire, we will consider the structure of this war primarily as the result of the interaction of German and English strategic plans.

The task facing Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff, was extremely difficult. After the conclusion of the Franco-Russian agreement of 1894, a war on two fronts turned from an eventual possibility into an inevitability. At the same time, the military capabilities of France were comparable to those of Germany, while Austria-Hungary was unable to fight Russia in a one-on-one fight. The use of the ground forces of the third ally - Italy - was difficult for geographical reasons.

The first drafts of a plan for a war on two fronts belonged to the even older (great) Moltke. Actually, Moltke, who built all his strategic planning on railway maps, described the fundamental principle of solving the problem: using the mobility provided by eleven through railway lines connecting the Western and Eastern theaters of military operations, defeat the enemy troops one by one.

This meant that Germany should strive for a fleeting military campaign, while the Allies would benefit from dragging it out. The preparation of the theater of military operations (theater of operations) is carried out by the parties in accordance with this principle.

France is fenced off from Germany by the line of fortresses Toul - Epinal - Belfort - Verdun. Russia adopts a wider railroad gauge as a defensive measure (which practically deprives the Germans of the possibility of using the Russian railroad network) and evacuates the western bank of the Vistula. Germany is improving the work of railways in every possible way and is investing money only in two fortresses - Konigsberg in the east and Metz in the west. At the same time, both of them are conceived as fortified camps interacting with active field troops.

Schlieffen's most important problem was the choice of the direction of the first strike. Protracted mobilization in Russia forced the German General Staff to make the defeat of France a top priority. This meant that the Germans were ready to take the risk of losing East Prussia and possibly all of Austria-Hungary.

Only a quick and complete victory over France could justify such a risk. The operational scheme of 1870, included in all textbooks of military art, did not suit Schlieffen because of its slowness. Schlieffen could only achieve his "ideal end result" by carrying out an encirclement operation.

Actually, now the “Schlieffen maneuver” is understood to mean almost any operation to encircle. This is a considerable "merit" of Schlieffen himself, who called his classic work "Cannes" and constantly referred to the experience of Hannibal.

“The battle of annihilation can still be fought according to the plan proposed more than two thousand years ago…”

Not having - due to the conditions of the terrain and the composition of the forces - the possibility of making a double detour, Schlieffen adopted an asymmetric operational scheme. The main blow was delivered by the right wing. This wing, deployed on 2/5 of the length of the Western Front, included 73% of all available German forces. Schlieffen created a colossal operational reinforcement. The active - Western - theater of operations received 7/8 troops, and 5/6 of them were sent to the active sector.

Schlieffen's plan is consistently logical:

1. War with France is inevitable.

2. Under the current political conditions, it can only be a war on two fronts.

3. With a given balance of forces, the only way to win such a war is to defeat the enemy troops in parts, taking advantage of the advantage provided by actions along internal lines of operations.

4. Due to the conditions and terrain, a quick victory over the Russian army is impossible. Therefore, the first blow must be struck in the West.

5. The French army must be defeated before the full deployment of the Russian forces. This can only be done as part of an environment operation.

6. Due to the lack of forces, the encirclement maneuver must be asymmetrical.

7. The French line of fortresses cannot be quickly broken through and therefore must be bypassed.

8. Such a detour can only be carried out through neutral territory - Belgium or Switzerland. According to the conditions of the area, the second option is unacceptable.

Schlieffen came to the conclusion that it was necessary to violate the neutrality of Belgium, guaranteed by all the great powers, including Germany itself and Great Britain.

So, the Schlieffen plan implied the entry into the war of Great Britain, the extremely negative position of the United States and other neutral countries. To the armed forces of the opponents of Germany (already superior to the German ones) were added six Belgian divisions and three fortress regions - Liege, Namur, Antwerp. "Surrendered" to the enemy East Prussia, Galicia, Alsace with Lorraine, the Rhineland. Perhaps no operation required such serious security and did not imply such a huge risk. And all this - just for the sake of winning the pace!

The fact is that with all other options, there was no chance of winning at all. Here, the gain in tempo could be transformed into something more real:

1. At the end of the deployment of the Right Wing, six Belgian divisions came under attack from 35-40 German and had to be written off from the account (together with the fortress areas). Germany was able to use the rich road network of Belgium and Flanders.

2. The march maneuver of the right wing led to the capture of the coast of Flanders and, later, the ports of the English Channel, which posed a threat to England.

3. Within ten to twelve days, the movement of the armies of the right wing was to be carried out in an operational "vacuum" - with the complete absence of enemy resistance. During this time, the outflanking wing, reinforced with reserves, managed to turn around on the line of the Franco-Belgian border, reaching the flank of the Allied units.

4. Under these conditions, the enemy's counter-manoeuvre was inevitably delayed. Superior German forces would always go out to the flank of the Allied troops, threatening their rear and forcing them to break off the battle. The retreat of the allied armies would have taken place under conditions of strong flank pressure and, consequently, disorganized. The allied troops, trying to slip out from under the blow, would have been forced to retreat to the south, then to the southeast, which could not but lead to the mixing of troops and their hilling southeast of Paris.

5. The French capital, which is an important road junction, the political and spiritual center of France, was captured during the operation without a fight.

6. The result of the offensive march maneuver through Belgium and Northern France was to be a colossal battle that the Allies would have to fight with an "inverted" front southeast of Paris. This battle, launched by the Germans in an ideal psychological and strategic environment, could lead to the defeat of the Allied armies. The latter would have been driven back to the east or northeast and destroyed by the main body of the army in cooperation with the troops of the German left wing.

So: “Let the one on the far right touch the English Channel with his shoulder. Alignment to the right, to the left to feel the elbow.

Calculation of the operation in time: deployment - 12 days, march maneuver through Belgium and France - 30 days, decisive battle - 7 days, "combing" the territory and destroying the remnants of the allied army - 14 days. Just 9 weeks. The transfer of forces to the East could begin between the 36th and 42nd days of the operation.

Schlieffen's plan was a masterpiece, but it required geometric precision and desperate courage from the performers. From the General Staff, he also demanded a thorough study of the details.

The first problem was the general lack of forces for the intended maneuver. Schlieffen solved it in a simple and revolutionary way: he made up reserve corps from reservists of older draft ages and included them in the battle line.

Difficulties were presented by the key fortifications of Liege and Namur, which had to be taken not quickly, but very quickly, since Liege was part of the zone of operational deployment of the 1st German Army. This task was promptly solved by the creation (from peacetime formations) of a virtual "Liege army", which was intended to solve a single task - the assault on Liege - and disbanded immediately after its completion. Technically, the mobility of the "Army of Liege" was de-energized by giving it a fleet of super-heavy artillery pieces (done already under Moltke).

In Schlieffen's plan, the execution geometry played a fundamental role. The leading force of the offensive was to be the right-flank army (in 1914 - the 1st Army of von Kluck). In moving west, southwest, south-southwest and south, it had to outstrip the other armies of the Right Wing (in 1914, the 2nd Army of von Bülow and the Third Hausen), just as they were supposed to overtake the armies of the Center . Practically at the first stage of the operation, all the armies moved along arcs of concentric circles, and the center of these circles lay somewhere in the southern Ardennes. At the same time, the path that the 1st Army had to go through was twice the path of the 3rd Army and four times the length of the route of the 5th Army. This implied either the "braking" of the central armies, or the huge (over 40 km per day) pace of movement of the 1st Army. Otherwise, the 1st Army began to lag behind, turning from a shock group into a flank cover (against a non-existent enemy), the center bulged forward, and the entire offensive score fell apart.

Schlieffen needed to gain time at all costs. It was necessary to slow down the advance of the central armies and speed up the pace of the operation on the right flank.

The first task was easy.

Schlieffen weakened the troops to the limit not only in Alsace-Lorraine, but also in the Ardennes. He assumed that the enemy would launch two offensive operations: an invasion of Alsace for psychological reasons and an offensive in the Ardennes for strategic reasons. Schlieffen was aware that his grandiose detour plan would become known in general terms to the enemy. The French had two possible answers:

1. Rejecting any idea of ​​an offensive, adopt a purely defensive plan. To invest large amounts of money in the modernization of the fortress of Lille and deploy the armies of the northern front on the Verdun-Lille-coast line.

Such a scheme, proposed by General Michel, was reasonable, although with the operational reinforcement that Schlieffen planned, it might not be enough. In any case, its adoption was unlikely for political reasons (national paranoia with Alsace).

2. Check in practice the chess principle: a flank attack is reflected by a counterattack in the center. With the onset of large forces through the Ardennes, reach the communications of the armies of the German right wing and neutralize them; under favorable conditions, carry out the encirclement operation ourselves, pressing the enemy troops to the Dutch border.

It was this strategic idea that formed the basis of the French deployment plan (Plan No. 17).

Although the Allied offensive in the Ardennes looked very dangerous for the Germans, Schlieffen welcomed him in every possible way. This blow stopped the armies of the center and even forced them to retreat, which corrected the German operational geometry. Meanwhile, the “short cut” on the impassable Ardennes required more time for the armies of the beginning of the century than the “long trip” on the Belgian roads. According to Schlieffen, the Allies would have to lose the pace in Belgium faster than win it in the Ardennes.

(In addition to natural conditions, the Metz fortress, which occupies a flank position relative to the Ardennes maneuver of the allied forces, should have played a role in this slowdown.)

But the delay of the center is only one (but essentially negative, in the sense that it does not lead directly to the achievement of the goal) link in the maneuver. Schlieffen needed to ensure maximum mobility of the right wing. At the tactical level, this task was solved by the inclusion of heavy howitzer artillery in the composition of the field troops (as an offensive weapon!) It seems to me that this is the technical basis of the Schlieffen plan. The regular inclusion of heavy artillery in the corps gave the Germans a decisive tactical advantage in battle.

So, the right-flank armies were able to easily suppress the resistance of the enemy rear guards and move in free space. However, the problem of continuous heavy marches remained.

If we can talk about the miscalculations of Count Schlieffen, then it is precisely in solving this problem. The idea of ​​partial mechanization - the use of vehicles - to speed up the movement of the armies of the right wing - suggested itself ... Having passed this opportunity, Schlieffen made a mistake, generally insignificant, in the conditions of August 1914, which suddenly became decisive.

Psychological features of the Schlieffen plan.

Alfred von Schlieffen belonged to that rare psychological type, which is characterized by an accurate and deep understanding of time (in war - the pace of the operation, rhythm), a penchant for creating algorithms, describing and implementing a sequence of actions aimed at resolving a certain system of contradictions in time (in war - strategic and operational planning).

He had systemic, deep, precise thinking, more strategic than tactical (he sees the general, not the particular).

Such people are usually bold and reckless.

These qualities were hidden in Schlieffen under the mask of cold isolation and aristocracy, but they broke through in discussions, games, in the nature of strategic planning.

Schlieffen is ready to take a terrible risk, because he clearly sees that with "more correct" and "less risky" actions there is no gain.

(Another well-known for his military merits, a person of a similar psychological and mental warehouse, Admiral of the Japanese Navy Ishiroko Yamamoto, in response to the phrase: “Your whole plan is a game of chance”, without looking up from the game of Go, remarked: “Uh-huh. And I will win ".

These words are important for evaluating the Schlieffen plan. There are many good things to say about him, but objectively he was a gamble. They say that the Schlieffen plan could only be carried out if the German troops were commanded by "gods" and the French by "idiots". This, of course, is not true. It would be more accurate to say: if the Germans made "correct" decisions during the implementation of the plan, and the French - "natural". At the same time, the Germans initially had the advantage that the “correct” moves were known to them: Schlieffen found them, calculated and carefully verified them. "At the board" the Germans had to carefully reproduce the "home analysis", while the French would have been forced to improvise.

Schlieffen was, of course, familiar with the basic paradox of planning, which is that the enemy usually does not behave in the way that is required in his best interests. Therefore, he tried to create an ideal plan, almost completely independent of the actions of the enemy. He succeeded, but psychologically at a high price. In fact, Schlieffen suspended the war for thirty-five to forty days, leaving both her own and others in a state of uncertainty, psychologically very difficult for a person, especially for a military man.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that the supreme command of the German armies belonged to Kaiser Wilhelm II, a man whose psychological stability left much to be desired. Modern researchers like to point out that the Kaiser commanded purely nominally, while the real power was wielded by the Chief of the General Staff. This is both true and false at the same time. German charters, despite their notorious accuracy and thoroughness, did not clearly define the relationship between the commander and the chief of staff of a large formation. Sometimes the commander played the first violin, and the chief of staff was reduced to the role of a registrar of orders (1st German Army of 1914 - von Kluck and Kühl), sometimes all real power was concentrated in the hands of the chief of staff (Hindenburg and Ludendorff in all posts), sometimes management was divided in a more complex way. But in any case, they work together and the mood of one cannot but be reflected in the mood of the other. In any case, the Kaiser, who was self-confident and during the operation, was much more useful for the headquarters and the army than the doubting and confused Kaiser.

And Schlieffen, organizing the annual maneuvers of the German army, all the time gives the Kaiser the opportunity to enjoy the victory. Only the side for which the Kaiser "plays" wins. Later, after Schlieffen's retirement, his successor, Helmut Moltke, stops this entertainment: "The maneuvers lose their meaning, the officers lose interest in them." Schlieffen might remark:

“Interest is not important. They are required to learn - at the level of the subcortex - algorithms of actions in standard situations. They are not asked to win, they are asked to follow simple instructions without being distracted and without gagging. As for the Kaiser, I need his self-confidence.”

If you bring up a naturally cowardly dog, you - for starters - slip a obviously weak opponent into it for a fight. Schlieffen raised his Kaiser.

Schlieffen completely subordinated his activities as Chief of the General Staff to a single goal - the preparation of a "geometric-dynamic" war with France, the first plan for a pan-European war. More can be said - the entire German army was created and trained only to carry out an asymmetric encirclement operation. An operation in which Germany's opponents win all the battles, except for one - the last and decisive one.

3. Lord Fisher and the English plan of war at sea.

War plans always bear the imprint of the creator's personality. The English plan of warfare is associated with the name of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir John Fisher.

John Fisher began service on Nelson's former flagship, the Victory, and perhaps this event, incidental in itself, influenced the entire history of the 20th century.

Nelson is not only the glory of England, not only a heroic death in the midst of a victorious battle and an example for future generations of sailors. Nelson is largely a symbol of Great Britain itself.

It's not even that the magnificent Battle of Trafalgar put an end to all attempts by Napoleon to create adequate naval forces and organize their landing on the British Isles. More important was England's awareness of its sea power, its role in the protection of maritime trade, its leading place in world politics.

Fisher came into contact with the history of British naval glory at the age of thirteen. Personality traits conditioned Fischer's strong emotional sense of history and his place in it. This feeling was reinforced by the fact of service on the Victory, a ship owned by History.

Thus Fischer found his destiny - to do for his England what Nelson did for his England.

An ironic and cynical logician, Fisher, of course, was not going to repeat Nelson's life path (and his heroic death). He knew the French proverb all too well: "When two people do the same thing, it's not the same thing."

And Fisher defined his task as a complete reorganization of the British fleet.

The operational situation by the end of the 19th century seemed simply magnificent: the British fleet - commercial and military - did not know rivals on the seas and oceans, industry was on the rise, the international position of the country - the arbiter of the world - did not inspire any fears.

Now we know for sure that such a situation is fraught with catastrophe. (All the more amusing to watch today's America, which seems to have set itself the task of making all the mistakes characteristic of the "hegemonic country" and in no case miss a single one.) Fischer did not have the necessary historical experience, so he had a working model presumably built by himself.

The operational situation at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century, according to John Fisher:

1. The "brilliant isolation" of Great Britain automatically makes it an adversary of a power claiming European or world domination.

2. Deviation from this policy, expressed in the preparation of an agreement with France (concluded in April 1904), is a grave mistake. This agreement, without giving Great Britain any additional opportunities (the confrontation between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine made it possible to direct French policy in a direction pleasing to Great Britain without it), demonstrates the country's loss of self-confidence.

(Great Britain - the mistress of the seas and the leader of the civilized world - was supposed to strive for an alliance of the "Delosian type" with frankly weak states that did not encroach on the prerogatives of a great power. From this point of view, the Anglo-Japanese maritime alliance was then quite acceptable for Fisher - in contrast from the Entente.)

3. The development of the political situation will inevitably lead Britain to war with Germany.

4. This war will begin with the defeat of France and the occupation of its Territory.

(Here, as is easy to see, Fischer agrees with Schlieffen. Moreover, even their interests coincide. Schlieffen needs the defeat of France in order to get chances in the further struggle against the whole world. Fischer is satisfied with the defeat of France from the point of view of the long-term interests of the British Empire. In addition, Fischer's logic countered Schlieffen's land strategy with the original English answer - the blockade naval strategy.But in this case, Fischer was obliged in his planning to proceed from the fact that the strongest land power would crush his enemy in one fleeting campaign.

Before us is a situation that chess players will call "opening clash". Both sides deploy their forces independently and, for the time being, pay no attention to the actions of the opponent.)

5. The latter circumstance is to a certain extent favorable for Great Britain, since it eliminates the negative aspects of the Anglo-French alliance and makes it possible to return to the former policy of the world leader.

6. To do this, it is necessary to defeat Germany and restore France exclusively or almost exclusively by the British Empire and its dependent countries.

7. Thus, we are talking about the consistent use of dominance at sea for the complete defeat of the enemy, who is indisputably dominant on the continent.

8. The destruction of Germany's economic and military power must be carried out in such a way as to indirectly harm the United States of America and force it to accept the role of a junior partner (on the level of Japan).

One may get the impression that such an analysis is of a retrospective nature and could not be carried out at that time in principle. But it was at the turn of the century that the classical strategy was created. In chess (which, in my opinion, is a more accurate model of war or, more precisely, of the decision-making mechanism in war than is commonly believed), this was done by Steinitz and Tarrasch. “... Tarrasch was a staunch supporter of an active strategy, methodically constraining the enemy, using space for a convenient regrouping of forces and preparing a decisive offensive. With inexorable consistency, carrying out his plans, he won dozens of instructive games in this way - whole from beginning to end. Tarrasch's ability to create distant plans, providing for a radical regrouping of forces, was noted by Lasker ... ".

The theory of war on land was created by the elder Moltke and Schlieffen. The task of developing a strategy for the use of sea power fell to Fischer.

As we can see, Fischer's plan was designed for Germany to apply a formally continental strategy (in the development of Bismarck's ideas). However, the intellect of Alfred Tirpitz and the ambitions of Wilhelm II dramatically complicated the "game". In preparation for the war for European dominance, Germany began to build a fleet.

Here, we note, Schlieffen made a serious mistake. His plan at the first and most important stage did not provide for interaction with this fleet. As a result, in 1914 the army did one thing and the navy did another (or rather, nothing - at least not useful).

One had to be Fisher in order to lead the English fleet and feel the danger from a power that forty years ago had no naval forces at all. Which was completely devoid of naval traditions.

Perhaps Fischer had only one indisputable and very disturbing fact at his disposal: we have already noted that at the turn of the century the Blue Ribbon of the Atlantic passed from English liners to German ones. In this isolated fact, the admiral saw the moral obsolescence of the mighty armored fleet of the “mistress of the seas”.

To this day, Fischer is reproached for the fact that, having started the “dreadnought revolution” in 1904-1907, he devalued the absolute superiority of his country as a maritime power and gave Tirpitz and Germany a chance. These critics do not want to understand that even without the Russo-Japanese War and the reassessment caused by Tsushima, the creation of a turbine armored ship with single-caliber artillery was inevitable. Only, according to the logic of historical development, this idea should have been realized in the young fleets - German, Italian and American. Great Britain was doomed to the end to cling to its superiority in the old battleships and be the last in the "dreadnought race". Fischer did not like this turn of events.

From the moment the Dreadnought was launched, strategic calculations at sea gave way to operational planning: a tempo game began.

It was obvious that if Great Britain got an advantage in time, then it was insignificant: the developed shipbuilding capabilities of Germany would allow it to quickly master the construction of dreadnoughts. Since all the ironclads of the previous types were instantly obsolete and turned into auxiliary ships, a ratio of forces was predicted from 1: 1 in unfavorable conditions for Great Britain to 2: 1 in favor of the English fleet under circumstances especially favorable for Britain. Thus, the issue of a technical absolute blockade was removed from the agenda.

Tirpitz accepted the challenge, naming Germany's hastily built battle fleet the "High Seas Fleet".

So, by being the first to put the dreadnought into operation, Fisher only avoided a quick and complete defeat, but the question of the possibility of victory remained open. The battle fleet provided the defense of Great Britain (including in the event of the complete defeat of its continental allies). But, as Fischer clearly realized, he was not an offensive weapon. A ship was needed to drive the enemy out of the maritime theaters, a ship that would force him to support any of his operations outside the territorial waters with the entire battle fleet.

And in parallel with the Dreadnought, Great Britain creates the Invincible, the world's first battlecruiser.

If the creation of the Dreadnought was an almost inevitable result of the evolution of the class of squadron battleships, then I am inclined to consider the Invincible an almost pure Fisher innovation.

Hymn to battlecruisers.

To paraphrase R. Sheckley's statement about the Distorted World, we can say: we call them battlecruisers, although they are not battlecruisers at all and are not cruisers. This whole class of ships appeared as a result of the grandiose plan of John Fisher, who designed the scheme of his future Trafalgar in 1906.

The ironic name battlecruiser, almost a hoax... The cruising qualities of these ships, primarily their range, were initially sacrificed for speed and artillery armament.

These ships at once devalued all the efforts of Tirpitz to prepare for a cruising war. The Scharnhorsts did not look good against the Invincibles, which was demonstrated in 1914 near the Falkland Islands: “Quod erat demonstrandum,” Dr. Tarrasch, who was very fond of Latin sayings, concluded the visual lesson. Further, one battlecruiser patrol locked up all German surface ships in Heligoland Bight, turning the "High Seas Fleet" into the "Closed Bay Fleet". Indeed, the light, versatile, armored German cruisers, like the pre-dreadnought battleships, had no chance against this patrol. And this, too, was brilliantly demonstrated in 1914. Now the Germans were obliged to support any operation of the surface forces with battleships, which created the possibility of a decisive squadron battle. And in this battle, it was the battlecruisers that were supposed to provide the Tsushima "crossing", covering the enemy's head with the consistent placement of his ships in the focus of squadron fire.

In other words, if the task of ensuring the stability of the battle line was entrusted to the battle fleet - both on an operational and strategic scale, then the fleet of battle cruisers was created in order to ensure its mobility and variability. And, therefore, winning the battle.

Fisher is constantly reproached for insufficient booking of his "battlecruisers." However, this criticism is based on a misunderstanding of the operational plans for which these ships were created.

The task of ousting enemy ships from the theater of operations clearly required the deployment of the maximum number of main battery guns on ships. The need to impose a battle on the enemy, the task of covering the head of his squadron, and finally, the task of fighting high-speed light cruisers - all this required maximum speed and, accordingly, the power supply of the ship. But with a fixed - primarily for economic reasons - displacement, these tasks could be jointly solved only by booking.

This, of course, raised the question of the cost of victory. The main blow in the naval battle was to be taken by weakly protected ships. Very expensive ships. The most beautiful ships of their time.

Fischer put so much inventiveness and cunning into the creation of Invincible that Tirpitz never managed to fully understand the depth of his plan. In any case, Germany's reflex response was unsuccessful.

Of course, the British intelligence joke with the Blucher also played its role. And here lies the first mystery of Fisher's strategic plan. The intelligent and informed Conan Doyle directly linked the gravest mistake of the German Admiralty with the work of his favorite hero. Well, Holmes or not Holmes, but someone gave the Germans a frank "misinformation" about the weapons of the Invincible. This is despite the fact that there was no such word: "misinformation" then.

It seems to me that if Fischer did not himself organize this reconnaissance operation, then, in any case, he knew about it. And from that moment on, the organization of naval intelligence and counterintelligence becomes his constant headache.

As for the Germans, they believed the information that the Invincible would be a smaller copy of the Dreadnought - with 203-mm or 234-mm guns - primarily because such a step seemed quite logical to them - being, by definition, a cruiser, the new the ship was to be a natural result of the development of an extensive family of English armored cruisers. A carefully thinking Tirpitz could not have imagined that Fischer would decide to create an extremely unbalanced strike ship.

The Blucher turned out to be the most unfortunate ship in the Kaiser fleet. Enormous funds were spent on the creation of a beautiful armored cruiser, which, due to the existence of the Invincible enemy, could not find any use for itself and, as a result, died uselessly.

So, Invincible instantly devalued both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the not yet ready Blucher, forcing the German Admiralty to take some measures, to oppose their English battlecruisers. And here the Germans made a decisive mistake.

Tirpitz rightly judged that it was unprofitable for Germany to build direct imitations of the English LKR. Lagging behind in the line fleet, the Germans were not interested in high-speed ships that could draw the enemy into battle under any conditions. That is, they were forced to give priority to the stability of the battle line over its mobility. As a result, the German battlecruisers lagged behind the British in terms of power-to-weight ratio, and over time this gap only increased. (From time to time, pop-up data about the excellent speed qualities of the German LCR: 28 knots for the Moltke, more than 28 for the Derflinger - have little to do with reality. In combat conditions, the German LCR always lagged behind the English of the same generation. in a long pursuit, this lag increased due to overwork of the stokers.) As a result, the Hipper connection practically could not act in isolation from the main forces of the Hochseeflitte. But in this case, the operational purpose of the German LCR became somewhat vague. In essence, the Germans should not have created their technical centaurs at all (attack ships, in which, however, the defensive function prevailed over the offensive one). Instead, the focus should have been on building fast battleships.

There was, however, a much stronger solution. I think Fischer, who had deeply worked out the concept of the battlecruiser and how to use it, knew about it and throughout the period from 1908 to 1914 prayed to God that the Germans would not go down this path.

The correct answer to a strike battlecruiser like the Invincible could be an ocean-going battlecruiser that sacrificed defense not for speed but for autonomy. Just as two Invincibles devalued the entire German cruiser fleet, two such autonomous raiders would devalue the entire British communications defense fleet and force the British Admiralty to use their battlecruisers for defensive functions (for which, we note, they were of little use).

After Germany passed by this strongest opportunity, victory became a matter of technique for Fischer.

Between 1908 and 1912, both sides gambled up the stakes, quickly curving up the "main sequence" specifications of their dreadnoughts and battlecruisers. Having gained an advantage, Fischer attacks under the threat of losing this advantage. The "dreadnought revolution" is followed by the "superdreadnought" - the rejection of the 12-inch caliber in favor of the 13.5-inch caliber. As a result, the Germans were forced to leave their favorite 280 mm gun and switch to the 305 mm caliber. (Few people noticed that the Orions essentially threw into the dustbin of history the first generation of "dreadnoughts", doomed to become auxiliary ships after the battleships.)

As the international situation worsens, nervousness intensifies. Fischer's already nasty character deteriorates even more. The success of his own reconnaissance operation against the Germans forced Fischer to look for traces of a similar German action in any, the most innocent events. Trying to organize a fight against the very possibility of such actions, Fischer is making efforts to create an atmosphere of mutual control in the fleet, in other words, denunciation. That is, now he - and, moreover, from scratch - makes a decisive mistake.

During this period, Fisher and Churchill persuaded each other to go on a frank adventure - to order the construction of ships with 15-inch guns - guns that at that moment were not yet available not only in metal, but also on drafting tables.

The success of this dubious undertaking makes me once again recall the magnificent comments of D. Bronstein: “Sometimes, willy-nilly, you have to give up a pawn or even an exchange, a piece - there is a reason for this, if you see that the normal course of the struggle will lead you to a difficult position.”

Defending the interests of the decrepit British Empire, old Fisher invested in the preparations for war the energy, will and adventurism of his youth.

4. The deployment of forces and the struggle for the allies: 1905-1914.

A superficial analysis of the “clash of openings” between Schlieffen and Fischer suggests that the English admiral “counted” his opponent for one move. Indeed, Fischer's plan begins its destructive work the moment Schlieffen reaches its goal. The only thing Fischer needs is to prove the priority of the "sea" strategy over the "land" strategy, forcing Germany to fight against the economic possibilities of the rest of mankind. (Which, we note, fully corresponds to the logic of resolving the intercivilizational conflict.)

In reality, things were not so simple.

Both plans were based on the implicit assumption that a country would go to war in a favorable political environment.

It was absolutely essential for England to enlist the support of Russia. Otherwise, the blockade of Germany would not have been hermetic. The Grand Fleet, of course, outnumbered the High Seas Fleet, and this superiority was enough to close the North Sea. It should have been enough for the blockade of continental Europe. But not all of Eurasia! At the very least, Fischer's plans did not include instigating war into a "secular conflict".

The subtlety was, however, that the interests of Russia and Germany did not clash anywhere. (Even the most orthodox Marxist would not seriously defend the concept that the Russian Empire entered the World War because of a trade conflict with Germany over grain duties.) popular, but it is hardly appropriate to consider the clarification of relations between Austria-Hungary and the South Slavic peoples as the real cause of the war. Of course, Russia could do anything for the sake of mastering the Straits zone, but the paradox of history was that it was Great Britain that was her main opponent on the way to Constantinople.

In addition, the frank assistance that England provided to Japan during the war of 1904-1905 did not help strengthen friendly relations between future partners in the Entente.

For some reason, no one, analyzing the history of the First World War, paid attention to the fact that, by entering into alliances with France and England, Russia, in essence, went against its own national aspirations. British diplomacy outplayed not only Russian, but also German politics, creating prerequisites for using the "Russian steamroller" in their own interests.

The second political task of Great Britain was to create a favorable image of the country in the eyes of neutral states (primarily the United States). The problem here was that the Fischer blockade severely restricted neutral trade. Here Fischer could safely rely on two people - Schlieffen, who predetermined the entry of German troops into the territory of Belgium and Luxembourg, and Kaiser Wilhelm, whose pre-war eloquence contributed a lot to turning Germany into the "empire of the Huns."

Here it should be noted that the formation of Schlieffen as a military theorist took place in the era of Prince Bismarck. The great chancellor, long before Churchill, learned the famous formula: "War is too serious a matter to be entrusted to the military." Dealing with such high-class professionals as Roon and Moltke Sr., he nevertheless strived to ensure that the military could only complete the work he had begun. B. Liddell Hart in his "Strategy of Indirect Actions" notes that throughout military history it is difficult to find examples of greater helplessness of one of the parties than the helplessness of Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. Note that in all three Bismarckian wars, Prussia was, in fact, the aggressor. However, in the first case, Bismarck created Prussia's image of a country defending the inviolability of international obligations, and in the other two, he provoked an enemy attack on "poor little peace-loving compliant" Prussia.

Alas, Bismarck was not only the first but also the last great German politician. His successors lacked above all flexibility. As a result, Germany quickly lost allied relations with Russia, quarreled with the British, and by the beginning of the World Crisis found itself at the tail end of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy: in fact, it was decided in Vienna whether Berlin should enter the war.

In order to ensure the implementation of the Schlieffen plan, genuine skill was required from German diplomacy. Perhaps Bismarck himself would not have been able to correctly solve the problem of "laundering the black dog." But in any case, Schlieffen had the right to expect at least some meaningful assistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

If the favorable position of the neutral powers was the "sine qua non" of the implementation of the Fischer plan, then for Schlieffen's plans the positive attitude of the neutrals was not so important. However, there was one country whose entry into the war on the side of Germany was absolutely necessary for him. To the same extent that Russia's participation was necessary for the Entente. It's about Italy.

Italy is not only an additional 25 divisions (of doubtful quality, however), not only the release of significant forces of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, not only a second front for France. Italy is a fleet. If Italy remains neutral or fights on the side of the Entente, her fleet and the Austro-Hungarian fleet balance each other out. Then the French fleet, reinforced by the English squadron, receives undeniable dominance in the Mediterranean.

But if Italy fulfills its obligations under the Triple Alliance, the situation looks different: by the end of 1914, the German fleet has 8 dreadnoughts in the Mediterranean against 4 French (the worst class). If, as a result of the defeat of France, French ships are sunk (for example, in Toulon), the German advantage in the Mediterranean becomes overwhelming, and they begin to seriously threaten the most important nodal points of the British Empire - Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria.

On this reasoning, the second stage of the Schlieffen plan was based: the English blockade breaks through in the Mediterranean Sea. The British are forced to either give up this region and lose the empire, or transfer at least a third of the Grand Fleet's available forces there. At the same time, the remaining forces for a complete blockade of not only the North Sea, but also the French coast might not be enough.

This is where the "Schlieffen Amendment" to Fischer's ideas comes into play: to question the blockade with a peripheral (Mediterranean) strategy. The chances of success of this operation (of course, subject to the defeat of France and Italy's entry into the war) can be estimated as "50 to 50". Much would have depended on the balance of losses at sea in the 1914 campaign.

Now Schlieffen's intention is clear. The key to defeating France lies in southwestern Belgium. The key to defeating England lies in the Mediterranean, and the Italians hold it.

It was on this front that Triple Alliance diplomacy suffered its worst setback. Italy, which has territorial claims exclusively against its ally - Austria-Hungary, citing the formally defensive nature of the Triple Alliance, refused to enter the war and thereby predetermined the success of Great Britain.

So, the pre-war struggle for the allies was won by the Entente by a huge margin. Apart from Turkey, which was doomed to oppose Russia (as France - against Germany), Germany managed to secure (and then rather accidentally) the assistance of only one power - Bulgaria, while Great Britain won over the rest of the world to its side.

"Don't we have any friends left?" the Germans asked each other in 1914.

S. Pereslegin

: “At best, Germany and Austria-Hungary started a reckless game that went completely wrong for them. At its worst, a premeditated war of aggression and conquest began in 1914, which turned out to be far from being the swift and decisive undertaking that some had imagined. At the end of January 1914, Russia entered into a formal alliance with Serbia. During the visit to St. Petersburg of the Serbian Prime Minister Nikola Pasic and the heir to the Serbian throne, Prince Alexander, Emperor Nicholas II promised to provide Serbia with "every possible military assistance" and even any "support that she needs." The guests, in their turn, undertook to coordinate their military plans with the Russian General Staff.

Such coordination was carried out in March-May 1914, and it was about the upcoming operations against Austria-Hungary. The same coordination of future hostilities took place with Montenegro, with which back in November 1913 Russia restored a military alliance, and in the spring of 1914 - a military convention, interrupted for the time of the Balkan wars. The special representative of Austria-Hungary, sent to Serbia to collect evidence, the former prosecutor adviser Friedrich Wicher, telegraphed to Vienna: “To prove and even suspect the Serbian government that it was aware of the assassination attempt, or participated in its implementation, preparation and provision shout-

and the bombs were received at Kparyenaue from the arsenal of the Serbian army. The Austrians, however, failed to establish exactly whether the weapons were received immediately before the assassination attempt. Austrian Prime Minister Count Karl von Stürgk was convinced that the connection between the Slavs of the monarchy and the Slavs abroad could only be broken by war. It was believed that only a war would put an end to the activities of Serbian agents in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, there were no plans in Austria-Hungary to annex Serbia and Montenegro, with the possible exception of some strategically important border territories. The calculation was rather that it would be possible to establish a pro-Austrian government there. But such a calculation was in any case utopian. It was hard to hope that such governments would be able to stay in power after the Austrian occupation. In the era of nation-states, Austria-Hungary was an anachronism, but its ruling circles did not understand this. One of the goals of the war was the annexation of Russian Poland to Austria, but without a clear idea how it would be possible to integrate so many Patyaks into the political structure of the Dual Monarchy, which any new conquests inevitably led to death. The Russian Empire was the same anachronism, but neither the supporters of autocracy nor their revolutionary and democratic opponents understood this, with the exception of leaders of national revolutionary and democratic movements. Not surprising,

that the tsarist government had no clear goals in the war. The main thing was the reunification of Poland under the scepter of the Russian Tsar, the capture of Constantinople and the Straits, Turkish Armenia and a number of other Turkish territories, as well as Eastern Galicia and Ugric Rus (Transcarpathia). However, there were no specific plans for the development of new territories and their relationship with the imperial metropolis in the event of an Entente victory. If all these annexations were carried out, they would only lead to the growth of national movements in the Russian Empire, which the imperial government would hardly be able to cope with. Control over Constantinople and the Straits was considered a panacea for all ills in St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, in pre-war Russian journalism, the significance of the Straits for Russian exports was greatly exaggerated. Even the closure of the Straits during Turkey's wars with its neighbors did not prevent Russian exports through the Balkan countries without a significant rise in price, since the vast majority of Russian goods were still carried on foreign ships. In St. Petersburg there was not even a clear position as to whether the dismemberment or preservation of Austria-Hungary was more advantageous for Russia. The leadership of the Dual Monarchy was very afraid of a war with Russia, despite the support of Germany. “You can see everything,” wrote N.N., Russian ambassador to Vienna, on August 3, 1914. Shebeko, - that they did not want war with us here and are very afraid of it *. And the envoy in the capital of Montenegro, Cetins A.A. Gears

in a note entitled "Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey. The Tasks of War and Peace, compiled after the Second Balkan War, proposed to abandon unilateral support for the adventurous course of the rulers of Serbia and, in particular, plans to annex the territories of the monarchy inhabited by the Kioslavs to it. Back in 1913, he predicted that "Great Serbia" would sooner or later move away from Russia. Gire, who had previously considered the struggle against the monarchy to be the main task of Russia's Balkan policy, analyzing the experience of the Balkan wars, spoke in favor of a radical turn in the course from confrontation with Austria-Hungary to cooperation with it and called for harmonizing the interests of both powers up to the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans. However, the sober voice of Gears was not heard. The Russian envoy in Belgrade III Hartwig believed that it was Serbia that was Russia's reliable support on the peninsula. A.P. was of the same opinion. Izvolsky, Ambassador to Paris and former Minister of Foreign Affairs. True, neither of them raised the question of dismembering Austria-Hungary. Other countries of the Entente represented the singing of the war more clearly. For England, the main thing was the crushing of the naval, commercial and industrial power of Germany, the seizure of its colonies and a number of territories of the Ottoman Empire. For Austria-Hungary, the war was also unprofitable because at the beginning of the 20th century, economic growth here was the highest in Europe, and if peace was maintained for a long time, it could expect to come close in terms of development to Italy and France.

And the corresponding growth in the well-being of the population, as many in Vienna and Budapest believed, could muffle the sharpness of interethnic conflicts within the empire. In 1900-1913, the GNP of the Danubian Monarchy grew by an average of 1.76% per year, while in England - by 1.00%, in France - by 1.06% and in Germany by 1.51%. Hungarian Prime Minister Count Istvan Tisza categorically opposed the war, who believed that defeat would inevitably lead to the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, and victory would only increase the instability of the Dual Monarchy, especially in the case of new territorial increments, and lead to its transformation into the Triune Monarchy, with the formation Czech kingdom, in favor of which Hungary will have to give up Slovakia. He also had no doubt that he would have to fight not only with Serbia, but also, at a minimum, with Russia, and such a war would be unbearable for Austria-Hungary. In the event that Germany came to the aid of the Danubian monarchy, the war would inevitably become a world war with France and England acting on the side of Russia, which did not promise a favorable outcome for the Central Powers.

However, at the decisive meeting of the crown council chaired by Franz Joseph on July 19, Tisza OShV made his objections of principle and agreed to the presentation of an ultimatum to Serbia. The change of position occurred after Tisza's exchange of views with the Kaiser and the German ambassador to Vienna, von Csirschka, who initiated the Hungarian premier into the "blitzkrieg" plan. The Hungarian biographer of Tisza, Ferenc Peloshkei, believes that "faith in Germany's matriarchal, military and spiritual power was and remained the weakest point of his foreign policy concept, and with his characteristic consistency, he remained faithful to it to the end." Austria-Hungary, urged on by Germany, delivered an ultimatum to Serbia, demanding not only to stop the Angihabsburg propaganda, but also to allow the Austrian police to enter Serbian territory to investigate the assassination attempt. The Serbian authorities expressed their readiness to accept all demands, with the exception of one - the admission of a foreign position to the investigation. It should be noted that this Austrian demand was not unfounded. In Vienna, not without reason, they feared that the Serbian police would try to hide the traces of the links of the assassin with the Mlada Bosna organization, as well as the links of this organization with a number of high-ranking Serbian military and politicians. Austria-Hungary broke off diplomatic relations with Belgrade and on July 28 declared war on Serbia. This automatically triggered a chain of alliances. The father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud, far from any nationalism and chauvinism, wrote in early August 1914: “For the first time in 30 years, I feel like an Austrian!” On July 29, Russia announced a general mobilization.

In the evening of the same day, the general mobilization was replaced by a partial one - only against Austria-Hungary. On July 30, under the influence of the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry, Emperor Nicholas II again returned to the decree on general mobilization. The Russian military had no doubt that war was inevitable and that they would have to fight not only against Austria-Hungary, but also against Germany. On July 30, Nicholas II allowed himself to be persuaded by Sazonov, who asserted that “the war had long been resolved in Vienna and that in Berlin, from where one could expect a word of admonition, they did not want to pronounce it, demanding from us capitulation to the Central Powers, which Russia would never forgive sovereign and which would cover the good name of the Russian people with shame. Handing over permission for mobilization to the Chief of the General Staff, Yanushkevich, Sazonov added that "now you can break the phone," i.e. mobilization will not be cancelled. The Baltic Fleet reacted most quickly, starting laying mines against a surprise attack at 6.50 am on July 31, 12 hours before the declaration of war.

On 29 July news reached Germany of military preparations in Belgium, especially around Liège. The German military command argued that the start of the war could not be postponed any longer, since the defensive measures of the Belgian army could significantly slow down the future offensive of the German troops in Belgium, which was vital for the implementation of the Schlieffson plan. The state of military threat in Germany was announced at 13.45 on 31 July. At midnight on July 31, the German ambassador, Count Pourtales, delivered an ultimatum to Sazonov, demanding the cancellation of mobilization in Russia and giving only 12 hours to respond. On August 1, at 7 p.m., 6 hours after the expiration of the ultimatum, Purgales, after Sazonov's refusal three times to give a declaration to stop "hostile preparations" against Austria and Germany, handed over a note declaring war. So, Germany demanded to cancel the mobilization, but Russia did not respond to this ultimatum. On August 1, German mobilization began, and in the evening of the same day the Reich declared war on Russia. At the same time, France began a general mobilization. The Germans were in a hurry to start implementing the Schlieffen plan. Therefore, already on the evening of August 3, Germany declared sex to the French soldier on the pretext that the French Samazets allegedly violated the neutrality of Belgium, and also circled German cities and bombed the railway. On August 2, the Germans occupied Luxembourg, and on August 4, German troops invaded Belgium without declaring war under the pretext that French divisions are preparing to enter there.

The British government demanded that Berlin give an answer by the end of the 4th whether it was ready to observe Belgian neutrality. The German Secretary of State von Jagov declared that he could not give such obligations, since military considerations were above all others. On the same day, England declared war on Germany. On August 6, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and a few days later found itself at war with other states of the Entente. In the autumn of 1914, US President Woodrow Wilson publicly declared that "the disintegration of the Danube monarchy into its component parts" would serve "the good of Europe." France on the same day mobilized all its land and sea forces, but did not declare war. A dispatch was received from London in Berlin from the German ambassador, Prince Lichnovsky, which stated that France would not intervene in Germany's war with Russia if Germany did not attack France first. But von Moltke, chief of the German General Staff, insisted on demanding from France the return of the two most important fortresses - Toul and Verdun - for the entire duration of the war. Moreover, it was Germany that declared war on France on August 3, hoping for a lightning-fast implementation of the Schlieffen plan. The French government, on the contrary, on July 30 ordered a 10 km withdrawal of troops along the entire length of the border with Germany - from Switzerland to Luxembourg, in order to avoid provocations and random skirmishes. Not a single unit and not a single soldier, under the threat of a court-martial, were to go beyond the 10-kilometer border zone. On August 3, Germany declared war on France and Belgium.

The latter was accused of refusing to let German troops through its territory. The war against Belgium allowed Britain to officially declare war on Germany on 4 August. And only on August 6, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and Serbia on Germany. Interestingly, having received the royal decree on mobilization, the Minister of Internal Affairs N.A. Maklakov told the head of the mobilization department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff, General S.K. Dobrovolsky: “War in our country, in the depths of the people, cannot be popular, and the ideas of the revolution are clearer to the people than victory over the Germans. But you can’t get away from fate ... ”Some of the most far-sighted military and political figures foresaw that the war would become the equestrian of the Russian Empire. Russian historian V.A. Avdeev describes the mobilization as follows: “Reserves began to arrive at the assembly points at the departments of district chiefs, where teams were formed from them to replenish personnel units and form secondary ones.

Not everywhere the call went smoothly. Already on the third day after the announcement of mobilization, news began to arrive from the districts about the unrest that had arisen among the reserve. Reports about this were received at the Ministry of War from Perm, Kurgan, the Don region, and Insar. Borisov, Orla, Kokchegava. The replacements gathered in crowds, smashed wine warehouses, shops, attacks on the police were observed in some places, during the riots there were casualties. The work of assembly points was also greatly hampered by the discovery of surpluses of spares, especially in the Kazan and Omsk military districts. This was due to the obsolescence and miscalculations of the 1910 mobilization schedule. Mobilization in the European part of Russia took place in a more organized manner and on time. This was facilitated by verification mobilizations on the eve of the war. In general, despite a number of shortcomings, the mobilization of the cadre army was successful and on time. By July 26 (August 8), on the 8th day of mobilization, operational transport of troops and a period of strategic concentration began. At this time, the formation of priority divisions continued, which, following the priority ones, were to move to the front. Russia's fully armed forces completed their mobilization on the 45th day. By September 3 (16), 3 million 388 thousand people were called up, not counting the peaks of the militia. In total, 4.2 million people stood up under the banners.”

One hundred great secrets of the First World War / B.V. Sokolov. - M .: Veche, 2014. - 416 e. - (100 great).