In January-June 2017, almost 12% fewer children were born than in the same period in 2016
In 2017, the trend towards a reduction in the number of births, which began in 2015, noticeably intensified. In the first half of the year, almost 12% fewer children were born in Russia than in the same period in 2016. Periodic declines and rises in the number of births have been characteristic of Russia in recent decades (Fig. 10). This is partly due to the wave-like deformation of the age composition of the population (including the number of women of fertile age), partly due to changes in the intensity of the birth rate and its age profile.
The last observed period of growth in the number of births occurred in 2000-2014. In general, during this period the number of births increased almost 1.6 times (by 57.5%) - from 1215 thousand people in 1999 to 1913 thousand people in 2014 (excluding Crimea), but it remained lower than recorded in 1971-1990 (the highest was in 1987 - 2,500 thousand people).
The increase in the number of births varied markedly from year to year. By 2004, the number of births increased to 1,502 thousand (23.7% more than in 1999), but in 2005 and 2006 slightly fewer births were registered than in 2004. After the introduction of measures to support families with children (primarily maternal capital in the case of the birth of a child of the second or higher birth order), the number of births in 2007 increased by 8.8% compared to 2006. However, then the growth rate of births began to slow down rapidly, amounting to 6.4% in 2008, 2.8% in 2009, 1.5% in 2010 and 0.4% in 2011. In 2012, the increase in the number of births accelerated again - 1,902 thousand live births were registered, which is 5.9% more than in 2011 (1,797 thousand people). A small contribution to this increase was made by a change in the live birth criteria, but not more than 0.2%. In 2013, there was a further expansion of the live birth criteria, but the number of births decreased slightly (by 0.3%). In 2014, the largest number of births during the period under review was registered - 1913 thousand people (excluding Crimea). However, in 2015 it decreased to 1911, and in 2016 to 1860 thousand people (excluding Crimea), which is 2.6% less than in 2015. Taking Crimea into account, the number of births in Russia in 2016 amounted to 1,889 thousand people, which is 2.7% less than in the previous year 2015 (1,941 thousand people).
The upward trend in the number of births was due to the fact that more generations of women born in the 1980s entered fertile age and the birth rate increased.
According to the change in the number of births, the most accessible and frequently used indicator of fertility - the total fertility rate - also changed. The total fertility rate reached its lowest value - 8.3 births per 1000 permanent population - in 1999. In 2004 it rose to 10.4‰. Having decreased slightly in 2005, it continued to increase in subsequent years, rising to 13.3‰ in 2012. Higher values were not achieved. In 2016, the total fertility rate decreased to 12.9‰ (with and without Crimea). Thus, the period of growth in the total fertility rate gave way to relative stabilization at a level of about 13‰, which is significantly lower than the level of the mid-1980s (17‰), as well as the years preceding this period.
Figure 10. Live births in Russia, 1960-2017*, thousand people and per 1000 people (excluding Crimea)
* 2017 – estimate based on current accounting data for January-June, annualized (not shaded)
According to operational reporting for January-June 2017, the number of births in Russia was 107 thousand people, or 11.6% less than for the same period in 2016 (821 versus 928 thousand people). Excluding Crimea, the reduction amounted to 106 thousand people, or the same 11.6% (809 versus 915 thousand people).
The value of the total fertility rate according to data for the first six months in annual terms decreased to 11.2‰ excluding Crimea or 11.3‰ in Russia as a whole.
Currently, the number of births is little subject to a clearly defined seasonal dependence, although there are always certain peaks and troughs throughout the year. The updated annual development data is smoother in nature compared to the operational monthly accounting data, but, nevertheless, their comparison is of some interest. In the 1990s, the largest number of births was recorded in January and March, and the smallest in the last months of the year; in the 2000s, a greater number of births were registered in the summer months, somewhat less in March, and the least in October-December ( Fig. 11). In 2016, the most births were registered in August (179 thousand), the least (145) in April.
In the first seven months of 2017, the most births were registered in March and July (146 thousand people each), but in each month less than in the corresponding month of 2016.
Figure 11. Number of births in Russia, by month 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, 2016 and 2017*, thousand people
* 2015-2017 - according to monthly operational records without information on Crimea, the rest - according to annual data
The vast majority of Russian regions have extremely low birth rates. According to data for January-June 2017, the total fertility rate was below the Russian average - 11.3‰ in annual terms - in 45 out of 85 constituent entities of the Russian Federation, in 3 it corresponded to it, and in 37 it exceeded it (Fig. 12 ). The value of the total fertility rate varied from 8.3‰ in the Leningrad region to 21.9‰ in the Republic of Tyva (in the first half of 2016 - from 9.3‰ to 23.0‰ in the same regions). In addition to the Republic of Tyva, the value of the total fertility rate reaches a high level in some other Russian regions: about 19‰ in the Chechen Republic, somewhat lower - about 14-16‰ - in the republics of Altai, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Buryatia, Sakha (Yakutia), in Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrugs and Tyumen Region without autonomous okrugs. However, in the central half of the regions, the value of the total fertility rate varies from 10.0 to 12.3‰, with a median value close to the average of 11.1‰.
A decrease in the total fertility rate in the first half of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016 was noted in all regions of the federation, except for the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
The differentiation of Russian regions by the level of total fertility is associated not only with differences in the true intensity of the birth rate, but also with the characteristics of the age structure of the population. Regions of the European part with an older age structure of the population have the lowest total fertility rates. In the regions of the North Caucasus, Siberia and the Far East, whose population is younger in their age structure, these indicators are higher.
Figure 12. Crude birth rate by region-subjects of the Russian Federation, January-June 2016 and 2017*, live births per 1000 population
* estimate based on current accounting data for January-June, annualized
“Men are becoming feminine”: why the birth rate has fallen in Russia
Demographics: Russia is being let down by the “women’s issue”»
The Federal State Statistics Service of Russia has published a Demographic Forecast until 2035. According to the forecast of Rosstat, it is expected that the population of Russia by 2036 will remain at the 2017 level - 147 million people, plus or minus a few percent. At the same time, the share of the working-age population will remain almost constant - 55−56%. Such data is not enough to ensure that the number of working age see internal changes. After all, if within these 55−56% there is an increase in the number of the young part up to the age of 40, and a decrease in the number of the older part of working age, then a favorable demographic future for Russia lies ahead. And something completely different awaits us , if, on the contrary, the young part decreases.
By developing the Rosstat forecast (by what method - more on this below), it is possible to determine the dynamics of the number of young people until 2040.
There is no particular point in separating men and women on the graphs, since the declines and rises in the dynamics of the future number of 20-year-olds, 30-year-olds and 40-year-olds are almost double. And the number of men and women aged 20 to 40 differs only by a few percent.
What does this diagram help you realize?
First. The number of 20-year-olds will increase until 2035, but only slightly.
Second. The number of 30-year-olds will begin to decline in the coming years. Moreover, in the first half of the 2020s the reduction will be very strong - about 10% annually.
Third. The number of 40-year-olds will increase until the second half of the 2020s. But this increase will be insignificant. And in the 2030s the reduction will begin, at approximately the same rate as the reduction of 30-year-olds in 2020.
So the total number of young people of working age will decrease in the period 2018–2040.
Finally
In recent years, official publications have been full of cheerful statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people.
In Russia, the Russian people make up about 80% of the total population. So the results of the spectral analysis of the Rosstat forecast can be extended to the Russian people.
Whether you like it or not, there is no basis for cheerful statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people.
Demography. The future of the country [Our country]
Why is Russia dying out? (Romanov Roman)
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In 2017, the country recorded a population decline. About half of deaths are due to cardiovascular diseases
Realnoe Vremya analyzes Russia's demographic statistics over the past year. As it turned out, in 2017 the number of deaths exceeded the number of births, while people mainly die from diseases of the circulatory system.
Birth and death rates are rising, the population is declining
According to statistics obtained by the analytical service of Realnoe Vremya, 1.69 million people were born in Russia in 2017. This is 203 thousand, or almost 11%, less than a year earlier. The number of deaths turned out to be higher - it amounted to 1.82 million people. This figure also decreased, but not as significantly as the birth rate - by 64 thousand people, or 3.5%.
Thus, over the past year, 8% fewer people were born in Russia than died. Compared to last year, the indicator deteriorated quite noticeably - in 2016, the birth rate, albeit by only 0.3%, still exceeded the death rate.
At the same time, the situation with the birth rate varies greatly from region to region. In 24 of 82 regions, the number of births exceeded the number of deaths, with the best indicators in the North Caucasus. Of the five best regions for this indicator, three are the southern national republics. For example, in Ingushetia, the number of deaths was only 19.4% of the number of births. In Chechnya the same figure is 22%, in Dagestan - 30.9%. Two more regions in the top five are Tyva with 40% and the Tyumen region with 55.3%.
The fertility situation varies greatly from region to region. Photo by Angelina Boksareva (vkonline.ru)
Tatarstan ranks 17th in this indicator - here the number of deaths was 91.4% of the number of births. This is the highest figure in the Volga Federal District (in all other regions of the Volga Federal District the mortality rate is higher than the birth rate), but over the year the figure has worsened significantly: in 2016 it was 80.4%. Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kalmykia are higher than Tatarstan in this indicator - here the figures range from 88.9% to 91%.
The situation with this parameter is worst in small regions of the Central Federal District. The five worst include the Tver region (here the number of deaths is 70.3% higher than the number of births), Smolensk (71%), Tambov (76.4%), Pskov (82.6%) and Tula (83. 9%) regions.
The best indicators in the Volga Federal District, in addition to Tatarstan, are in Udmurtia (here the number of deaths is only 1% higher than the number of births), Bashkortostan (by 1.4%), Mari El (by 4.2%), and the Perm Territory (by 8.7%). ) and Chuvashia (by 11.6%). The worst demographic situation in the Volga region is in Mordovia (mortality exceeds birth rate by 57.6%) and Penza region (by 57.5%).
It is interesting to look at the same indicator in another context - in terms of changes over the year. The ratio of births to deaths over the year improved only in three regions. These are the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (the ratio of deaths to births was 74.7%, now 69.1%), Tyva (was 41.9%, now 40%) and Chechnya (was 22.2%, now 22%) . In the remaining 79 regions, the proportion worsened, and, for example, in the Pskov region a year earlier there were 1.6 deaths per birth, and in 2017 there were already 1.8 deaths per infant.
The ratio of divorces to marriages has decreased over the past year. Photo infobrod.ru
Residents of Russia are getting married more often and getting divorced less
As for changes in the marital status of the country's residents, the ratio of the number of divorces to the number of marriages has decreased over the past year. In 2016, there were 617 divorces for every thousand marriages, but last year this figure dropped to 583.
The fewest divorces per thousand marriages were recorded in regions already mentioned among the leaders in the ratio of births to deaths: for example, in Chechnya - 149 divorces per 1000 marriages. The rate is also low in Ingushetia (194 divorces per 1000 marriages), Tyva (251), Dagestan (292) and Sevastopol (454). There are few divorces, in addition, in Crimea, St. Petersburg and Moscow, as well as in Tatarstan.
The largest number of divorces per 1000 marriages was recorded in the Leningrad region (825), Magadan region (730), the Komi Republic, Kirov and Kurgan regions (710-712). At the same time, the proportion of the number of divorces to the number of marriages increased over the year only in seven regions - the Novgorod and Leningrad regions, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan, North Ossetia and Crimea, as well as in the Vladimir region.
If we talk about marriages in proportion to the number of residents, then the most marriages per 1000 population were recorded in Sevastopol and St. Petersburg (about 10), Kamchatka Territory, Irkutsk Region and Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (8-9 marriages per 1000 population) .
In Russia, there were an average of 7.2 marriages per 1,000 people in 2017 (a year earlier - 6.7), in Tatarstan - 6.9 marriages (a year earlier - 6.7). At the same time, on average there are 4.2 divorces per 1000 residents in Russia (the figure has not changed over the year), and in Tatarstan - 3.5 divorces (the figure also remained at the 2016 level).
Demographic indicators by regions of Russia, 2017
| Region | Per 1000 population | Number of divorces per 1000 marriages | |||||||||||||||
| Born | Deceased | Natural increase, decrease (-) | Marriages | Divorces | |||||||||||||
| 2017 | 2016 | 2017 as a percentage of 2016 | 2017 | 2016 | 2017 as a percentage of 2016 | ||||||||||||
| Magadan Region | 10,9 | 11,1 | 98,2 | 11,3 | 11,3 | ||||||||||||
| Kamchatka Krai | 11,8 | 12,9 | 91,5 | 11,0 | 11,6 | ||||||||||||
| Sakhalin region | 12,9 | 14,3 | 90,2 | 12,0 | 13,1 | ||||||||||||
| Chukotka Autonomous Republic district | 13,2 | 13,4 | 98,5 | 9,1 | 10,0 | ||||||||||||
| Murmansk region | 10,3 | 11,2 | 92,0 | 11,0 | 11,5 | ||||||||||||
| Khabarovsk region | 12,0 | 13,4 | 89,6 | 13,0 | 13,1 | ||||||||||||
| Tyumen region | 14,2 | 15,8 | 89,9 | 7,9 | 8,2 | ||||||||||||
47% of deaths in Russia are from cardiovascular diseases
As already mentioned, 1.82 million people died in Russia in 2017, which is 64 thousand less than in 2016. The mortality rate per 100 thousand people was 1,243 people. This indicator decreased over the year by 3.5%.
In Russia as a whole, the mortality rate varies from 321 to 1,742 people per 100 thousand population. The highest mortality rate was recorded in the regions of Central Russia. The figure of 1,742 people is in the Pskov region. The figure is also high in the Novgorod region - 1709.5 people per 100 thousand population. In the Tver region, the mortality rate was 1686, in the Tula region - 1652, in the Ivanovo region - 1583.
The lowest mortality rate was recorded mainly in the regions of the North Caucasus. Thus, in Ingushetia the figure was only 321 people per 100 thousand population. In Chechnya it is 461, in Dagestan - 509. The top five also includes the Tyumen region with an indicator of 785 and Yakutia - 809.
Moscow took 10th place - here the mortality rate was 960 people per 100 thousand population. Tatarstan is in 19th place, and this is the best indicator among the regions of the Volga Federal District. Here, 1,130 people died per 100 thousand people. For comparison: in St. Petersburg the figure was 1,146 people, in Udmurtia - 1,195, in Bashkortostan - 1,236. Over the past year, the mortality rate increased only in two regions - Kalmykia (by 2.1%) and the Tomsk region (by less than 0. 1%).
The most common cause of death in Russia was diseases of the circulatory system. Photo by Maxim Platonov
The most common cause of death in Russia was diseases of the circulatory system. With a total mortality rate of 1243 people per 100 thousand population, 584 died precisely for this reason. Let us note that this figure for the year in Russia decreased by 4.8%. Circulatory diseases thus accounted for 47% of all deaths in the country. Moreover, depending on the region, this share varies greatly - in the Pskov region and Crimea it is 62-63%, in Sakhalin - only 27%, in the Amur region and Mordovia - 30-31%. In Tatarstan, the share of deaths from cardiovascular diseases is quite high - 53%. This is nevertheless less than in St. Petersburg and Moscow (57% and 55%, respectively), and approximately the same as in the Ulyanovsk region. In other regions of the Volga Federal District, the share of mortality due to diseases of the circulatory system is lower.
Another common cause of death is oncology: 16% of the number of Russian residents who died in 2017. Here the spread across the country is not as large as in the case of diseases of the circulatory system - from 22% to 12%. Note, however, that the share of cancer in the total number of deaths is lower in regions with a generally high mortality rate. From this we can make the assumption that mortality from oncology is high in the country as a whole, but the low share of oncology in regions with high mortality is due to the poor situation with the treatment of other diseases.
For example, the highest mortality rate from neoplasms - 22% of the total number of deaths - was recorded in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Its share is also high in Sakhalin, Sevastopol, Tomsk region (19-20%). And in 11th place, for example, is Chechnya, which is safe in terms of mortality rates (18%). Tatarstan was in 24th place here with 17% of deaths from oncology (the highest figure among the regions of the Volga Federal District).
The smallest share of deaths from cancer - 12% - is in the Novgorod, Tambov, Rostov, Voronezh and Nizhny Novgorod regions, as well as in Chuvashia.
Mortality from diseases by regions of Russia
Mortality from external causes in Russia was about 95 people per 100 thousand population. Compared to last year, this figure decreased by almost 10%. The lowest rates here, as often happens, are in Ingushetia and Chechnya (20 and 22 people per 100 thousand population, respectively), as well as in Dagestan (40 people), Kabardino-Balkaria (46 people) and Moscow (47 people). Tatarstan is in 12th place with an indicator of 71 people per 100 thousand population. Most people died from external causes in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug - 222 people out of 100 thousand, in Tyva - 205 people and the Amur Region - 198 people.
There are three most notable external causes of death. These are suicides, road accidents and murders. At the same time, mortality for each cause decreased over the year.
14% of all deaths from external causes occurred in Russia due to suicide. Their highest share was recorded in the Jewish Autonomous Region and Udmurtia - 30%. Also high rates are in the republics of Altai and Khakassia (28%), in the Trans-Baikal and Altai territories (27%). Note that five of the six regions with the highest proportion of suicides are located in the east of the country. The smallest proportion of suicides is in the Khabarovsk Territory and the Astrakhan Region (1%), Tyva, Chechnya, North Ossetia and the Samara Region (3%). In Tatarstan, the figure is higher than the Russian average - 15% of all deaths due to external causes.
Homicides account for 6% of all deaths due to external causes in Russia. Their largest share was recorded in Ingushetia - 20%. The rate is also very high in five regions located in the east of the country. In the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, in the republics of Yakutia, Buryatia, Altai and Tyva, the figure is 13%, and in the Primorsky Territory - 12%.
The share of road accidents in the causes of overall mortality from external causes in Tatarstan is very high. Photo autoexpertnost.ru
The smallest proportion of murders is in the Astrakhan and Voronezh regions (1% of all deaths due to external causes). In another seven regions the figure is 3%. These are the Volgograd, Ulyanovsk, Murmansk and Kursk regions, as well as the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic, Chuvashia and Kalmykia. Tatarstan’s indicator is 6%, which is 24th place.
But the share of road accidents in the causes of overall mortality from external causes in Tatarstan is very large. While the all-Russian figure is 11%, in Tatarstan it is 15%. This puts the region in 14th place in the sad list of leaders in terms of the share of deaths from road accidents. Most of the southern republics were ahead: Dagestan with 38%, Karachay-Cherkessia with 26%, Adygea with 21%, Ingushetia with 20%, Kamchatka, Stavropol and Crimea with 19%, as well as the Tula region, Krasnodar region, Vladimir region, North Ossetia and Chechnya.
The smallest share of road accidents in total mortality due to external causes in Russia is in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (2%), Magadan (3%), Tomsk (4%) and Sverdlovsk regions (5%).
Mortality from external causes by regions of Russia
| Region | from external causes of death | including from: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| accidental alcohol poisoning | suicides | Proportion of suicides from all external causes | murders | Proportion of homicides from all external causes | all types of transport accidents | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 2017 | 2016 | 2017 as a percentage of 2016 | 2017 | 2016 | 2017 as a percentage of 2016 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Kamchatka Krai | 107,3 | 114,8 | 93,5 | 1,3 | 0,3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Republic of Kalmykia | 98,9 | 114,6 | 86,3 | 0,4 | 0,0 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Tyva Republic | 205,5 | 250,2 | 82,1 | 10,0 | 15,1 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Republic of Adygea | 86,8 | 97,9 | 88,7 | 11,3 | 13,5 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Leningrad region | 114,8 | 125,4 | 91,5 | 8,7 | 11,3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Amur region | 198,0 | 209,5 | 94,5 | 3,6 | 7,7 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
Maxim Matveev, analytical service of Realnoe Vremya
Putin’s successes in the field of demographic policy have been repeatedly voiced in the media, and the president himself willingly advertised overcoming population decline. Promising to continue supporting families with children this week, the president announced that in previous years, “unexpectedly for everyone, the birth rate has picked up very well.” The Kremlin is proud, firstly, that demographic decline has been replaced by natural growth. Secondly, the fact that during the years of Putin’s rule the mythical indicator of life expectancy has increased. It was these theses that worked to promote the image of Putin as a president who had accomplished the impossible.
IS THEY GROWING IN 2017?
The information provided to Russian citizens is extremely refined. The goal is to talk about the Kremlin’s achievements, while keeping silent about the mistakes and shortcomings of government policy. Last week, for example, the media reported that the Ministry of Health reported a decrease in mortality in Russia. According to the statement of the Minister of Health V. Skvortsova at the Congress of the National Medical Chamber “Russian healthcare today: problems and solutions”, in the nine months of this year, 39 thousand fewer people died in the Russian Federation than in the same period last year. At first glance, a rosy picture of demographic well-being emerges. According to her statements, over 20 years of work, mortality has decreased to 12.6 per thousand population, “in 10 years we have increased the life expectancy of Russians by more than 7 years.”
Looking at the official statistics for this year, you begin to understand that the Minister of Health has kept silent about a lot. Firstly, that along with the fall in mortality, the birth rate has sharply decreased. Over the nine months of this year, 163.6 thousand fewer children were born in Russia than during the same period of the previous year. Secondly, there is a natural decline (!) of the population in Russia. In January-September of this year it amounted to minus 106.176 thousand people, while during the same period last year there was an increase of 18.143 thousand people. Thus, in 9 months of this year, Russia experienced a demographic collapse, when all the supposed achievements of the last four years were reversed, and Russia again entered a period of demographic decline. The reasons for the changing demographic picture are obvious. The population reacts first of all to the moral and psychological situation and secondly to the economic situation. Fertility is a more accurate indicator than income, wages or GDP per capita.
If in the long term the erosion of values led to a change in the demographic trend, then in the short term of several years the influencing factor was uncertainty about the future. A new term has already been born for emigration from Putin’s Russia - “evacuation”. The country is being brought to a state of crisis and disintegration, and this cannot but affect the moral and psychological state of the population.
The reduction in mortality that was recorded this year, according to experts, is associated with changes in the sale of alcoholic beverages. Stores selling alcoholic beverages were connected to the Unified Automated Information System (USAIS), which was done after mass poisonings with hawthorn. However, official statistics show that over 8 months, out of a total reduction in mortality of 31.2 thousand people, the drop in mortality from accidental alcohol poisoning amounted to 1.1 thousand people. That is, the contribution of this factor to the reduction in mortality was minimal.
NEW TRENDS
The era when Russia's population grew due to natural growth is over. The country has again entered a period of demographic decline. Natural growth lasted three years, and this year it again reached negative values, and by the end of the year it will probably reach the level of 2011 (Fig. 1).
Rice. 1. Natural population growth in Russia, people. (according to Rosstat)
The reduction in natural increase in 2017, along with economic factors, also had a different nature - as a consequence of the fall in the marriage rate in 2016. The marriage rate fell by 15%, and the birth rate for 8 months of this year decreased by 11%. The economic crisis has led to a decline in the number of marriages since 2011. (Fig. 2)
Rice. 2. Number of marriages in Russia (according to Rosstat)
Mortality rates since 2014 have increased slightly, but have increased compared to 2013, to which they have not yet returned. (Fig. 3).
Rice. 3. Mortality rate in Russia (according to Rosstat). Data for 2017 for 8 months.
Since 2014, the demographic picture has generally corresponded to the crisis situation: the birth rate began to decline since 2015. In 2015, it decreased at the level of statistical error - by less than 1%, in 2016 by 2.7%, and over 8 months of this year by 11.3%. The positive thing is that there is no sharp spike in deaths amid the economic downturn. However, this contradicts the general theory, which suggests a possible statistical error.
Another achievement of Putin’s Russia, which the Kremlin never misses a chance to report on, is the increase in life expectancy in Russia. The trick here is this. that they omit one word: “expected”. That is, the estimated life expectancy of those who were born today and will die in 70 years, when Putin will not be remembered. The indicator is not statistical, far from the parameters of today's real mortality in Russia. Let us emphasize that, based on calculations, since 2000 it has grown by 6 years on average: by 6.89 for women and by 4.45 for men (Fig. 4).
Rice. 4. Life expectancy in Russia, in years (according to Rosstat)
But is everything really as official statistics portray? If we carry out an alternative calculation, calculating the average age of today's actual mortality, we come to the following conclusion.
In 2002, the average real life expectancy for men was 58.9 years, for women - 71.6. In 2016, men were 61.4 years old, women – 72.5 (Fig. 5). That is, the increase was only 1–2 years, and this is far from what Rosstat declares. Life expectancy of 76 and 66 years for women and men, respectively, is out of the question.
Rice. 5. Calculation of the average age of mortality by the Central Scientific Research Center for Mortality in Russia. The calculation is approximate, since it took the maximum life expectancy for each interval (for example, with a population in the interval 20–24 years, the entire population was taken for 24 years), the average value for the parameter 70 or more was set for men at 74 years, for women at 80 years old
If we consider the distribution of age at death, we will see that the mortality rate for men in all age groups is quite high, while for women there is a clearly defined mortality rate over the age of 70 years (Fig. 6).
Rice. 6. Mortality by age groups, according to Rosstat
For men, mortality statistics remain alarming. In Fig. Figure 6 shows that in 2002, the number of those who died before the age of 70 was 2.3 times higher than the number of deaths over the age of 70. In 2016, this ratio decreased to 1.7, but still more than half of men in Russia do not live up to 70 years. 39% of men did not live to see retirement this year, compared to 45.4% in 2002. Among women, the picture is different: only 11% do not live to see retirement, and the number of women dying at the age of 70 is 2.4 times higher than the number of those who do not live to this age.
The reason for this picture can be explained by the meaninglessness of life in Putin’s Russia, the erosion of values, which occurs most quickly among the male part of the population - alcohol, drug addiction, loss of value guidelines.
CAUSES OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS
The main reason is the loss of meaning and the value of a large family. The focus is shifted in favor of a family with one or two children, for whom the parents can provide a good education. The Russian family adopted the European model.
1. Late marriage and increasing age of motherhood. In 2016, the most common age at first birth was 25–26 years (Figure 7). Over time, this age will continue to increase.
Rice. 7. Number of first-born children born alive by maternal age, 2016 (according to Rosstat)
In Fig. Figure 8 shows the birth rate (births per year per 1000 women on average over a 4-year maternal age interval), which has changed significantly over a quarter of a century. If previously the main age for giving birth to a child was 20–24 years, now it has shifted to 25–29 years.
Rice. 8. Distribution of births by maternal age (according to Rosstat)
Based on the rate of increase in the birth rate, we come to the conclusion that the trend towards reaching the leading positions at the age of 30–34 years is stable.
2. Having few children has become the norm of Russian life. In 2016, the most common family model was one or two children. By birth order, the share of children third or higher was only one fifth (Fig. 9).
Rice. 9. Number of births by order of birth of the child, 2016 (according to Rosstat)
Models of families with more than two children are common mainly in national republics, while in regions with a dominance of the Russian population, the model of small children is common. According to the 2010 census in Russia, the share of families with one child was 61.1%, with two - 31.7%, and with three or more only 7.2% (Fig. 10).
Rice. 10. Family units with children under 18 years of age, in%. According to the All-Russian Census
3. Value erosion of society, the transition to open relationships, the loss of responsibility among couples for the fate of the child, and as a result, out-of-wedlock birth rates in Russia remain at a high level. And even in regions where, at first glance, religious traditions require the preservation of the sacrament of marriage, the share of out-of-wedlock births can reach the Russian average level. However, the positive thing is that the proportion of those born out of wedlock is decreasing every year. Now this is one fifth (21.1%), in 2008 there were 26.9%. Only in a few regions the situation has worsened; the situation has become significantly worse in Chechnya, where this figure increased from 4.7% in 2008 to 18.3% in 2016. As statistics show, mothers or fathers with children, that is, single-parent families, most often have one child (Fig. 11). That is, the erosion of the institution of a full-fledged family leads to birth control.
Rice. 11. Single-parent families, 2016 (according to Rosstat)
4. Focus on the Epicurean Lifestyle- live for yourself, and not start a family. According to the Rosstat survey “Family and Fertility”1, if before 1990 the share of marriages that began with registration was 71.6% for women and 77.6% for men, then by 2009 it decreased to 49.5% and 49%, respectively When answering the question “If you think that the marriage should be registered, then when?” 38% of women and 41.4% answered “first you need to live together for a year or two and check your feelings, and then register.” As a rule, an unregistered marriage does not have the goal of procreation.
If for women the most important thing is to raise a child (4.88), then for men it is in second place after material well-being (4.81), and “having three children” ranks lower than “being free, independent and doing what what only I want."
Bad government policies are a major contributor. Instead of a people-saving model, the state has focused on a policy that only demonstrably promotes an increase in the birth rate, but in fact leads to a deterioration in demography against the backdrop of growing extortions from the population, the commercialization of sectors responsible for human development, and sexual permissiveness. State support measures mainly stimulate the birth of a second child, without affecting the birth of the first child. According to the Rosstat survey “Family and Fertility” (2009), in 2009, 89.6% of respondents believed that the decision to have a first child was not influenced by government assistance measures. But in relation to the second child there were already fewer such persons - 78.6%. 14.3% answered unequivocally that it had an impact. Although the percentage has increased, one must nevertheless understand that a low level indicates a lack of government support measures.
The most common answer to the question about obstacles to the birth of the desired number of children is about the material factor - that is, about what the state can decide in the short term. Material difficulties (85% consider them to be a hindrance or a very hindrance), uncertainty about the future (82–83%), housing difficulties (62–65%).
When discussing the effectiveness of government support measures, it is worth noting that the most valuable have become the provision of housing subsidies on preferential terms and “maternity capital”, which, by the way, is also often used to improve housing conditions (Fig. 12). It follows from this that in conditions of high mortgage rates and low wages, the most pressing problem for young families remains the problem of improving housing conditions.
Rice. 12. Distribution of women’s answers according to the importance of demographic policy measures, in% (according to Rosstat research)
The solution to the demographic problem should be based on the fact that the family and fertility are a unity of the spiritual and material. That is, measures should cover both the revival of the spiritual understanding of the family and material encouragement. A way out of the situation may be a return to understanding the value of family and large families, that is, we need a propaganda policy of the state through the media, cinema, public service advertising, and schools. The second tool is the development and implementation of state social policy to support children. Maternity capital, which is given only for the second child, does not cope with the task. In this regard, it is advisable to develop the possibility of part-time employment for young mothers, a solution to the problem of preschool child care institutions, preferential housing programs for young families, etc.
If the demographic policy remains unchanged in the country, there will inevitably be a reduction in the population and a change in the ethnic composition due to migrants.
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In Russia, the birth rate has been declining for the third year in a row, and the trend has been steadily increasing, and this year there has been a real collapse. As a result, the natural population decline, which had stopped, resumed. According to forecasts, the number of newborn children in the country will not begin to increase until 2030.
The decline in the birth rate began in 2015, when the number of births amounted to 1940.579 thousand children, decreasing by 2.1 thousand, or 0.01%, compared to the previous year, according to Rosstat. In 2016, the number dropped to 1888.729 thousand, already falling by 51.9 thousand, or 2.6%.
This year there was a real collapse: in the first half of the year, 821,028 thousand newborns were registered, which is 107,349 thousand, or 11.6%, less than in the same period a year earlier.
Prior to this, during 2000-2014 (excluding 2005 and 2013), the indicator showed growth, and in 2014 a record number of children were born in Russia in the entire history of the country - 1942.683 thousand.
As a result, last year in Russia for the first time since 2012, the number of deaths exceeded the number of births by 2.3 thousand, or 0.1%, putting an end to the period of natural population growth observed in 2013-2015. This year the population decline has already amounted to over 119 thousand people, or 12.7%. The collapse was not prevented even by the fact that in 2016 and the first half of 2017 there was a significant decrease in the number of deaths compared to the corresponding periods of previous years.
Since the birth rate peaked in 2014 and then began to fall steadily, it seems likely that the economic crisis that began then played a significant role.
“Over the entire history of modern Russia, the birth rate has perfectly correlated with economic development. As soon as the situation stabilizes, incomes immediately begin to grow - the birth rate is rising and the demographic situation is improving, and then a crisis comes - failure again. But now the crisis has dragged on longer than usual, and the demographic hole is getting deeper,” Nikita Isaev, director of the Institute of Contemporary Economics, noted in his article.
A similar opinion was expressed in an interview with RIA Novosti by Andrei Korotaev, professor and head of the laboratory for monitoring the risks of socio-political destabilization at the Higher School of Economics, who noted that “during a crisis, the birth rate decreases almost everywhere.”
Also, one of the reasons for the fall in the birth rate is the reduction in the number of women of childbearing age. In particular, according to official data, during the period from 2010 to 2015, the number of women aged 20-29 years (who account for about 60% of all births) decreased by 1,750 thousand people, or 14.6%. Experts explain this by the small number of the generation born in the difficult 1990s for the country, and clarify that since the Great Patriotic War, such demographic holes appear approximately once every 25 years.
In addition, the demographic situation in Russia is aggravated by the postponement of childbearing (the age of the mother at the birth of her first child has reached 25.5 years, having risen by three years over the past 20 years) and the increase in childless women. “There is growing evidence that among generations of women, starting with those born in the 1970s, the rate of eventual childlessness will rise compared with previous generations. Our forecast for the potential growth of childlessness coincides with the estimate for the entire region of Eastern and Central Europe: within 15-20% (previously it was at the level of 6-8%),” write the authors of the report “Monitoring the Economic Situation in Russia.”
In recent years, in Russia, in order to increase the birth rate, a number of measures have been implemented, including maternity capital (payment for the birth/adoption of a second, third and subsequent child is now about 453 thousand rubles), a monthly cash payment for the third child, free provision of land to large families for housing construction, increasing places in kindergartens. The Russian government believes that all this makes it possible to “smooth out the negative impact of the deterioration of the population structure.”
Scientists assess the results of the state's demographic policy with restraint. “There are indeed some positive developments, but their significance is completely insufficient to look at the future of the Russian birth rate and the reproduction of the country’s population with optimism,” says the article, prepared based on the results of the research project “Trends in the demographic development of Russia in 2005-2015.” in the context of long-term demographic trends.” Experts, in particular, state that “the effect of the first policy measures introduced in 2006-2007 quickly weakened from year to year,” and the increase in the birth rate in 2012, associated with the launch of a number of additional regional programs, almost disappeared no longer in 2013.
Context
Is the birth rate in Russia declining?
Forbes 03/02/2016Lack of stability and birth rate in Russia
Huanqiu shibao 08/02/2015A shrine as a way to increase the birth rate in Russia?
Le Monde 11/11/2011Long live fertility!
El País 04/25/2011 This year, the search for ways to improve the demographic situation has again come to the fore. At a meeting on economic issues, President Vladimir Putin voiced various options for supporting families with children - providing places in nurseries, assistance with housing, improving the system of social benefits. He also noted that “the opportunity to analyze the future prospects of the maternity capital program is being considered.”Experts do not deny the importance of economic support for families with children, but they say that, firstly, it should be more serious, and secondly, combined with other, non-material measures.
Anatoly Antonov, head of the Department of Family Sociology and Demography at the Faculty of Sociology of Moscow State University, is confident that money does not increase people’s need for children; large families need to be promoted. “In order for 50 percent of our families to have three children, we need to sway the entire population in this direction from morning to evening. It’s cynical, but we need PR for large families, and here television, of course, is most effective,” the demographer emphasized in a conversation with journalists. In addition, in his opinion, the government is making a mistake by focusing its policy on those who are already married; the focus should be on current teenagers and children.
The chairman of the supervisory board of the Institute of Demography, Migration and Regional Development, Yuri Krupnov, shares a similar point of view. “...We are obliged to encourage large families by all non-repressive means: with the help of the media, benefits, status, taxes, payments, to make sure that every girl in our country dreams of having many children... After all, a fifth of all children in Russia come from large families,” - he said in an interview with Izvestia. In his opinion, “the old formula of a large family with three children is no longer enough. A new ideal and a new formula - four children in a family.”
As the authors of “Monitoring...” write, the potential of the additional measures of material incentives discussed today “does not seem very high” and admit that “it will not be possible to avoid the influence of the small number of today’s generation of mothers and, consequently, a serious drop in the number of births in the coming years.”
Meanwhile, a number of experts believe that the best way to increase the birth rate is to ensure stability, including economic stability. “At all times, stability has been the main motivational impetus for increasing the birth rate. Demographics are growing organically, and not in spurts in response to drastic incentives. It is more important not to concentrate on some narrow measures - it is very important to improve the economy as a whole,” said the head of the department of the Russian Economic University. Plekhanov Ruslan Abramov. “Citizens don’t need money from the state, they need the opportunity to earn money themselves.”
According to the “Demographic Forecast until 2035”, published on the Rosstat website, in the next 12-14 years there will be a continuous decrease in the number of births in Russia (with the exception of 2018, according to the results of which an increase is expected within the average version of the forecast).
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
